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9Foreword by the editors
The Hungarian Labour Market Yearbooks series was launched in 2000 with the 
support of the National Employment Foundation (OFA). The yearbook presents 
the main characteristics of Hungarian employment policy and features an in-
depth analysis of a topical issue each year. The editorial board has striven from 
the beginning to provide up-to-date results of labour market research and use-
ful information on the Hungarian labour market tendencies as well as the leg-
islative and institutional background of the employment policy for the GO and 
NGO organizations of the public employment services, the local governments, 
the public administration, educational and research organisations and – last but 
not least – for both the press and the electronic media. This year we have also 
created a clearly structured and easily accessible volume that presents the main 
characteristics and trends of the Hungarian labour market on the basis of avail-
able statistics, theoretical research and empirical analysis. Continuing our previ-
ous editorial practice, we selected an area that we consider especially important 
for the effectiveness of Hungarian employment policy: the impact evaluation of 
active labour market policies. Its characteristics and results are discussed in de-
tailed in the section In Focus. The book has four main sections
The Hungarian labour market in 2010–2011
After the economic recession in Hungary brought about by the crisis, the period 
between September 2010 and September 2011 was planned to be a year of recov-
ery – although this was not successful in the light of recent data. Stagnation in 
domestic demand meant that the only driving force of the economy was export, 
which failed to improve the employment situation significantly. There were no 
positive shocks in the economy during this period, the only important effect on 
the labour market were export demand and public works.
However, the decline of the employment rate of 15–64 year olds was not a break 
in a previous growing trend. Hungary ranked among the worst performing coun-
tries in regional comparisons of GDP-growth and employment rates, and neither 
did this situation change in the current period – employment seems to have sta-
bilised at a low level (55.4%), characteristic of the early 2000s. The private sector 
has been characterised by stagnating wages and declining employment, while the 
public sector was characterised by declining real wages and increasing employ-
ment; however, this was largely the impact of extended public work schemes. A 
favourable development was the decline in the number of inactive people, nev-
ertheless this was more the result of the increase in the number of unemployed 
and public works participants rather than the growth in employment. There were 
The hungarian Labour MarkeT
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similar trends in unemployment as well. The rapid increase of the unemploy-
ment rate in 2009 – as a result of the crisis – reached its peak in the first quarter 
of 2010 at 11.9%, not dropping however under 11% ever since.
Meanwhile, labour demand in the private sector was characterised by sectoral 
heterogeneity and continuous fluctuations. The fact that the main mechanisms of 
adjustment in the private sector are layoffs and hiring and their timing: postpon-
ing the recruitment of regular workers companies can even achieve a two-digit 
decline in their workforce. Data suggest that with the recovery of export pros-
pects in the manufacturing sector, companies started again hiring new workers.
At the height of the crisis, the share of part-time employees within the total 
workforce increased significantly. Although this trend continued throughout 
the year, its rate eased between the autumn of 2010 and 2011. Meanwhile the 
gender gap has widened and the number of female part-time workers increas-
ingly exceeds that of men. This suggests that while part-time employment is only 
an adjustment strategy for men, the increasing trend of part-time employment 
among women might be longer term.
Policy changes and changes in taxation might have a direct as well as an indi-
rect impact on labour demand. The number of participants in public works was 
growing rapidly during recent years but it only had a noticeable effect on the ag-
gregate level of employment last year. Transition from subsidized employment to 
other employment states is minimal to date, which suggests that public works in 
their current forms are more of a short-term employment policy measure. From 
the indirect effects it is worth highlighting that the rate of corporation tax for 
an annual turnover of up to 500 million forints was reduced from 19% to 10%. 
This might have a positive impact on micro- and small enterprises through the 
reduction of the administrative burden. The extraordinary taxation (“crisis tax-
es”) of larger companies, due to its timing and rate might force businesses to fire 
workers or postpone hiring to compensate for the loss of income.
The development of the labour supply was influenced by policy measures after 
January 1, 2011, most importantly the creation of a flat rate personal income tax 
system. From a theoretical perspective this is more likely to increase the labour 
supply of higher earners (thanks to a decrease of the tax burden) and reduce the 
labour supply of lower earners (due to the increase of the tax burden), however 
there were no sure signs of this in 2011.
Contrary to previous periods, the number of unemployed workers was influ-
enced by movements inside the group of actives in 2010 and 2011, meanwhile 
2008 and 2009 were characterised by the influx of the inactive into unemploy-
ment. The labour market attachment of the active thus remained fairly strong, 
and even the short term balance between unemployment and inactivity was 
positive. It is a cause for concern however, that long term unemployment is in-
creasing. There is a very limited dynamic behind the high unemployment rate. 
The regional pattern of long term unemployment is still characteristic: over half 
foreword
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of the long term unemployed (51.7%) lived in Northern Hungary (particularly 
Borsod-Abaúj-Zemplén county) or in the Northern Great Plain (Szabolcs-Szat-
már-Bereg county). We expect that the new public work schemes will have a large 
impact in these regions.
In Focus
The In Focus section of the current volume addresses the impact evaluation of ac-
tive labour market policies. The aim of active labour market measures is to provide 
long term employment to unemployed or other potential workers who have been 
excluded from the labour market. They provide services that help job search and 
develop skills and knowledge that will improve their employment prospects. If 
these programs are effective they might increase the level of employment. If they 
are ineffective they are an additional burden on taxpayers and use scarce resourc-
es that might have been used more effectively elsewhere. It may sound surprising 
but we rarely know the effects of active labour market programs on participants, 
and we know even less about potential side-effects.. In Focus provides an overview 
of program evaluations and offers a selection of the few Hungarian examples.
The first chapter (written by Gábor Kézdi, the editor of In Focus) introduces 
the reader to the methodology of program evaluation. It argues that experiments 
are the most valid and simplest program evaluation method.At the same time, 
non-experimental methods can also provide valid results if they use adequate 
methods and high quality data. The chapter by Péter Hudomiet and Gábor Kézdi 
summarises the international experiences of active labour market policies based 
on the most credible program evaluations. They show that the effectiveness of 
programs is more influenced by regulation and organisational factors than the 
type of the program and this is why truly valid program evaluations are important. 
International experience also highlights that even the most effective programs 
are not a panacea. We can expect decent positive results from these programs 
but we cannot expect them to solve the problem of structural unemployment 
and low employment.
Other chapters of In Focus summarise the results of some program evaluations 
in Hungary. These cover the most important active policy measures and were 
selected from the most valid Hungarian examples. None of them are based on 
experiments and the limited availability of data might compromise the validity 
of some of the studies. Zsombor Cseres-Gergely analysed the impact of the mod-
ernisation of the Public Employment Service on the employment chances of cli-
ents of selected job offices. The results show that modernisation had a moderate 
but positive effect on re-employment and thus shortening the duration of unem-
ployment. Judit Csoba and Zita Éva Nagy’s ambitious study examines the impact 
of three main active labour market policies – training, wage subsidy and public 
works – running in 2009 and 2010 using a single analytical framework. Their 
results show that public works participants were less likely to find non-subsidised 
The hungarian Labour MarkeT
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work than the control group, training participants were slightly more likely and 
wage subsidy recipients were significantly more likely to take up employment. 
János Köllő and Ágota Scharle examined the impact of changes in public works 
between 2003 and 2008 and showed that they did not reduce long term unem-
ployment. Nándor Németh and Gergely Kabai present the small scale complex 
employment program Life changing – Life Shaping [Sorsfordító – sorsformáló] 
aiming to tackle long term unemployment in rural areas. Based on their quali-
tative assessment the program might be successful in this. The final chapter of 
In Focus reviews program evaluations of unemployment benefits (“passive labour 
market policy measures”) and wage subsidy schemes in Hungary (the authors of 
this chapter are Zsombor Cseres-Gergely and Ágota Scharle). They also review the 
methodology of each study allowing the reader to judge their validity.
Valid program evaluations are relatively rare but their number is steadily in-
creasing especially abroad. There are more and more experimental studies and 
non-experimental studies can also rely on better quality data. Hopefully this 
year’s Labour Market Yearbook will provide a further impetus to this process 
and encourage high quality, valid program evaluations in the future. The most 
important aim is that, based on the results of valid impact evaluations, active la-
bour market programs will receive an adequate role based on their true effect in 
Hungarian employment policy.
Institutional environment of the labour market  
between September 2010 and September 2011
This chapter continues the tradition of the Hungarian Labour Market Yearbook 
that has reviewed changes in the labour market institutions each year, however 
this time it is presented in a slightly different format. The authors of the chapter 
have created a structure that is closely related to the labour market and its forces 
and allows a clear distinction of measures according to whether they have an im-
pact on wages, labour cost, labour supply or demand or labour market structure.
The components of the institutional system and changes were organised accord-
ing to two criteria. First, a thematic framework was created by joining nomencla-
tures of the Eurostat and the European Commission that will help to structure 
current and future labour market policy interventions. This will also help to fol-
low changes in the emphasis of policies over time. The chapter presents a large 
number of labour market policy and labour market related policy measures. The 
first group includes for example unemployment benefits or employment services 
for the unemployed. The latter group includes for example personal income tax. 
A promising future possibility might be the collation of financial data (expendi-
ture) for the individual interventions considering that the European Union col-
lects data in a structure similar to the one used in the chapter. Although the au-
thors highlight analytical studies and evaluations for each measure, the chapter 
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does not aim to provide an evaluation. Readers who would like to do this will 
find guidance and information on previous studies.
Each area was considered from multiple perspectives. The possible labour mar-
ket mechanism of each measure is presented briefly and any relevant Hungar-
ian, or in their absence international research is highlighted. This is followed by 
the overview of the situation in August/September 2010 and the presentation 
of changes between September 2010 and September 2011. Given the scope of 
the review it is not possible to present changes in great detail and therefore we 
provide references to relevant legislation for each measure and also to on-line re-
sources, where they exist.
We chose a thematic structure and explicit questions to facilitate policy analysis 
and evaluation, as opposed to another, simpler organising structure. Although a 
number of programs and institutions implement multiple measures, we focused 
on the main interventions and measures following the logic of decision makers 
and policy analysts. The efficiency and rationale of economic policy can only be 
judged if we know the full range of available measures, the effect of these measures 
and the specific policy choices. This chapter aims to support this type of analysis.
Three of the changes discussed in the chapter should be highlighted here: the 
reform of unemployment benefits, public works and personal income tax. The 
benefit period of unemployment insurance became considerably shorter than 
previously: as of September 1, 2011 job seeker’s allowance is only paid for up to 
three months. After this most claimants must take part in public works or la-
bour market programs if they want to qualify for financial assistance (now called 
out-of-work assistance). The only exceptions are people within five years of the 
state pension age who qualify for pre-retirement assistance and people claiming 
regular social assistance.
There were major changes in the system of public works as well. The previous 
three types were combined into a single scheme and the entitlement conditions 
were expanded. Apart from the state and local councils, churches and social co-
operatives can also run public works projects. A new type of employment status 
was created for participants of public works programs that differs from regu-
lar employment statuses in various aspects, most importantly the possibility to 
pay less than the statutory minimum wage. Public works projects are supported 
through grants of various lengths and at various rates of co-financing. Special 
temporary agencies that employ public works participants and provide re-em-
ployment services are also eligible for these subsidies. Businesses do not qualify 
for public works subsidies, however they can claim a wage subsidy if they take 
on job seekers claiming out-of-work assistance.
The new personal income tax entered into force on January 1, 2011 and intro-
duced two new changes. First, it is a flat rate system: the tax rate is 21.5% of the 
gross income. This favours high earners and the limitation of tax credits increas-
es the tax burden on low earners. In addition, it also introduces significant tax 
The hungarian Labour MarkeT
14
reliefs for working parents. As a result high earners with three or more children 
might not have to pay income tax at all.
Statistical data
This section gives detailed information on the main economic trends, popula-
tion, labour market participation, employment, unemployment, inactivity, wages, 
education, labour demand, regional disparities, migration, labour relations and 
social welfare assistance as well as an international comparison of selected labour 
market indicators following the structure developed in previous years. Follow-
ing our traditions tables reporting data on labour market programs related to 
the topic of this year’s In Focus were added. All tables with labour market data 
published in the Hungarian Labour Market Yearbook since 2000 are available 
at the following website: http://adatbank.mtakti.hu/tukor.
*
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nomic and Regional Studies, Hungarian Academy of Sciences; Central Statistical 
Office; the Human Resources Department of Corvinus University, Budapest; the 
National Employment Service; the National Pensions Directorate; the Ministry for 
National Economy, Ministry of National Resources; and the Budapest Institute for 
Policy Analysis for their help in collating and checking the necessary information, 
editing the volume and preparing the individual chapters. We would also like 
to thank the Management Board of the Labour Market Fund and the board of 
the National Employment Non-profit Public Company Ltd. for their comments 
and recommendations for previous and current volumes and last but not least 
for supporting financially the publication of the yearbook series.
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The Hungarian labour market between the summers of 2010 and 2011 can 
be characterised by the situation that evolved as the aftermath of the crisis of 
2008 and in which economic activity was mainly triggered by export. Eco-
nomic growth continued to remain moderate with a low level of employment 
combined with a high rate of unemployment, and the economy seems to have 
stabilized at a lower steady state than the preceding one. Accordingly, the la-
bour market was unable to surpass its own former output levels or to exceed the 
performance of similar countries. In contrast to market processes, the increased 
government activity went through major changes. Policy measures such as the 
abolition of the former public work program or the radical restructuring of the 
unemployment benefit system can have a direct effect on the labour market. 
On the other hand, the restructuring of the tax system, the introduction of the 
new public work program or the institutional reforms might also exert their 
influence in an indirect way. The exact effect of the numerous provisions can 
only be analysed next year when in full possession of the corresponding data.
The economic environmenT and employmenT1
The recession, brought about by the global financial crisis hitting Hungary in 
the second half of 2008, touched bottom in the middle of 2009. The period 
following is marked by a constant recovery, which is generally observable in the 
countries of the region (Figure 1). This rise can mainly be attributed to the in-
stant economic stimulus measures implemented by the national governments 
(MNB, 2010a). However, the effects of the programs proved to be temporary as 
shown by the stagnant growth rates of the last one and a half years. Apart from 
this, growth was heavily supported by the dynamic growth of the developing 
– mainly Asian – countries. The expansion of their demand for import had a 
positive effect on the countries of the European Union, especially on the growth 
of the German economy. The German growth indirectly provoked the rise of 
orders in manufacturing sectors in the countries of the region (MNB, 2011).
In contrast to the rest of the region, whose higher growth rates at the begin-
ning of 2011 still have not achieved the former levels of 5 to 7 percent, the an-
nual 1–2 percent growth rate of Hungary last year roughly corresponds to its 
performance prior to the crisis. The GDP growth of Poland during the crisis 
was unparalleled in the European Union and its growth rate of 3.5–4 percent 
continued to be the highest in the region during the last year. The possible rea-
sons for this include the relatively low level of residential debt (even in the case 
1 The manuscript was closed on 
15th of October, 2011.
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of debt denominated in foreign currencies) and public debt, and the compara-
tively low exposure to export (NBP, 2010).
Figure 1: The development of real Gdp in the visegrád countries  
by quarter (per cent)
Note: Percentage changes relative to the corresponding period of the previous year.
Source: Eurostat on-line database (teina011).
The slowdown was greatest in the second quarter of 2009 in Hungary, with a 
drop of 8 percent compared to its previous value for the same period in the pre-
vious year. Considering the annual growth rates over the entire period, Hun-
gary was not only below the other Visegrád countries, but the EU-15 average 
as well. The figures of 2010 at the same time show that a slow recovery process 
is observable compared to the EU-15 average.
The upturn, however, still displays a dual structure. While the export ori-
ented manufacturing industry has been growing steadily since 2009 due to the 
strength of international demand, the domestic demand is only capable of a 
slow recovery, which still induces weak performance in the service industries. 
The scarce internal demand originates from the stagnant household consump-
tion and the weak credit market activity that can be traced back to the declin-
ing investment activity of the private sector. The latter was able to increase af-
ter two years in the first quarter of 2011, which growth, however, can mostly 
be attributed to a few major manufacturing enterprises such as Mercedes or 
Hankook (MNB, 2011).
The shock hitting the real economy exerted its influence rather quickly on 
the labour market; the relative upsurge on the other hand didn’t appear at such 
a speed. Even though the fall in employment in Hungary did not differ sig-
nificantly either in extent or in tendency from other European countries, the 
absolute numbers show remarkable differences (Figure 2). Whilst the current 
employment levels of other countries approximate the 2006 values, in the case 
of Hungary the current level of 55 percent is below both the 2008 and 2006 
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values. As a result, the level difference compared to the EU-27 average grew 
from 7 percent to a current level of 9 percent over the last four years. Another 
significant achievement of Poland in this regard is that, in spite of the crisis, it 
was able to retain the employment advantage acquired earlier.
Figure 2: employment rates in the visegrád countries by quarter,  
15–64 year-old population (per cent)
Source: Eurostat online database (lfsq_ergan).
The fall in employment might partly be attenuated by the accommodation of 
wages, which was indeed implemented both in the public and private sectors. 
The wage advantage of approximately 40 percent present from 2006 onwards 
in the public sector was decreasing gradually over the period, and after its dis-
appearance in 2009–2010, it turned into a wage disadvantage compared to the 
wages of the private sector (Figure 3). This phenomenon was mainly triggered 
by the distinct way in which the two sectors reacted to the crisis. The adjust-
ment in the private sector took place via the employment channel, while in the 
public sector the adjustment was predominantly through the moderation of 
wages (Köllő, 2011). The fall in employment was the largest among workers with 
primary level education or less in the private sector (a total of 5.4 percentage 
points between the third quarters of 2008 and 2010), while the fall was much 
smaller among employees in jobs requiring higher levels of education. The em-
ployment of workers having vocational education in the same period decreased 
by 1.9 percentage points, of employees with upper secondary education by 4.4 
percentage points, and with higher education by 3.2 percentage points. In the 
meantime, employment in the public sector grew by 2.7 percentage points 
among the less qualified, and decreased by 1.1, 0.3 and 0.2 percentage points 
respectively among the three categories of higher education.
On the whole, stagnant wages and a decrease in employment can be observed 
in the private sector, and decreasing real wages with an increase in employ-
ment are present in the public sector until the first quarter of 2011 (Figures 
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3 and 4). The extended public work schemes however played a crucial role in 
the adaptation of the public sector by employing mostly unskilled labour force 
with low wages, and thus this might have been pushing the average real wage 
of the sector downwards through the composition effect. This phenomenon 
is indicated by the fact that in the first three quarters of 2010 the employment 
of workers having primary education or less grew by 3.5, 0.6 and 0.8 percent-
age points respectively compared to the same period in the previous year. On 
the other hand, in the case of employees in jobs requiring a vocational or gen-
eral secondary education the observable tendency was regressive. At the same 
time, it is also worth mentioning that the growth in the employment of high-
er education graduates proved to be more stable as, contrary to the growth in 
unskilled employment, it continued at the end of 2010 and the beginning of 
2011 (approximately 0.5 percentage points).
Figure 3: major economic indicators in hungary by quarter from 2006 (per cent)
Note: Employment rate shown on the y axis on the right. GDP volume: Q1 2006 = 100, 
GDP production at average prices in 2000.
Earnings: average gross earnings in private sector in Q1 2006 = 100, real earnings 
deflated by the Consumer Price Index.
Source: GDP, earnings: authors’ calculations based on HCSO Stadat; level of em-
ployment: authors’ calculation based on the Hungarian Central Statistical Office 
(HSCO) Labour Force Survey.
The employment rate has decreased from its former equilibrium level by 4 
percent (approximately 2 percentage points) since the beginning of 2009 and 
seems to have stabilized at this level. Similar processes have taken place with 
regard to unemployment as well. The unemployment rate, which was rising, 
from 2009 onwards, as a result of the crisis reached its peak at 11.9 percent in 
the first quarter of 2010 and has not fallen below 11 percent ever since, even 
reaching 11.7 percent again in the first quarter of 2011.2 Due to the lack of 
radical changes, the post-crisis equilibrium level is set 3–4 percentage points 
higher than earlier. This process is further facilitated by the fact that parallel 
90
120
150
2011/12010/12009/12008/12007/12006/1
80
100
120Real earnings, public sector (gross)
Real earnings, private sector (gross)
GDP
Employment rate
2 This effect can partly be at-
tributed to the seasonality of the 
indicator, and partly to the im-
pact of the public work schemes 
observable in connection with 
inactivity (see also Figures 5, 6 
and 18).
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to the fall in employment, economic activity has risen by 4 percent since the 
first quarter of 2009, a tendency which might continue to persist due to govern-
ment measures aimed at increasing the labour supply. Due to the strict credit 
conditions and the labour hoarding observed during the crisis, the continu-
ally rising labour supply can be trailed only slowly by demand, thus leading to 
a higher unemployment rate in the long run as well (MNB, 2011).
Figure 4: major labour market indicators by quarter, 2006–2011  
(2006 Q1 = 100, unemployment rate in percentages) 
Note: Unemployment rate shown on the y axis on the right.
Source: Authors’ calculation based on HCSO Labour Force Survey data, 15–64 year-
old population.
Based on experience from previous years, the decrease in inactivity is a posi-
tive phenomenon on the whole, but the decrease must be complemented by 
the fact that the underlying mechanism is rather growing unemployment and 
not a rise in employment (Figure 4). Figures 5 and 6 display stock-flow consist-
ent calculations of labour-market status transitions based on Cseres-Gergely 
(2011). In this paper, unsubsidised employment or subsidised private sector 
employment (hereafter: unsubsidised), and subsidised public sector employ-
ment (hereafter: subsidised) are discussed separately.3
According to the figures, the dynamics of status transitions that shifted in 
2009 seems to be resettling. We find a significantly increased flow from unsub-
sidised employment to unemployment compared to the previous year in the 
first quarter of 2010, which was balanced during the following quarters by the 
(unusually) high number of new entrants onto the labour market. The dynam-
ics of the first quarter of 2011 however resemble the period before 2007: the re-
markable increase in unemployment that characterised the winters of 2009 and 
2010 didn’t arise in 2011. On the other hand, subsidised employment, which 
includes participants in public work schemes, shows signs of drastic changes 
(Figure 6). As a joint result of the decreasing inflow and increasing outflow of 
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employment, the sharp rise in mid-2009 and mid-2010 turned into an abrupt 
fall in the first quarter of 2011 (reporting a loss of about 35.000 people). These 
changes were mainly attributed to the delay in public work schemes and roughly 
offset the rise in subsidised employment during the previous two years.
Figure 5: Quarter to quarter changes in unsubsidised employment, and its 
components: flows between employment and unemployment, inactivity (omitted 
direction: subsidised employment), 15–64 year-old population, 2007–2011
Note: Unemployed: registered unemployed.
Source: Authors’ calculation based on HCSO Labour Force Survey micro-data, stock-
flow consistent model.
Figure 6: Quarter to quarter changes in subsidised employment, and its 
components: flows between employment and unemployment, inactivity (omitted 
direction: unsubsidised employment), 15–64 year-old population, 2007–2011
Note: Unemployed: registered unemployed.
Source: Authors’ calculation based on HCSO Labour Force Survey micro-data, stock-
flow consistent model.
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In spite of the significant growth of the public sector, the transitions in em-
ployment are just narrowly influenced by it; Figure 7 shows that it had a sub-
stantive impact on the aggregate level of employment only in the first half of 
the last couple of years. The figure also displays that the transition between the 
subsidised sector and other employment groups is extremely restricted; a topic 
which will be discussed later on.
Figure 7: Quarter to quarter changes in subsidised and unsubsidised employment 
and its components: flows between subsidised and unsubsidised employment 
(omitted directions: inactivity and unemployment),  
15–64 year-old population, 2007–2011
Note: Unemployed: registered unemployed.
Source: calculation based on HCSO Labour Force Survey micro-data, stock-flow con-
sistent model.
Even though the latest statistics on employment (KSH, 2011) published by the 
Hungarian Central Statistical Office is not directly comparable to data from 
previous years, the tendencies derived might provide some valuable informa-
tion. According to these figures, the relatively low employment rate of 56.1 
per cent among the 15–64 year-old population in May-July 2011 was 0.6 per-
centage points higher than in the same period in the previous year. Another 
favourable development is that the activity rate reflects an increasing trend, ac-
companied by the decreasing number of unemployed people. Its value of 62.9 
per cent was 0.5 percentage points higher between May and July 2011 than 
the previous year (representing an increase of 39,000 people). In the mean-
time the unemployment rate fell from 11.1 percent to 10.9 percent (a decrease 
of 3,900 people). All of the above might give grounds for optimism, albeit of-
ficial HCSO data do not make it possible to distinguish between subsidised 
and unsubsidised employment.
Large-scale heterogeneity of worker groups accompanies the new lower level 
of aggregate employment. The population most heavily affected by job losses at 
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the onset of the crisis were skilled workers (Cseres-Gergely and Scharle, 2010). 
The same process seems to persist in 2010; the employment rate between the 
first quarters of 2007 and 2011 fell by a total of 6 percentage points from 68.7 
to 62.6 percent, out of which 1 percentage point has arisen since 2009. The ef-
fects of the crisis became apparent among workers with primary level educa-
tion or less with a slight delay, appearing only at the beginning of 2009. The 
drop in employment in their case is around a stable 1 percentage point (Fig-
ure 8). However, due to the lower initial level among this group, such a drop 
is still remarkable.
Figure 8: employment rates among the 15–64 year-old population by education 
from Q1 2006 to Q1 2011 by quarter
Note: Q1 2006 = 100.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on HCSO Labour Force Survey micro-data.
Skilled workers, and especially higher education graduates, seem to be more 
resistant to the effects of the crisis. Among these groups, the decrease in em-
ployment had already begun before the onset of the crisis and can largely be 
attributed to the mass layoffs in the public sector after 2006. The correspond-
ing employment rate in the public sector fell by a total of 6.7 percentage points 
between the first quarters of 2006 and 2009. The private sector started to show 
the same tendency from the second half of 2008 onwards: the period between 
the first quarters of 2008 and 2011 saw a decline of about 3 percentage points.
During a period of falling demand, restrictions put on labour expansion by 
entrepreneurs hit the employment of young cohorts most heavily. The sub-
stantial drop in men’s employment as the direct effect of the crisis seems to be 
overturned in the case of the new labour market entrants (left panel of Figure 
9), whose situation (that is the relative difference between employment rates) 
has clearly been improving in the past two years compared to non-new labour 
market participants, with the exception of the 20–24 year-old cohort (Figure 
9). However, the fall in employment is still most severe in the youngest cohort, 
both among new entrants and non-new labour market participants.
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Figure 9: employment rates among younger cohorts by gender and new entrant status  
in the first quarter of 2008, 2009, 2010 and 2011
Note: A new employment entrant is defined as a worker in employment and not in full-time education who was 
a student a year before data collection. A new labour market entrant is defined as a person not in full-time 
education who was a student preceding data collection. The non-new employed are those in employment and 
not in full-time education who were not students one year before data collection. Non-new labour market par-
ticipants are those not in full-time education who were not students preceding data collection. The figures for 
30–34 year-old new labour market entrants are omitted because of the large error margin associated with low 
cell counts.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on HCSO Labour Force Survey micro-data.
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Looking at women, the employment rates are invariably lower than among men 
in all cohorts and statuses. On the other hand, the effect of the crisis on their 
employment was less substantial and there have been favourable processes tak-
ing place ever since (right panel of Figure 9). The employment rate of 27.1 per-
cent among the cohort of 15–19 year-old non-new entrants was 13 percentage 
points higher at the beginning of 2011 than at its lowest level in 2009. However, 
it must be taken into consideration that this cohort is relatively small and that 
the spectacular growth can rather be ascribed to a decrease in the denomina-
tor of the calculated ratio.4
labour demand
The crisis and the ensuing recovery process affected the different sectors of 
the economy in a distinct way. The changes in labour demand further inten-
sified the already existing heterogeneity. The general setback of 2008–2009 
was followed by an upsurge only in the industrial sector, especially in the heav-
ily export oriented manufacturing industry (Figure 10). The contraction of 
the manufacturing industry that had commenced before the crisis contin-
4 The number of non-new entrant 
women in the 15–19 year-old co-
hort fell from 13,500 to 9,500 
between 2009 and 2011.
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ued, although at a slower pace. As a result of the decline of the domestic de-
mand, the performance of the service industry fell during the crisis, and has 
been stagnant ever since. The only industry that was able to grow extensively 
within the service sector is the transportation industry, whose performance 
is heavily correlated with industrial production. At the same time, retail sales 
didn’t proliferate as they were expected to as the income tax reduction failed 
to provoke a satisfactory growth in consumption. The moderate lending ac-
tivity in Hungary continues to create barriers to the further expansion of the 
service sector (MNB, 2011).
Figure 10: Quarterly real output by industry, 2006–2011
Note: At constant prices (base year: 2000), agriculture GDP in Q1, 2006 = 100. The 
GDP contributions shown in the figure are relative to the contribution of agriculture, 
e.g., in the first quarter of 2006 services contributed more than ten times, and manu-
facturing contributed more than four times the contribution of agriculture.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on HCSO Stadat.
The boom in the different industries had its influence upon the evolution of 
the labour demand as well, but the reactions evoked may differ by industries 
due to the heterogeneity of the production elasticities (Kőrösi, 2005). The fall 
provoked by the crisis was the largest in the industrial sector, and as a result of 
its relatively high production elasticity, it also induced a significant decline in 
employment (Figure 11). Employment has expanded rapidly in the manufac-
turing industry, increasing by 2.7 percent between the first quarters of 2010 
and 2011, yet it could not reach pre-crisis levels. Meanwhile, employment in 
the construction industry continued to decrease (a total change of –2.4 per-
cent between the first quarters of 2010 and 2011). It is worth mentioning 
that in spite of its weak performance, employment in service industries rose 
steadily to its 2006 level during 2010. This can primarily be ascribed to the 
expansion of employment in administrative, engineering and catering ser-
vices (MNB, 2010b).
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Figure 11: employment by sector (Q1 2006 = 100)
Source: Authors’ calculations based on HCSO Labour Force Survey.
The deflections might have been caused to a great extent by the low flexibil-
ity of the Hungarian labour market, meaning that the firm adjustment hap-
pens mainly at the extensive margin. However, this does not necessarily mean 
mass layoffs as the regular hiring of new labour may result in a decrease of the 
magnitude of two-digits and the corresponding data seem to confirm that the 
same has been happening in the Hungarian labour market (see Köllő, 2011 and 
Cseres-Gergely, 2010). The available data suggest that the expansion of hiring 
started at manufacturing firms as a response to the improvement of export per-
spectives. Similar to the decomposition of changes in the case of the employ-
ment as a whole, the effect of the creation and destruction of jobs on labour 
demand should be examined properly. Unfortunately, there is no direct data 
available on the destruction of jobs, while the main (but not entirely satisfac-
tory) indicator of job creation is the reported number of empty jobs at the Na-
tional Employment Service.5 The former seasonality of the reported number of 
jobs changed dramatically in 2009 and its volatility rose considerably (Figure 
12). The decrease in the number of unsubsidised jobs at the end of 2008 was 
soon followed by stabilization at a lower level and later on, at the beginning of 
2010 by a slight increase that resulted in being only temporary. The majority of 
registered new jobs at the beginning of 2011 were subsidised, clearly indicating 
that the tendency starting at the bottom of the crisis still persists. According 
to this, the number of reported new jobs is influenced principally by the num-
ber of subsidised jobs, especially by jobs created within public work schemes.
Another, perhaps more refined adjustment strategy of labour demand is 
through working time reduction, which is indicated by the growing amount 
of part-time employment during the crisis. Though the same process seemed 
to persist between the first quarters of 2010 and 2011 with the further 0.5 per-
centage point increase of the rate, the degree of the growth is far less than it was 
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Employment Service in 2011.
cseres-gergely & szőke
28
in 2009. The observed differences by gender have been growing steadily since 
the beginning of 2010; still, the share of part-time employment among women 
continues to be higher and is growing even further (Figure 13). Between the 
same periods of 2010 and 2011, part-time employment among women grew by 
1 percentage point, while considering men the corresponding rate is only 0.4 
percentage points. This might mean that while part-time employment is only 
an adjustment strategy for men, it is of a long-term increasing trend in the case 
of women. The majority of the growth might be attributed to the private sector, 
where the rate of part-time employment among women grew by 1.1 percent-
age points between 2010 and 2011, but the growth of 0.4 percentage points 
in the public sector is notable too. Bálint, Cseres-Gergely and Scharle (2011) 
attributed this effect to the introduction of obligatory part-time employment 
offered to mothers returning to the public sector from maternity leave since 
the 1st of January 2010. This hypothesis, however, is not supported by the data 
having become available.
Figure 12: number of registered subsidised and non-subsidised vacancies
Source: National Employment Service.
Figure 13: Share of part-timers in total employment, 2006–2011
Source: CSHO Labour Force Survey.
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We have examined the motives of the expansion of part-time employment using 
several simple methods. Looking at part-time employment by gender and age 
(15–24, 25–44, 44+), we find that its rate has increased most heavily among 
the 15–24 year-old cohort of women and the 25–44 year-old cohort of men. 
The former saw an increase from 4.2 to 14.2 percent between 2006 and 2011, 
while the latter from 1.4 to 2.9 percent. Based solely on this, the decisive im-
portance of returning from maternity leave cannot be excluded just yet, thus 
we examined transitions between the fourth quarters of 2006, 2007, 2008 
and the first quarters of the following year. If the scope of employment status-
es consisting of employed, unemployed and inactive is complemented by the 
fourth category of inactive due to maternity leave, the ratio of entrants from 
the latter group into part-time employment did not rise significantly among 
either of the cohorts. As a result, two different processes had been taking place 
during the examined period.
The first pair of years reflects the influence of the crisis. During this period, 
the stability of part-time employment under the age of 24 has somewhat risen 
(the rate of workers who were part-time employees in earlier periods grew from 
87 to 91 percent in the category of part-time employment). However, this might 
also refer to the slowing integration to full-time employment of this employ-
ment group. A similar process has been taking place for those above the age of 
45 where the rate of 89 percent rose to 94 percent. Based on the magnitude of 
the changes, the first process seems to be more robust: part-time employment 
increased most among the younger cohort with primary level education or less 
and in the public sector. The direction of the changes was the opposite between 
the ages of 35 and 45, where transitions from full employment increased sub-
stantially. As a result, the rate of new entrants arriving from full-time employ-
ment grew from 3 to 7 percent. Extensive change was observable only among 
the younger and older population between 2009 and 2011: the ratio of entrants 
from inactivity but not on maternity leave rose considerably.
A possible conclusion might be that the above transitions are mainly the re-
sults of the different public work schemes. Nevertheless, the data calculated 
from the HCSO Labour Force Survey disprove this theory by revealing that 
the share of part-time employment in subsidised public sector employment 
does not exceed 10 percent among any of the age or gender groups. Accord-
ingly, the roots of this effect do not lie in regulation, supply-demand changes 
or public work schemes, but is rather evoked by a market mechanism that re-
quires further thorough examination.
Besides the quantitative adjusments in labour, the price adjusments, namely 
the changes in wages, should be emphasised as well, being a crucial determi-
nant of labour demand. As a consequence of the measures provoked by the 
crisis, the wage advantage of the public sector melted completely in 2009 and 
even turned into a wage disadvantage during 2010 (Figure 14). Apart from the 
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already mentioned distinctions in the adjusment of the two sectors, another 
dominant factor might have been that the layoffs in the private sector mainly 
affected the blue-collar workers. Therefore, the so called composition effect in 
itself resulted in higher average wages.
Figure 14: Gross real wages in the public and the private sector by quarter,  
2006–2011 (Q1, 2006 prices)
Note: Monthly wages in Hungarian forints (HUF). 100,000HUF ≈ 379EUR (calcu-
lated on 2006 yearly average rates, 1EUR = 264HUF).
Source: Authors’ calculation based on HCSO Stadat.
Policies affecting labour demand
Labour demand was heavily shaped by government measures including public 
work schemes, development programs and the transformation of the tax sys-
tem (further details in Chapter IV of In Focus). As we have already mentioned, 
the first months of 2010 saw a considerable drop in public employment; more 
precisely, the falling number of public jobs offered as part of the Pathway to 
Work program. The regime of public employment was reshaped in two steps 
by the government during 2011, the first of which mostly affects the part re-
lated to social security benefits, thus having no direct effect on labour demand. 
Detailed information on the progress of development programs in the frame-
work of the Széchenyi-plan is not available, thus no estimate can be given on 
its short-term effects on the economy and on labour demand.
Two major effects prevail among taxes levied on businesses. Firstly, the tax 
rate on profits has been changed automatically to 10 percent instead of the gen-
eral rate of 19 percent after the 1st of July 2010 (consequently in 2011 as well) 
for firms with revenues less than HUF 500 million. As there are no further 
conditions for obtaining this allowance, the decrease of administrative bur-
dens might have a positive effect on micro- and small businesses.
Secondly, the government laid claims to revenue from additional taxes (so 
called “crisis taxes”) during the whole period under discussion, levied on large 
companies in financial, telecom, energy and trade sectors. By diminishing the 
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profitability of these firms, and especially due to its degree and timing, this 
extra tax might oblige firms in the private sector to compensate for the losses 
with layoffs or the delay of regular labour expansion. In absence of detailed 
analysis, the extent of this effect cannot be determined.
Notable changes took place in the wage and tax policies during the last one 
and a half years. Among these, one of the most important is the introduction 
of the flat-rate personal income tax instead of the progressive personal taxation 
system from the 1st of January 2011. However, the effect on labour demand 
could be realised only indirectly, through the change of the wage costs, if the 
employees were ready to give up the increase in their gross wages in return for 
a decrease in tax burdens. Even though Figure 14 displays the moderation of 
wage dynamics, we cannot be sure about the permanence of this effect, espe-
cially as the only sector reporting significant changes in employment is the 
export-oriented manufacturing industry.
According to the analysis of the OECD (2011), the extent to which aver-
age tax wedge was reduced in Hungary was one of the largest during the last 
ten years: the drop was approximately 6–8 percentage points among worker 
groups with different marital and income statuses (54.5 percent to 46.4 per-
cent between 2000 and 2010 in the case of single workers with average wag-
es, for example). However, its average value was still 9–13 percentage points 
higher than the OECD average in 2010 (which was 34.9 percent in the same 
category). 
Figure 15: Tax wedge at the minimum wage and for an average wage in 
manufacturing, 2008–2011, bi-annual series (percent)
Note: The tax wedge is expressed as a percentage of the total wage cost.
Source: Taxes and contributions from Hungarian Tax Authority data; gross wages 
HCSO institutional statistics.
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Figure 15 shows that the tax wedge of a worker in manufacturing with aver-
age wages decreased in 2011, primarily due to the moderation of the personal 
income tax. Meanwhile, the tax wedge has grew considerably for minimum 
wages (from 37.3 to 40.1 percent), which came about due to the phasing out of 
tax allowance and which elevated the figure to the former level of the second 
half of 2009. As a result of the higher wage elasticity of unskilled workers, this 
could reduce the demand for this group considerably.
The minimum wage and the skilled workers’ wage minimum are instruments 
that affected wage costs to a smaller extent. Following their drop in real value 
on 2010 prices, the increase of both the minimum wage and the skilled work-
ers’ wage minimum exceeded the expected inflation of 3.9 percent in 2011, as 
a result of which the former rose approximately by 2 percent and the latter by 
1 percent in real value (Figure 16). All these changes may encumber the adjust-
ment in labour demand among unskilled workers even further.
Figure 16: The minimum wage and skilled workers’ wage minimum  
in real value, 1997–2011
Note: HUF at 1997 level, in 2011 using the Hungarian National Bank’s 3.9 per cent 
inflation projection (MNB, 2011). The values for 2009 were weighted with reference 
to changes in employer contributions during the year. The skilled workers’ wage 
minimum is the lowest wage payable to employees in jobs requiring general or voca-
tional secondary education (before July 2009 the pay could be slightly lower if the 
employee had less than two years’ experience). 100,000HUF ≈ 463EUR (calculated 
on 1997 yearly average rates, 1EUR = 211HUF).
labour Supply
As opposed to the massive negative effects of the demand shock that has already 
been alluded to, the crisis emerged in a more temperate way on the supply side 
of the labour market (Bálint, Cseres-Gergely and Scharle, 2011). The changes 
arose mostly as intended or unintended consequences of policy measures.
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As has already been shown, the labour activity of the population did not 
change considerably after the crisis. The principal reason for this is that the 
government did not open the way that could have helped the passing to inac-
tivity, and moreover, the Pathway to Work program activated a large part of the 
inactive, long-term unemployed population for a certain period. The labour 
market dynamics of the inactive population changed during this time, as the 
typical cyclic fluctuations of earlier periods turned into a continuous fall until 
the end of 2010 (Figure 17). A possible explanation is the retarded influence of 
the elevated statutory retirement age and the aggravation on the conditions of 
the disability pension (Kátay and Nobilis, 2009).
Figure 17: Quarter to quarter changes in inactivity, and its components:  
flows between unsubsidised employment and unemployment, 15–64 year-old 
population, 2007–2011 (omitted direction: subsidised employment)
Note: Unemployed: Registered unemployed.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on HCSO Labour Force Survey micro-data, stock-
flow consistent model.
However, at the end of the period, a different influence becomes more pow-
erful: the increased expansion of the public work schemes which activates a 
number of the long-term unemployed for a certain period. Consequently, the 
number of transitions from inactivity to subsidised employment increased in 
mid-2010. In the first quarter of 2011 inactivity unusually rose again, which 
could be attributed to the delay in the public work schemes appropriated 
for 2011 (Figure 18). Revisiting Figure 7, it can be seen that the public work 
schemes fulfil a primordial role in employment policy; however, they only fa-
cilitate temporary employment and not stable long-term work opportunities 
for the affected groups.
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Figure 18: Quarter to quarter changes in inactivity, and its components:  
flows between subsidised employment and unemployment, 15–64 year-old 
population, 2007–2011 (omitted direction: unsubsidised employment)
Note: Unemployed: Registered unemployed.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on HCSO Labour Force Survey micro-data, stock-
flow consistent model.
Policies affecting labour supply
One of the fundamental purposes of the government’s economic policy is the 
expansion of the labour supply, and several policy measures were implemented 
during the second half of 2010 and the first half of 2011 to support this. Out 
of these, ushering beneficiaries of pre-retirement and disability pensions to 
the labour market had perhaps the most indirect and uncertain effects, given 
the relatively low education of those affected. The case of disability pension-
ers is discussed in detail in the paper of the Hungarian National Bank (MNB, 
2011, p. 76–79). According to their analysis, among the returners with higher 
education, approximately every second person has a chance of becoming em-
ployed. However, a remarkable part of this returning group, about 40%, is of 
lower educational level (primary education or less), and they are expected to 
contribute to a smaller extent to the expansion of employment in the private 
sector. Even though the rehabilitation of this group is feasible (Scharle, 2011), 
the majority of people with changed workability do not find employment in 
this way. Whether the activated people become employed or unemployed de-
pends on the possible solutions of this situation in the future.
Another significant change was the restructuring of the tax system to a flat-
rate personal income tax system from 2011. There are no detailed empirical 
analyses available on the labour market effects of this measure, and there are 
no demonstrable signs of short-term effects among the limited data at our dis-
posal (data of the first quarter of 2011 from the HCSO Labour Force Survey). 
Based on preliminary research, however, a few consequences can be drawn. The 
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adjustment could be realised either through working time or by bringing to 
work people who were not employed earlier. In addition, no identical effect is 
expected among groups with different educational or income levels. Accord-
ing to Bakos et al. (2008), the adjustment through working time is negligible 
in the case of income levels under the average wage level, while above this level 
it equates to the strong sensitivity usually experienced in the international lit-
erature.6 Possibilities of adjustment through entering the labour market are 
discussed in Galasi (2003), showing that the elasticity both on wages and non-
labour income is small. MNB (2010a) recites related results which state that 
the change of the average tax wedge has only a moderate impact on entering 
and quitting [a drop of 1 percentage point implicates an increase of approxi-
mately 0.1 percentage point (p. 49)], but the effect is somewhat greater among 
the unskilled than the skilled workers.
Given that higher earners are most affected by the tax changes (Cseres-Gergely 
and Simonovits, 2011 and Tóth, 2011), the already employed skilled workers are 
expected to work more (in number of hours worked). The opposite is expected 
on the extensive margin, as the sensitivity of unskilled lower income groups 
is higher; however, due to the fact that the new tax system affected them in a 
negative way, their labour supply is expected to decrease.
unemploymenT
The unemployment rate as defined by the ILO7 increased sharply from the sta-
ble pre-crisis level of 7–8 percent to 11 percent in 2010 and seems to have sta-
bilized at this new higher equilibrium level. The share of jobseekers registered 
with the National Employment Service among the 15–64 year-old population 
has been continuously moving above the rate of unemployment. However, the 
co-movement of the two figures experienced during previous years broke up 
in 2010 (Figure 19).
The split between the statuses of unemployment and registered unemploy-
ment is mainly the result of the timing of the public work schemes, which raise 
the possibility of entering employment from the status of registered unemploy-
ment in the second quarter of the year. This powerful effect can be observed in 
2010 (which was present in previous years as well, but less powerfully), but not 
yet seen in 2011 (Figure 20). As a result of a delay in the programs, the num-
ber of unemployed not seeking jobs even increased in this period. This is also 
shown by the fact that based upon the ILO definition, the number of regis-
tered unemployed is continuously increasing among the unemployed, while 
the ratio of job seekers among registered unemployed has been sharply falling 
since the winter of 2010. In the light of previous results, this can be ascribed 
to the effect of the inactive registered unemployed who are waiting for the 
public work schemes.
6 A 1 percent change of the mar-
ginal tax rate increases the tax-
able income by approximately 
0.3–0.4 percentage points.
7 This is the general definition 
of unemployment rate. We try to 
emphasize the source of the defi-
nition to clarify the difference 
between unemployment rate 
and registered unemployment.
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Figure 19: non-employed subpopulations (partially overlapping)  
among the 15–64 year old population after 2006 by quarter
Source: ILO-unemployed, long-term unemployed, inactive: authors’ calculations 
based on HCSO Labour Force Survey; registered job seekers: authors’ calculations 
based on Office for Employment and Social Affairs data.
Figure 20: Quarter to quarter changes in unemployment, and its components:  
flows between employment and inactivity, 15–64 year-old population, 2006–2011 
(including subsidised and unsubsidised employment)
Note: Unemployed: Registered unemployed.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on HCSO Labour Force Survey micro-data, stock-
flow consistent model.
Contrary to earlier periods, the number of unemployed is shaped by movements 
inside the group of actives and not by the flow from inactivity to unemploy-
ment as in the spring of 2008 and 2009. The considerable quarter to quarter 
changes have been persistent since the onset of the crisis, induced by the flow 
between (unsubsidised) employment and unemployment, both of which are 
at a continuously high level. Accordingly, the attachment of active workers to 
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the labour market remained strong and, what is more, in the case of unemploy-
ment and inactivity the balance is positive in the short run.
The situation is more alarming among the most sensitive groups such as the 
young labour market entrants. According to the data of the National Employ-
ment Service (2011), the number of long-term job seekers (registered for more 
than one year) was 11,500 among the new labour market entrants in 2010, 
which represents 21.9 percent of the whole registered stock of new entrants. 
Though this figure is smaller than the overall ratio of 28.3 percent of long-term 
job seekers among the totality of the registered, taking into account that the 
affected group is of people who have not yet been able to integrate to the labour 
market, the rate seems to be extremely large.
The growth in long-term unemployment did not localize to unskilled work-
ers with a low level of education. Comparing the monthly average values of 
2009 and 2010, it appears that the largest growth of 38.2 percent was among 
higher education graduates, while the increase among workers with second-
ary education was 32.4 percent, with vocational education 21.7 percent, and 
with primary education or less 1.9 percent. Due to the differing number of the 
groups, the percentage changes might be misleading; the corresponding abso-
lute changes are 1.6, 7.7, 9 and 1.4 thousand people.
The regional distribution of long-term unemployment is representative: half 
of the long-term job seekers in 2010 (51.7 percent) lived in the north of Hun-
gary (especially in the county of Borsod-Abaúj-Zemplém) and in the northern 
part of the Great Plain (Szabolcs-Szatmár-Bereg county). The number of reg-
istered long-term job seekers in these two counties separately was 21,630 and 
18,222, while the third place is occupied by the South-Transdanubian region 
with 11,133 people (NFSZ, 2011).
Policy measures
We have already mentioned that the restructuring of the public work schemes 
was presumably the main reason for the changes that can be observed in the 
number of registered unemployed. In the meantime, no policy measures have 
been taken that could have substantially affected the changes in the number of 
unemployed in the short run. There are various changes, however, that are ex-
pected to exert influence on the size and structure of unemployment in the fol-
lowing year. Such changes are the radical reduction in unemployment benefits; 
the cutback in active labour market programs, alongside with the expansion of 
public work schemes to a much larger scale than earlier; and the fact that half 
of the human resources of the National Employment Service will be devoted 
to the handling of the public work schemes. The details of these changes are 
further discussed later in this volume which deals with institutional changes.
cseres-gergely & szőke
38
reFerenceS
Bakos, Péter, Benczúr, Péter and Benedek, Dóra 
(2008): Az adóköteles jövedelem rugalmassága [The 
Elasticity of Taxable Income]. Közgazdasági Szemle, 
Vol. 55. No.9, p. 733–762.
Bálint, Mónika, Cseres-Gergely, Zsombor and 
Scharle, Ágota (2011): The Hungarian Labour 
Market in 2009–2010. In: Fazekas, Károly and Molnár, 
György (eds.): The Hungarian labour market. Review 
and analysis, 2011. IE HAS and National Employment 
Foundation, Budapest, pp. 13–36. o. http://www.econ.
core.hu/file/download/HLM2011/TheHungarian-
LabourMarket_2011_Labour_Market2009-2010.pdf
Cseres-Gergely, Zsombor (2010): Munkapiaci áram-
lások, gereblyézés és a 2008 végén kibontakozó gaz-
dasági válság foglalkoztatási hatásai. [Labour mar-
ket flows, raking and the employment effects of the 
economic crisis Unfolding after 2008], BWP 2010/4.
Cseres-Gergely, Zsombor (2011): Munkaerőpiaci 
áramlások, konzisztencia és gereblyézés. [Labour mar-
ket flows, consistency and raking]. Statisztikai Szemle, 
Vol. 89, No. 5., p. 482–500
Cseres-Gergely, ZsomborandScharle, Ágota 
(2010): The Hungarian Labour Market in 2008–2009. 
In: Fazekas, Károly, Lovász, Anna and Telegdy, Álmos 
(eds.): The Hungarian labour market. Review and 
analysis, 2010. IE HAS and National Employment 
Foundation, Budapest, pp. 15–40. o. http://econ.core.
hu/file/download/mt2010_eng/labourmarket08-09.
pdf
Cseres-Gergely, Zsombor and Simonovits, András 
(2011): A személyi jövedelemadó-reform hatása a tb-
nyugdíjakra. [The impact of the personal income tax 
reform on social security pensions]. BWP 2011/7.
Galasi, Péter (2003): Labour supply estimates – paid/
unpaid labour and income. In: Fazekas, Károly and 
Koltay, Jenő (eds.): The Hungarian labour market. Re-
view and analysis, 2002. IE HAS and National Em-
ployment Foundation, Budapest, pp. 64–79. http://
econ.core.hu/doc/mt/2003/eng/OFAGalNagytan.
pdf
Kátay, Gábor and Nobilis, Benedek (2009): Driv-
ing Forces Behind Changes in the Aggregate Labour 
Force Participation in Hungary. MNB Working Pa-
pers 2009/5. http://www.mnb.hu/Root/Dokumen-
tumtar/ENMNB/Kiadvanyok/mnben_mnbfuzetek/
mnben_WP_2009_5/wp_2009_5.pdf.
Köllő, János (2011): Employment, unemployment, 
and wages in the first year of the crisis. In: Fazekas, 
Károly and Molnár, György (eds.): The Hungarian 
labour market. Review and analysis, 2010. IE HAS 
and National Employment Foundation, Budapest, pp. 
43–68. o. http://www.econ.core.hu/file/download/
HLM2011/TheHungarianLabourMarket_2011_In_
Focus.pdf.
Kőrösi, Gábor (2005): A versenyszféra munkapiacának 
működése [The labour market of the private sector]. 
KTI Könyvek, MTA KTI, Budapest.
KSH (2011): Létszám és kereset a nemzetgazdaságban, 2011. 
január–július, [Employees and earnings, January–
July 2011]. http://portal.ksh.hu/portal/page?_page-
id=37,869059&_dad=portal&_schema=PORTAL.
MNB (2010a): Quarterly Report on Inflation. Augustus 
2010 http://www.mnb.hu/Root/ENMNB/Kiadvan-
yok/mnben_infrep_en/mnben_inflation_20100825.
MNB (2010b): Quarterly Report on Inflation. Novem-
ber 2010. http://english.mnb.hu/Root/ENMNB/
Kiadvanyok/mnben_infrep_en/mnben_infla-
tion_20101201.
MNB (2011): Quarterly report on Inflation. June 2011. 
http://english.mnb.hu/Root/ENMNB/Kiadvanyok/
mnben_infrep_en/mnben_inflation_201106.
NBP (2010): Inflation Report, National Bank of Poland, 
Warsaw, October.
NFSZ (2011): Munkaerő-piaci helyzetkép a Nemzeti Fogla-
lkoztatási Szolgálat adatai alapján, 2010 [Labour mar-
ket situation in Hungary related to the data of the 
National Employment Service, 2010], 2010. Authored 
by Ágnes Nagy. National Employment Office, Bu-
dapest, http://www.afsz.hu/engine.aspx?page=full_
afsz_eves_reszletes.
OECD (2011): Taxing Wages 2009–2010. OECD, 
http://www.oecd.org/document/34/0,3746,
en_2649_34533_44993442_1_1_1_1,00.html.
ONYF (2011): Nyugdíjban, nyugdíjszerű ellátásban 
részesülők állománystatisztikai adatai [Number Of 
Recipients Of Pensions And Pension Type Benefits]. 
http://www.onyf.hu/index.php?module=news&act
ion=getfile&fid=9145&rand=7850aaa73f1c9b84d8
a1d3a469e88281.
Scharle, Ágota (2011): Foglalkoztatási rehabilitációs 
jó gyakorlatok Magyarországon [Employment reha-
bilitation best practices in Hungary, research report]. 
Budapest Institute.
Tóth, István János (2011): Az új szja-szabályok hatása 
a gyermektelenek nettó reálkeresetére [Impacts of 
the new personal income tax regulation on the real 
wage of childless workers]. Manuscript, www.wargo.
hu/tij/publications/aa_adovalthat_2011_110224.pdf
In Focus
EvaluatIon oF actIvE 
labour markEt programs
Edited by 
Gábor Kézdi

41
IntroductIon
Gábor Kézdi
The employment rate has been very low in Hungary over the past 20 years. 
In 2010, it lagged behind the OECD average by ten percentage points. The 
lag had already been of the same magnitude in 1994. While most countries 
saw their place change between these two years in the ranking, Hungary has 
been a stubborn laggard for the entire period, being fourth-to-last in 1994 
and second-to-last in 2010. Figure 1 shows the employment rate statistics in 
the OECD countries.
Figure 1: Employment rate (employment over population excluding full-time students) 
among the 15 to 64 year age group in the oEcd countries; 1994 and 2010
Source: OECD Employment Outlook, 2011. Online Statistical Annex, Tables B.
Many factors may explain the low performance of Hungary, see, for example 
Commander–Köllő (2008) and Chapter 5 in this In Focus by János Köllő and 
Ágota Scharle. Active labour market policies are often viewed as potential rem-
edies. However, it is not obvious whether that view is warranted. Active labour 
market policies may or may not increase aggregate employment, and even if 
they do, the magnitude of their effect may or may not be substantial. Appro-
priate evidence is needed to understand more about those effects.
Active labour market policies aim at helping the unemployed find long-term 
employment. These policies offer services that are supposed to help people 
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
4991 0102
Ice
lan
d
Sw
itz
erl
an
d
No
rw
ay
Ne
the
rla
nd
s
De
nm
ark
Sw
ed
en
Au
str
ali
a
Ne
w 
Ze
ala
nd
Au
str
ia
Ca
na
da
Ge
rm
an
y
Un
ite
d K
ing
do
m
Ja
pa
n
Fin
lan
d
Un
ite
d S
tat
es
Slo
ve
nia
Po
rtu
ga
l
Lu
xe
mb
ou
rg
Cz
ec
h R
ep
ub
lic
Fra
nc
e
Ko
rea
Be
lgi
um
Es
ton
ia
Ire
lan
d
Me
xic
o
Isr
ae
l
Gr
ee
ce
Sp
ainCh
ile
Po
lan
d
Slo
va
kiaIta
ly
Hu
ng
ary
Tu
rke
y
OE
CD
 av
era
ge
in focus
42
search for jobs or acquire skills and knowledge that make them more valuable 
employees. If effective, these programs can increase aggregate employment 
and thus decrease the lag of Hungarian employment. If not effective, these 
programs may be harmful by posing an extra burden on taxpayers (even if fi-
nanced in part from outside Hungary) and using resources and creative energy 
that could be used for more productive purposes.
Active labour market policies can be classified the following way by the con-
tent of their services.
– Job search help (consulting).
– Public works programs (organized typically by government agencies or mu-
nicipalities).
– Employment subsidy programs (also known as wage subsidy programs ,public 
subsidies to private firms for employing people from the target population) 
and programs helping self-employment.
– Training programs (in-class or firm-based training for general or specific skills).
– Complex programs (usually small and narrowly targeted programs that in-
clude elements from the above four program types).
Countries differ a lot in their use of active labour market policies (see Fig-
ure 2). Active labour market policies are relatively small in the Anglo-Saxon 
countries and they are substantially larger in continental Europe. Post-com-
munist countries are spread out in the rankings but most are in the lower half. 
Hungary is below the OECD average both in terms of costs (relative to GDP) 
and participation (relative to labour force), but it is above most of the Anglo-
Saxon countries.
0.0
0.3
0.6
0.9
1.2
1.5
Expenditures (% GDP)
(left axis)
De
nm
ark
Sw
ede
n
Ne
the
rla
nd
s
Ge
rm
any
Be
lgiu
m
Fin
lan
d
Fra
nce
No
rwe
y
Sw
itze
rla
nd
Sp
ainIta
ly
Ire
lan
d
Por
tug
al
Aus
tria
Lux
em
bo
urg
Pol
and
Ne
w Z
eal
and
Hu
nga
ry
Ca
nad
a
Aus
tra
lia
Gre
ece
Cze
ch 
Re
pu
blicJap
an
Un
ite
d S
tat
es
Ko
rea
Slo
vak
ia
Un
ite
d K
ing
do
m
OE
CD
 av
era
ge
0
2
4
6
8
10
Participation (% aborforce) 
(right axis)
Source: OECD Employment Outlook, 2011. Online Statistical Annex, Tables K.
Figure 2: Size of the active labour market programs in the oEcd countries, 2009  
(costs as a percentage of GdP and the number of participants as a percentage of the labour force)
It may sound surprising but we rarely know the effects of active labour market 
programs on participants, and we know even less about potential side-effects. 
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Few programs are followed by impact evaluation studies, few of such studies 
are accessible to the public, and even fewer provide credible results. As we shall 
see (Chapter 2 in this In Focus), organizational details, incentives or selection 
of participants are important determinants of the effects of any particular 
program. As a result, programs of similar type implemented in different coun-
tries at different times in different ways may produce very different results. It 
would therefore be essential to know about the effects of individual programs.
One reason for the shortage of credible analyses is the lack of adequate data. 
Experimental evaluations are still rare everywhere, and they are all but non-
existent in Hungary. Data that can meet the strict requirements for informa-
tive non-experimental evaluations are also rarely available. Another reason is 
the often low quality of the evaluation methods. Whether due to inadequate 
data or inadequate expertise, the ultimate reason for the shortage of credible 
evaluations is on the demand side. If potential users of evaluation studies want 
to have credible evaluations, they could get them a lot more often than they may 
think. Many programs can be evaluated by credible experimental methods, and 
the data and expertise requirements for informative non-experimental evalu-
ations can also be met for many programs. Most of the time it is a question of 
resources and priorities. Public access by the scientific community, combined 
with peer reviews is arguably the best way to impose appropriate quality con-
trol over the evaluation studies. Ensuring public access and hiring high-quality 
reviews are also under the control of potential users of the evaluation studies.
Only credible evaluations are valuable if one is genuinely interested in learn-
ing the effects of a program. Using a somewhat strong analogy, we can think 
of the evaluation of program impacts as similar to learning about the effects 
of medical treatments. If we were to choose from alternative treatments for 
our sick child, would we want advice that relies on credible evidence (from, 
say, proper experiments) on the effects and side-effects? Or would we be com-
fortable with advice based on “expert opinion” without such evidence? And, 
would we be fine with opinion affected by the doctor's personal incentives to 
choose one treatment over the rest?
The effects and side-effects of active labour market programs may not be mat-
ters of life and death. But they are important, too. As we shall see (in Chapter 
1 below), the methods of program evaluation are not trivially simple but are 
not extremely complicated either. There is enough expertise to carry out well-
designed experiments and informative non-experimental evaluations even in 
Hungary. Of course, credible evaluations are costly. Setting up experiments 
takes time and money, and data collection and expert analysis are costly too. 
However, in most cases, these costs are negligible relative to the total costs of 
the programs or their potential effects and side effects. In light of this, it is 
very surprising to hear the all too often repeated excuse of too little money 
and time available for proper evaluations. Instead, the right question is why it 
in focus
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makes sense to spend vast sums of money and energy on programs with com-
pletely unknown effects?
It is a very positive development that credible evaluations are becoming more 
common in many countries. Experimental evaluations gain ground, and non-
experimental evaluations can use better and better data, often from high-qual-
ity administrative sources. These trends signal not only positive developments 
within the evaluation community and improvements in data quality but the 
increased demand from stakeholders for credible evidence. There are signs for 
positive developments within Hungary, too. Only one randomized experiment 
was conducted in Hungary, and that looked at the effects of changes within 
the benefit system as opposed to active labour market policies (Micklewright–
Nagy, 2010, looked at the effect of increased control over unemployment ben-
efit recipients). Large and high quality administrative data are still not acces-
sible in Hungary. Nevertheless, we start to see studies published and reviewed 
by the scientific community that are based on high quality analyses within the 
constraints of the data at hand. Most importantly, there are signs that indicate 
increased demand for credible evaluations by important stakeholders. Spon-
soring this volume is a proof in case.
We hope that, by publishing this chapter in the Hungarian labour Market 
volume of 2012, we can contribute to the positive developments described 
above. Our goal is to facilitate credible evaluations of Hungarian labour mar-
ket programs. The ultimate goal of such studies is to make sure that active la-
bour market programs are used in line with their benefits.
*
The In Focus consists of seven chapters. Chapter 1 covers the methodology of 
program evaluation without technical details. Chapter 2 gives a review of the 
international evidence on the effects of labour market programs, focusing 
on the most credible evaluations. Chapters 3 to 5 show the results of recent 
Hungarian evaluation studies. Chapter 6 presents a small complex program 
and discusses the possibilities of evaluating it. Finally, Chapter 7 reviews the 
evaluation studies of the unemployment benefit system and the employment 
subsidy programs in Hungary.
The chapter covers Hungarian evaluations of all major program types, from 
job search help through public works programs and complex programs. As the 
results of Chapter 7 point out, evaluations of Hungarian active labour policies 
are rare even compared to studies on the Hungarian unemployment benefit 
system. As a result, we could select from a very limited set of studies. Neverthe-
less, all studies presented in this chapter represent high quality analyses given 
the data at hand, and all provide important information on the effects of the 
Hungarian programs.
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The effect of a program can be understood as the outcomes following the 
program compared to the outcomes that would have occurred in the absence 
of the program. The effect is therefore defined as the difference between ac-
tual outcomes (measured after the program) and hypothetical outcomes, also 
called “counterfactual” outcomes that would have occurred had the program 
not taken place. Chapter 1, written by Gábor Kézdi, points out that collect-
ing data from participants alone is never enough to measure the effects of a 
program. Measuring the counterfactual outcomes is equally important, and 
that measurement is the fundamental challenge of evaluation studies. Statis-
tical evaluations measure counterfactual outcomes with the help of control 
groups. Outcomes measured in control groups are supposed to represent out-
comes that participants would have achieved in the absence of the program. 
Qualitative evaluations do not make use of control groups, but they too have 
to make assumptions, even if very implicitly, about counterfactual outcomes. 
Comparing to counterfactual outcomes is essential because of the definition 
of the effects of a program.
The most credible and simplest evaluation method is the randomized con-
trolled experiment. The decision of participation is controlled by the evaluation, 
and the assignment procedure is independent of any relevant characteristic of 
potential participants, including their potential outcomes. The inevitable ad-
vantages of experimental evaluation are often offset by its practical infeasibil-
ity. However, recent examples show that experiments can be designed in more 
situations than we may think. As a result, experimental evaluations of labour 
market programs, while still rare, are gaining ground.
Of the non-experimental evaluations, regression-discontinuity can lead to 
credible estimates of the program effects for part of the target group (individ-
uals around the discontinuity point). Under suitable assumptions, matching 
and regression methods can estimate the program effects for everyone and 
specific subgroups as well. In reality, however, those assumptions are often un-
likely to be met and thus these results are less credible, in general, than either 
experimental or regression-discontinuity estimates. It is a shared view within 
the profession that matching and regression methods are better used in com-
bination, and they lead to more credible results the more successful they are at 
controlling for pre-program labour market histories, program eligibility crite-
ria and local labour market conditions for control as well as treated individuals.
Chapter 2 reviews credible evaluations to present international evidence on 
the effect of active labour market programs (authors are Péter Hudomiet and 
Gábor Kézdi). The evidence suggests that job search programs are often effec-
tive (albeit not always), public work programs are very rarely effective (but there 
are exceptions), and complex and well-targeted programs can be effective even 
in situations where traditional programs are ineffective. Perhaps the most im-
portant conclusion from the literature is that organizational details are more 
in focus
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important determinants of success than the type of program. This highlights 
the importance of appropriate evaluation of each and every program in order 
to give feedback for subsequent modifications or termination of the program.
The international evidence shows that even when effective, active labour 
market programs are not a panacea to aggregate employment problems. The 
National Supported Work program, a complex employment subsidy program 
in the U.S. in the 1970’s, increased participants’ employment rate from 30 per 
cent to 40 per cent. This is a significant increase, but it is very far from making 
all participants employed. Active labour market programs can improve consid-
erably in Hungary if the institutional background develops further, programs 
are designed by incorporating international evidence, and the effects of imple-
mented programs are measured by credible evaluations for providing feedback 
for further improvements. We can expect positive effects from programs un-
der such conditions. On the other hand, even if done in the best ways, active 
labour market programs cannot be the stand-alone solution to the problem of 
the low employment rate in Hungary.
Chapter 3, written by Zsombor Cseres-Gergely, evaluates the effect of the 
modernization of the Public Employment Services in Hungary that took place 
between 2005 and 2008. The intervention included national elements (e.g., de-
velopment of the informational infrastructure), but many elements targeted 
local offices, including quality assurance systems, staff training, office recon-
structions and the introduction of a new model of service. The improvements 
aimed at making local offices help job search of the unemployed. The evalua-
tion study uses panel data on unemployment offices and a difference-in-differ-
ences methodology to look at whether employment probabilities increased in 
participant offices relative to non-participant offices. The results imply a mod-
est increase in employment probabilities, and the effects are most pronounced 
among the 20 to 50 year old unskilled unemployed with some labour market 
experience. Simple back-of-the envelope calculations with the estimates sug-
gest that , as a result of the modernization program, unemployment duration 
decreased by one to two months (5 to 10 per cent) in this most affected group.
The ambitious study of Judit Csoba and Zita Éva Nagy, in Chapter 4, looks 
at the effect of three major labour market programs in a single framework. The 
evaluated programs include, in principle, all training, employment subsidy and 
public work programs in Hungary between 2009 and 2010. The authors use 
administrative data on a sample of registered unemployed people, supplement-
ed with their own questionnaire. They compare participants of the programs 
to a non-participant but eligible unemployed control group, and they use re-
gression methods to control for observed differences. The administrative data 
does not provide enough information on pre-program labour market histories, 
and the treated groups differ from each other and from the control group in 
terms of many important observable characteristics. These problems limit the 
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credibility of the estimated effects, but the results are nevertheless informa-
tive. The longer-term results indicate that, six to twelve months after the end 
of the program, participants of public work programs were significantly less 
likely to find jobs than members of the control group, participants of the train-
ing program had a slightly higher success rate, and participants of employment 
subsidy programs were significantly more likely to find jobs.
The survey data used in the study contained additional interesting informa-
tion. Members of the control group feel less healthy on average, they are more 
likely to think that they lack the skills demanded on the labour market, and 
they are less willing to work in occupations that demand long hours or work-
ing in public areas. These differences highlight the limits  to comparing par-
ticipants to members of the control group. These limitations are likely to be 
relevant beyond this particular study, as they suggest that controlling for “hard” 
characteristics observable in administrative data are unlikely to capture impor-
tant aspects of self-selection. Another important result from the supplemen-
tary data suggests that at least one third of the jobs created by the employment 
subsidy program would have been created in the absence of the program as well.
In Chapter 5, János Köllő and Ágota Scharle analyse the effect of public 
works programs between 2003 and 2008. The effects of these programs can 
show the expected effects of the “Road to jobs” [“Út a munkához”] program 
introduced in 2009. In essence, the Road to jobs program is a scaled up ver-
sion of the previous public works programs. Data from the program indicate 
that targeting was adequate but the take-up was larger than expected due to 
incentives built in for municipalities to use money in the central budget to 
finance public work locally.
The analysis uses administrative data and panel regressions at the level of 
municipalities to uncover the effects of year-to-year changes in participation 
in public work programs on subsequent changes in long-term unemployment. 
The results suggest that public work programs between 2003 and 2008 did 
not lead to a decrease in long-term unemployment. These results are in line 
with international evidence as well as previous Hungarian studies on the ef-
fects of public work programs. Therefore, while its targeting is adequate, the 
new Road to work program is unlikely to achieve its goals in decreasing long-
term unemployment.
Chapter 6, written by Nándor Németh and Gergely Kabai, describes the 
“Change of destiny, forming of destiny” program, a small complex program 
targeting long-term unemployed in small villages in Hungary. In contrast to 
the other chapters in this In focus, Chapter 6 is not based on a statistical evalu-
ation study. Instead, it is a descriptive study with qualitative evaluations. At 
the same time, the study follows the spirit of the chapter by asking questions 
relative to counterfactuals, that is, by contrasting outcomes after the program 
to outcomes that would have happened in the absence of the program.
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The program was launched by the Labour Office of Southern Transdanubia 
(Dél-dunántúli Regionális Munkaügyi Központ), in 40 villages of three coun-
ties, with 200 participants. Program participants took part in an eight-month 
personalized training and are then employed in subsidized agricultural jobs for 
a year or two. This is a complex program with elements of training, subsidized 
employment, and consulting with goals of personality development. The re-
sults show that participants of subsidized employment stayed employed after 
the employment subsidies ran out, and participants formed local communi-
ties with purpose. The qualitative analysis indicates positive effects of the pro-
gram, which would be interesting to evaluate with statistical methods as well.
Chapter 7, the last one in this chapter, reviews the evaluation studies of the 
unemployment benefit system (“passive labour market policies”) and employ-
ment subsidy programs in Hungary. The paper, written by Zsombor Cseres-Ger-
gely and Ágota Scharle, lists all evaluation studies and their references, and it 
classifies them in many dimensions. These dimensions include methodological 
criteria and thus help the reader judge the credibility of each study separately.
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1. MEthodS For ASSESSInG thE IMPAct  
oF ActIvE LAbour MArkEt ProGrAMS
Gábor Kézdi
Introduction
Impact assessment studies1 use statistical methods to assess the impacts of so-
cial programs on a few well-defined outcomes. For labour market programs, the 
most common outcome variables are employment, earnings and unemployment 
duration. Impact assessment studies are important in their own right, and their 
results are essential ingredients of further analyses. It is natural to ask whether 
programs have the impact they promise, what the magnitude of that impact is, 
and whether they have negative or positive side-effects. Results of impact as-
sessment studies are used in cost-benefit analyses, which convert the estimated 
impacts into monetary value and contrast that with the costs of the program.
This chapter gives a short overview of the methods of impact assessment. It 
introduces the methods without many technical details and Greek letters. The 
discussion is kept short, but it covers the most often used methods, the condi-
tions of their use, and I discuss their advantages and disadvantages.
Most impact assessment studies focus on direct impacts on program partici-
pants. These participants are often named as the “treated” group. In some cas-
es, indirect effects may be important as well. Perhaps the most widely consid-
ered potential indirect effects are displacement effects, also known as program 
substitution effects. These can occur, for example, in an employment subsidy 
program if program participants are hired instead of non-participants, but the 
number of jobs remains fixed, and, as a result, non-participants are less likely to 
find jobs as a result of the program. Other indirect effects may include labour 
market equilibrium effects that operate through wages (a large employment 
increase due to a program may put downward pressure on wages) or general 
equilibrium effects that affect other markets as well (if large programs use re-
sources which would otherwise be used elsewhere). Indirect effects are relatively 
rarely investigated. The larger part of this methodological chapter focuses on 
the measurement issues of direct effects, and it covers indirect effects in less 
detail in a separate section.
The effect of a program is defined as the difference between outcomes follow-
ing the program and outcomes that would have been realized in the absence of 
the program. The effect to measure is therefore the difference between actual 
outcomes and so-called counterfactual outcomes. These counterfactuals are 
not observable by definition. As a result, it is impossible to assess the effects of 
a program by looking at the participants only. Take the example of a program 
that wants to help unemployed people find a job. Suppose that we find that 30 
1 The economics literature uses 
the “program evaluation” label 
for such studies. For many peo-
ple, evaluations may include 
analyses that do not make a 
serious attempt at assessing 
impacts, and, at the same time, 
some people restrict evaluations 
to studies that talk about the 
costs and benefits of the program 
as well. In this paper I use pro-
gram evaluation in the econom-
ics terminology, synonymous 
with impact assessment.
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per cent of the participants find a job within six months after the end of the 
program. This number tells us nothing about the impact of the program. It 
is possible that this 30 per cent would have found a job without the program 
as well, in which case the effect of the program is zero. It is also possible that, 
without the program, no participant would have found a job, in which case 
the effect of the program is a 30 percentage point increase in the job finding 
rate. In principle, it is also possible that even more people would have found a 
job without the program, in which case the effect of the program is negative.
Assessing the impact of a program is impossible without the counterfactual 
outcomes. These counterfactual outcomes are not observable though. Unfor-
tunately, there is no way to know what would have happened to participants in 
the absence of the program. One can think of this problem as the unfeasibility 
of a thought experiment. The thought experiment would make people partici-
pate in the program, record their outcomes, roll back time, and then make the 
same people not participate in the program and record their outcomes.
Statistical impact assessment studies measure counterfactual outcomes by 
looking at the outcomes of a control group. Members of the control group are 
supposed to substitute for the participants in the unobservable state of the 
world in which they would be non-participants. Qualitative program evalua-
tions do not examine control groups. Because of the low number of the cases 
they look at, statistical analysis of a control group would, in any event, be prob-
lematic. On the other hand, qualitative studies make assumptions about the 
counterfactual outcomes, too, if only in implicit ways. It is important to make 
those assumptions explicit, because the effect of a program can be understood 
only in comparison with counterfactual outcomes. The need for counterfac-
tual comparisons is not specific to the method of the impact assessment study. 
It follows from the definition of the impact of a program.
Statistical impact assessment studies can be distinguished along two dimen-
sions. 1. How is the control group selected? 2. What is the method of compari-
son between the treatment group and the control group? It turns out that the 
better the control group (i.e. the more credible the assumption that the con-
trol group represents the counterfactual outcomes of the treatment group), the 
simpler the methods needed for comparing the outcomes.
The design closest to the ideal is the randomized experiment (also known as 
randomized controlled trial). In these experiments a random rule is used to 
decide who participates in a program and who does not. Randomized experi-
ments used to be relatively rare in program evaluation for practical reasons. At 
the same time, their results are exceptionally credible and widely accepted. For 
this reason, as stakeholders have started demanding credible results, randomized 
experiments have seen a recent increase in impact assessment studies worldwide.
All other methods are labelled together as non-experimental methods. The 
so-called natural experiments do not use an explicit random rule for deciding 
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who participates in the program and who does not, but they assume that there 
is some factor in the determinants of participation that can be viewed as ran-
dom. The essence of natural experimental evaluations is finding and isolating 
that factor and comparing the outcomes of the participants to control group 
members whose participation is decided upon that particular factor. Another 
method is regression-discontinuity design that makes use of specificities of the 
assignment rule. Regression-discontinuity can be used if there is a threshold 
value of some variable (say, age), that leads to a jump in participation (because, 
say, nobody can participate above the threshold). Matching evaluations and 
regression analyses compare the outcomes of treated and control individuals 
that are similar in their observable characteristics. Matching methods explicitly 
pair people for comparison, while regression methods attempt to do the same 
in a more implicit fashion. An important subset of the matching and regres-
sion analyses is the difference-in-differences (diff-in-diffs) method that uses 
information on the outcome variables from before the program.
There are several excellent papers on the methods of statistical program evalu-
ation. Most of these are more technical than this introduction. The most widely 
known of the papers are Heckman, LaLonde and Smith (1999), Imbens and 
Wooldridge (2009) and DiNardo and Lee (forthcoming).
Randomized experiments
Randomized experiments, also known as randomized controlled trials, start 
with a pool of potential participants and split this pool into a treatment group 
and a control group. The rule that assigns potential participants into the two 
groups is random. The meaning of randomness is sometimes the subject of 
rather abstract discussion, but the practical requirement here is simple: the 
rule should be completely independent of outcomes of the individuals. There 
are more complicated designs with more groups or certain overlaps, but they 
are not covered here.
In many randomized experiments, not everybody ends up participating in 
the program from the group that was selected to be treated. Some of the people 
that were selected to participate may decide not to participate or drop out dur-
ing the program. In such cases comparing the outcomes of the original treat-
ment group and the control group does not measure the effect of the treatment 
itself because part of the original treatment group ended up not receiving the 
full treatment. Instead of the treatment effect, such comparisons measure the 
effect of being assigned to the treatment group. This effect is called the “inten-
tion to treat effect” in contrast to the “treatment effect” itself. Actually, inten-
tion to treat effects are more relevant for program cost-benefit analyses than the 
treatment effects themselves. Incomplete participation in the treatment in the 
randomized experiment shows that incomplete participation is a feature of the 
program itself that should be taken into account in the cost-benefit analyses. At 
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the same time, the effect of the treatment itself is often an interesting question 
in its own right. Incomplete participation makes the eventual treatment group 
systematically different from the control group, even if the original treatment 
group was very similar to the control group because of randomized assignment. 
As a result, a simple comparison of the eventually treated group to the control 
group leads to biased estimates of the treatment effect. Fortunately, the treat-
ment effect can be estimated in such cases using the econometric technique of 
instrumental variables, under certain assumptions.
Randomized experiments are the standard methods of scientific inquiry from 
physics through medical research to psychology. Besides its sound methodolog-
ical credibility, a major advantage of the experimental method is its simplicity. 
Simplicity helps in communicating the results to the stakeholders and the gen-
eral public and leaves less room for manipulating the results. Their disadvantage 
is that randomization has to be built into the design of the program itself, which 
requires close collaboration between researchers and program administrators. 
Program administrators often resist accommodating the needs of program evalu-
ation in general and randomized selection in particular. However, the needs of 
credible evaluation are necessary to take into account if one is genuinely inter-
ested in the impact of a program. The most successful demonstration programs 
(programs that are implemented in order to show the impacts for present and 
future stakeholders) are all evaluated by randomized experiments. There are 
powerful movements in the research community that advocate randomized pro-
gram evaluations, such as the J-PAL group (http://www.povertyactionlab.org).
Natural experiments
In principle, natural experiments are similar to randomized experiments, with 
the important distinction that assignment to treatment group and control group 
is not the result of a randomized algorithm but some other mechanism. That 
mechanism qualifies for natural experiment if the researcher assumes that the 
assignment mechanism is practically random from the viewpoint of the outcome 
variables. Typically, though, the mechanism that is assumed random is only one 
of the many factors that influence participation in the program. Simple com-
parison of the treatment group to the control group is therefore not appropriate. 
Instead, the researcher has to isolate the effect of this particular mechanism on 
the outcome variable. The econometric technique used for this isolation is the 
method of instrumental variables. While instrumental variable estimations based 
on natural experiments have produced important results in labour economics, 
their practical applicability has been limited in impact assessment studies.
Regression-discontinuity
Discontinuity means a sudden increase or decrease in a variable at a particular 
point. In impact assessment studies, the regression-discontinuity design is ap-
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plicable if the likelihood of participation shows a sudden increase or decrease 
at a threshold value of a variable. In the so-called “sharp” case there is a thresh-
old that completely determines participation in the program: everybody par-
ticipates from one side of the threshold value and nobody participates from 
the other side. Frequent examples include compulsory programs with age or 
income thresholds or restrictions on the length of unemployment (the pro-
gram is restricted to a group defined by the thresholds but everybody in that 
group participates).
The basic idea is the following. People on the two sides of the threshold are 
very similar if they are close to the threshold value (e.g., those who just turned 
25 are very similar to those who will be 25 within a short time). Their outcomes 
would also be very similar in the absence of the program. Importantly, this is 
true even if the underlying variable itself (e.g., age) is strongly related to the 
outcome variable (e.g., employment). The requirement here is one of “conti-
nuity”: age can have a strong effect on employment, but, in the absence of the 
program, there should be no sudden increase or decrease in the employment 
probability at the particular threshold value (age 25). As a result, the employ-
ment prospects of those who have just turned 25 and those who will be 25 
within a few months should be very close in the absence of the program. If, 
therefore, we observe significant difference in the outcomes at the age thresh-
old, we can safely attribute that to the program. The method can identify the 
effect of the program for those who are in the immediate neighbourhood of 
the threshold value. The effect may of course be different for people far away 
from the threshold value, but the regression-discontinuity design cannot iden-
tify the effect for them.
In a sharp regression-discontinuity design, the probability of participation 
changes from zero to one as one passes the threshold. In more complicated 
cases the change in the participation probability is smaller. Frequently, the 
age threshold is a requirement but the participation is not compulsory among 
the age-eligible people: in this case the jump in the participation probability 
is from zero to a non-zero number less than one. It may also happen that the 
threshold is not prohibitive so that people from both sides can participate, but 
there is a sudden significant change in the probability (the fraction of people 
who participate). These are called “fuzzy” regression-discontinuity designs. 
Fuzzy designs require instrumental variable methods to identify the effect of 
the program. These methods can isolate the effect of the threshold on program 
participation and then on the outcome. The identified effect is local in one more 
sense compared to the case of sharp design. The fuzzy regression-discontinuity 
design allows for measuring the effect for people that are around the thresh-
old and would change their participation status if they crossed the threshold.
Figure 1.1 shows a hypothetical sharp regression-discontinuity design with 
an age threshold. In this setup nobody participates in the program if above 
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the threshold and everybody participates if below the threshold. The outcome 
variable is earnings. The continuous line shows the observable average of earn-
ings as a function of age, while the dashed line shows the counterfactual aver-
age that would be observable in the absence of the program. Average earnings 
and age are positively related in a continuous fashion in the absence of the 
program. The sudden jump at the age threshold indicates that the effect of the 
program is positive and significant. We can estimate this effect by comparing 
the average earnings of those who are just below the age threshold and those 
who are just above.
Figure 1.1: A hypothetical example for the logic  
of sharp regression-discontinuity design
Many researchers argue that regression-discontinuity design gives the most 
credible assessment of program impacts from among the non-experimental 
methods. The logic of the method is simple and intuitive, but the practical 
implementation is not without difficulties. The analysis has to balance two 
opposite problems when deciding whom to compare with whom. On the one 
hand, the closer the compared individuals are to the threshold value the more 
credible the comparison. On the other hand, the more we restrict the com-
parison groups the smaller the number of observations that we can use for the 
comparison, which decreases the precision of the results. The other caveat is 
that regression-discontinuity identifies the effects locally as described above.
Despite those caveats, regression-discontinuity is a powerful method to give 
credible results for at least a subset of the potential program participants. It 
has become very popular not only in impact assessment studies but in other 
areas of labour and education economics. The method was first used by This-
tlewaite and Campbell (1960), but Angristand and Levy (1999) was perhaps 
the most influential study that popularized the method. The most important 
questions of identification and estimation are covered by Hahn, Todd and Van 
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der Klauuw (2001), and the most recent methodological surveys are Imbens 
and Lemieux (2008) and Lee and Lemieux (2010).
Matching and regressions
Matching and regression are the most widely used non-experimental methods 
in impact assessment studies. They attempt at handling potential biases due to 
non-random program participation by “controlling” for “confounding” fac-
tors. Controlling means restricting the treated versus control comparisons to 
individuals that are the same in terms of those factors. Confounding factors 
are variables that are thought to affect program participation and may be re-
lated to program outcomes in their own right, too. Comparing the outcomes 
of treatment and control individuals that are different in those variables would 
not identify the effect of the program because the differences in outcomes may 
be due to their differences in the confounding factors as well as the effect of the 
program. For example, if more motivated people are more likely to participate 
in the program, but more motivated people would be more likely to find jobs 
in the absence of the program, then comparing the job finding rates of pro-
gram participants to non-participants cannot tell us the effect of the program. 
(More precisely, the comparison gives an “upward biased estimate” of the ef-
fect of the program, meaning that the true effect is smaller than the estimated 
effect.) The example highlights the major problem with these methods: Moti-
vation is one of those potential confounding variables that are hard to measure, 
but it is necessary to control for all confounding variables, including hart-to-
measure ones like motivation, in order to avoid bias.
In order to focus on the more technical questions, assume for now that all 
potential confounders are measured appropriately and can be used as control 
variables. Also assume that within groups of people that share the same control 
variables we find both participants and non-participants. In this case, within 
those groups, program participation can be considered random for the pur-
pose of impact assessment analysis. Within those groups, therefore, simple 
treatment-control comparisons identify the effect of the program just as in 
the case of randomized experiments. The assumption that all potential con-
founding factors are observed and controlled for is called “unconfoundedness” 
or “ignorable treatment”. The assumption that we can find both participants 
and non-participants within groups of people that are identical in terms of 
the confounders is called the “overlap” or the “common support” assumption.
Matching methods carry out the comparisons in a very intuitive way. They 
take one or more program participants and match them with one or more 
non-participants that have the same control variables. The treatment versus 
control comparison then is carried out within these matched pairs or groups. 
If the overlap assumption is satisfied, the comparison is always feasible. If the 
unconfoundedness assumption is satisfied, the outcomes of the matched con-
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trol person or persons can be used as the counterfactual outcomes for the treat-
ed person or persons. There are various matching methods that differ in the 
way they use the control variables and the algorithm they use to find matched 
pairs or groups.
There are two ways to use the control variables in matching. The first one is 
“exact” matching, simple in principle but rarely used in practice. It looks for 
matches that have the exact same control variables. Exact matching is feasible 
if we have relatively few variables that are categorical in nature, and we have a 
large enough sample. One can also make categories out of continuous variables 
and do exact matching on those categories. However, exact matching suffers 
from the “curse of dimensionality”, the problem that it is extremely difficult to 
find exact matches when the number of control variables is large (high-dimen-
sional). That is a serious problem because the number of potential confound-
ing variables is large in most applications, and thus many variables have to be 
controlled for in order to satisfy the unconfoundedness assumption.
Matching on the “propensity score” offers a solution to the curse of dimen-
sionality. The propensity score, introduced by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983), 
(1984), is the probability of program participation as a function of all the con-
trol variables, estimated for each individual (participants and non-participants). 
The method uses the one-dimensional propensity score in place of the many 
control variables. Obviously, two people with the same control variables have 
the same propensity score. But people can have the same propensity score with 
different combinations of the control variables. Less obvious but also true is 
that, from the point of view of program evaluation, comparing two people 
with the same propensity score is practically the same as comparing two peo-
ple with exactly the same control variables even if they actually differ in those 
variables. As a result, matching on the propensity score yields the same results 
as exact matching, at least in theory. The reason is that the propensity score 
contains all the information in the control variables that are relevant for pro-
gram participation. Any remaining differences in the control variables are ir-
relevant from the point of view of program participation and thus do not cause 
any problems for estimating the effect of the program.
Matching on the propensity score solves the curse of dimensionality because 
it reduces the potentially high-dimensional set of confounding variables to a 
single-dimensional variable that is also bounded (it is a probability and is thus 
between zero and one). When implemented, the propensity score is the pre-
dicted left hand-side variable in a probability model (typically probit or logit). 
Perhaps more intuitively, it is a combination of the control variables, like some 
kind of a weighted average. In a sense, variables that are more important in pre-
dicting program participation receive larger weights, and those that are less 
important receive smaller weights. Higher values on some variable can com-
pensate for lower values on other variables and yield the same propensity score.
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The propensity score is a continuous variable in principle. Two people are un-
likely to have the exact same propensity score if the dimension of underlying 
control variables is high. Matching on the propensity score therefore means 
finding matches with a similar but not necessarily the same score. Various 
methods are used to find matches with a similar propensity score.
The most intuitive method is nearest neighbour matching. It takes treated 
individuals one by one and pairs them with the control individual with the 
closest value propensity score. This is a one-to-one matching. Typically, match-
ing is done “with replacement”, which means that control individuals can be 
used to match with multiple treated individuals (controls are replaced to the 
pool of potential matches after they are matched to the treated individual). It 
is also common to specify a maximum distance and leave treated individuals 
unmatched if no match is found within that interval.
In many cases, the control group is many times larger than the treatment 
group. In such cases nearest neighbour matching is inefficient because it leaves 
a lot of potentially useful control individuals unused. Many-to-one methods 
may be more efficient in such cases. One of them specifies an interval around 
the propensity score of each treated individual and matched all control indi-
viduals that fall within that interval. A symmetric procedure, applicable if the 
treatment group is larger than the control group, matches treated individuals 
within an interval around each control. The fourth group of methods yields 
many-to-many matches. One such method specifies intervals of the propensity 
score and compares average outcomes of all treated individuals in the interval 
to the average outcome of all control individuals within the interval.
In ideal circumstances and infinitely large samples, the different matching 
methods should yield very similar results. In small samples and if the uncon-
foundedness assumption is invalid, they can be very different. Choosing among 
the matching methods is not easy therefore if they yield different results. In 
such cases there is always a danger of manipulation, conscious or unconscious: 
Researchers may favour results that confirm their prior expectations (“nice” 
or “meaningful” results). The problem is obvious: it is very possible that the 
unexpected estimates are the ones that are closer to the truth. The problem 
is aggravated by the many modelling choices some matching methods allow 
for (size of the intervals, potential weighting within intervals etc.). In order to 
minimize the role for manipulation, the profession treats matching results as 
credible only if results from many different matching methods are presented 
and they all yield similar results.
Regression methods are alternatives to matching. They use some additional 
technical assumptions, but they are easier to estimate and are somewhat less 
subject to potential manipulation. The unconfoundedness assumption is need-
ed for the regression, too. In regression models, in contrast to matching mod-
els, we have to specify a functional relationship between the expected value of 
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the outcome variable and the confounder variables. The usual choice is a lin-
ear relationship. That is less restrictive than generally thought as it allows for 
nonlinear transformations of the control variables (higher-order polynomials, 
interactions, splines etc.). However, the choice of functional form introduces 
flexibility that can lead to manipulation of the results similarly to the choice 
of the details of the matching methods.
The other difference is that regression models do not explicitly require the 
overlap assumption (the assumption that for any combination of confounding 
factors that are observed for treated individuals we can find control individu-
als with the same confounding factors). Regressions can be estimated without 
technical problems even if there is a range of the value of the right hand-side vari-
ables that correspond to treated or control individuals only. Matching would 
not be able to compare such individuals to anyone and thus they would be left 
out. But they may influence the regression estimates. That is not a problem in 
principle if the functional form assumption behind the regression is correct. 
However, since the functional form is an assumption that is hard to test, the 
influence of those observations may very well bias the results.
It is therefore advised to restrict the regression analysis to treatment and con-
trol observations that share the same value range of the control variables. With 
such preparations and using flexible functional forms, regression estimates for 
the effect of the program yield similar results to matching estimates in gen-
eral. Matching models are surveyed by Imbens (2004), Caliendo and Kopei-
nig (2008) and Imbens and Wooldridge (2009), the latter covering regression 
models in great detail as well.
Matching and regression methods have been the choice of the vast majority of 
ex-post program evaluations. Randomized experiments require close collabo-
ration with the program administrators, and regression-discontinuity design is 
applicable under rare and lucky situations. Matching and regression methods 
are feasible in many more situations. Unfortunately, however, matching and 
regression methods do not necessarily yield credible estimates for the effect of 
programs. The profession is therefore sceptical of the results of such methods 
(LaLonde, 1986, contributed significantly to that scepticism). In order to cir-
cumvent scepticism, evaluations that use regression or matching methods have 
to provide many robustness checks and extra evidence to support their analysis.
In principle, the condition for credible results from matching or regression 
analyses is simple: we have to control for all confounding variables that affect 
program participation and program outcomes at the same time. That is, of course, 
easier said than done. But decades of experience in evaluating active labour mar-
ket programs produced some general guidelines for the kinds of information that 
always needs to be controlled for (see, for example, Heckman, LaLonde and Smith, 
1999). We can summarize those guidelines in three rules. 1. Control and treated 
individuals should belong to the same labour market. 2. Members of the control 
kézdi: Methods for assessing...
59
group have to satisfy all the eligibility criteria of the program, in a similar way to 
participants. 3. The analysis should control for detailed individual labour market 
histories. In the end, evaluations using matching or regression methods have to 
say something about why it is that some individuals participate in the programs 
while others not even though they share the same characteristics. This last require-
ment is often referred to as the need for "exogenous variation" in participation.
The importance of labour market history  
and difference-in-differences analysis
Controlling for labour market histories is important because they contain the 
most important information about individuals’ productivity and labour sup-
ply characteristics, which are in turn the most important determinants of the 
outcome variables. These labour market histories should contain past values 
of the outcome variable (employment, earnings, employment durations), as far 
back in the past as possible.
The simplest method to control for pre-program labour market histories is 
the difference-in-differences (diff-in-diffs or DID) method. In its simplest form, 
diff-in-diffs means measuring the change in the outcome variable from before 
the program to after the program for each individual (the “diffs”), and then 
comparing the average of these changes in the treatment group to the average 
of the changes in the control group (the “diff” in the diffs). This simple method 
meets the unconfoundedness assumption if treatment and control individuals 
who have the same previous value of the outcome variable would end up with 
the same outcome variable later, on average, in the absence of the program. If 
this assumption is true, evidence for significant difference between treated and 
control outcomes after the program are evidence for the effect of the program.
It is of course unlikely that the assumption behind the simplest diff-in-diffs 
model is satisfied. Longer labour market histories and other potential con-
founder variables may also be necessary to control for. If we think that we have 
all those confounding variables observed, we can easily embed the diff-in-diffs 
logic in a matching or a regression context. All that is needed is to include past 
value (or, even better, a series of the past values) of the outcome variable among 
the control variables. Matching on the propensity score uses those control vari-
ables in the estimation of the propensity score, while regressions use them di-
rectly. Heckman et al (1997) provide a convincing argument for the need of 
combining the diff-in-diffs approach with matching.
If the other conditions in the guidelines are not met (same labour market 
and every individual meeting the eligibility criteria), the diff-in-diffs logic can 
increase extra bias in the analysis if it is based on short labour market history. 
The reason is a phenomenon that is called Ashenfelter’s dip after its discoverer 
(Ashenfelter, 1978). The typical active labour market program aims at helping 
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people with labour market disadvantages. Being unemployed during a reference 
period before the program is usually required in order to be eligible for the pro-
gram. As a result of the eligibility rule, all participants were unemployed dur-
ing the reference period. However, if we do not restrict members of the control 
group to those that were unemployed during the same reference period, diff-in-
diffs can lead to a severe overestimation of the employment effect of a program.
In order to see this, assume that members of the control group are from the 
same target group of disadvantaged people as members of the treatment group, 
but control group members do not satisfy the program eligibility criteria. Be-
cause they are from a disadvantaged group, many of them were unemployed 
during the reference period, but some were probably employed (say, 20 per cent). 
If nothing significant happens to the labour market, the fraction of employed 
people would remain the same among them (20 per cent). The participants are 
from the same target group, but none of them were employed during the refer-
ence period. If the program had no effect, the employment rate among them 
would converge to the employment rate of the entire group in the long run (20 
per cent). If the diff-in-diffs comparison compares long-run outcomes to before-
program outcomes measured in the reference period, it would show a positive 
increase (from 0 per cent to 20 per cent) in the treatment group, compared to a 
zero increase in the employment rate in the control group. A simple diff-in-diffs 
comparison would attribute this increase in the employment probability of 20 
per cent to the effect of the program, even though the program had no effect.
In the jargon of econometrics, the problem is that the eligibility criteria make 
the group of participants a selected sample of the target group. The target group 
has a low but non-zero employment probability. The selected sample has zero 
employment probability at baseline by construction. Figures 1.2 and 1.3 show 
examples for Ashenfelter’s dip.
Figure 1.2: Ashenfelter’s dip for the treatment group in a standard training program 
(reproduced from Ashenfelter, 1978)
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Figure 1.3: Ashenfelter’s dip for the experimental control group in a program  
that combines training with employment subsidies  
(reproduced from heckman and Smith, 1998)
The first of the two figures, reproduced from Ashenfelter (1978), shows yearly 
nominal earnings of participants of a standard training program. The program 
started in 1964 and participants had to be unemployed at the starting date. The 
program ended in 1965. There is a significant increase in earnings from that 
point. The dip is in there right before the program, with a break in the trend 
and even a slight decrease in nominal earnings.
The second example is more striking. It shows the dip for an experimental 
control group. The outcome variable is again nominal earnings, monthly earn-
ings in this case. Members of this experimental control group satisfied all the 
eligibility criteria for the program, that is why they show the dip. Month zero 
on the figure denotes the start date of the program, and the eligibility criteria 
included unemployment in the previous six months.
Ashenfelter’s dip is a rather general phenomenon for active labour market 
programs. It is problematic for program evaluation if it affects the treatment 
group but not the control group. There are two kinds of “remedies” to this prob-
lem. One trivial way out is making sure that members in the control group are 
subject to the same eligibility criteria as members of the treatment group. The 
other one is avoiding diff-in-diffs-type comparisons to recent outcome variables 
and, instead, taking significantly longer labour market histories into account.
Indirect effects
The question analysed so far was the effect of the program on its participants. 
The social benefits and costs of programs include the effects on non-partici-
pants too. Take the example of an active labour market program that increas-
es the employment prospects of its participants. From a social point of view, 
it is important whether that increase is due to creation of new jobs or filling a 
fixed number of jobs with program participants instead of non-participants.
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Indirect effects are the effects of a program on non-participants. Potential 
indirect effects include so-called displacement or substitution effects, when 
program participants take jobs that would otherwise be filled with other peo-
ple, thereby displacing them. Partial equilibrium effects occur when the direct 
effect of the program leads to a significant increase of effective labour supply in 
a labour market. Such an increased labour supply can affect wages (a large in-
crease in employment may put downward pressure on wages), which may feed 
back to the labour supply of other people, etc., until a new equilibrium is reached. 
General equilibrium effects occur when the program affects other markets as 
well, for example, by using resources that would be used elsewhere otherwise.
Indirect effects cannot be measured by simply comparing outcomes of par-
ticipants and non-participants even in randomized experiments. Moreover, 
indirect effects may distort the proper measurement of the direct effects. Take 
the example of an employment subsidy program that increases the probability 
of employment of participants by ten percentage points. Assume, however, the 
worst: All of that increase was achieved by displacing other people without any 
new job creation. The net employment effect is therefore zero per cent in the 
society. Take an experimental control group that would be ideal for any impact 
assessment study. It may be, however, that the control group includes people 
who were displaced by the program participants, i.e. who would have found a 
job in the absence of the program but did not find one because of it. If the pro-
gram or the control group is large enough, we can expect many such people 
to be included in the control group. The effect of the program on the average 
employment probability in the control group is, therefore negative. If we com-
pare the employment of the treatment group to the employment of the control 
group, the estimated effect of the program would be more than 10 per cent.
This latter problem is not easy to handle. If the treatment and control groups 
are small relative to the size of the labour market, the bias is likely to be insig-
nificant. Ignoring potential indirect effects when estimating the direct effects 
is not a grave mistake in such cases, and most studies do just that. If the program 
is very large, though one has to deal with the problem, and that’s not easy. One 
solution is comparing treated and control people across labour markets when 
estimating the direct effect in order to avoid the bias outlined in the previous 
paragraph. But that may introduce other problems, as it fails to satisfy the require-
ment for comparing people within the same labour market in the case of non-ex-
perimental evaluations. One strategy that circumvents all these problems would 
randomize treatment not across individuals but across labour markets. In such a 
design, the program is implemented in randomly selected local labour markets, 
and outcomes from control labour markets are used to evaluate the net effects 
of the program. Blundell et al. (2004) use a similar, although non-experimental 
design to evaluate the direct and indirect effects of a comprehensive job search 
program in the U.K. Their evidence clearly shows the lack of indirect effects.
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That finding is not uncommon in the literature: however worrisome indirect 
effects may be in principle, they may be less of a problem in practice. But that 
is not always the case. Employment subsidy programs are sometimes prone to 
produce displacement effects. Large programs can affect equilibrium wages, 
which may create partial equilibrium effects.
There are programs that, by their sheer magnitude, are very likely to exert indi-
rect effects on other markets, creating general equilibrium consequences. Unfor-
tunately, statistical methods are not useful to measure such effects. The thought 
experiment to measure would require recording outcomes on various markets in 
an economy in the absence of the program and compare them to outcomes after 
the program. This thought experiment cannot be made operational in any way 
(except for fundamentally problematic cross-country comparisons). The fact that 
they are impossible to measure does not mean that one should not think about 
such effects when the programs are very large. Albrecht, van der Berg and Vro-
man (2004) analyse the equilibrium effects of an ambitious Swedish training 
program using a calibrated macro-model, and they present qualitative evidence 
on effects on other markets (the demand for teachers in the program is likely to 
have led to a decrease in high quality schoolteachers in public education).
Conclusion
This chapter gave a brief and not very technical introduction to the methods 
of impact assessment studies, with a special focus on the evaluation of active 
labour market programs. Much of the chapter focused on direct effects on pro-
gram participants and it covered indirect effects briefly in a separate section. 
Besides introducing the methods, the chapter highlighted that not all meth-
ods are equally credible.
Randomized controlled experiments are the most credible for assessing the 
impact of a social program. They are also the simplest to analyse, leaving less 
room for ex post manipulation than other methods. In the context of evalu-
ating social programs, randomized experiments have been somewhat rare, in 
part because of practical problems. However, those problems can be more often 
overcome than many researchers and program administrators think. Rand-
omized controlled experiments have been applied in the most successful dem-
onstration studies, and they are becoming more and more common for testing 
new programs and assessing older programs worldwide.
Of the non-experimental methods, regression-discontinuity design offers 
the most credible identification when it is applicable. An important disad-
vantage of regression-discontinuity is that it identifies the effect for a subset 
of the participants (those who are around the threshold). But, for that subset, 
the identification is credible.
In principle, matching and regression methods are more flexible non-ex-
perimental methods, and they can identify the effects for many groups of par-
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ticipants and non-participants. However, their application rests on the un-
confoundedness assumption, which is fundamentally untestable. Of the two, 
matching has the advantage of being free of any functional form assumption. 
On the other hand, they often require large samples, and they offer many mod-
elling choices that may lead to publication biases. Regression models are sim-
pler to estimate, but they are not free from modelling choices either, and they 
require functional form assumptions that are hard to test. An important ad-
vantage to matching models relative to regressions is that they make the need 
for comparable individuals explicit. When evaluating active labour market 
programs with results that need to make the unconfoundedness assumption, 
guidelines help for informing as to which factors one should control for. Econo-
mists also converged to the view that it makes a lot of sense to combine match-
ing and regression methods, especially if pre-program outcomes are also taken 
into account as in diff-in-diffs models.
As it should be clear for the reader at this point, the methodological require-
ments for statistical impact evaluation studies are rather strict. One often hears 
opinions stating that statistical studies that want to meet these strict meth-
odological criteria are ones from the many possible approaches, and they may 
be substituted by more qualitative analyses that could produce equally valu-
able results.
Such statements confuse two arguments, one of which is true and one, as I 
will argue, is false and dangerous. Statistical impact assessment studies that 
want to meet the strict methodological criteria cannot uncover all the evidence 
that may be useful in understanding the impact of a program. Qualitative evi-
dence is very often needed to complement statistical analyses. Quite often, sta-
tistical evaluations cannot be carried out in a sound way. In those cases some 
qualitative evidence is usually more informative than nothing.
Not all methods are created equal, however. Strict scientific criteria are nec-
essary to differentiate between sound analysis and opinion. Without methodo-
logical criteria, how could we tell which result is credible and which is not? By 
the authority of the analyst? Or whether the results match the prior opinion of 
administrators or whoever commissioned the study? The essence of scientific 
inquiry is to set up rules that need to be met in order for results to be credible. 
The fact that most program evaluation studies cannot meet all the rules does 
not mean that they should not aspire to do that.
It is important to know the effects of social programs that spend taxpayers’ 
money on people in need for help. The methods outlined above require statisti-
cal training, but they are not extremely complicated. While the most credible 
evaluations require substantial amounts of money and organizational input, 
these resources are negligible in comparison to the budget of the programs 
and their potential social impact. There is little excuse not to aim for sound 
impact assessment studies.
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2. IntErnAtIonAL EvIdEncE on thE IMPAct  
oF ActIvE LAbour MArkEt ProGrAMS
Péter Hudomiet & Gábor Kézdi
Introduction
This chapter provides an international overview of the impact of labour mar-
ket programs. We emphasize the results of evaluation studies that use credible 
identification strategies. We show examples of the four program types (train-
ing, wage subsidy, employment services and public works) and we compare 
their effectiveness to each other.
First, we analyse three complex and targeted programs, the Job Corps and 
the National Supported Work programs from the United States and the New 
Deal for Young People from Britain. Then we describe the large scale national 
programs of Sweden, Denmark and Switzerland. We present evidence from 
training programs in a separate section. We describe the labour market pro-
grams of post-socialist countries in the last section.
This chapter builds on a previous paper of ours (Hudomiet and Kézdi, 2008) 
published in the online journal “Kormányzás, Közpénzügyek, Szabályozás” 
[Governance, Public Finance and Regulation] in Hungarian. In that paper, we 
overview more evaluation studies and more programs, and we describe them 
in more detail. The conclusions of that paper are, of course, the same.
Well-designed complex programs
First, we analyse three programs that combine multiple program types and add 
additional elements to them, such as stipends, counselling, etc. These programs 
are typically well organized, small and relatively expensive. All three programs 
are designed in a way that facilitates their evaluation. Partly for this reason and 
partly because of the quality of the evaluation studies, we have a good under-
standing of their impacts.
Job Corps (United States)
The Job Corps program was launched in 1964, and it continues to this day. Its 
target group is 16–24 year old young people, typically high school dropouts, 
who are unemployed or employed at low wages. The Job Corps is a six month 
intensive training program. One part of the curriculum focuses on general 
skills, while the other part is flexible. Counselling and placement assistance 
are essential parts of the program. These build on the established network of 
Job Corps. Participation in the program is free of charge, and the majority of 
the participants live in dormitories where they are provided with additional 
benefits such as meals and sports facilities. Practically, participants in the dor-
mitories are also under 24 hours of supervision.
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The Job Corps is a federally initiated and federally financed program. The 
first extensive studies in the eighties found the program largely successful (La-
Londe, 1995). The success led to a large increase of the budget that turned Job 
Corps into a rather large scale program. It covers 60.000 young Americans per 
year, with an overall budget of about $1.5 billion.
More recent evaluations use data from a randomized controlled experiment 
called the National Job Corps Study. The data collection started in the mid-
nineties, and the first results were published between 2001 and 2003. The re-
sults created a lively discussion both among academics (mostly economists) and 
policy makers. The data covers 9000 participants and a randomized control 
group of 6000. Individuals were followed for four years following the comple-
tion of the program. Attrition from the survey is not negligible, which, as we 
shall see, may distort the results.
Using the survey data, Gritz and Johnson (2001) found that program par-
ticipants’ weekly earnings were $20–$25 higher four years after the program 
than earnings of the control group. They found that participants of vocational 
training earned $40–$50 more in a week than the control group, while those 
who finished high-school during the program earned $60–$70 more than the 
control group. They also found that earnings of other groups did not change 
significantly due to the program. Using the same data, McConnell and Glaz-
erman (2001) made a cost-benefit analysis. The benefit part included increased 
earnings of the participants, decreased receipt of transfers and other social 
expenditures and decreasing involvement in crime. The preferred estimate 
of the study suggests that the social benefit of the program exceeded its cost, 
but a large part of the benefit was non-monetary. The analysis is based on the 
assumption that the earnings premium of participants would never decline. 
In a specification where the authors assume that the earning premium would 
drop to zero after four years, the estimated rate of return of the program is zero.
Schochet, Burghardt and McConnell (2006) show that the early evaluations 
based on the National Job Corps Study overestimated the benefits of the pro-
gram. Instead of survey data, they used more reliable administrative data from 
the Social Security Administration. This data also covers a longer time ho-
rizon and it does not suffer from survey attrition. The results show that the 
earnings premium of program participants was much smaller than indicated 
by the previous studies, in large part because the premium strongly declined 
after four years. The preferred estimates of the study indicate a net positive ef-
fect on participants but a net negative effect on society. They also indicate that 
the program was most beneficial for the older 20–24 year old group where the 
net social benefit was positive, too.
Important reasons for the initial success of the Job Corps program may have 
been its small scale and careful targeting. It makes perfect political sense that, 
after the early successes, the program was enlarged to offer opportunities to 
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more and more people. It seems, however, that as the program grew in size, 
targeting became less successful and the program lost efficiency. In this light, 
it is remarkable that the program is still socially beneficial for a subset of the 
target group.
National Supported Work (United States)
The National Supported Work (NSW) program is perhaps the most widely 
analysed among the active labour market programs. The NSW was designed 
for demonstrative purposes. The goal of the program was to equip hard-to-em-
ploy people to obtain and hold normal, unsubsidized jobs. The target groups 
were AFDC recipient women (poor single mothers), former drug users, ex-in-
mates, high school dropouts and the very-long term unemployed. Joblessness 
for a certain amount of time was a criterion in all cases.
The NSW was an employment subsidy program with additional elements. 
Participants were guaranteed a job for 9–18 months with a private employer. 
During this time the program covered all labour costs. The program followed 
the individuals throughout their participation in the program and held weekly 
group meetings with them. Initial wages paid to participants were lower than 
the market rate, but they rose relatively rapidly. The job was guaranteed dur-
ing the program, but once the program was over, participants were left on their 
own to keep their jobs, now as regular employment, or find a new job. Women 
were typically employed in unskilled clerical jobs in services while men typi-
cally worked in construction.
The demonstration feature of the program meant that the criteria for cred-
ible evaluation were built into the design of the program. Applicants were 
randomly selected into a treated group and into a control group, and detailed 
information was collected about them.
The impact of the program was a significant increase in employment prospects. 
LaLonde (1986) showed that average earnings of treated women exceeded av-
erage earnings of the control group by $850 a year after the program, and the 
difference prevailed for subsequent years. The mean effect for men was similar, 
$880, but higher heterogeneity of wages made the point estimate less reliable. 
The differences between participants and the control group were mostly due to 
differences in the employment rates (non-employed individuals were entered 
with zero earnings into the figures above). Figure 2.1 shows the evolution of 
employment rates on a monthly basis.
Employment rates were the same (and very low) before the program. 90 per 
cent of the treatment group started employment with the program. Their em-
ployment rate declined throughout the program, and it reached 65 per cent at 
the end of the subsidized period. Once the program was over, employment of 
the treatment group fell to 40 per cent. In the 24th month, that is, 12 months af-
ter the program ended, the employment rate of the treatment group was rough-
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ly 10 percentage points higher than the employment rate of the control group. 
The medium-run effect of the program, thus, was about a 10 percentage point 
increase (almost a third in relative terms) in the probability of employment.
Figure 2.1: Employment rates among treated and control women in the nSW  
before the experiment (months –12–0), during the experiment (months 0–12)  
and after the experiment (months 12–26)
Source: Replication of Figure 1 of Ham and LaLonde (1996) p. 182.
Figure 2.1 points at three other issues that are interesting. First, the employ-
ment rate was zero only at the beginning of the program and a couple of months 
earlier. It was positive before and after this period even in the control group. 
This is a nice illustration of Ashenfelter’s dip that has already been introduced 
in the first chapter. In order to be eligible for the program, individuals had to 
be out of work for a couple of months. The same was not required for the pre-
ceding time periods, and some people from the target group were indeed then 
employed. It is thus natural that some people in the control group, after real-
izing that they would not participate in subsidized employment, find regu-
lar non-subsidized jobs. Their non-zero employment rate is analogous to the 
non-zero employment rate long before the program. Zero employment at the 
beginning of the program creates a “dip”. By this argument, the dip should be 
symmetric in the experimental control group, and in many cases it is indeed 
symmetric. That is obviously not the case here.
The second remarkable feature of the figure is the strong asymmetry in Ashen-
felter’s dip. The employment rate of the control group jumps to significantly 
higher than its pre-program level: to 15 per cent four months following the 
start of the program and 20 per cent in the 12th month at the termination of 
the program, compared to the 5 per cent level 12 months before the start of 
the program. Many factors may explain this significant increase. Most likely 
among them is a general improvement in economic conditions. That can also 
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explain the fact that employment in the control group kept increasing after the 
end of the program. Due to this trend in economic conditions the employment 
prospects of the target group would have improved significantly even in the 
absence of the program. Changes in the economic conditions do not invali-
date the analysis here because the target and the control groups were affected 
by the same conditions. On the other hand, such potential changes highlight 
the need for a properly chosen control group.
The third interesting feature of the figure is a drop in the employment rate of 
the treatment group after the end of the program, a further decrease and then a 
moderate increase. The reason for the drop is that many program participants 
were not offered the option of staying with the employer they were assigned to, 
and they could not immediately find alternative jobs for themselves. Some of 
them, though, eventually managed to return to employment.
The results of the NSW program evaluation are quite optimistic. The program 
positively affected the employment prospects of the participants, especially for 
AFDC recipient women. According to the estimates of Ham and LaLonde 
(1996), the program increased the duration of employment spells, indicating 
that the increased employment prospects were due to increased skills that could 
lead to more stable jobs for many participants. The results also highlight what 
a successful program can do. The estimated impact is a 10 percentage point 
increase of a baseline 30 per cent employment probability. This is a significant 
increase but far from what full employment would require.
New Deal for Young People (United Kingdom)
The United Kingdom has operated active labour market programs since the 
1980s to reduce the unemployment rate of the young. The New Deal for 
Young People program was introduced in 1998 in order to help the disad-
vantaged youth find regular employment. It was built on the experience of 
the previous British programs as well as the Job Corps. The New Deal for 
Young People is a complex program. Participation is mandatory for every 
18–24 year old who has been unemployed for six months (noncompliance 
leads to the withdrawal of other social transfers), but certain groups can join 
the program even earlier.
The program consists of three phases. The first phase is called the Gateway 
period. During its four months, everyone is linked to a personal consultant 
who tries to provide help and incentives to find a job. People can participate 
in short term training as well, in subjects such as computer usage. Those who 
fail to find a job during this period enter the second phase, in which they are 
offered four options: subsidized employment in the private sector, full time 
training, subsidized employment in the non-profit sector, and public work in 
environmental projects. In certain cases people can also stay in the first phase 
and continue searching for unsubsidized jobs. The second phase typically lasts 
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for six months, after which people enter the third phase. The third phase is 
similar to the first one, with job search help.
Because participation in the program is mandatory, it is not easy to find an 
appropriate control group for evaluation purposes. However, certain features 
of the program can help identify its impact. The first feature is the age restric-
tion. The target group is the 18–24 year old population, and those who are 25 
years old or older are excluded. It seems a reasonable assumption that the 24 
and the 25 year old population are more or less similar, and a regression dis-
continuity design can exploit this characteristic of the program. The second 
feature is that while the program started in the country in April, 1998, it was 
launched three months earlier in 12 locations. With the help of some assump-
tions and appropriate matching methods, this three-month period can be used 
to estimate the effect of the early launches.
De Giorgi (2005) used the regression discontinuity design in his analysis with 
the threshold of age 25. It is a sharp design as participation in the program is 
mandatory for those below the age threshold and satisfying the eligibility crite-
ria, while those who would be eligible otherwise but are 25 already cannot par-
ticipate. The sharp feature of the regression-discontinuity lends itself to a quite 
simple and precise statistical method to analyse the local effect of the program 
on the 24 year old population. De Giorgi (2005) found that the program raised 
the employment rate by 6–7 percentage points, which is a quite remarkable in-
crease for a large program. However, regression discontinuity can identify the 
effect on the 24 year old but not on other age groups. Moreover, the estimates 
are biased if there is a displacement effect of the program, i.e., if program par-
ticipants found jobs at the expense of the 25 year-old population. If they are sig-
nificant, displacement effects make estimated effects larger than the true situ-
ation because the employment chances of the 24 year old are compared to the 
decreased employment rate of the 25 year old instead of the appropriate coun-
terfactual that would occur in the absence of the program. As we shall see later, 
there is no evidence that the New Deal for Young People program would have 
any displacement effects.
Blundell et al. (2004) and Van Reenen (2001) analysed both the direct and 
the indirect effects of the Gateway phase of the program. Both papers used the 
pilot program in which 12 regions started the program earlier than the rest 
of the U.K. Comparing early starter regions to appropriately chosen control 
regions can identify both the direct and the indirect effects of the program. 
These papers found that the Gateway phase lead to an increase in the employ-
ment rate in the target group by 4–5 percentage points. The indirect effect of 
the program, at least as measured for in 1998, was negligible. This finding re-
inforces the results of De Giorgi (2005).
In the second phase of the New Deal for Young People program, participants 
could choose from four options. Dorsett (2004) used administrative data and 
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propensity score matching to compare the effectiveness of these four differ-
ent options. The study aimed at estimating the relative effect of the four New 
Deal options, i.e. how people who chose a particular option would have done 
had they chosen another option. He found that the private sector wage subsi-
dy programs worked considerably better compared to the other three options 
that were otherwise quite similar to each other.
Beyond the quantitative evidence, the program seems successful and enjoy-
able based on the opinion surveys. The most successful part seems to be the 
first Gateway phase, which is also significantly cheaper than the second phase. 
In the second phase, the private sector wage subsidies seem to work the best, 
although due to the limited number of offers only a smaller fraction of the par-
ticipants could choose this option.
Large national programs
While the active labour market programs in the United States and in the United 
Kingdom focus on specific problems or specific age groups, countries in conti-
nental Europe usually have large scale national programs. They contain a big 
set of program types and participation is relatively open. These national pro-
grams are not complex and the target groups typically receive only one type of 
treatment at any one time. These programs are usually not targeted and the 
treatment is not individual specific but general.
Sweden
The Swedish national programs are perhaps the best documented, this is our 
reason to describe them in detail. We will briefly talk about the programs in 
Denmark and in Switzerland afterwards.
By the end of the 1990s, active labour market programs of Sweden were 
among the largest in the world. In 1997 when the unemployment rate exceeded 
10 per cent, 4.5 per cent of the population participated in various labour mar-
ket programs, with monetary costs of 3 per cent of the GDP (Sianesi, 2002a). 
Since then these numbers have declined, but Sweden still spends more on these 
programs than most other European countries. Sweden provides a textbook 
example of the large scale national programs.
The registered unemployed are automatically and continuously assisted in 
job search. Besides giving information about vacancies at local employers, they 
are also provided with services to help job search and boost motivation. One 
feature of the Swedish system is that these services are not even considered to 
be labour market programs since they are part of the unemployment benefit 
system. As a consequence, all other labour market programs are compared to 
this reference program, unlike in other countries where the counterfactual 
state of a program does not involve official help in job search. The unemployed 
are also informed about training programs, employment subsidies and public 
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work programs. Another important feature of the Swedish system is that par-
ticipation in these programs is monetarily incentivized in a way that makes 
them more beneficial than regular unemployment.
Larrson (2000) studied a typical Swedish training program for the 18–24 
year old group. The program was very large with approximately 200,000 par-
ticipants. The author argued that many people participated in the program 
because of the monetary benefits only, and this feature had negative effects 
on the success of the program. The evaluation method was a propensity score 
matching method with a large set of variables. Her results suggested that the 
training program actually decreased both the employment rate and the earn-
ings of the training group in the short run (1 year), while the effect was zero in 
the long run (2 year). Larrson (2000) also looked at a wage subsidy program 
where her estimates were slightly positive but very imprecise so that the point 
estimates were not statistically significant.
Regner (2002) analysed the effect of vocational and general training programs 
using data from 1987–1992. He used a version of the difference-in-difference 
method. Similarly to Larrson (2000) he did not find a positive treatment ef-
fect. Frederiksson and Johansson (2003), using regression based methodology 
and data from 1993–1997, found negative effects: both the training and the 
employment subsidy programs decreased the chance of finding jobs later. They 
speculate that the negative effect is a consequence of decreasing geographical 
mobility of the treatment group.
Although the majority of the papers find zero or negative effects for the Swed-
ish programs, the effects of some programs on some demographic groups may 
be positive. Sianesi (2001), using the propensity score matching method, looked 
at those who became unemployed for the first time in their careers. She found 
that the wage subsidy programs significantly increased the employment rate 
in this group (by as much as 25 percentage points). Similarly to other studies 
she found the other program types ineffective.
Most evaluation studies argue that the Swedish labour market programs are 
ineffective partly because of the incentives in the system. The main message 
is that if organizers provide monetary incentives for participants and anyone 
can join a program then the program can easily turn ineffective as people may 
not use the services in the right way. As we will see later, this mechanism is 
supported by findings from other countries as well. Another explanation for 
the failure of the Swedish programs is their lack of targeting.
Denmark
According to evaluation results, the Danish programs were more successful. 
Denmark is among the countries that spend the most on active labour market 
programs by international comparison. From the mid 1990’s, the unemployed 
in Denmark had to participate in a labour market program every year (later 
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every half year) in order to remain eligible for UI benefits. Jespersen et al. (2004) 
analysed the effect of classroom training and on-the-job training programs on 
earnings and employment prospects. They followed the treatment group and a 
control group for six years after the program and they used a propensity score 
matching method with a large set of variables. According to their results, the 
most successful programs were the private on-the-job training programs that 
turned positive after one year and led to a 10 per cent wage increase for the treat-
ment group after the third year. The second most successful programs were the 
classroom training programs that turned positive in the second year with an 8 
per cent wage gain. The public on-the-job training program also had a positive 
effect after four years at a 5 per cent level.
Geerdsen and Holm (2004) analysed the employment effects of Danish train-
ing programs and employment subsidy programs. Using data from 1995–1998 
and a regression based method they found that program participants increased 
their job search effort even before the programs started. They found that the 
success of these programs was partly coming from these early effects. An ex-
planation for this is the mandatory nature of the programs. People who do 
not want to participate in labour market programs will increase their effort 
to find a job just to avoid participation. Similar effects have been documented 
in other mandatory programs in other countries as well. These results suggest 
that compulsory programs have an indirect but definitely positive effect on 
labour market outcomes.
Switzerland
Switzerland reformed its unemployment insurance system in 1997 and in-
creased the importance of its active labour market programs. These programs 
are organized by individual cantons but the regulation is federal. Participation 
is mandatory for roughly 15 per cent of the unemployed. The largest programs 
are the training programs that are typically composed of short classroom train-
ing, but there are employment subsidy programs in both the private and the 
non-profit sector as well.
Lalive at al. (2002) used regressions to analyse the effect of the programs on 
the duration of unemployment spells. He found the programs largely ineffec-
tive. The only subgroup with partial success was the immigrants for whom the 
wage subsidy programs seemingly worked.
Frölich and Lechner (2004) used regression-discontinuity design to analyse 
the effects of employment subsidy programs at private and non-profit firms. 
Importantly for their analysis, participation in such programs is mandatory 
in some cantons but not in others. The identification strategy used disconti-
nuity at canton borders: participation is mandatory for unemployed people 
living on one side of the border but it is voluntary for unemployed people on 
the other side. The method can identify the treatment effects for those living 
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close to canton borders and would participate in the program if it is manda-
tory but not if voluntary. The results suggest that the employment subsidy 
programs had a substantial effect (15 percentage points) on the employment 
rate. While these results are not entirely in line with the findings of Lalive 
at al. (2002), both studies find that the wage subsidy programs might work 
in Switzerland.
Training programs
Job Training Partnership Act (United States)
The United States has organized federal training programs since the 1960s. 
The literature usually refers to these programs by the law that enacted them. 
The first law was called Manpower Development and Training Act (MDTA) 
in 1962. This was replaced by the Economic Opportunity Act in 1964. The 
Job Corps program that we have been discussing earlier was initiated within 
this act. The next law was the Comprehensive Employment and Training Act 
(CETA) from 1973 to 1982, then the Job Training Partnership Act (JTPA) 
from 1982 to 1998. The most recent law is called the Workforce Investment 
Act (WIA) and has been in effect since 1998.
These laws determine the institutional framework and the goals of the differ-
ent sub-programs. Although the programs are organized federally, the actual 
training and related services are provided by more than 600 private and pub-
lic institutions locally. As a result, the programs show significant geographic 
heterogeneity. The programs can be differentiated by the type of service and 
by groups they target. Participation in the programs has been increasing; and 
at present one million Americans are involved.
Within the JTPA a controlled experiment was carried out involving 16 train-
ing centres between 1987 and 1989. This experiment was called the National 
JTPA Study. The long-run results of the experiment were published in a 1996 
GAO report. The most important findings were the following. Overall, the 
programs had a short-run positive effect on both employment and earnings, 
but the long-run effects were smaller and not statistically different from zero. 
The effects were more positive for women, and there were little if any effects 
on young participants regardless of their gender.
Figures 2.2 and 2.3 show male and female earnings from three years before 
the program through the 5 years following the program. The earnings of the 
non-employed are counted as zeros. The figures show the short-run positive 
effects and their decrease over time. They also show a marked decrease before 
the program (especially among men) and marked increase after the program 
both for participants and the control group: this is Ashenfelter’s dip discussed 
above. At the end of the 5th year the earnings difference between participants 
and the control groups is not statistically significant.
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Figure 2.2: Yearly earnings of males in the treatment and the control groups  
in the JtPA program
Source: GAO (1996), pp. 5, Figure 1.
Figure 2.3: Yearly earnings of females in the treatment and the control groups  
in the JtPA program
Source: GAO (1996), pp. 6, Figure 2.
Heckman et al. (2000), however, are critical about these conclusions. They 
point to important biases due to the program substitution and attrition from 
the program. The first means that some people in the control group actually re-
ceived treatment through other programs. The second point means that some 
members of the randomly selected treatment group did not receive treatment 
in the end. For this reason the controlled experiment identifies the intent-to-
treat effect and not the actual effect of the training on program participants. 
The authors claim that the effect of these two biases is substantial.
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According to their estimates, 27–40 per cent of the control group received 
some treatment. At the same time, only 49–60 per cent of the treatment group 
received the treatment. These numbers are very far from the theoretical 0 and 
100 per cent. When the authors estimate the treatment effects using these 
treatment probabilities, they found substantially stronger positive impacts in 
all groups, young or adults, men or women.
Eberwein et al. (1997) aimed at uncovering the mechanism behind the posi-
tive employment effect of the programs. Their question was whether employ-
ment increased because employment spells became longer or unemployment 
spells became shorter. Longer employment spells would be evidence for in-
creased productivity, while decreased unemployment spells would suggest more 
efficient search. They found that the duration of the employment spells did not 
increase significantly, but the length of the unemployment spells shortened. 
Ham and Lalonde (1996), using the same techniques, analysed the effect of the 
NSW program and found the opposite effect. According to their results, the 
NSW program increased the duration of the employment spells while it did 
not affect the unemployment spells. Taken together, these two studies suggest 
that the complex and targeted NSW program likely increased the productivity 
of the participants, but the JTPA training programs only helped people find 
jobs more easily and quickly.
Worker Profiling and Re-employment Services (United States)
Black et al. (2003) analysed the Worker Profiling and Re-employment Services 
(WPRS) program that has taken place in Kentucky since 1994. The program 
consisted of a 4 to 6 hours long counselling session and consequent training. 
The program started as a mandatory program for the long-term unemployed, 
but it soon turned out that they did not have enough capacities. For this rea-
son the program become mandatory only for specific target groups. Based on 
a priori estimates the organizers profiled the unemployed into groups based 
on the expected duration of their unemployment. From these estimated dura-
tions a few groups were created, and the treatment groups were selected based 
on which group people belonged to (the group with the highest expected du-
rations received treatment first, the second highest next, etc.). For those who 
were selected, participation was compulsory. The number of the groups was 
small, and selection to the program was often randomized in order to break ties. 
These randomized selection events created an experiment that helped identify 
the effect of the program.
The authors found that participants found jobs in a significantly faster way. 
This led to lower social costs and an increase in the employment rate of the target 
group. They also found a remarkable result: the majority of the increase in the 
employment rate could be attributed to those who left the program (by finding 
a job) before it actually started. The most important effect of the program, thus, 
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was not due to the enhanced job search skills of the participants. Instead, the 
program made some people look for a job in order to avoid participating in it.
Knowledge Lift (Sweden)
The Knowledge Lift, a program “unprecedented in its size and scope” (Albrecht 
et al., 2004) was launched in 1997 by the dramatic extension of the existing 
Swedish training programs. It aimed at raising the general skill levels of the 
undereducated Swedish adults in Swedish and English languages, maths, etc. 
The program ran with more than 200,000 participants until 2002, a number 
that is remarkably high even in Sweden. As a comparison the total number of 
students in Swedish high schools is 300,000.
Albrecht et al. (2004) estimated the direct effect of the program by propen-
sity score matching method, and they assessed the general equilibrium effect 
by a calibrated macroeconomic model. Because of the long history of labour 
market programs, most of the long-term unemployed had already participat-
ed in some of those programs before the Knowledge Lift. This fact made the 
evaluation difficult as the authors restricted the analysis to treated and con-
trol individuals without such history. The results of the study suggest that 
the Knowledge Lift did not increase the earnings of any age groups or any 
gender, but it helped the employment prospects of young (25–40 year old) 
males. According to the general equilibrium analysis, the program led to a 
shift in labour demand for skilled occupations. Another important effect is 
that the program created a large demand for teachers that led to significant 
shortages in high schools.
Evidence from post-communist countries
Active labour market programs are significant in most of the post-communist 
countries of Central and Eastern Europe. In terms of total spending relative 
to the total cost of unemployment benefits, they are comparable to other con-
tinental European countries. Relative to GDP, though, their active labour 
market programs are smaller. Programs in Central and Eastern Europe are 
typical examples of the large scale national programs. At the beginning of the 
1990s they were mostly targeted to the unemployed who had lost their jobs 
due to the structural transformation of the former socialist economies. Later 
the programs started focusing on minorities, on the disabled, on the young 
and on other special groups. All types of active labour market programs have 
been widespread in post-communist countries, including general and voca-
tional training programs, wage subsidies, assistance of the self-employed and 
public work programs.
An important conclusion of the program evaluation literature is that the 
effectiveness of the programs largely depends on details of the organization, 
incentives and other regulatory issues. Since unemployment was a new phe-
in focus
78
nomenon, it took a considerable amount of time to build up appropriate insti-
tutions and streamline procedures. Consequently, the early programs in the 
region were often even less effective than their Western European counterparts.
Unfortunately, similarly to most continental European countries, the active 
labour market programs in Central and Eastern Europe were not evaluated by 
credible studies in the 1990s. There are signs of progress after 2000 but ran-
domised experiments are still very rare, and the quality of the available data is 
very weak for non-experimental evaluations. Nevertheless, we describe some 
studies not because of the credibility of the evaluations but because of the rel-
evance of the programs for the Hungarian experience.
East Germany
Active labour market programs immediately appeared in East Germany after 
the unification of the country in 1990. The largest programs were the voca-
tional training programs, but there existed general training programs, wage 
subsidy programs and public works programs as well. At the beginning of the 
1990s, vocational training programs focused on retraining the unemployed for 
other occupations. Participants of these programs received a stipend that was 
larger than the unemployment benefit, and participation counted as employ-
ment for the renewal of unemployment benefits.
Bergemann at al. (2005) used a propensity score matching method with data 
including long labour market histories. They analysed programs that ran at the 
beginning and at the end of the 1990s. They found that training programs had 
zero or at most a marginally positive effect on employment rates. According 
to their results, the small positive effects on employment came from decreased 
duration of unemployment spells, without any effect on employment spells. 
In other words, participants could find jobs a little easier, but they could not 
hold on to their jobs longer. This suggests that the programs did not increase 
the skill level of the treatment group. Instead, it increased participants’ efforts 
or efficacy in job search. At the end of the 1990s when programs shrank in size 
but became more complex and more costly, the analysis found a weak positive 
effect on the duration of employment spells as well.
Poland
The early Polish programs were described by O’Leary (1997) and Puhani (1998). 
Poland had all the major types of active labour market programs. At the be-
ginning of the 1990s, retraining programs were the largest. Similarly to the 
early East German programs, participants in Poland received a stipend that 
was higher than the unemployment benefit. The wage subsidy programs sub-
sidized all wage and social security costs of employment up to 150 per cent of 
the average wage in the country. Beyond training and wage subsidy, there were 
programs to assist the self-employed and public works as well.
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Several studies analysed the effects of these programs, for example O’Leary 
(1998a), Puhani (1998) and Kluve et al. (2004). They all used non-experimen-
tal methods (propensity score matching method or regression models), but 
data quality in all cases was rather weak. The results of these studies are often 
contradictory, except that they all agree that the public works programs were 
ineffective in Poland. The more reliable papers found that the wage subsidy 
programs were also unsuccessful. Some of the evaluations showed short run 
positive effects for retraining programs, but medium and long-run effects were 
not analysed due to the unavailability of data.
A Hungarian study
O’Leary (1998b) analysed the labour market programs of Hungary in the mid-
1990’s. Hungary is also among the countries that have offered a wide range of 
program types. The popular retraining programs of the 90s, similarly to other 
countries in the region, offered a stipend that was higher than the unemploy-
ment benefits. The wage subsidy programs were less generous than elsewhere, 
with employers obliged to make up for at least half of the labour costs. Due 
to the quality of the available data the results of the evaluation study are not 
particularly credible. The study suggests that self-employment assistance in-
creased the employment rate of the participants but it decreased their earn-
ings. The training programs may have had some small positive effects, while the 
wage subsidy program decreased the employment rate but increased earnings.
Romania
Active labour market programs grew rapidly in Romania after a reform in 1997. 
The largest were the training programs, both general and vocational, but all 
other program types were offered as well.
Planas and Benus (2006) analysed programs between 1999 and 2002 using 
a propensity score matching method. Their data were richer than the Polish 
and Hungarian data, with information about the labour market histories of 
individuals. Unfortunately, their sample was rather small which made their 
estimates imprecise. They found that the programs assisting small businesses 
increased the employment rate of the participants but they did not influence 
their earnings. The results suggest that the employment and relocation ser-
vices were also beneficial, the training programs had a small and statistically 
insignificant effect, and the public works programs were rather detrimental.
Slovakia
The most reliable analysis of the active labour market programs of Slovakia from 
the 1990s is by Ours (2000). Slovakia also used all the major program types, 
but their size distribution was different from other post-communist countries. 
The largest programs, both by the number of participants and by their costs, 
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were the wage subsidy programs, followed by public works programs. Train-
ing programs were smaller than those.
The wage subsidy programs commenced in 1991. They were open for the reg-
istered unemployed, and they supported employment in profit-oriented private 
firms. These criteria became less restrictive over time. In 1992 they eliminated 
the profit-seeking requirement and in 1994 fresh graduates from the schooling 
system were also let in. Public works programs, or as they were called, publicly 
useful jobs, were originally run by the public administration and the non-profit 
sector. In 1992 Slovakia reorganized this system. Public organizations were ex-
cluded from these programs, and private firms were allowed to enter as long as 
the subsidized jobs were considered publicly useful. The programs grew signifi-
cantly after 1995, with many large-scale construction projects (highways, water 
dams etc.). Retraining programs in Slovakia were relatively small. They were also 
very short, with a duration of two months on average. Most training programs 
were organized by the private sector, and they focused on vocational training.
Ours (2000) analysed the effects of the programs on the duration of the em-
ployment and unemployment spells. Contrary to findings from other coun-
tries in the region, he found the public works programs quite effective. Ac-
cording to his results, these programs reduced the unemployment spells and 
they increased the length of the employment spells. It seems, therefore, that 
the Slovak model for public works programs worked, perhaps because of the 
participation of private firms. The results suggest that participants of these 
programs could acquire skills that were valued on the labour market, unlike 
in typical public works that do not increase participants’ skills. Ours (2000) 
found that the most popular wage subsidy programs were ineffective, and the 
training programs were effective only by decreasing the length of the unem-
ployment spells. The author is somewhat sceptical about this last result. Ac-
cording to his argument, the duration of unemployment may have dropped 
because some people joined the private sector training programs only when 
they were offered future employment to begin with.
Conclusion
This study gave an international overview of active labour market programs. 
Because credible identification of the effects of these programs is challenging, 
our overview was very selective by concentrating on the papers we judged the 
most credible. One of the most important results of our survey is that the qual-
ity of the organization and other details matter more for the effects of a pro-
gram than the type of the program. Because details of any particular program 
are very important, it is important to evaluate each and every program to give 
feedback to policy makers and the general public.
The evidence suggests that complex and well-targeted programs, like the Job 
Corps, the New Deal for Young People or the NSW, can have positive results, 
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even for groups in which labour market programs usually do poorly. An exam-
ple for this is the long-term unemployment of the young. The example of the 
Job Corps is also interesting because it demonstrates how a successful small 
scale program can lose efficiency when it grows very fast.
In continental Europe, however, complex and targeted programs are rare. 
Instead, these countries have large scale national programs that offer a wide 
range of program types to almost all unemployed. Participation in these pro-
grams is usually incentivized by stipends that are larger than the unemploy-
ment benefit. Our survey suggests that these programs have very little or zero 
impact on the employment and earnings of the participants.
We surveyed examples of ineffective programs where participation is helped 
by monetary incentives. There are reasons to believe that such incentives can 
be responsible for the negative results even if the content of the program is 
meaningful. Other examples showed that mandatory programs, when refus-
al of participation leads to the withdrawal of social benefits, can be very effec-
tive. The mandatory nature of programs can help even if the content of the 
program itself is not particularly useful because it gives strong incentives to 
people to search for jobs.
Training programs are relatively expensive and their effects are questionable if 
they are offered within the large scale national programs. The targeted American 
training programs are more successful to help finding jobs, although they may 
not enhance skill acquisition that could make participants more productive once 
employed. Mandatory training programs may be successful, but as we argued 
above, it may very well be because of the mandatory nature of the program that 
makes many people intensify their search effort in order to avoid participation.
Wage subsidy programs show mixed results, but the more successful ones 
increase the employment prospects of participants. Unfortunately we know 
very little about the indirect effects of these programs on other workers who 
might be crowded out of the labour market by the program participants. Public 
works programs are almost always ineffective and may be detrimental to partici-
pants’ future employment by decreasing their search effort and locking them 
into geographic areas. The only one positive example we are aware of is from 
Slovakia, but those programs were run by private institutions and they were 
more similar to the wage subsidy programs than classic public work programs.
Overall, the results suggest that the active labour market programs in conti-
nental Europe, including the former socialist countries, are not effective. The 
effects can be improved with more careful design of the institutional details 
and the incentives, better targeting and complex solutions. Proper incentives 
for job search are essential, and credible evaluation of the programs is necessary 
for feedback for improvements. These improvements can make active labour 
market programs help the employment prospects of the long term unemployed. 
At the same time, even the best designed programs cannot produce miracles.
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3. GrEASInG thE WhEELS oF thE LAbour MArkEt?
Impact estimation of modernising the public employment 
service (project HRDOP 1.2)1
Zsombor Cseres-Gergely
Introduction
The Public Employment Service (PES, in Hungary: Állami Foglalkoztatási 
Szolgálat) is an important player in the Hungarian labour market as well with 
a budget of around HUF 20 billion per year (of the GDP) and serving – de-
pending on the labour market conditions – 450–600 thousand registered job-
seekers (about 11–15% or the active population).2 It has absorbed more than 
HUF 10 billion in order to modernise its operation, yet we know little about 
the effectiveness of its operations and none about the effect of this moderni-
sation. The study in this chapter attempts to quantify this effect using econo-
metric techniques.
The aim of a PES in general is to facilitate the match of the demand and 
supply side of the labour market using specific tools – in terms of the match-
ing theory of (Blanchard and Diamond, 1989) and (Pissarides 2000), this 
amounts to helping the operation of the matching technology. Although the 
need for public funding in this area was supported since the post-second 
world war period (Baldwin, 1951) to today (OECD, 2006), the toolbox has 
undergone several changes. In industrialised countries and most important-
ly in Europe, the role of the PES is not limited to the mere matching of job 
seekers and job offers. The PES offices are the main vehicle of delivering la-
bour market policy measures, the most important tools of activation (OECD, 
2007), both a cause and result of the high proportion of the less educated 
among clients. The PES is thus a central institution in the so-called flexicu-
rity framework as it greatly facilitates the transition between labour market 
states (Wilthagen, 2008).
The Hungarian PES (HPES) plays the role of both an authority and a sup-
porting organisation. In line with its previous strategy, its latest articles of 
incorporation declare that its main role is the delivery of active and passive 
labour market measures. However, being the primary delivery network of em-
ployment policy with the potential of relatively rapid and direct intervention, 
it almost always had to attend different duties as well, such as the administra-
tion of temporary jobs, administering a large part of the rehabilitation process 
of disabled workers or assisting public employment (parts of these have been 
institutionalised by the new articles of incorporation in 2011). In addition to 
the diversity of duties, only limited resources are available to the HPES, barely 
1 This work is an advanced ver-
sion of the qualitative part of 
the evaluation study delivered 
by Budapest Institute and IFUA 
Horváth & Partners Ltd. in 
fulfilment of an order within 
a framework-agreement by the 
National Development Agency. 
The evaluation project was led by 
Ágota Scharle and its full final 
report can be downloaded in 
Hungarian from the web ad-
dress http://www.budapestin-
stitute.eu/dontestamogatas/
prj/Az_Allami_Foglalkozta-
ta si_Szolgalat_modernizacio-
janak_ertekelese. 
I would like thank the con-
structive comments that Ágota 
Scharle and Gábor Kézdi made 
on the manuscript and the op-
portunity of thinking about the 
the problem together. I would 
like to thank the support and the 
precise work of the people at the 
National Employment Office. I 
also appreciate the apt research 
assistance given by Bálint Szőke 
to this version of the paper.
2 Act 2008. CII. on the Central 
Budget of the Hungarian Repub-
lic. The Public Employment Of-
fice was subsequently renamed 
the National Employment Office 
in 2011.
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sufficient to run basic operations. As part of the austerity measures, the number 
of employees in local offices had already began to shrink in 2006 and neither 
did they increase following the onset of the 2008 crisis. While in 2006 one 
officer attended an average of 206 clients, this has increased to 273 by 2009 
(figures from direct HPES communication).
The modernisation process started in 2002 and is still ongoing. Given its 
importance both in terms of employment policy and the size of the develop-
ment effort, one might assume that its monitoring has attracted as much at-
tention as did its delivery, but this is not so. The current paper aims at provid-
ing a quantitative assessment of the potential impact of the program, based on 
the best data available for analysis. The question I would like to answer here is 
a very simple one from the point of view of economics: did the modernisation 
project contribute to making the operation of the PES more efficient so that 
the chance of its clients finding jobs increases? In what follows, I use a differ-
ence-in-differences (DiD) strategy to estimate such a possible effect of the de-
velopments between 2004 and 2008 using aggregate data relating to the local 
PES offices. First I briefly describe the development program itself, then move 
on to the theoretical and methodological considerations and the data used for 
the analysis. Thirdly I describe the estimation results and finally put them in 
context and provide conclusions.
The modernisation of the Hungarian Public Employment Service 
– a summary
The EU-funded modernisation of the Hungarian PES started before Hun-
gary joined the EU in 2002 and is still ongoing. Its main aim was to carry out 
a general reform of operations to boost its performance in improving clients’ 
re-employment potential. At the end of the 1990s, the operation of local PES 
offices were characterised by neglected interiors, out-dated IT infrastructure, 
officers lacking a general overview of competency areas and clients being not 
only served by but also dependent on officers and interested mostly in collect-
ing unemployment insurance and benefit payments. A Phare “twinning” pro-
ject (with a budget of around HUF 1.2 billion) was started in 2002 to prepare 
accession to the European Union through improving upon these unfavour-
able circumstances, followed by the HRDOP 1.2 measure (with a budget of 
HUF 9.3 billion) and the still on-going SROP 1.3.1 project. These efforts have 
touched upon all mentioned areas in 20, 60 and another 60 local offices, respec-
tively as well as in the National Employment Office, the methodological and 
coordination centre of the PES. Here I shall look at the middle of this process, 
the HRDOP 1.2 measure.
The aims of the development process are mapped onto projects – often over-
arching actual measures or programs – whose combined effect is what I con-
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sider here as the intervention to be analysed. The total of 89 projects in the 
HRDOP 1.2 measure consisted of the following elements:
– Introduction of the new service model (NSM) on the participating local of-
fices, including profiling of the clients. The essence of the NSM is that clients 
are profiled and sorted3 on the basis of their individual characteristics so that 
they can be served with personalised services. International experiences show 
that efficient profiling and a proper match of services can shorten the length 
of the unemployed status and thus be an effective device in lowering the un-
employment rate as such.
– Remodelling the participant local offices, installation of self-help terminals 
(M-points) This development was based on the international experience that a 
more open, client-centred interior makes a less official impression and presents 
the place as a service provider rather than a rigid governmental office, which in 
itself facilitates the interaction with clients. Self-help terminals can be useful 
for all jobseekers, but after proper profiling, a large share of the services pro-
vided by the PES can be directed to this channel.
– Introduction of a quality assurance system in the participating local offices. The 
HRDOP 1.2 measure included the introduction of the Common Assessment 
Framework, CAF in order to support the operation of the NSM through the 
increase of overall efficiency of operations.
– Training of staff at the participating local offices. This part of the project con-
nects to the NSM and CAF in order to educate staff members about their op-
eration and enable them to successfully adopt them.
– Introduction of an integrated IT system (IR). This development is aimed at 
supporting the operation of the whole network of local offices by providing 
an integrated information backbone to services dependent on data managed 
or processed centrally. It supports administration, serves as a basis of a perfor-
mance monitoring system and provides data for statistical analyses.
– Other types of activities, such as research indirectly related to the operation 
of the PES.
Given the above main interventions, we can expect effects in relation to all 
offices on the one hand (in the case of the IR) and in relation to participant of-
fices on the other (such as the self-help terminals, remodelling, the introduc-
tion of NSM and CAF). Although the progress of the program can be moni-
tored in the case of all projects, we can measure the effect on the re-employment 
chances of clients only in cases where the interventions were specific to par-
ticipating local offices. The reason for this is that there is no good reference 
point for developments that affect all local offices uniformly and therefore an 
impact cannot be reliably estimated. Although not helpful for measurement, 
the presence of such interventions does not create a problem either: it has af-
fected all offices uniformly and most importantly, it was completed only by the 
end of the period at which we are looking. We also have to note that given the 
3 Profiling is essentially the pre-
diction of the length of the un-
employment spell. Unemployed 
persons with a longer and shorter 
expected unemployment spell 
might require very different as-
sistance and be capable of very 
different levels of self-help.
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multiple links between interventions and that all of them were completed in 
the participating local offices, we cannot measure their individual effect, but 
only the totality of them.
The principle and model for impact estimation
The current analysis aims at estimating the program effect on the level of es-
tablishments using data on operation before and after the program period, in 
line with the suggestions of (Nagy, 2006). Being interested in the actual out-
come of the program, I estimate the average treatment effect on the treated 
(ATT). Because the analysis is focussed on labour markets in which the PES 
offices are located, this measurement provides us with an estimate of the net 
effect of the program on the unemployed, that is the combined effect of direct 
effect and indirect effects. It does not include the possible displacement ef-
fects on people outside the unemployment registry or people in neighboring 
labor markets. Given however that the program effects are freely available to 
everyone and without extra obligations, those unaccounted indirect effects 
are likely to be modest.
In what follows, I estimate program effects in a difference-in-differences 
(DiD) framework corrected with linear regression, first applied directly to the 
affected groups of offices, then using matching to homogenise them. These to-
tal four versions of the estimates can be used as a cross-check on the one hand 
(similarly to the dated but comprehensive evaluation of active labour market 
programs in Hungary (O’Leary, 1998)), but on the other hand, they also de-
liver information on the contribution of other factors to the outcomes of the 
program.
In order to get rid of the time-invariant effects possibly correlated with pro-
gram participation, I have written the estimating equation in differences-form:
ΔYit = τ + δpi + βΔXit + uit,
where pi is an indicator of program participation, τ is a constant measuring 
the autonomous rate of change in this, Xit is a set of variables indicating relevant 
observable characteristics of the local offices, while uit summarises character-
istics that are not correlated with these observables. Yit is an outcome indica-
tor, which I chose to be the re-employment rate of clients. The relationship is 
defined over PES offices observed in different time-points, i being an index 
for an office, t being an index for a specific month. The difference (Δ) operator 
takes time-difference of a variable between the same month in both the “be-
fore” year and “after” year. For example, if Yit is the re-employment rate of the 
registered unemployed at office i in January 2008, then ΔYit is the difference 
between this and the re-employment rate in January 2004 at the same office. 
Our interest centres on δ, the coefficient on the pi indicator for program-partic-
ipation, which delivers the program effect in this context. One can show that 
in focus
86
the equation in this form is a direct implementation of the DiD idea, general-
ised to the multiple-regression case.
First I estimate this equation using OLS based on the assumption – sup-
ported by program design – that the participant and nonparticipant groups 
are similar. Variable ΔXit ensures that we take into account the differences de-
veloping over time between the participant and non-participant group, and 
thus we do not confuse these with the effect attributable to the program. This 
estimation strategy runs into difficulties if there are differences between par-
ticipant and non-participant groups that are correlated with the ΔXit varia-
bles or with the indicator of participation. In order to treat this, I first perform 
propensity-score matching, which amounts to predicting program participa-
tion using such detailed set of pre-participation variables and use the predicted 
propensity to find observations for every program participant that is close to 
it in some way (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983). The individual program effect 
can be calculated from the difference of the differences in the actual and the 
counterfactual outcome: (ΔYit – ΔYit*). Averaging office-level differences gives 
us a reliable DiD estimate of the ATT under the working assumptions (Heck-
man, Ichimura, and Todd, 1998). After calculating simple averages, I control 
for time-variation in characteristics as in the simple OLS case. Here I am not 
matching on original re-employment rates, but on residuals from a first-step 
regression similar to the one used in simple OLS estimation but without the 
program-participation indicator. Even though the estimation is not compli-
cated, the matching introduces hidden nonlinearity, therefore the straightfor-
ward way of calculating standard errors for the estimator would be misleading. 
In order to handle this situation correctly, I calculate and present bootstrap 
standard error estimates.
The lack of correlation between observed and unobserved effects is an as-
sumption that one cannot prove, only argue for. We shall see that although 
the arguments are valid, we have a reason to be careful and observe the pos-
sibility of selective sorting into the participant group. The amount of the in-
consistency in such cases depends greatly on the size and direction of effects 
governing such selection.
Data, preliminary results and the estimation method
This study uses data primarily from the IR developed within the framework of 
the HRDOP 1.2 measure itself, which contains individual data on the regis-
tered unemployed from 2000-on. I was granted permission to use these data 
aggregated at the level of the local offices and this aggregation was performed 
within the Employment Office based on the required rules. Individual data 
on registered unemployed in the IR of the PES contains information on sex, 
age, education, the occupational code of the previous job as well as an indica-
tor of disability. Aggregate indicators calculated from these data play the role 
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of X variables, characterising the PES offices (using levels of their post-program 
values) on the one hand as well as the role of controlling for initial observable 
differences between participant and non-participant groups (using levels and 
some interactions of levels of their pre-program values) in the matching pro-
cess on the other. The indicators are all defined as the share of a particular type 
of registered client within all registered clients.
In the case of the registered unemployed staying in touch with the local PES 
office, we know the direction of exit at the end of the registered status – and 
we can base the measure of efficiency on this information. The possible direc-
tions are the following:
1. Employment (open market).
2. Public works.
3. Supported employment (various forms of wage subsidy).
4. Training.
5. Not known due to lack of cooperation with the PES.
We can use one of the above as the indicator of efficiency to look at the pro-
gram effect from different angles. Given that the primary goal of the PES is fa-
cilitation labour market match, the most directly relevant measure of efficiency 
is the share of clients exiting the registry towards unsupported employment on 
the open labour market, the rate of re-employment. Exit rates were calculated 
not only for different directions but also for different subpopulations too, de-
fined over individual characteristics such as age, education or disabled status. 
Looking at these exit rates too enables us to assess the heterogeneity in the im-
pact of the program, if there is any.
A great advantage of the database I use is that it is coming from the admin-
istrative records of the PES and it is thus a complete account of the events hap-
pening to the registered unemployed. This nevertheless has drawbacks too. 
Even though contact and thus reporting is required in principle and loses the 
right for financial benefits administered by the PES without it, there is no real 
penalty if this is not the case either due to no initial eligibility in the first place 
or due to having exhausted such benefits (the punishment is that it is not pos-
sible to re-claim the benefit for 3 months). In relation to the current analysis, 
this means that we have reliable information on the direction of exit only for 
those eligible for benefit.4 In terms of measurement, this means that we are 
able to measure the direction of exit and thus the aggregate outflow rate only 
with error. Moreover, this error can be correlated with the factors determin-
ing the chance of exit and I have no outside information to assess its size. If the 
measurement error is present, it lowers the outcome variable by not counting 
every successful exit to the open labour market, but we have no reason to sup-
pose that the reverse can happen.
In order to apply the DiD strategy here, we have to chose an appropriate be-
fore and after period. Considering that the HRDOP 1.2 measure was rolled 
4 Careful readers might have 
noticed that so far, I have 
talked about those eligible for 
financial aid, but switched to 
talking about those receiving 
it. The reason for this is that it 
is eligibility for which we have 
some idea about the factors 
motivating the selection, but it 
is the actual receipt that is con-
nected to the availability of data 
on exit. I have no information 
on the connection between the 
two, but there is no reason that 
a person in contact with the PES 
would not take advantage of the 
benefit, hence the difference is 
possibly not that great.
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out between the second half of 2004 and the first half of 2008 and also that the 
effects of the economic crisis were very apparent in the third quarter of 2008, I 
chose the first 6 months of 2004 to be the before and that of 2008 to be the af-
ter period. To assess the program effects fully – following the advice of (Nagy, 
2006) and the evidence presented in (Card, Kluve and Weber 2010) – one 
should ideally follow and observe program participants for years after the end 
of the program. Unfortunately this is impossible due to both the very asym-
metric impact of the economic crisis and the continuation of the development 
through the SROP 1.3.1 project, basically eliminating the control group.
There are 158 local PES offices in the analysis – only those present both in 
the first half of 2004 and 2008. I have omitted the one on Haller Street (spe-
cialising in helping homeless people) and the one on Andrássy Street (special-
ising in helping higher education graduates) in Budapest. I have omitted those 
two offices as well where all of the Phare developments were completed. If we 
are looking only at the formal definitions, we can consider offices modernised 
during the HRDOP 1.2 measure as participants and those not modernised 
in either during the Phare project or during the HRDOP 1.2 measure as non-
participants. However, as only 7 offices5 adopted the CAF during the Phare 
project and the rest (13) did so only during the HRDOP 1.2 measure, I also 
consider these as participants in this exercise. The end result is that out of the 
total 158 offices, I have 71 participants and 85 non-participants as their controls.
The information I obtained regarding the selection of participating offices 
was not free from controversy. On the one hand, we know on the basis of pre-
liminary information that participants were selected from smaller and larger 
towns in every county, providing a degree of uniform randomness. On the 
other hand, interviews made during the evaluation exercise showed that par-
ticipation was guided to some extent and offices in worse shape had a higher 
chance to become participants. Because it proved to be impossible to collect 
information on the condition of the buildings or anything similar, we can only 
use the characteristics of the clients as a proxy.
Figure 3.1 shows monthly exit rates from the unemployment register be-
tween 2004 and 2008. Based on this evidence, the two major exit paths are 1) 
unsupported employment, with around 4 percent rate by the end of the peri-
od, 2) Not known due to lack of cooperation with the PES, with an average of 
around 8 percent. Besides the slight increase in exit to unsupported employ-
ment, we can observe a much stronger decrease in the exit rate to a not known 
state (already present from 2000 on, not visible on the graph), highlighting the 
importance of autonomous changes. Exit rates towards all destinations appear 
to show seasonal cyclicality. Figure 1 shows that exit rates grow particularly 
strongly during the summer and decrease during the winter – the reason for 
this is partly that seasonal jobs are offered mostly during the summer and sub-
sidies are made available during the spring, building up capacity by the summer.
5 These are located in Baja, 
Orosháza, Barcs, Ózd, Hatvan, 
Balassagyarmat and Esztergom.
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Figure 3.1: Exit rates between 2004 and 2008 (average, all offices)
Source: Own calculation from the IR based on aggregated individual data.
The large and trending decrease in the rate of exit towards an unknown state 
makes it very likely that there is indeed measurement error present in the indi-
cator of the exit route and so it also affects the aggregate variable created from 
it. Given that the modernisation is likely to have a positive effect on efficiency a 
negative correlation between participating in the modernisation program and the 
measurement error in the outflow rate is likely to arise, leading to the overestima-
tion of the program effect (by usual omitted variable arguments). Although we 
can be sure that such a distortion exists, I suspect that its size is likely to be small.
Table 3.1 shows re-employment rates in the pre- and post-program period 
based on office-level data, weighted by the number of the locally registered 
unemployed. Re-employment rate has increased greatly from 2004 to 2008. 
Program participants observed a 1% point increase, while the same was 0.8 % 
point in the case of the control group – following the DiD, the program-effect 
is the difference between these two numbers, 0.23 % point. This number is 
not small in relation to the overall re-employment rate, but is not significantly 
different from 0.
table 3.1: changes of average re-employment rates at the PES offices  
by hrdoP 1.2 program participation status
Year
Participant?
Difference
No Yes
2004 0.0414 0.0386 –0.0028
2008 0.0496 0.0491 –0.0005
Difference 0.0082 0.0105 0.0023
Notes: Without participants of the Phare program; averages are weighted by the num-
ber of clients registered with the local office.
Source: Own calculations using data aggregated from the IR of the PES.
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Aggregating data to the level of the whole country, we can observe trends re-
lating to the registered unemployed. Figure 3.2 shows that the composition of 
the clients has changed over time – this is one of the external effects we have to 
control for during estimation. The graph shows the proportion of vulnerable 
groups, likely to have difficulty with re-employment: those without maturity 
exam, above 50, labour market entrants and disabled persons (counting them 
multiply, hence proportions add up to more than 100).
Figure 3.2: Average composition of the local PES offices  
between January 2004 and december 2008
Source: Own calculations using data aggregated from the IR of the PES.
The most pronounced change is the growth of the share of the 50+ among 
the registered clients. Their share was a mere 15% in 2000, which grew by 5% 
points in 10 years, partly explained by the rise in retirement age, partly by the 
autonomous increase in their level of education. The share of those without 
a maturity exam decreases slowly but steadily, showing a strong seasonal pat-
tern: it decreases rapidly during the summer months providing seasonal jobs, 
but decreases during the winter.
When using a DiD strategy, it is very important to have very similar partici-
pants and non-participants on average so that the latter form a valid control 
group. Table 3.2 shows the average of indicators of offices’ characteristics in 
the beginning of 2004, just before program participation. There are two types 
of indicators: one set includes the characteristics of the registered unemployed, 
the second includes their exit rates towards different outcomes.
Participating and non-participating local offices appear very similar: there 
is no real difference either in re-employment chances. The main difference is 
that there are almost twice as many clients registered with participating offic-
es on average than in the case of non-participants whereas the share of better 
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educated clients is larger in the latter case (with very low absolute shares). Not 
only means, but also the spread of the indicators are very similar (not shown 
in the table), therefore the requirement of using only observations whose char-
acteristics are actually comparable (staying on the common support) during 
the DiD analysis is not particularly demanding, as we shall see when perform-
ing matching.
table 3.2: Main observable characteristics of participating and non-participating 
local PES offices in January 2004
Participant Non-participant
Average number of clients of the local office 1531 3090
Re-employment rate in the given subgroup of the registered unemployed
Age: 15–25 4.3 4.1
Age: 26–50 4.4 4.1
Age: 50+ 3.1 2.9
Education: without maturity exam (including lower secondary  
vocational education) 3.9 3.6
Education: with maturity exam 4.9 5.0
Education: higher education 5.5 5.3
Education: lower secondary vocational education 5.1 4.8
Disabled 2.5 2.6
Not labour market entrant 4.5 4.2
The share of the given subgroup among all the registered unemployed
Age: 15–25 14.7 14.5
Age: 50+ 19.4 19.3
Education: without maturity exam (including lower secondary  
vocational education) 75.9 77.5
Education: higher education 3.2 2.4
Not labour market entrant 7.3 6.8
Source: Own calculations using data aggregated from the IR of the PES and TSTAR 
data from the HCSO
I work with aggregate data during estimation, in which observations appear 
more than once and this has a direct effect on the calculation of standard er-
rors. In order to get rid of seasonal effects and increasing efficiency at the same 
time, I use observations for 6 months for each office in the period before and 
after the program, respectively. This way every observation contributes 6 times 
to the estimation, and the final estimate will be an average of the monthly ef-
fects. Since there is a high degree of autocorrelation between the time-periods, 
I calculate clustered standard errors to take account of this. Aggregation of 
units with different numbers of observations in them creates a well-known 
form of heteroskedasticity, therefore I weight the regressions by the number 
of registered individuals.
Explanatory variables in the model of program participation include the 
2004 January values of the variables characterising local labour markets in the 
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parametric estimating equations, as well as levels, squares and cross-products 
of outflow rates towards unsupported employment and unknown direction. I 
have calculated z-statistics using the bootstrap method, with 100 replications. 
I have used the PSMATCH2 Stata module for matching (Leuven and Sianesi, 
2003). I experimented with different averaging methods such as 1:1, k-nearest 
neighbour, kernel and local linear matching.
Estimating results
I start presenting results with estimated coefficients from simple OLS regres-
sion of the differenced estimating equation, using the method explained earlier, 
including restriction to the common support obtained from the participation 
equation in the matching estimator.6 Estimates related to the re-employment 
chances of an average registered unemployed person are shown in Table 3.3, the 
program effect being the coefficient on the participation indicator in the first row. 
The results from the most simple specification (1) simply echoes the results seen 
in Table 3.1, indicating a program effect of 0.16%point, or 5% (the numerical 
difference is due to the slightly different conditions of the estimation).7 How-
ever, this estimate is not significant at conventional significance levels. This 
can be due to – besides the lack of certain control variables – the negative bias 
caused by measurement error. Specification (2) includes separate indicators for 
all months to filter out the effect of the time of measurement. Although it in-
creases explanatory power to 14%, neither the estimate of the program effect 
nor its precision has changed. Specification (3) includes even more information, 
most importantly shares of registered clients with a particular characteristic: age, 
education, labour market entrant status. Besides the rise in explanatory power, 
we observe an increase in the program effect to 0.3%point and an improvement 
in precision that makes the estimate significant. The size of the effect is close to 
the one obtained with matching (see later), but is somewhat larger than the raw 
estimate. I have experimented with further specifications, in particular with 
the inclusion of characteristics of local labour markets, but these brought little 
gain in precision, so specification (3) has remained my preferred one.
After the completely parametric estimates, I turn to matching to take into 
account possible initial differences between the local offices, which I have so 
far assumed away. Table 3.4 shows estimated program effects from simple DiD 
matching8 with various methods. Program effects are positive in all cases, but 
they are somewhat smaller in magnitude than raw effects in the case of averag-
ing methods using all data (such as the kernel and local linear methods).
The next step is to combine matching and parametric estimation that is the 
control for both initial differences and changes in characteristics during the 
program period using the two-step method outlined earlier. Based on earlier 
results, I use the kernel method in matching and include the parametric gen-
eration in the bootstrap procedure used for the z-statistics.
6 It is worth noting that without 
this restriction, the estimated 
effects are stronger than we 
shall see. Still, knowing that 
this strength come purely from 
extrapolation in the linear OLS 
model renders it non-credible 
and suggests that they are not 
to be used.
7 Raw re-remployment figures 
were calculated from totals ag-
gregated at the level of treated 
and control groups. Regres-
sions are run on off ice-level 
data weighted by the number 
of registered clients constrained 
to observations on the common 
support.
8 The equation used for calculat-
ing the propensity score included 
the share of registered clients 
in certain age and education 
groups, job market entrants, 
disabled, local registered unem-
ployment rate, average income 
tax per taxpayer, average number 
of dwellings built-, enterprises-, 
nonprofit organisations per in-
habitant, share of children in 
créches among all children, net 
inmigration rate, outflow rate 
from registered unemployment 
to employment, to other direc-
tions, the quadratic and the in-
teraction of these.
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table 3.3: results from did oLS regressions in various specificationsa
Dependent variable: change in the exit rate to
(1) (2) (3)
HRDOP 1.2. participant 0.0016 0.0016 0.0030*
(0.431) (0.433) (0.0952)
Age: 15–25 –0.000919
(0.991)
Age: 50+ 0.0716
(0.225)
Education: without maturity exam (including lower 
secondary vocational education)
0.0259
(0.703)
Education: higher education 0.367**
(0.0123)
Not labour market entrant –0.188***
(0.00339)
Disabled –0.154**
(0.0264)
Constant 0.00852*** 0.00874*** 0.00653***
(6.36e–09) (1.06e–09) (0.00859)
N (on common support)/All observations 834/948 834/948 834/948
R2 0.02 0.14 0.22
a Standard errors in parentheses.
* Significant at 10% level, ** significant at 5% level, *** significant at 1% level.
table 3.4: raw program effects estimated with matching
Nearest neighbour 5 nearest  neighboursa Local linear
b Kernelcc
Estimated program-effects 0.0039 0.0059** 0.0019 0.0016
Bootstrap z-statistics 1.41 2.03 0.69 0.71
a Five nearest neighbours matching (with replacement).
b Local linear estimation uses tricube kernel with the default bandwidth of 0.8.
c Kernel estimation uses Epanechnikov kernel with the default bandwidth of 0.06.
** Significant at the 5% level.
Results from controlled matching are shown in Table 3.5 in the same structure 
adopted in Table 3.3. It is worth noting that the smallest difference is brought 
about here by controlling for seasonality, after which the program effect in-
creases to 0.5%point and is significant at the 10% level. This value decreases 
slightly but not significantly after including the composition of the client pool 
of the local offices. For the same reasons as earlier, the most credible and thus 
preferred results come from specification (3). Replacing raw numbers with 
those coming from a multivariate DiD procedure combined with matching 
has thus small but significant net effects in the end, benefitting from correct-
ing for both initial differences and those developing over time.
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table 3.5: Program effect calculated with matching on residuals  
obtained from did oLS regressions
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Estimated program-effects 0.0016 0.0051* 0.0048* 0.0043
Bootstrap z-statistics (0.71) (1.81) (1.76) (1.55)
Notes: Matching is performed using the kernel averaging method. Regression pre-
processing uses specification (3) from Table 3.3.
* Significant at the 10% level.
Working with numbers aggregated over the whole client pool, I could not so 
far look at the heterogeneity of the program effect. Given that some parts of 
the program targeted some types of clients, this way we actually obtain some 
information that is possible to relate to specific parts of the program. One ex-
ample of this is self-help terminals which are more targeted on the better edu-
cated clients: obtaining a positive program effect of the latter makes is more 
likely that elements targeted at them could have worked better. The NSM on 
the other hand is more likely to benefit the less able, where we can apply the 
same argument. Another dimension of the heterogeneity of the program ef-
fect is the direction of exit. It might be the case that overall, the NSM is more 
efficient in directing clients towards training, but not so effective in directing 
them towards employment. In order to take a look at the effect on different 
groups of clients and with regard to different outcome indicators, I have rep-
licated the analysis for all combinations of these using different populations 
and outcome indicators. The former included groups defined by characteristics 
listed in Table 3.2, the latter included exit towards the directions discussed in 
the data section, that is towards the open labour market, public works, other 
active programs, training and exit to unknown direction.
The main conclusion from this exercise is that the program helped open-mar-
ket employment the most: two out of three significant effects are estimated in 
this case. The 0.3% point average estimate comes from few large (and signifi-
cant) and many smaller (and less significant) results. This can be a result of a 
measurement problem, given that these groups are small, but also that the pro-
gram actually had a more pronounced effect in the case of the affected group. 
While in the case of open market employment, we do not see a significant effect 
in the case of the young and the 50+, the effect for the prime-age group is well 
above the average at 0.38%point. There is no real difference in terms of educa-
tional attainment, but these coefficients are rather imprecise. Finally, the effect 
for those already on the labour market is significantly larger than the average. 
Other coefficients are not significant at conventional levels, except for those 
with higher education towards ALMPs, where the program effect is negative 
and significant. If this effect is real, it can be attributed to the better informa-
tion provided and the selection mechanism put to work and can suggest that 
less participation in ALMPs might be appropriate for this group.
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Conclusions
This study has evaluated the effect of the 2004–2008 phase of the modernisa-
tion of the Public Employment Service in Hungary on exit chances from the 
unemployment registry. Results suggest that the program had a positive effect 
on exit to unsupported open-market employment. If I control for initial dif-
ferences between participant and non-participants local offices in the compo-
sition of clients as well as its changes over time, I can conclude that the total of 
the interventions carried out in the HRDOP 1.2 measure had a statistically 
significant positive effect on re-employment chances. Analysis of subgroups 
revealed that the program effect was strongest in the case of prime-age workers.
The final numerical results include several corrections and are slightly larger 
than the one obtained from averaging raw numbers. Re-employment chances 
have risen from 3.86% to 4.91% in the case of participant local offices, includ-
ing also effects distinct from the program itself. The impact of the program is 
calculated to be 0.3–0.48%point. In the first half of 2008, the number of reg-
istered unemployed was 450 thousand, of which 263 thousand were registered 
with program participant local offices and 5% of these become employees on 
the open labour market in the next month. Results show that approximately 
800–1200 of them became employed as a result of the development program. 
We can express this result also in terms of an effect on the length of the unem-
ployment episode. The approximately 5% exit rate measured in 2008 means 
that an average unemployed person spends 100/5=20 month as a registered 
unemployed person (assuming a constant hazard of exit), which we can cal-
culate to be 100/(5–0.3)=21.3 to 100/(5–0.48)=22.1 months in the counter-
factual case had the program not being rolled out. This means that the length 
of the unemployment spell was shortened by 1.3–2.1 months by the program 
for clients registered with the participating local offices.
Because the modernisation of the PES can be considered as a labour market 
program, one might want to ask the question how the benefits from the mod-
ernisation effort compare to costs and to alternative programs. Had the pro-
gram an effect that lasted forever, its cost can be shown to be equal to an annual 
HUF273 million, or a yearly HUF1038 thousand, a monthly HUF86 thou-
sand per capita cost. Comparing this to monthly costs of training programs 
and subsidies for self-employment, being a monthly HUF101 and HUF177 
thousand per capita respectively, this is similar, but somewhat smaller amount.
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4. thE EvALuAtIon oF trAInInG, WAGE SubSIdY  
And PubLIc WorkS ProGrAMS In hunGArY*
Judit Csoba & Zita Éva Nagy
This study explores the impact of labour market training, wage subsidy and pub-
lic works programs in Hungary using multivariate analyses and a control-group 
design. The evaluation of active labour market policies was first carried out in 
Hungary in 1992–1993 upon the initiative of the Japanese Program of the ILO 
(Godfrey, Lázár and O’Leary, 1993). Following this the Hungarian public em-
ployment service has been assessing the results of active labour market programs 
on an annual basis since 1994. This uses a tailored monitoring system to measure 
the aggregate outcomes of labour market programs after they have ended. The 
monitoring system was reviewed and new methods were introduced in 2009 
(Tajti, 2009). These – similarly to the previous period – cover the participants 
of wage subsidy and school leaver and business start-up schemes; however the 
largest group, those in public works programs, are not included.
Information in this system came from two main sources before 2009: on the 
one hand from the records of the employment services, and on the other hand 
from the responses to a postal questionnaire sent to participants three months 
following the end of the program. Furthermore, data have been available on 
employees in unsubsidised employment from the records of the National Tax 
and Customs Administration (NAV) and the unified employment database 
(UED) of the National Employment Service (NES) since 2009. However, the 
database of the NES does not allow us to control for selection bias nor to calcu-
late an aggregate employment effect. Information on the largest active programs, 
the participants of public works schemes are still not available. This prompted 
us to turn to new methods.
Participants, methods and research questions
This evaluation focuses on the three active labour market policies with the larg-
est number of participants over the past 10 years, as well as the largest share of 
the budget allocated to active labour market policies. The study explores the 
operation and impact of training, wage subsidy and public works from multi-
ple perspectives. In 2009 73.8% of the decentralised Employment Sub-fund 
of the Labour Market Fund was spent on these measures.
In accordance with the generally accepted methodology of program evalua-
tions, in addition to the participants of active programs we included a matched 
control group that had similar characteristics but did not participate in any 
active labour market policies (for a discussion of counterfactual analysis see 
Chapter 1 of In Focus).
* This chapter presents the results 
of research that was part of the 
sub-project 3.2 “A foglalkozta-
tási szolgálat fejlesztése az in-
tegrált munkaügyi és szociális 
rendszer részeként” [Multivari-
ate controlled evaluation of ac-
tive measures and labour market 
programs] of the priority project 
TAMOP 1.3.1 Supporting em-
ployment policy decisions. The 
study was conducted by Consult-
ing’95 in close cooperation with 
researchers from the Depart-
ment of Sociology and Social 
Policy, University of Debrecen. 
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Monitoring questionnaires for training programs were self-report, and for 
all other programs employers provided the required information in Hunga-
ry until 2009. Given that the information came from different sources – for 
some programs the employers and for other programs the employees – their 
comparability is questionable. This study collected data from job seekers and 
program participants, regardless of their current status.
We employed a two-stage stratified sampling to select participants.1 First, we 
selected the 18 small regions to be involved in the study using the CSO’s complex 
deprivation/development indicator of small regions.2 Then the Public Employ-
ment Service selected the participants in the active program and control groups 
from the records of the job centres in the 18 small regions. The list was then for-
warded to the research coordinators in each local job centre who contacted the 
individuals – current or past job seekers – for consent to take part in the study 
(individuals who were no longer registered clients received a postal letter).
Data collection was carried out by independent researchers who were not af-
filiated with the employment service. Interviews took place at the participant’s 
chosen location between August 15 and September 30, 2010. The number of par-
ticipants was 1,041 in the active program group and 1,068 in the control group. 
Thirty-eight percent (n = 394) of the active program group participated in train-
ing, nearly 10% (n = 100) in wage subsidy and 52% (n = 547) in public works.
One of the main methodological components of the research (and also one 
of its main challenges in terms of implementation) was the longitudinal nature 
of data collection. We studied the period between September 1, 2009 and Feb-
ruary 28, 2010 and the sample included those who participated in active pro-
grams in this six-month period. Those who did not take part in any programs 
made up the control group. Changes were followed through four time points: 
pre-intervention, intervention, exit and at the time of actual data collection. In-
depth analysis of the 12-month period prior to data collection was carried out.
The four time points allow multiple comparisons and a detailed follow-up. 
Apart from the difference between the entry and exit status, the changes within 
the 12-month period, their timing, seasonality, their duration and the direct 
impact of active policies can be analysed.3 In addition to the four fixed data 
collection points, additional points and intervals can be chosen because there 
is information on job finding. Therefore the dynamics and characteristics of 
employment can also be analysed for example taking into account the cyclical 
nature of the jobs market or other factors (such as seasonal cycles, economic 
and political factors, changes in the legislation etc.) within the 12-month peri-
od. The flexible timeframe and the four data collection points allow a pre- and 
post comparison and thus a more thorough program evaluation.
The scope of the questions was significantly expanded. Apart from the net 
employment effect of the programs and other standard indicators of program 
evaluation, detailed information was collected on:
1 This is a random sampling 
method that allows statistical 
generalisation of results be-
cause, in principle, there is no 
selection bias. We used data on 
participants and job centres in 
our analysis.
2 There were a total of 18 job 
offices in the sample from five 
territorial development catego-
ries. Within each development 
category we selected the three 
or four small regions that had 
the best development indica-
tors. This was justified because 
we aimed to measure the effec-
tiveness of active measures, so 
we selected small regions that 
provided the most favourable 
conditions within each category.
3 Data was collected on differ-
ences in income and occupation 
at the start, during and after the 
end of the program that could 
indicate an improvement, wors-
ening or stability of status.
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– the targeting of each program (the socio-demographic and employment char-
acteristics of participants and those left out from the programs),
– the expectations of the participants towards the programs,
– “what happened” in each program,
– what were the objective changes in the participants’ situation after the pro-
gram (for example changes in the job role, income etc.),
– what other, indirect effects did the programs have (for example in terms of 
quality of life, work-related skills, future expectations and work-related plans),
– the respondents’ subjective evaluation of active labour market programs and 
services.
Comparison of program participants and the control group
To assess the impact of active programs the study has compared the total sample 
of program participants (n = 1,041) and control group (n = 1068) in three main 
areas: firstly the most important socio-demographic and social characteristics – 
termed “entry differences”. It was necessary to explore these because they might 
have an impact on the outcomes (selection bias). Secondly, it was assessed to 
what extent the members of the control group had these entry characteristics 
and what other factors they mentioned to explain their passive status. Finally, 
the analysis of the changes observed during the 12 months of the study aimed 
to explore the impact of the active programs in contrast to no intervention.
Entry differences and the targeting of the programs
There were marked differences between the groups in terms of socio-demo-
graphic characteristics (Table 4.1). These indicators might act as pre-selection 
criteria and might ultimately have an impact on the outcomes of active pro-
grams (selection bias).
table 4.1: Main socio-demographic characteristics of program participants and the control group
Active program 
(mean)
Gender (%)
Age 
(mean)
Place of residence (%) Development/
deprivation 
level (mean)
Family size 
(mean  
persons)
Distribution of the sam-
ple between the active 
programs and the con-
trol group (%)
fe-
male male
county 
centre
other 
town village
Participated in 
active program
57 43 37 20 44 36 3 3 49
Training 57 43 35 30 50 20 3 3 19
Wage subsidy 72 28 38 43 44 13 3 3 5
Public works 54 46 39 9 40 51 2 4 26
Control group 54 46 41 31 43 26 3 3 51
Total 55 45 39 26 43 31 3 3 100
The share of women in active labour market programs (57%) is slightly higher 
than in the control group (54%). Therefore active labour market measures – at 
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least in principle – (might) considerably contribute to reducing the employ-
ment disadvantages of women.
The average age of participants in active labour market measures is substan-
tially lower (by 4.2 years) than the average age of the control group. This re-
sult confirms the widely known disadvantage of older workers even in subsi-
dised employment schemes. The average of the control group is closest to that 
of participants in public works projects (difference of 2.6 years) that suggests 
that out of the active measures public works projects are the most inclusive for 
the older generations, however they are still less likely to be involved in these.
There are also substantial differences in terms of education level. Out of all 
the groups included in the research, the education level of the control group was 
the second lowest. Participants in training programs and wage subsidy schemes 
had spent the longest time in education (the control group left school at the age 
of 18.7 on average, while the recipients of wage subsidies left school at at 20.7 
years, training participants at 19.8 years and those in public works at 17.8 years).
While the majority of those in public works programs and in the control 
group had vocational qualifications, participants from wage subsidy schemes 
and training programs had graduated from secondary school and had a bac-
calaureate in addition to their vocational qualification (Figure 4.1).
Figure 4.1: highest education level by status groups (percent)
The difference in the education levels at baseline is particularly relevant be-
cause – according to a number of previous studies – this alone, regardless of 
the effect of the program can influence the probability of different outcomes. 
Galasi, Lázár and Nagy (2003) argued that education level has a large impact 
on the success of participants. A higher education level increases the probabil-
ity of job-finding, with the exception of the baccalaureate alone without any 
higher qualifications.
At first glance this study also predicts a higher job finding rate for those with 
a higher education level which could lead to the conclusion that active labour 
market measures are more effective for this group. Nevertheless estimating 
0 20 40 60 80 100
College or more
Post-secondary vocational program
High school
Vocational secondary school
Vocational training school 
Primary school
Less than eight grades
Control group
Public works
Wage subsidy
Training
in focus
100
more complex relationships using a logit model later will suggest that educa-
tion level alone is not a significant factor.
According to our hypothesis, the likelihood of a successful employment out-
come might be also related to the labour market status prior to the program. 
The correlation between program entry, education level and previous activity 
might suggest that the employment prospects of active program participants 
are overall considerably worse than in the control group (at the beginning of 
the intervention 4% of the active labour market program participants and 
21% of the control group had worked in unsubsidised employment (Table 4.2).
table 4.2: number of participants in unsubsidised jobs by highest education  
at the beginning of the intervention, September 2009 (per cent)
Education level
Participants in active  
labour market measures Control group
Less than eight grades 0 5
Eight grades 20 17
Vocational training school 24 41
Vocational secondary school 11 14
High school 26 12
Post-secondary vocational program 4 6
College or more 15 6
Total 4 21
The data highlight the variability of previous labour market activity by educa-
tion level both within and between groups. It can be assumed that individuals 
with at least a higher secondary education (baccalaureate) are not only more 
likely to find employment on the open labour market but they are also more 
likely to be involved (and more quickly) in active labour market measures.
The family structure of the control group and participants of public works 
programs is more traditional than in other participant groups (38 and 39 per 
cent respectively are married or live with a partner, while this is only 29% 
among training participants and 33% among the beneficiaries of wage sub-
sidies). The average family size in the control group was smaller than among 
program participants (3.1 compared to 3.4 persons). The members of larger 
families are more likely to be involved in active labour market measures than 
job seekers from smaller families (the average family size for participants re-
ceiving wage subsidy is 3.1 persons, 3.3 for those in training and 3.6 for partici-
pants of public works). Single mothers – who make up nearly a quarter of the 
sample – and young families with small children are particularly motivated 
to secure an income.
The residents of the most disadvantaged small regions were more likely to be 
involved in active labour market programs than those in more developed re-
gions, nevertheless jobseekers living in smaller localities were less likely to ac-
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cess wage subsidies and training opportunities than would be expected based 
on their other characteristics (Table 4.1).
Whether the participants of active labour market programs received any un-
employment or inactivity related assistance significantly influences the prob-
ability of finding a job. Galasi, Lázár and Nagy (2003) suggested that people 
who previously had received benefits were around 40 percent less likely to find a 
job than people who never received benefits before. Our findings confirm this. 
Job seekers who are not receiving unemployment benefits are twice as likely to 
find a job than the recipients of unemployment benefits. Consequently those 
who have ever been in subsidised employment before (mainly in public works) 
are half as likely to find open employment as the people who have never been 
involved in these active labour market measures.
The majority of participants of active labour market measures in this study 
had previously received unemployment-related assistance or took part in other 
active programs (Table 4.3). Only 29% of those entering a training program 
were registered unemployed who did not receive any unemployment-related 
assistance. The same number was 26% in the wage subsidy schemes, 17% in 
public works programs, and 23% in the control group. The control group and 
the public works group had the highest level of inactivity-related income. As a 
result they had relative income security and thus were least motivated to find 
a job on the open jobs market.
table 4.3: Participants and control group according to labour market status  
prior to the program
Status Training Wage subsidy Public works
Control group 
(March 2010)
Worked in a non-subsidised job 4 6 3 5
Worked in a subsidised job 2 10 7 1
Participated in training 3 0 0 0
Registered unemployed 88 83 88 90
Out of which without assistance 29 26 18 23
Other inactive 3 1 1 5
The longest jobless period was on average 15 months among people entering wage 
subsidy schemes, 18 months for training participants, 27 months in the control 
group and 35 months among the participants of public works programs. Consid-
ering the length of unemployment, the control group would be very motivated 
to get involved in active labour market programs because they have been out 
of work for a long time. Only participants of public works programs had long-
er jobless cycles, nevertheless – as will be shown later – the majority of them is 
not trying to access active labour market programs or find lawful employment.
When analysing socio-demographic indicators, the question of counter-se-
lection should be addressed too: is there a counter-selection and if so, what fac-
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tors influence this for each active labour market policy. Data estimated using a 
logit model shows the following specific entry selection criteria.4
For training, the individual’s locality plays a significant role: people who live 
in “other towns” were 1.7 times more likely to enrol in a training program than 
those who live in a village (the situation of people who live in county centres 
is not significantly different from those who live in villages). Education level 
is also significant: training programs seem to be targeted at individuals with 
a baccalaureate – grammar school graduates were 1.83 times and secondary 
school graduates with a vocational qualification were 1.49 times more likely to 
be involved in training compared to those with the highest level of education. 
In comparison to people with eight years of general education these numbers 
are 3.04 and 3.74. In terms of regional development/deprivation, training is 
significantly more common in areas with an average or above average develop-
ment level than in the most deprived areas (2 and 1.65 times)
For wage subsidy the main selection criteria are gender, education level and 
per capita income, however the level of regional development is also a signifi-
cant factor. Women are 1.8 times more likely to participate in a wage subsidy 
program than men. In terms of education level, the advantage of college and 
higher vocational qualification is the greatest factor, they are 4.1 times more 
likely to receive a wage subsidy than people with only eight years of general 
education, while the same number is 3.3 for people with a university degree.
Participation in public works was influenced by the individual’s locality, the 
development level of the small region, ethnic background and previous work 
history. The Roma unemployed were 1.8 times more likely to be involved in 
public works than the non-Roma unemployed. Village dwellers were twice as 
likely to enrol in public works than residents of towns, and seven times more 
likely than city dwellers. Public works is primarily targeted at lower educated 
people and the least developed areas. Compared to the least developed small 
regions, the probability of being in public works was 0.5 in “less developed” 
and “developed” areas, and was even lower in the remaining two categories.
Data suggest that the unemployed who lived in county centres were 3.3 times 
more likely to be in the control group than the unemployed in villages (or in 
other words: not participating in any active labour market programs and hav-
ing no income). The unemployed who lived in the most developed small re-
gions were 6.3 times more likely to be in the control group than those in the 
least developed small regions, 0.6 for a non-Roma versus a Roma, and 0.6 for 
a graduate versus someone with eight years of general education.
These findings about the selection into participant and control groups sug-
gest that active labour market measures are after all targeted at those with 
multiple disadvantages (although different groups of them). While selection 
into the control group was more likely among the non-Roma unemployed 
with a vocational qualification or a degree who lived in the more developed 
4 In our logit model the depend-
ent variable was participation 
in the given active measures or 
control group. The explanatory 
variables were type of locality 
(city, town or village), the devel-
opment level of the region, gen-
der, age, education and ethnic 
background of the respondent, 
the length of time spent in em-
ployment within the total work 
history, per capita income of the 
household.
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small regions (whose employment prospects are in principle better), regional 
disadvantages, being lower on the hierarchy of localities and educational dis-
advantages increased the likelihood of participation in active labour market 
measures. However there were some fundamental differences between the dif-
ferent measures in terms of entry characteristics. Therefore, it can be assumed 
that training was more powerful in reducing disadvantages due to its more 
favourable entry characteristics (small regions of average or above average de-
velopment level, medium-sized towns, grammar school or baccaleareate with 
vocational qualification) than for example public works where the main entry 
characteristics (least developed regions, villages, low education level) forecast 
the lower probability of successful labour market integration.
Subjective status assessment and work motivation
There were other differences between the control group and active labour mar-
ket program participants that were due to subjective rather than objective fac-
tors. These differences are presented in Table 4.4.
table 4.4: obstacles reported by participant groups (per cent)
Subjective reason Training Wage subsidy Public works Control group
Health problem that limits the range of 
potential jobs 18 14 21 28
Too old 14 12 18 22
Too young, not enough experience 18 15 11 10
Ethnicity 3 1 13 5
Does not have enough money to buy 
adequate clothes 3 0 5 4
Housing problems 1 0 4 4
Has been out of work for long/has 
never had a job 11 14 9 15
Outdated qualification 6 4 8 11
Outdated knowledge 4 3 6 11
Stopped working during maternity leave 12 4 8 12
Village locality, lack of jobs 21 13 39 22
Too expensive to commute 26 16 34 27
Lack of adequate public transportation 10 5 18 8
They are less likely to hire unemployed 11 4 10 16
Too many unemployed in the area 54 30 54 55
Could not sell property to move away 12 8 19 14
People in the control group were considerably more likely than active labour 
market measure participants to view their health status, their age and the lack 
of employment opportunities, the time spent out of work, outdated qualifica-
tion and the rejection of the environment as a result of their unemployment as 
an obstacle. The subjective assessments also emphasise the regional disadvan-
tages and the lack of work-related skills (knowledge and work experience) but 
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health status is considered more important – nearly one third of respondents 
mentioned this as the reason for not looking for work.
Apart from the data presented in Table 4.4 there is information on the in-
tensity of job search after participation in an active labour market measure. 
Twenty-six percent of the control group clearly expressed their unwillingness 
to work and even to participate in active labour market programs. The main 
reason for non-participation (50% of respondents mentioned this) was that 
they were not offered the possibility to take part in an active measure. Never-
theless, it should be highlighted that it was only in a minority of cases that par-
ticipation in an active labour market policy was initiated by job centre advisors. 
Participation was initiated by the unemployed themselves in 65% of the cases 
in training, 67% in wage subsidy and 55% in public works. For each measure 
less than one third of the participants were referred by the employment service. 
Therefore passivity results from other factors, not only the fact that they were 
not informed of the opportunities or offered participation.
Investigating (further) the reasons for staying away from the labour market 
both among the participants of active labour market measures and the control 
group, we sought the individual’s own explanation of their passivity, why they 
are not looking for work on the open labour market.
Men were deterred from the open labour market by their health status and al-
ternative sources of income, while women mentioned child care responsibilities, 
increased expenses as a result of taking up work, less flexibility in terms of time 
use and higher expectations. Participants of training, wage subsidy and public 
works programs mentioned similar factors as disadvantages of active labour mar-
ket programs. Only a smaller proportion of respondents said that illegal employ-
ment was one of the factors that kept them away from work (24% said that they 
have ever worked illegally and 6% said that they were working illegally at the 
time of responding), the majority of them in the control group. Nearly a quarter 
of those not giving any reasons for staying out of work were employed illegally.
There were also differences in terms of expectations towards work. Partici-
pants of active labour market programs were “less picky” and the control group 
had higher expectations and stricter conditions towards potential jobs: they 
were more likely to reject outdoors work (71% vs 59% among participants), work 
that is potential harmful to health (68% vs 65%), were less likely to accept 12-
hour working days (56% vs 60%), and shift work (53% vs 56%). Interestingly 
there were no differences between the groups in terms of accepting part of the 
salary paid directly in cash (and without paying tax or other contributions), 
or if they could work part-time or from home – nearly two thirds were willing 
to accept these options. Almost 60% would be willing to pay for equipment 
or work wear if they had the opportunity to work. A similar percentage (over 
70%) would reject undeclared employment, if they could not take annual leave, 
if they could not go on sick leave and unpaid overtime.
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The results suggest that there are substantial differences between the two 
groups in terms of their attitude and expectations towards work. The partici-
pants of the active labour market programs seem more open and flexible, while 
the control group is more attached to traditional forms of employment both 
in lawful and undeclared work. This has implications for the job prospects of 
both groups and highlights the necessity of differential treatment.
Program evaluation – a comparative analysis  
of active labour market policies
Changes in the status as a result of participation in active labour market pro-
grams (ALMPs) was measured at four time points: before intervention (base-
line), at the beginning of the intervention, at exit from the active measure (and 
linked to this the outcome indicator), and at data collection (at the end of a 
12-month observation period). Data from the first two stages (baseline and in-
tervention) have already been discussed. The results as measured by the outcome 
indicators and the impact of the programs will now be summarised, highlight-
ing and comparing the similarities and differences between the four measures.
Immediately after the intervention (at exit) participants of the wage subsidy 
schemes were the most likely to find unsubsidised work on the open labour 
market (72 per cent) (Table 4.5).These were followed by training participants 
(12 per cent). The employment rate of the control group and public works 
participants – both at 5% – seems to support the previous argument that the 
probability of open employment is similarly low in the two groups with less 
favourable socio-demographic indicators, less motivation and worse employ-
ment prospects.
table 4.5: Employment status of ALMP participants and the control group 
immediately after the intervention (per cent)
Status Training Wage subsidy Public works Control group (March 2010)
Employed, not subsidised 12 72 5 5
Employed, subsidised 4 0 7 1
In training 0 0 1 0
Unemployed 83 25 87 89
Other inactive 2 3 1 5
Note: For ALMPs N = 839, for the control group N = 1061.
Thus far monitoring studies have measured the effectiveness of programs with 
the number of participants who found paid employment within six months 
from the end of the program. Although this study has adopted a longer time-
frame (12 months), data from the first six months was compared to findings 
of other studies (see Table 4.6).
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table 4.6: comparison of the number of participants taking up employment within 
six months in the two studies (per cent)
ALMP 1997 (Galasi, Lázár and Nagy, 1999) 2010 (this study)
Training 45 33
Wage subsidy 71 77
Public works 25 23
Control group n. d. 7
The findings of the study by Galasi, Lázár and Nagy (1999) – that used the 
records of the Hungarian Employment Methodological Centre with nearly 
5,000 participants in 1997 – and this study using survey methods are by-and-
large similar.
Considering the differences in the methods between the two studies (one 
was based on the secondary analysis of data from a large administrative da-
tabase and the other on data collection using survey methods on a sample of 
participants) this is noteworthy and reassuring. Nevertheless, it also suggests 
that the efficiency of active labour market policies – regardless of any changes 
in the labour market or external circumstances – has been fairly constant over 
the past 13 years.
The comparison of the status of the ALMP participants and the control 
group at the end of the study (at the 12th month) also indicates the more fa-
vourable situation of ALMP participants. Nineteen percent worked in un-
subsidised jobs as opposed to 11% of the control group. Sixty-three percent 
of ALMP participants were registered unemployed in comparison to 80% of 
the control group.
There was a substantial difference between ALMP participants and the con-
trol group in terms of participation in subsidised employment at the end of the 
12-month period: this was only 4% in the control group while 15% of ALMP 
participants were once again among the beneficiaries. A considerable number 
had already participated in subsidised employment at least once (mainly public 
works). Only one per cent of the control group were involved in a wage subsidy 
scheme and 4% were in a public works programs at the end of the 12-month 
period. At the same time, they were significantly more likely to receive welfare 
benefits (34% as opposed to 20% among former ALMP participants) or un-
employment benefits (23% in the control group and 20% in the ALMP group), 
and they were twice as likely to be inactive (4% vs 2%).
At the end of the analysis the question as to what influenced successful job 
finding on the open labour market should be addressed. Did the individual 
active labour market programs contribute significantly to this success? Using 
a logit model5 we found that two variables were particularly important in pre-
dicting a successful employment outcome. These were: status4(.) variable that 
showed participation in a given ALMP during the intervention period, and 
5 In our logit model the depend-
ent variable was non-subsidised 
work at the time of measurement. 
The explanatory variables were 
type of active measure (or con-
trol group), type of locality, the 
development level of the region, 
gender, age, education, marital 
status and ethnic background 
of the respondent, the length 
of time spent in employment 
within the total work history, 
labour market characteristics 
at the beginning of the inter-
vention period (working on the 
open market – all else; in a sub-
sidised job – all else; claiming 
unemployment benefit – all else; 
parental leave – all else).
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unemp(1) that represented the ratio of the duration of unemployment within 
the total work history (see Annex 4, Table 4A1).
A further analysis of the variables with a significant effect within the model 
reveals that training participants were 1.82 times and receipients of a wage sub-
sidy 20.24 times more likely to be in employment on the open labour market. 
The outcomes of those in public works programs are even less favourable than 
those of the control group: the likelihood of them finding employment was 0.26.
The “raw effects” of each active labour market program, summarised in Table 
4A1 (which includes the effects of all variables and not only those of ALMPs), 
were compared to the results of the logit model adjusted for the effect of ac-
tive labour market programs. Effects were expressed as the group-wise odds 
ratio between the participant and control groups. The comparison of results 
suggests that, despite the different methods of data analysis, the un-adjusted 
and adjusted odds were relatively similar (the unadjusted odds ratio of wage 
subsidy was 19.04 and the adjusted 20.24, while both odds were 1.82 for train-
ing relative to the control group). In public works the unadjusted odds ratio of 
finding employment relative to the control group was 0.37 and the adjusted 
odds ratio was 0.26. This difference can indicate on the one hand a selection 
bias or alternatively a negative effect on employment outcomes (for example 
through a stall effect – this is discussed later in the study).
The variable unemp(1) highlighted again the already known negative rela-
tionship between the length of unemployment and the probability of finding 
employment.
Our results are similar to the findings of Galasi et al. (2003) and also to 
those reported by Kluve (2010): the outcome is largely explained by the type 
of ALMP the individual has participated in (or the absence of ALMP). This 
also means that the differences in the entry characteristics do not have an ef-
fect of their own but they are accumulated through selection into a program.
During the 12-month period of data collection in this study – considering 
the whole of the period (Table 4.7) – 41% of ALMP participants found em-
ployment. Unlike the general practice, in this time period only lawful employ-
ment was considered in order to give an insight into the movements between 
“re-employment”, subsidised employment and active labour market programs. 
(This indicator includes very short-term employment too.) On average it took 
2.1 months for ALMP participants to find work and 24% found employment 
on the open labour market. Thirty-eight percent of those who have taken part in 
training found work and this took on average 2.3 months. Two thirds of those 
who found work (24.4% of total training participants) secured a job on the 
open labour market and the rest were divided between wage subsidy schemes 
(66%) and public works (33%). Eighty percent of those previously involved in 
a wage subsidy scheme found work out of which 76% were on the open labour 
market and less than one percent in public works. On average it took 0.5 month 
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for them to find employment. From those in public works 32% found employ-
ment in an average of 2.8 months. However only 6% of these were employed 
on the open labour market.
table 4.7: the number of those in employment at the end  
of the 12-month observation period (per cent)
Employed
Not em-
ployed
Missing 
status
If employed, how long did it take to find first 
“regular” employment?*
total subsi-dised
0–3 
months
4–6 
months
7–9 
months
10–12 
months
Training 38 14 60 1 29 7 2 0
Wage subsidy 80 4 20 – 75 3 2 0
Public works 32 26 62 6 21 8 2 1
Total ALMPs 41 17 56 3 31 7 2 1
Control group 37 5 63 –
* Data includes unsubsidised employment, public works, wage subsidy, business start-
up support and agricultural producers.
Thirty-seven percent of the control group found work – including any type of 
employment – during the 12-month observation period. Thirty-two percent 
of this was open employment.
The methodology of the study also allows us to consider changes longitudi-
nally rather than at discrete data collection points. Figure 4.2 illustrates this.
Figure 4.2: Status of ALMP participants and the control group  
between March and September 2010 (per cent)
Figure 4.2 shows the second half of the 12-month observation period (from 
February to August) in which anyone from the control group had the possi-
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bility to take part in ALMPs as well – this was an exclusion criterion only in 
the first six months of the study. The figure allows us to follow the dynamics of 
changes month by month and also illustrates the variety and changes of out-
comes other than open employment.
The figure shows that those who had previously participated in ALMPs were 
more likely to be among the beneficiaries again even in the second – relatively 
short – part of the observation period than people from the control group. Pre-
vious ALMP participants were found in wage subsidy schemes, training and 
public works in fairly large numbers. Maybe they were participating in a differ-
ent type of program, however it can be concluded that they were making bet-
ter use of the opportunities offered by the labour market and the employment 
service than members of the control group. Another notable difference is that 
the people in the control group were more likely to move to an economically 
inactive status than participants who had previously been involved in ALMPs.
In program evaluation – in addition to the employment outcomes – it is 
also important to consider to what extent active labour market policies con-
tributed to maintaining or improving the situation and social status of those 
involved. To assess this effect, changes in the participants’ job roles and type 
of work contract were analysed.
The findings of the analysis are briefly summarised here. Participants in train-
ing and public works programs generally maintained their status following in-
tervention and there was even evidence of a small improvement. The status of 
those in wage subsidy schemes remained largely the same. There is also a mi-
nor status improvement in the control group, however its scale lags behind the 
changes among training and public works participants.
Another finding was that the share of fixed-term contracts increased consid-
erably among all employment contracts. Wage subsidy programs appear the 
most stable because the share of permanent contracts was highest among their 
former beneficiaries (nearly two thirds), and there was only a 9% decline in the 
number of permanent contracts compared to the longest job ever held by the 
respondent. Among public works participants barely every tenth worker has 
the chance for a stable and long-term job.
During the intervention period – apart from the above changes – the wage ex-
pectations grew substantially in each ALMP group while there was no change 
in the control group.
Active labour market policies can also have an impact on participants’ em-
ployability and skills, self-esteem, feeling a useful member of society and social 
networks. These “soft” indicators are not widely accepted in program evalua-
tions because there are no standard measurements for these. Nevertheless it is 
useful to offer a brief insight into these more “indirect” outcomes of ALMPs.
The subjective assessment of programs was carried out among those who par-
ticipated in ALMPs and were successful in finding a job: 32% said that they 
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would have not found a job without the program while 28% thought that they 
would have been able to secure a job without it. Particularly, those in training 
thought they would have been able to find a job without it while public works 
participants were more likely to attribute their success to the program.
According to our findings, ALMPs also altered some of the self-concepts 
held by the individual participants. Participants of training and wage subsidy 
schemes were more likely to report a significant improvement in their employ-
ability. Nearly two thirds of those who reported a deterioration were from the 
control group. In terms of self-esteem, changes were similar: the highest im-
provement was reported by training participants (21%). Participants of wage 
subsidy schemes were the least likely to report a significant improvement in 
self-advocacy and work motivation (13% for both). The biggest improvement 
in professional and theoretical knowledge was – not surprisingly – reported 
by training participants: 61% said that the program was “good”. According to 
respondents programs were not very helpful in developing contacts and social 
networks for job search.
Data suggest that one of the value added elements of ALMPs can be person-
al development and the strengthening of self-esteem. Participants most often 
mentioned the importance of respect, a feeling of being useful and actively 
contributing to the family income.
An important finding however, was that individuals from the control group 
who succeeded in finding a job on their own were much more positive about 
the changes than ALMP participants who considered job creation and con-
tinued employment as part of the programs.
Characteristics and outcomes of active labour market policies
The following section considers each of the three active labour market policies 
and examines the characteristics, the processes and factors behind the effects 
presented earlier.
Training
According to data 38% of participants found a job between the end of training 
and the end of the data collection period. On average this took 2.3 months from 
the end of the training program. In the first three months 29% of respondents, 
in months four to six a further seven per cent, in months six to nine only an ad-
ditional two per cent and in months 10 to 12 only 0.3% found work (Table 4.7).
Program evaluations often put forward a number of misgivings with respect 
to the effectiveness of training / re-training programs (see the Chapter 2 in this 
In Focus as well as Frey, 2008). According to earlier program evaluations, many 
of the participants in training programs are people with higher than average 
education level and skills sought after on the labour market who would most 
likely find work without this (Frey, 2008, Tajti, 2009). Our results confirmed 
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this finding. Training is not the most adequately targeted active labour market 
policy. It is not helping those without qualifications to gain a qualification but 
rather it is assisting in the re-training of people who already have a qualifica-
tion. Sixty-two percent of training participants already had a vocational qual-
ification (the same level was 68% in wage subsidy schemes and 47% in public 
works) and the number of early school leavers was not higher than the average 
among them (24% of the total sample and 23% of training participants were 
early school leavers). It is also known that just over a quarter of previous quali-
fications were never used!
Fifty-two per cent of participants received a re-training allowance once, while 
13% twice or more often – most likely they participate in successive training 
programs to secure an income.6
The large majority of respondents (92%) participated in their preferred train-
ing. Typically participants were self-referred (65%) and only 30% of the par-
ticipants were referred by the employment service. It is interesting to note that 
28% of those referred by the employment service found a job on the open la-
bour market, while this was only 13% for those who referred themselves. So 
why did participants enrol in training? Most people mentioned interest, the 
hope of finding work, however 60% also mentioned that they were paid to 
participate.
About a fifth of labour market training programs do not provide a new qual-
ification but develop new skills and abilities that improve the employability 
of the participants.7 The majority of training programs are in the areas of in-
formation technology, languages, administration, retail, welding and cutting 
and social care.
The majority of training participants (78%) received a national vocational 
qualification, 6% received a vocational diploma (not included in the register 
of national vocational qualifications), 12% received a special vocational qual-
ification (such as ECDL, language examination, non-professional driving li-
cence etc.), and two per cent received other qualification. Furthermore two 
per cent of participants dropped out of training. Results show that there was 
no significant relationship between the type of training and the probability 
of re-employment (the only exception was the special vocational qualification 
that was significantly less likely to be associated with successful job search).
Out of the 38% in employment only 24% were on the open labour market. A 
further nine per cent of training participants were employed in a wage subsidy 
scheme and five per cent in a public works programs. The effect of training on 
the probability of re-employment is strongest in the first three months and is 
also noticeable for a further three months, however it becomes negligible six 
months after the closure of the program.
To understand the effect of training on employment, we should also consider 
the characteristics of participants who succeeded in returning to the labour 
6 Researchers created the term 
trainfare based on the concepts 
of work-fare and welfare. It de-
scribes the phenomenon when 
participants enrol in subsequent 
training programs in order to 
qualify for the training allow-
ance that becomes a main source 
of income (Jordan, 1996).
7 Such as language courses, com-
puter courses, driving lessons 
and other courses developing 
competences.
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market. The effect of the following variables on re-employment was examined: 
status at the beginning of the observation period, education level, age, marital 
status, gender, ethnic background, type and development of place of residence. 
The main characteristics of training were also taken into account, such as the 
duration, the type of qualification, type of referral, and whether it was the pre-
ferred training option of the respondent.
Results show that three factors had a significant effect on the probability of 
a successful employment outcome. On the one hand the respondent’s place of 
residence, and the development level of the small region on the other, were im-
portant. Compared to a respondent living in a county centre, the odds of job-
finding were significantly higher for somebody living in a small town (2.27) 
and significantly lower for a village resident (0.642). Therefore, training might 
be more important and effective in helping job seekers to find work in medium-
sized localities where there are potential job vacancies, however there might be 
a shortage of qualified workforce (even due to the drain effect of larger cities) 
than in small localities or cities. It might also be argued that the organisers of 
training initiatives are more aware of the needs of the local labour market. The 
results also show that the effect of training on the probability of re-employ-
ment is smallest in the most developed areas: the odds of a successful employ-
ment outcome here are 0.113 compared to the least developed areas. The effect 
of training on employment outcomes is similar to the general trends observed 
within all active labour market policies: there are particular patterns within 
the five development categories. The effects are most favourable in the less and 
more developed areas, however they are negligible in the least developed, de-
veloped and most developed areas.
The third contributing factor to the probability of re-employment was the 
duration of training. Similarly to earlier research (see Chapter 2 of In Focus, 
O’Leary, 1998b) the findings of this study also confirmed that short training 
courses (one to six months) are much more effective than long courses (see Ta-
ble 4.8).8
table 4.8: the effect of the duration of training on the probability of re-employment
Duration of training Percentage of respondents in unsubsidised jobs at time of data collection
Less than 3 months 25
4–6 months 27
7–9 months 14
Longer than 9 months 10
The evaluation of training programs by the participants was not very favour-
able. Forty-five per cent of participants said that they would have been able to 
find a similar job without training (the same number was 21–28% for other 
active labour market policies). If we accept the assessment of the participants 
8 This effect was strengthened by 
the fact that people with higher 
levels of education were more 
likely to enrol in longer – espe-
cially six to nine months – train-
ing courses. The only exception 
was skilled workers who were 
significantly more likely to be 
involved in training courses 
longer than nine months.
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then it can be concluded there is a large deadweight loss associated with cur-
rent labour market training policies.
Respondents said that the training was useful at a personal level; two thirds 
thought that the new knowledge was slightly or very useful and would happi-
ly take part in training again: 27% said they would do it once more, 39% said 
would be willing to do it twice or even more times. The most popular courses 
were language, IT, accountancy, and machine-operating. In terms of motiva-
tion to enrol in a training program and the willingness to participate again by 
62% of the respondents, it might be argued that this is not only the result of 
the new skills / knowledge but also due to the motivating effect of the income 
that training participants received which was significant. This suggests that 
participants were motivated to “learn a living”.
The effect on employment outcomes of training is distorted by changes in the 
attitude of participants: they were looking for different, higher prestige jobs 
than they would have done without training. According to our results there 
was no skill enhancement effect among participants. Expectations regarding 
potential jobs – for example wage expectations or whether they would be will-
ing to take up undeclared employment – changed substantially (improved). 
However this was also the case for other active labour market policies (there-
fore it might be argued that this is an effect of the intervention itself, the fact 
that people were offered support, rather than a training-specific issue).
Wage subsidy
In wage subsidy schemes 80% of the participants found a job between the end 
of the intervention and the end of the observation period. Out of this figure, 
77% found one within six months which increased to 80% by the end of the 
twelfth month.
The primary aim of wage subsidy schemes within active labour market poli-
cies is to help job seekers into the open labour market and provide a sustain-
able employment outcome following the end of the subsidy. The follow-up of 
these programs within the monitoring system over the past years showed a very 
favourable picture and indicated a very high (continued) employment ratio 
(Frey, 2008, Tajti, 2009). For example in 2009 over two thirds of recipients 
(75.6%) of a wage subsidy were still employed six months following the end of 
the scheme (and over the required duration) (Tajti, 2009).
In this study the average duration of unemployment before entering a wage 
subsidy scheme was 9.7 months – 23 months for social assistance recipients, 10 
months for registered job seekers, and the shortest time (one month) among 
former training participants. Those who spent three months or less without 
work before the wage subsidy scheme were significantly more likely to find un-
subsidised employment than those who were jobless for longer. In this respect, 
wage subsidy policies support the employment of the short-term unemployed.
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In terms of the typical routes into wage subsidy schemes, three groups were 
identified among the job seekers using a clustering method.9
The largest group (active jobseekers – 44 people) was characterised by self-refer-
ral without previous participation in wage subsidy schemes or work experience 
at their chosen workplace. Typically they were not hired for new positions and 
it was observed only in this group that other employees lost their job because 
the employer hired subsidised workers. The second group (those using their so-
cial networks to return to work – 22 people) was made up – among others – of 
participants who had already received wage subsidy in the past. Their personal 
relationship with their future employer is key in their employment which is 
also indicated by the fact that they had not worked at the chosen workplace 
before and they were hired for a newly created position. The smallest group 
(returnees – 12 people) comprised of people who had already been employed by 
the same employer at least once but sometimes even twice. Nevertheless, most 
respondents said that they were hired for a newly created position.
According to Gerfin-Lechner and Steiger (2002) as cited by Hudomiet and 
Kézdi (2008) wage subsidy schemes often have a greater effect on the situation 
of women than that of men, although the reasons are unclear. The effect was 
particularly large for the long-term unemployed for whom the wage subsidy 
scheme increased the probability of employment by 13% 18 months follow-
ing the end of the scheme. For the short-term unemployed the estimated ef-
fect was not significant.
In this study the percentage of men and women in the scheme was 28% and 
72% respectively – men were more likely to say that they would have been able 
to find a job without the subsidy (61%) than women (50%). Their expectations 
were confirmed by the actual outcomes, 74% of men were in unsubsidised em-
ployment after the end of the scheme as opposed to 68% of women, while seven 
per cent of men and 13% of women were registered job seekers. In conclusion 
it might be argued that contrary to the international literature, women were 
more likely to be involved in wage subsidy schemes, however men had more 
favourable employment outcomes.
Over one third of respondents (38%) said that they received a wage subsidy 
for up to six months. The average duration of subsidised employment was 8.3 
months.10 Women are not only more likely to be involved in a scheme, they also 
receive the subsidy for longer than men: on average for 8.5 months compared 
to 7.8 months. The mode employment duration was nine months.
The analysis reveals no relationship between successful employment and 
socio-demographic factors (age, marital status, place of residence and de-
velopment level, education). What are the significant factors? According to 
some it is the relationship with the employer. Wage subsidy schemes were 
often criticised in this study because they do not create new jobs but rather 
they create incentives for re-employing existing workers for a higher wage. A 
9 The analysis was carried out 
using k-means clustering.
10 The monitoring studies car-
ried out by the PES collected data 
from employers to evaluate the 
efficiency of wage subsidy pro-
grams. Our research aimed to 
involve participants in the sur-
vey. One of the disadvantages of 
this is that participants couldn’t 
always differentiate the differ-
ent phases of the program. They 
struggled to distinguish the sub-
sidy period from the continua-
tion of employment although 
our questionnaire clearly asked 
about the situation after the end 
of the program regarding the 
continuation of employment.
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few respondents mentioned that whole teams (for example sewing factories) 
were “re-employed”.
To check the accuracy of these claims and to try to uncover the real effect re-
spondents were also asked whether they started their subsidised employment 
alone or as part of a group of workers. Seventy-seven per cent said they started 
their job alone and 23% reported that they were part of a group.
There was a highly significant relationship between group re-employment 
and the willingness of employees to continue the employment of workers 
without the subsidy. Seventy-four per cent of those in a group said that they 
would have been employed without the subsidy as opposed to 48% of those 
employed alone.
The extent of the substitutions effect – or termed differently the hypotheti-
cal “re-employment” – was measured using further variables. First, respond-
ents were asked where they heard about the opportunity. Fifty-four per cent of 
recipients of wage subsidy reported that they first heard about the scheme in 
the job centre and 23% said that they were informed by their employer. This 
gives an upper value for the extent of re-employment in the sample. The sec-
ond question to measure the extent of re-employment was about who initiated 
employment. In 20% of the cases this was the job office, in 23% the employer 
directly and in 53% of the cases the job seeker (out which 9% had already par-
ticipated in a wage subsidy scheme).
Thus in 23% of the cases employers provided information and in 23% of the 
cases initiated subsidised employment but only 9% of participants had previ-
ously participated in a wage subsidy scheme. Sixteen per cent of respondents 
had worked for the same employer before and three per cent said that this was 
their third job with the same employer. It can be assumed that nearly 20% of 
participants were re-employed in the wage subsidy program. There was evi-
dence that the respondent had previously worked for the same employer and 
participated in a wage subsidy program before. Therefore it is justified to ar-
gue that approximately 20% of program participants were simply re-circulated 
into the labour market.
Another highly contested feature of wage subsidy programs is whether they 
actually contribute to the creation of jobs. The monitoring studies of the em-
ployment service asked employers whether they would have created the same 
jobs in the absence of the subsidy. This is the so-called deadweight loss of the 
active labour market policy and according to the monitoring studies it was 
consistently around 20–25% each year.
To measure deadweight loss this study asked participants of wage subsidy 
programs: 53% said that they would have been employed without the subsidy. 
The logit model looking at the effect of deadweight loss highlights an impor-
tant factor: there was no significant difference between the probability of find-
ing employment after the program among those who said they would have got 
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the job without the subsidy and those who thought the subsidy was necessary. 
Therefore it seems that there is a large deadweight loss at the start of the pro-
grams, at the selection of participants, however there is no deadweight loss in 
terms of the long-term employment effect and it makes no difference whether 
they would have got the job with or without the subsidy.
Examining deadweight loss from a different perspective, the data show that 
70% of job seekers were first-time wage subsidy recipients and had not worked 
for the same employer before. Therefore it could be assumed that these were 
new positions that were created using wage subsidy. However the possibil-
ity that workers were made redundant to hire somebody using wage subsidy 
cannot be ruled out. Nine per cent of the respondents – and one person who 
was re-employed by the same employer – said that their job had been filled by 
somebody else and that person had been made redundant before they started 
working for the employer.
It is useful to consider the substitution effect and the deadweight loss of wage 
subsidy programs because the average unit cost of wage subsidy was 853,200 
forints per person in the first half of 2009 in contrast to 173,200 forints for 
training (Tajti, 2009, p 17).
Hudomiet–Kézdi give an overview of the attempts to measure the impact of 
active labour market policies in Chapter 2 of In Focus and in their 2008 paper. 
They also argue that international experience suggests that wage subsidy pro-
grams have large negative externalities, highlighting the substitution effect in 
particular. They argued in Chapter 1 that wage subsidy programs in the Unit-
ed States are generally considered successful, while wage subsidy programs in 
Northern Europe are regarded as non-successful. The picture in Western Eu-
rope and the post-communist countries is mixed. This study could not measure 
the substitution effect but it can be assumed that it is present in the wage sub-
sidy programs. In conclusion, with regard to the substitution effect and dead-
weight loss, up to 60–65% of jobs created using wage subsidies are new positions.
Our results also suggest that the employment effect of wage subsidy programs 
is very good in comparison to other active labour market policies, however this 
is moderated by their strong substitution effect and deadweight loss. If these 
are taken into account the effects are only slightly better than in training pro-
grams, nevertheless wage subsidies are still considerably more effective than 
public works programs. Nevertheless recipients of wage subsidy have more fa-
vourable socio-demographic characteristics and the unit cost of the program 
is higher than in public works programs.
Public works
Looking at the employment effect of public works – the combined ratio of open 
employment and subsidised employment – the results are surprising. Within 
the first three months following the end of public works 21% of the partici-
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pants found work, within four to six months a further 8%, two per cent within 
seven to nine months and one percent within ten to 12 months. This meant 
that 32% of the participants worked for some time either in open employment 
or in another subsidised job, mainly public works after leaving the program.
The effectiveness and the impact of public works programs can be assessed 
in the context of their objectives.11 None of the regulations and documents 
setting out the aims of public works programs makes an explicit reference to 
the objective of open employment.12 Therefore we only used one indicator to 
measure the effectiveness of public works – participation in the open labour 
market. The analysis of other effects and outcomes can also indicate whether 
the program fulfils its objectives, and its effectiveness.
Participants in public works programs had less favourable demographic char-
acteristics and lower levels of education – as shown in previous sections – than 
registered job seekers. Older, less educated groups were significantly over rep-
resented among public works participants. Probably related to this, the type 
of work typically carried out in public works is unskilled physical labour. Ac-
cording to data from the monitoring evaluations between 2001 and 2006 77–
80% (Frey, 2008), and according to this study 78% of the jobs were unskilled 
positions related to community infrastructure. Related problems have been 
well documented by a series of research studies over recent years and several 
alternative models were put forward, however the type of work carried out in 
public works programs has basically remained unchanged for the past 20 years 
(Csoba, 2010a, 2010b).
The effectiveness of a program is enhanced by the attitudes of participants 
– whether they are motivated to take part and accept the aims of the program 
as their own. The element of coercion is considerably stronger in public works 
than in wage subsidy programs and this also impacts on its effectiveness. Six-
ty-five per cent of training participants and 67% of wage subsidy program par-
ticipants said that they volunteered to participate, the same number was 55% 
for public works and in 27.9% of the cases unemployed participants were ap-
proached by the job office.
Mainly men with upper secondary education or lower rely on this employ-
ment opportunity, although over half of those with a vocational qualification 
would also be willing to take part again. Over three quarters of women with 
a vocational qualification or a baccalaureate said that they were likely to par-
ticipate again in public works. Participants aged 25 years or under were more 
optimistic in terms of open employment prospects than those aged 26 years or 
over who would be more willing to participate in public works again. In gen-
eral, older generations are more willing to accept public works as a substitute 
for open employment.
There is a significant relationship between the average duration of participa-
tion in public works and the level of regional development. In the most devel-
11 The study looked at the pre-
vious regime of public works 
that included municipal public 
works (organised by local coun-
cils), communal public works 
(organised by the PES) and cen-
trally organised public works. In 
the end we did not consider the 
three types separately because 
participants could rarely tell 
which type they were involved 
in. They identified themselves 
as “public workers” regardless 
of the type of the program.
12 At the time of the research 
municipal public works were 
regulated by Article 36 of Act 3 
of 1993 on Social Administra-
tion and Social Provisions. The 
aims and the subsidies available 
for communal public works 
were set out Article 16/A of Act 
4 of 1991 on the Promotion of 
Employment and Provision of 
Unemployment Assistance and 
Article 12 of MoL regulation no. 
6/1996. (16. 07). Centrally or-
ganised public works projects 
were regulated by Government 
regulation no. 49/1999 (26. 03).
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oped areas this was 8.6 months, 8.4 months in the areas of average development 
and 7.9 months in the least developed areas.13 The duration of employment is 
also related to the position filled by the worker: in non-administrative white 
collar positions this was 9.7 months, in administrative white-collar positions 
8.5 months and in blue-collar positions it was 6.9 months.
The effect of subsidisied employment is significantly reduced if the same job 
seekers are admitted to the programs more than once. The ratio of re-employ-
ment is highest in public works programs, more than half of the job seekers 
had already worked in the same job. As a result of recurrent employment the 
worker considers the public works agency as a long-term stable employer which 
can hinder efforts to find a job elsewhere. Nearly one third of the sample took 
part in public works programs on a recurring basis (more than twice). Nearly 
one third of respondents (28%) had already worked in their current position 
more than once. This is particularly characteristic of men who regularly return 
to public works as if it was a seasonal job. Four per cent of the sample partici-
pated in public works 10 times or more; the average number was 2.78–3.2 for 
men and 2.4 for women. In line with the recurring nature of public works, 80% 
of participants were planning to take part in similar programs again.
There is a significant relationship between the effect of the program and the 
age of participants. For the under 25 group there is a stronger transition effect 
than in the older age group.14 Younger people are more likely to find work than 
older people who participated in similar active labour market programs. Peo-
ple aged 36–45 years, although they make up the largest proportion of partici-
pants in public works, seem to rely on returning to the program for temporary 
income. There are very few people aged over 45 years involved in public works 
and they are less likely to find a job.
The probability of unsubsidised employment is also influenced by the place 
of residence: compared to county centres, public works is 1.47 times more like-
ly to lead to employment in small towns and 2.4 times more likely in villages. 
Therefore personal networks and the fact that new employees are often hired 
as public workers at the beginning due to the lack of resources have a consid-
erable impact on the transition effect of the program.
The probability of open employment increases as the sector of the employer 
moves away from the local council status. The average ratio of open employ-
ment was 5% – if the employer was a local council this was only 3% and at non-
profit organisations it was 5%.15 However, if the participant was employed by a 
state-owned company the job finding rate increased to 8% and if it was a large 
state-owned company it reached 17%.
Public works in companies that operate under market or quasi-market con-
ditions is significantly more effective in helping people find employment than 
the public sector where the emphasis is on temporary work and income rather 
than on the transition effect.16
13 It should be highlighted here 
that our data collection coin-
cided with the Road to Work 
Program that saw significantly 
increased spending on public 
works programs compared to 
previous years and thanks to 
this the average employment 
was nearly 50% longer than in 
previous years.
14 By transition effect we mean 
the extent to which the given 
measure contributes to the 
change of unemployed status 
through the provision of unem-
ployment supports – services, 
wage subsidies, job brokerage 
etc. – and re-employment – pref-
erably – on the open labour mar-
ket. If the measure – as in this 
case – is the subsidised employ-
ment itself then its “transition 
effect” can be (re-)employment 
on the open labour market.
15 A similar rate was reported 
in the public sector by a study in 
2000 using a sample of partici-
pants from Budapest. Here the 
number of public works partici-
pants who received a permanent 
work contract after the end of the 
subsidised period was four per 
cent. According to the authors 
the low rate was explained by the 
hiring freeze in the public sec-
tor and the disincentive of em-
ployers – they would no longer 
qualify for the subsidy (Orsovai 
et al., 2000).
16 Subsidised employment does 
not lead to employment and it 
does not change the labour mar-
ket status of participants. After 
the end of subsidised employ-
ment participants return to their 
original unemployed status.
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It is assumed that some of the participants of public works programs remain 
in open employment for a couple of months following the end of the program 
(6% of those lawfully employed), however the open employment effect of the 
program declines after the third month and by the twelfth month hardly reach-
es 3% and the share of public works increases again (at the 12th month point of 
the observation this stood at 38%).
Within six months following the end of the program, participants of public 
works were the most likely to develop a “survival strategy” and 24% reported 
working illegally for various lengths of time.
Those who became economically inactive after taking part in a public works 
program did not want to return to subsidised employment again. It seems that 
public works and inactivity-related benefit receipt were considered mutually ex-
clusive rather than alternative options by the respondents. Those who managed 
to secure an inactivity-related benefit did not wish to return to public works. 
Public works are not attractive enough in terms of income potential, prestige 
or any other factor to motivate inactive benefit recipients to return to work.
The more often people return to public works the less motivated they become 
to find a job on the open labour market. Seventy-three percent of first-time pub-
lic works participants said that they were likely to participate again, while the 
same number was 77% for those who participated twice and 93% for people 
who participated in public works three times. The numbers of participation in 
public works is strongly related to the probability of re-employment. Among 
those who were involved in public works five or six times the job finding rate 
on the open labour market is very low. Public works programs create depend-
ency and a loss of self initiative.
The lock-in effect develops during participation in the third public works 
program and leads a situation that is less favourable than the individual’s ini-
tial situation in terms of employment prospects (Hudomiet and Kézdi, 2008, 
Scharle, 2011).
Considering another aspect of this phenomenon it confirms our hypothe-
sis that it is the third public works program that locks in participants. Eight-
een per cent of those who participated once said that they were not planning 
to take part again, and the same number was 14% for those who participated 
twice and only five per cent for those who participated three times. Therefore 
those who are at the beginning of their “public works career” and not yet con-
sidering subsidised employment as a way to extend eligibility for unemploy-
ment-related benefits were more likely to reject this rather unfavourable job 
opportunity than those for whom this short-term employment and income 
opportunity had already become part of their survival strategy.
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Conclusion
This study has examined the impact of three active labour market policies – wage 
subsidy, training and public works – using multivariate analysis with a control 
group design. The study considered a broad range of outcomes and looked at the 
changes longitudinally. The sample was selected using a two-stage stratified sam-
pling method and consisted of 1,041 participants in active labour market poli-
cies and 1,068 job seekers not receiving any interventions in the control group.
In terms of the targeting of programs, the findings of the study suggest that 
ALMPs generally target disadvantaged job seekers compared to the control 
group: regional disadvantages, localities at the lower end of the hierarchy and 
educational disadvantages increase the probability of participation in an ac-
tive labour market program. However there are differences between the par-
ticipants in each program that might have implications for their effectiveness.
At the end of the study 19% of ALMP participants were in unsubsidised 
employment compared to 11% of the control group. However the probability 
of re-employment on the open labour market – a successful employment out-
come – was significantly different by type of program. Training participants 
were twice as likely as the control group to find a job, while beneficiaries of 
wage subsidy programs were 20 times more likely. However, participants of 
public works programs were considerably less likely – one fourth as likely – to 
find work than the control group.
Training is not the most adequately targeted active labour market measure 
because over two thirds of participants had a formal vocational qualification 
thus it did not help participants to gain their first vocational qualification. 
Furthermore it only helped one in four participants to find work on the open 
labour market. This might be related to the fact that over half of the partici-
pants considered training not as a direct route into work but rather as an in-
come opportunity.
Taken literally, the results suggest that wage subsidy programs tend to en-
hance the employment of the short-term unemployed. On the other hand, the 
program has a large substitutions effect and deadweight loss: only up to two 
thirds of the jobs are newly created as a result of the subsidy and in over half 
of the cases the participants would have also been hired in the absence of the 
subsidy. Therefore the finding that the participants of wage subsidy programs 
were 20 times more likely to find work than the control group probably mas-
sively overestimates their real effect.
Public works programs had a strong lock-in effect: the job finding rate 
dropped sharply after the end of the programs and nearly half of the partici-
pants were involved in the same public works program more than once.
The regression analyses suggest that training and wage subsidy programs had 
a direct positive effect (even conditional on the characteristics of the partici-
pants). The direct effect of public works is less favourable than the outcomes 
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in the control group. These programs on the one hand cannot compensate for 
the unfavourable entry characteristics of participants and on the other hand, 
through their lock-in effect, they reduce the probability of open labour mar-
ket integration.
The study also provided interesting information on the subjective status as-
sessment and work motivation of job seekers. Participants of active labour mar-
ket programs were more open, flexible and pro-active than those in the control 
group, while they were more attached to the more traditional forms of lawful 
employment. These characteristics can also influence the effectiveness of ac-
tive labour market policies.
In conclusion, out of the active labour market programs public works defi-
nitely does not have a positive effect while the effect of training and particularly 
wage subsidy programs can be positive. The real effect of the program is more 
modest than the employment ratio after the end of the program indicates be-
cause the majority of participants would been employed also in the absence of 
the subsidy and not more than two in three posts were newly created thanks 
to the wage subsidy program. The evaluation of active labour market programs 
was further complicated by the fact that there were significant differences be-
tween the participants and the control group that could not be fully taken into 
account in the analysis.
Appendix 4
table 4A1: Factors influencing the probability of open employment.  
dependent variable: individual takes up work on the open labour market  
(rather than any other type of employment or status)
Explanatory variable* b
Standard 
error Wald-test
Degree of 
freedom Significance Exp(b)
ratio –0.014 0.006 5.732 1 0.017 0.986
education 9.076 6 0.169
education(1) 0.056 0.508 0.012 1 0.912 1.058
education(2) 0.178 0.493 0.131 1 0.717 1.195
education(3) 0.054 0.52 0.011 1 0.918 1.055
education(4) 0.435 0.506 0.741 1 0.389 1.545
education(5) 0.163 0.585 0.077 1 0.781 1.176
education(6) 0.863 0.536 2.592 1 0.107 2.371
Development 4.971 4 0.29
Development(1) –0.363 0.265 1.876 1 0.171 0.696
Development(2) 0.27 0.294 0.841 1 0.359 1.31
Development(3) –0.231 0.303 0.582 1 0.445 0.794
Development(4) –0.13 0.301 0.186 1 0.666 0.878
status4 120.148 3 0
status4(training) 0.597 0.213 7.852 1 0.005 1.817
status4(wage subs) 3.008 0.39 59.402 1 0 20.243
status4(publ empl) –1.324 0.336 15.517 1 0 0.266
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Explanatory variable* b
Standard 
error Wald-test
Degree of 
freedom Significance Exp(b)
Age group 5.833 4 0.212
Age group(1) –0.335 0.276 1.481 1 0.224 0.715
Age group(2) –0.396 0.311 1.619 1 0.203 0.673
Age group(3) –0.656 0.331 3.925 1 0.048 0.519
Age group(4) –0.946 0.439 4.651 1 0.031 0.388
Residence 2.275 2 0.321
residence(1) 0.46 0.308 2.223 1 0.136 1.583
residence(2) 0.416 0.319 1.709 1 0.191 1.516
Gender 0.229 0.175 1.709 1 0.191 1.257
d4(marital stat) 12.508 8 0.13
d4(1) 0.22 1.186 0.034 1 0.853 1.246
d4(2) 0.083 1.202 0.005 1 0.945 1.087
d4(3) 0.75 1.164 0.415 1 0.519 2.116
d4(4) 1.329 1.246 1.137 1 0.286 3.776
d4(5) 0.232 1.409 0.027 1 0.869 1.261
d4(6) 0.25 1.182 0.045 1 0.833 1.284
d4(7) –0.105 1.266 0.007 1 0.934 0.901
d4(8) 0.109 1.278 0.007 1 0.932 1.116
u10 (Roma) 1.65 2 0.438
u10(1) 0.175 0.332 0.277 1 0.599 1.191
u10(2) –0.353 0.533 0.437 1 0.509 0.703
Open empl(1) –0.522 0.312 2.793 1 0.095 0.593
Subsidised empl(1) –0.355 0.428 0.686 1 0.407 0.701
unemployed(1) 0.436 0.314 1.925 1 0.165 1.547
Unemployment benefit(1) 0.127 0.273 0.216 1 0.642 1.135
Child care allowance(1) 0.89 0.825 1.165 1 0.28 2.435
Constant –3.111 1.886 2.72 1 0.099 0.045
* Explanatory variables included in the analysis:
ratio: ratio of the duration of unemployment within total work history
Education(.): respondent’s highest education level;
Development(.): development level of the small region;
status4(.): respondent’s status at time of intervention (training, wage subsidy, public 
works);
age group(.): respondent’s age;
residence(.): respondent’s place of residence;
gender: respondent’s gender;
d4 (marital stat)(.): respondent’s marital status;
u10(.): respondent’s Roma ethnic background;
open empl(1): employment status at the beginning of the observation period: previ-
ously in open employment;
subsidised empl(1): employment status at the beginning of the observation period: 
previously in subsidised employment;
unemployed(1): employment status at the beginning of the observation period: previ-
ously unemployed without receiving any unemployment-related benefit;
unemployment benefit(1): employment status at the beginning of the observation 
period: previously unemployed, receiving unemployment-related benefit;
child care allowance(1): employment status at the beginning of the observation pe-
riod: maternity leave
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5. thE IMPAct oF thE ExPAnSIon oF PubLIc WorkS ProGrAMS  
on LonG-tErM unEMPLoYMEnt
János Köllő & Ágota Scharle
The Road to Work Program (“Út a Munkához Program”) was launched in 2009 
with the objective of providing income and an employment opportunity to un-
employed low education level workers living in the most disadvantaged small 
settlements, or in other words to provide work incentives and improve the em-
ployability of the long-term unemployed. This study examines the impact of 
public work programs on the employment opportunities of the long-term un-
employed before the launch of Road to Work Program. As will be shown later, 
Road to Work Program was virtually the extension of existing public works 
programs therefore the same effects can be expected as those presented here.
After an overview of the labour market and institutional context, the study 
will present the development of public works in the 2000s and the Road to 
Work Program in more detail. It will address the allocation of additional re-
sources to different groups of workers (targeting) and the number of unem-
ployed workers and local councils – including disadvantaged micro-regions – 
that were reached by the program (take-up). A separate section will discuss 
the experiences of public works programs in Hungary. The last section will 
focus on the key question of the study, the impact of public works programs 
between 2003 and 2008.
The study is based mainly on administrative data and analyses the impact 
of public works programs on the development of long-term unemployment at 
the settlement-level. This chapter is a substantially shortened version of the 
full research report prepared by the Budapest Institute and Hétfa Research 
Institute (Budapest Intézet, 2011).
Labour market and institutional context
Unemployment rose very rapidly during the early years of regime change. Long-
term unemployment rose steadily within the working age population and stood 
at just over three per cent by the 1990s. Over half of the unemployed took 
longer than a year to find employment. Both the number of short- and long-
term unemployed was declining until 2001, but then started growing again. 
The relative ratio of short- and long-term unemployment remained relatively 
stable until 2008 when the crisis started to deepen. Since then the ratio of 
short-term unemployment has somewhat increased. The rate of long-term un-
employment (within the working age population) again approached three per 
cent in 2009 (Figure 5.1).
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Figure 5.1: unemployment and benefits  
(within the working age population, percentage)
Source: The Hungarian Labour Market in 2010. Tables 5.6 and 5.7 claimant 
count, October.
The majority of the long-term unemployed are older workers, low-educated 
workers and people living in remote settlements with poor public transporta-
tion links due to cuts in transport services (Galasi–Nagy, 1999, Köllő, 2009). 
Consistently low employment levels can be linked to a number of issues – inher-
ited economic structure, the post-communist transition, demographic trends 
and government policies might have been contributing factors. The global cri-
sis in 2008 made things worse but internal structural problems and processes 
that had originated much earlier are a more likely explanation for the low em-
ployment level. It is not surprising that the rapidly changing economy during 
the years of the post-communist transition did not offer many employment 
opportunities to masses of the low-educated workforce. However, persistent 
long-term unemployment is not an inherent part of the market economy – it 
is explained by the characteristics of Central East European economies. One 
of the contributing factors is most probably the weak education system (pub-
lic and vocational education) that is responsible for the low adaptability of 
the workforce (Commander and Köllő, 2008, Kézdi, Köllő and Varga, 2009). 
Other important factors include the lack of small and family businesses and 
the extensive red tape that hinders their expansion. In Western Europe the 
employment rate of the low-educated is similar to that of graduates, but they 
are typically employed by small businesses. This sector was disrupted by the so-
cialist economies and cannot be restored overnight – even in Poland where the 
SME sector is growing rapidly thanks to the capital investments of returning 
migrants, it falls behind the extent of the SME sector in similarly developed 
South American economies (Maloney, 2004). In addition, the Hungarian 
regulatory environment is not particularly helpful in fostering the long and 
difficult process of small business development.
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Economic and employment policy decisions with a direct effect on labour 
supply and demand also contributed to stagnating employment. There is an 
unhealthy balance on the labour market that is maintained by the mutually 
reinforcing effects of low employment, welfare policies, high taxes and low tax 
revenues. As a result of the generous welfare policies designed to mitigate ten-
sions in the early years of regime change, currently the main source of income 
for nearly one fourth of the working age population is some form of welfare 
payment with the majority of recipients being economically inactive and ab-
senting themselves from the labour market for a long period or permanently 
(Cseres-Gergely and Scharle, 2008). The ex-post evaluation of the increase to 
the minimum wage in 2001–2002 showed that it had no significant impact 
on labour supply, however it clearly reduced employment in labour-intensive 
sectors (Benedek et al., 2006, Kertesi and Köllő 2004). In some areas it is not 
the excessive government intervention but rather inaction that hinders em-
ployment. These areas include the reluctance to combat gender and ethnic dis-
crimination and delaying the adoption of public health policies to improve the 
health status of the population. Finally, based on the rather sporadic data and 
empirical studies active and passive labour market policies aimed at reducing 
unemployment did not prove effective in increasing employment (Bódis et al., 
2005, Bódis and Nagy, 2008, Cseres-Gergely and Scharle, 2010, Fazekas, 2001, 
Csák, 2007, Nagy, 2008).
The system of unemployment assistance, including both the insurance-based 
and time-limited unemployment benefit and the means-tested social assistance 
paid to the long-term unemployed, underwent numerous changes over the past 
20 years (for more on this see Budapest Intézet, 2011, and Duman and Scharle, 
2010). There are a number of conditions attached to the payment of unemploy-
ment assistance in most countries, including Hungary. As part of a workfare 
reform in 2000 a new rule was introduced that required the long-term unem-
ployed claimants of social welfare assistance to take up public works for up 
to 30 days before the assistance could be paid. The only exception was when 
the local council or job centre was unable to organise public works programs. 
Claimants were required to cooperate with the local council or a designated 
service (typically the family counselling service or the job centre), sign on as 
unemployed, visit their advisor on a regular basis, report any changes that may 
affect eligibility and take part in employability programs.
The reform in 2000 expanded the range of activities that could be carried 
out in public works programs and allocated central government subsidies for 
financing public works. The new rules were based on the principles of work-
fare and aimed to provide “work instead of benefits”. It was hoped that the new 
system would help to reduce benefit fraud and reduce long-term unemploy-
ment (Fazekas 2001, Duman and Scharle, 2011). The focus of this study, the 
Road to Work Program, is not substantively different from the system created 
in focus
126
in 2000 in terms of its objectives or main components. The difference was a 
substantial increase of the budget available for public works programs man-
aged by local councils.
The Road to Work Program
The Road to Work Program was launched by the Hungarian government in 
2008. The main objectives of the program were to improve the labour market 
situation of benefit claimants, reduce work disincentives of the benefit system 
and increase employment level (Szűcs, 2009). It also aimed to create public 
sector jobs to provide work opportunities for the long-term and improve joint 
working between social and employment services. Some further benefits of the 
program were also envisaged by the Government, such as reducing the number 
of working age people claiming social assistance, improving the time-use of job 
centres, enhancing the efficiency of partnerships between local councils, family 
counselling services and the public employment service, increasing the num-
ber of work-ready jobseekers, better targeting of employment assistance and 
improving the employment situation in the most disadvantaged small regions.
The Road to Work Program was introduced in two phases in 2009. Social as-
sistance claimants were allocated into two groups: those able to work and those 
not able to work. The first group would either participate in public works or 
receive income replacement. The central government substantially increased 
the budget available to local councils for public works programs. There were 
also further incentives for local councils to make the most of this: the rate of 
government co-financing was 95% for public works programs but only 80% 
for income replacement (reduced from a previous level of 90%). The income re-
placement is a fixed-sum payment and somewhat less than the average amount 
of social assistance. This rule entered into force in January 2010, thus in 2009 
all claimants were receiving the regular social assistance according to the pre-
vious regulation (Csoba, 2010a; Frey, 2010).
The Road to Work Program limited the possibilities of local councils because 
it no longer allowed the involvement of a broad range of long-term unemployed 
only those receiving the income replacement. At the same the available budget 
increased. Previously the budget was allocated by the ministry responsible for 
local councils based on the needs forecasted by local councils at the beginning 
of each year. On the contrary the Road to Work Program was based on norma-
tive post-financing which meant that the State Treasury reimbursed 95% of 
the expenses related to the employment of public workers to local councils at 
the end of each month (they received a 50% discount on contributions paid 
by employers). For related program components and details on management 
see Budapest Intézet (2011). The rapid expansion of the Road to Work Program 
is illustrated by Figure 5.2. The figure clearly shows that the total number of 
participants increased substantially by the end of the year.
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Figure 5.2: Introduction of the road to Work Program – number of people claiming 
social assistance, income replacement and participants of public works programs, 
monthly average, 2009, thousand people
Source: Regular social welfare assistance and income replacement claimants Employ-
ment Office (claimant count on the closing day); municipal public works partici-
pants: Ministry of National Resources.
Figure 5.3 shows that there was no clear upward trend in the number of reg-
istered unemployed prior to the launch of the Road to Work Program: the 
number of claimants and registered unemployed only started to increase as a 
result of the global crisis. Nonetheless the number of long-term unemployed 
receiving assistance already showed an upward trend throughout 2008. There 
have been three kinds of public works programs in operation in Hungary: the 
“municipal” public works programs, the “communal” public works programs 
and the public works programs organized by the National Employment Ser-
vice (ÁFSZ) program.
Figure 5.3: Average headcount of unemployment assistance claimants  
and public works participants
Source: Own calculation based on the Labour Force Survey of the Hungarian Central 
Statistical Office (CSO).
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According to available administrative data on average 14,000 to 16,000 people 
were employed in one ot the three types of public works programs each year 
before to the introduction of Road to Work. Thus each program provided em-
ployment to approximately 10–12% of the long-term unemployed (20–22% in 
total). In the first year of the Road to Work program, the average headcount in 
communal public works jumped to 60,000 (while it shrank to 5,000 in munici-
pal public works) that made up 27% of income replacement claimants. Together 
with those in municipal public works the number of workers increased by 50% 
compared to the previous year. It should be noted that the level of employment 
in public works was only extraordinary in a sense that local councils have never 
been allocated so much funding for this from the central government’s budget. 
The level of employment measured as the percentage of benefit claimants was 
similarly high in 2003 as well: then 15% of benefit claimants were employed 
in municipal public works and a further 10% in the community (Figure 5.4).
Figure 5.4: ratio of participants in municipal and communal public works  
within the total eligible benefit claimants, 1996–2009
Source: Average headcount in October for municipal public works (Labour Market 
Review, 2010, Table 5.13). Average annual headcount for communal public works 
(Fazekas, 2001; based on data provided by the National Audit Office (2007) and 
the Hungarian State Treasury, 2001 and 2007 figures estimated on the basis of data 
provided by the State Treasury, 2008 figure calculated using settlement data on the 
number of days eligible for reimbursement. Both data sets are expressed as the ratio 
of eligible benefit claimants (income replacement assistance, social welfare assis-
tance and income replacement) using the average October headcount (The Hungar-
ian Labour Market, 2010, Table 5.13): ratio of municipal public works = municipal 
public works participants/(municipal + community + benefit claimants); ratio of 
communal public works participants/(community + municipal + benefit claimants).
Regional disparities in targeting and take-up
Considering the regulatory background of the Road to Work Program, we can 
expect that its targeting is probably adequate and it reaches the most disadvan-
taged long-term unemployed with the worst employment prospects. However it 
might create problems if local councils decided to employ more educated jobseek-
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ers who are more likely to have the necessary skills, or if due to inadequate man-
agement capacities programs fail to reach those living in remote villages with no 
jobs. Uptake at the national level is very high, but due to the decentralised na-
ture of the program implementation, there might be major regional disparities.
Table 5.1 shows the number of settlements that had municipal public works 
programs between 2003 and 2009. After the introduction of the state subsidy 
in 2000 it took a few years for the program to take off. While in 2003 less than 
half of the local councils arranged public works, in 2005 this was more than 
85%. This then remained by-and-large unchanged until 2008 and increased 
slightly after the launch of the Road to Work Program. In 2009 nearly all local 
councils had public works programs. A more detailed analysis shows that up-
take increased most by local councils with high long-term unemployment and 
where there was a history of public works (Budapest Institute, 2011). In locali-
ties further away from the capital the number of participants in public works 
programs increased more, however the most remote villages were less able to 
take advantage of the increasing funding opportunities. There was no signifi-
cant relationship between the percentage of the Roma population within the 
settlement and changes in the uptake.
table 5.1: Share of local councils that organise public works programs, 2003–2009
Local council 2003 2005 2007 2008 2009
Village with a population of less than 50 0.00 0.53 0.53 0.67 0.84
Village with a population of 50–99 0.13 0.78 0.73 0.80 0.91
Village with a population of 100–149 0.14 0.83 0.81 0.86 0.95
Village with a population of 150–499 0.25 0.84 0.85 0.87 0.96
Village with a population of 500–4,999 0.44 0.88 0.87 0.88 0.97
Town / village with a population of 5,000–9,999 0.71 0.89 0.92 0.92 0.97
Town with a population of 10,000–19,999 0.70 0.85 0.85 0.84 0.99
Town with a population of 20,000–49,999 0.71 0.98 0.90 0.98 1.00
Town with a population of over 50,000 0.90 0.95 1.00 1.00 1.00
Total local councils 0.39 0.85 0.85 0.87 0.96
Note: Villages with a population of less than 50 inhabitants make up nearly one third 
of all municipalities, and villages with 500 to 5,000 inhabitants make up nearly two 
thirds (without population weights).
Source: own calculations based on data from the Hungarian State Treasury and Tstar.
The targeting of the Road to Work Program was analysed using quasi-panel 
monthly data generated from individual-level data held by the Employment 
Office. The data-set was generated using individual data and a time-series of 
group-level observations; “real” panel data follows individuals over time, how-
ever the data did not allow this type of analysis. Our groups were based on gen-
der, level of education and age group.
Our regression model analysed the relationship between take-up and other 
characteristics within groups and the month of observation. The results in Ta-
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ble 5.2 show that the Road to Work Program did reach its target groups at the 
individual level: low educated job seekers were more likely to participate. Age 
had no significant effect on take-up aside from the fact that in the age group 
under 25 years, involvement was significantly more likely. This might not be a 
good thing if they do not gain work experience in public works that can also 
be useful elsewhere but they have less time and motivation to look for work 
on the open labour market.
table 5.2: Probability of public works take-up (social assistance recipients  
from the register of Employment office, 2009)
Co-efficient Standard error
Less than 8 years of general education and aged over 35 years –0.003 0.0023
Less than 8 years of general education 0.002 0.0019
Eight years of general education 0.006*** 0.0013
Lower secondary 0.005*** 0.0011
Upper secondary 0.002** 0.0010
Education level not known –0.054*** 0.0015
Under 25 0.003** 0.0011
25–29 years 0.001 0.0011
30–34 years 0.000 0.0011
Over 55 0.001 0.0011
January – March –0.002 0.0014
May 0.063*** 0.0017
June 0.088*** 0.0017
July 0.050*** 0.0017
August 0.053*** 0.0017
September 0.065*** 0.0017
October 0.050*** 0.0017
November 0.035*** 0.0017
December 0.020*** 0.0017
Constant –0.002 0.0015
Source: own calculations based on data from the Employment Office.
The experiences of public works programs in Hungary before 2008
In a review of the international experiences of the effectiveness of active labour 
market policies Kluve (2010) argues that public works programs are rarely effec-
tive and in some cases they can be detrimental for future employment prospects 
– if they lack even a minimal positive impact that could compensate for the re-
duced time available for job search by job seekers (see also Chapter 2 of In Focus).
Our understanding of the effectiveness of active labour market policies in 
Hungary is limited. The validity of program evaluations has been challenged 
by the fact that participants of public works programs are a special group and 
it is very difficult to find adequate control groups to measure the effect of non-
intervention (on the importance of this see for example Chapter 1 of In Focus). 
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There have been no experimental studies and the validity of non-experimental 
studies can often be questionable. Nevertheless this section will review research 
on the effectiveness of public works programs before 2008. There seems to be a 
general agreement in the literature that public works failed to achieve its main 
objectives and improve the job prospects of workers in public works programs.
Many reports present only unadjusted job-finding rates. Although these data 
are informative, they do not allow us to separate the program’s real effects from 
the participant and context effects. The ÁFSZ monitoring studies measure the 
job-finding rate three months after the end of the main programs. These studies 
in 2007 found that after training nearly 40% and after participation in wage 
subsidy schemes, over 60% of jobseekers found work (ÁFSZ, 2007). Frey (2008) 
argued that the job-finding rate among participants of public works programs 
was virtually zero (0.1–0.3 per cent) in counties with high unemployment, and 
even in more developed counties this rate was around 5% between 2001 and 
2005. Csoba (2010a) showed that the exit rate from long-term unemployment 
as a result of finding a job was only 1.4% in 2009.
Galasi, Lázár and Nagy (1999), in their study that also takes into account 
selection, found a weak positve effect of training and a negative effect of pub-
lic works on job finding. Galasi, Lázár and Nagy (2003) showed that public 
works participants were less likely to find a job than participants in other active 
labour market programs, but the difference was partly explained by participant 
characteristics. Fazekas (2001) studied the first results of the introduction of 
public works using data recorded by local councils, interviews and data from 
administrative sources in 2001. He found that the number of participants in 
municipal public works fell short of expectations and job finding among the 
long-term unemployed did not increase. Nevertheless the program provided 
an opportunity to offer employment for people who were not eligible for un-
employment assistance. According to Fazekas (2001) 11.4% of those claiming 
regular social assistance were recruited to public works using this option be-
tween May 1, 2000 and October 31, 2001.
The National Audit Office investigated the use of resources allocated for 
public works in 2002 and 2007. In 2002 18% of the financial resources were 
included in the investigation using site visits and data from the unemploy-
ment register. They concluded that there was a lack of coordination between 
the different types of public works and their efficiency was rather poor. There 
was limited use of employment plans to facilitate return to the open labour 
market and public works programs were largely led by the short-term finan-
cial interests and workforce needs of local councils. In terms of the allocation 
of resources, no consideration was given to efficiency and all program propos-
als received funding until the budget was exhausted. The second report from 
2007 was based on site visits between 2003 and 2006 and a survey on the per-
ception of public works. This report reiterated the conclusions of the previous 
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report and also highlighted deficiencies in the monitoring and evaluation of 
programs whether they delivered the planned outcomes (employment, educa-
tion etc.). It also concluded that public works failed to considerably improve 
the employment prospects of participants. The survey however, found that 
public works were socially accepted and the jobs carried out were considered 
useful by the majority of respondents.
Bódis and Nagy (2008) suggested that the differences in the administration 
of benefits between local councils persisted based on a survey carried out in the 
summer of 2007. The survey examined the assessment of eligibility and consid-
ered whether claimants were offered the possibility to take part in public works 
at 44 municipalities and local job centres. Eighty per cent of participating lo-
cal councils designated the employment service to monitor the compliance of 
claimants, in the rest of the cases the designated authority was the family coun-
selling service but benefit claimants were still required to cooperate with the 
public employment service too. The findings of this study, similarly to some 
earlier case studies, suggested that, in the absence of incentives and professional 
inspection, adherence to policies was very uneven: authorities involved in the 
administration of benefits could create their own rules and based on personal 
characteristics, their legal and human rights awareness and local interests de-
cided on the level of cooperation expected from benefit claimants and the use 
of sanctions (Bódis and Nagy, 2008, Szalai, 2004–2005).
Firle and Szabó (2007) examined the job finding rate among benefit claim-
ants and public works participants based on individual panel data from the 
CSO’s Labour Force Survey between 2001 and 2004. They found that public 
works participants were six to nine per cent less likely to find (non-subsidised) 
employment in the following quarter than a comparable group – in terms of 
age, education level and family situation – of unemployed people. To date this 
is the only research using a large sample to estimate the individual-level effect 
of public works in Hungary. Similarly to other program evaluations discussed 
here, the results of Firle and Szabó (2007) are more informative than a simple 
comparison of exit rates, however it does not necessarily reflect the real effect 
of the program because non-experimental studies usually need to control for 
a wider range of variables (for example long-term employment history).
The effect of public works on job finding  
– a settlement-level analysis
Based on international experiences and program results in Hungary so far we 
can hypothesise that public works does not contribute to the reduction of long-
term unemployment in the short run. Longer term effects are also unlikely to 
be positive, but we cannot assess those, due to the relatively recent nature of 
these programs.
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Before the settlement-level analysis, it is worth considering national rates. 
According to the CSO’s Labour Force Survey very few workers – approximate-
ly one to five per cent – with short fixed-term contracts in any type of public 
works program (municipal, communal and national) find unsubsidised em-
ployment from one quarter to the next (Figure 5.5). Approximately 20–40% 
of those employed in public works in a given quarter will (again) become reg-
istered unemployed in the following quarter.
Figure 5.5: Exit rate from subsidised employment compared to baseline rates  
by labour market status
Note: The flows are consistent with the population flows and do not include new en-
trants.
Source: Calculations by Zsombor Cseres-Gergely based on the CSO Labour Force 
Survey (Budapest Institute, 2011).
Our study measures the effect of public works programs implemented between 
2003 and 2008 using a settlement-level analysis. It seeks to answer the ques-
tion of whether long-term unemployment declined more (increased less) in 
settlements where there was an expansion of public works programs (relative 
to long-term unemployment) than in settlements where public works did not 
expand or expanded less. If public works programs really improve participants’ 
employment prospects then we should find a negative relationship, namely 
with the expansion of public works we should see a decline in long-term un-
employment with time.
Impact evaluations of employment policies generally compare participants’ 
employment odds with the counterfactual odds, notably those that would have 
characterised them in the absence of the program. The counterfactual odds 
are usually measured with a carefully selected control group. The comparison 
is typically between individuals in the intervention group and individuals in 
the control group. In this case, to measure the effect of public works we should 
consider the long term employment odds of program participants with the 
employment odds of long-term unemployed people who were not involved in 
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the program but are similar to participants in all other aspects. To achieve an 
adequate sample size and to measure participation more accurately the partici-
pant and the control group should be selected from the register of the Employ-
ment Office. However it was not possible to obtain individual data in time for 
the analysis and the measurement issues of individual data would have posed 
more difficulties. Therefore we decided to do settlement-level analysis instead 
of an individual analysis.
Unemployment data was obtained from the central register of the Employ-
ment Office, data on program participation came from the municipal public 
works database of the State Treasury. The analysis also used the CSO Labour 
Force Survey as well as the CSO’s settlement-level indicators database (ex-
panded by the IE HAS). The settlement-level estimates were based on a panel 
dataset generated from these, in which each observation represents yearly data 
from settlements in Hungary. The data necessary for the analysis were only 
available for the years 2003 to 2008, therefore all estimates are for this period.
Using the panel datasets we employed panel regressions to estimate the rela-
tionship between trends in public works and long-term unemployment. The 
first type of regression tested the levels with fixed settlement and year effects; 
the second type of regression analysed changes between years. The two regres-
sion formulas are as follows:
LUit = βPit + αSUi,t–1 + γXit + ci + dt + uit
ΔLUit = βΔPit + αΔSUi,t–1 + γΔXit + Δdt + vit ,
where:
i is the settlement,
t is the year of observation,
LU is the rate of long-term unemployment within the working age population,
SU is the rate of short-term unemployment within the working age popu-
lation.
P is the share of public works participants within the total number of public 
works participants and social assistance recipients.
X is the vector for settlement-level control variables,
ci denotes fixed effects of the settlement,
dt denotes fixed effects of the given year,
uit denotes the unobserved time-varying heterogeneity within settlements,
vit is the equivalent of this in the differential equation.
Both uit and vit can be auto-correlated, therefore in the basic models we es-
timated clustered standard errors and we also repeated all estimations using 
generalised least squares that takes autocorrelations into account to estimate 
parameters. Both regressions were also estimated with the lagged rate of public 
works (Pi,t–1) instead of the real time rate (Pit) in the right side of the equation.
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The rate of long-term unemployment was defined in our analysis as the total 
number of jobseekers who had been registered for 180 days or longer and par-
ticipants in public works, divided by the total working age population. The rate 
of short-term unemployment is the total number of public works participants 
and jobseekers registered for less than 180 days divided by the total number 
of the working age population. The rate of public works participants was cal-
culated dividing the number of public works participants with the total num-
ber of social assistance recipients (income replacement assistance) and public 
works participants.
These regression equations can also be seen as variations of the difference in 
differences (DiD) technique: we compared long-term unemployment rates of 
settlements along the expansion of public works. However, while in DiD mod-
els there is a pre- and post treatment measurement, in our model we compare 
data from settlements with different levels of public works expansion. The 
comparison is based on changes in participation rates over time.
The regression outputs with the estimated coefficients are presented in Ta-
ble 5.3 (see next page). The results clearly show that public works do not reduce 
long term unemployment and they may even increase it slightly in the short 
term. The results of the equations estimating the short-term relationships show 
that if the share of public works participants among the total unemployed in-
creases by one per cent in a given settlement then the rate of long-term unem-
ployment in the working age population increases by 0.016 percentage points 
within the same year. The results of the models estimating lagged effects are 
more ambiguous; depending on the parameters this coefficient is not signifi-
cant (zero), positive or negative. Considering that all coefficients are very small, 
it can be concluded that increased participation in public works does not lead 
to a perceptible decline in long-term unemployment in subsequent years either.
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table 5.3: Municipal public works and long-term unemployment in hungarian 
settlements, regression estimates (2002–2008)
Estimated on levels Estimated on differences
given year previous year given year previous year
Baseline model
Public works (Pit)a 0.0098*** – 0.0186*** –
(0.0018) (0.0021)
Public works,lagged (Pit – 1)b – 0.0045** – –0.0060**
(0.0022) (0.0025)
Short-term unemployment, 
lagged SUt – 1c
0.1217*** 0.1252 0.2156*** 0.2167***
(0.0098) (0.0116) (0.0097) (0.0115)
Other explanatory variables (Xit) YES YES YES YES
Settlement fixed effects YES YES
Year fixed effects YES YES YES YES
Autoregression ( ρ) 0 0 0 0
Observations 16,610 12,726 12,709 9,710
Number of settlements 2,994 2,878 2,871 2,703
Number of years 6 5 5 4
Model incorporating autocorrelation
Public works (Pit)a 0.0169*** – 0.0159*** –
(0.0026) (0.0026)
Public works,lagged (Pit – 1)b – 0.0028 – –0.0043
(0.0026) (0.0033)
Short-term unemploymen, 
lagged SUt – 1c
0.1833*** 0.1842*** 0.2337*** 0.2602***
(0.0102) (0.0121) (0.0113) (0.0143)
Other explanatory variables (Xit) YES YES YES YES
Settlement fixed effects YES YES
Year fixed effects YES YES YES YES
Autoregression ( ρ) 0.3787 0.3412 –0.1313 –0.1099
Observations 13,116 9,848 9,838 7,007
Number of settlements 2,907 2,732 2,730 2,486
Number of years 5 4 4 3
a The number of public workers divided by the total number of public workers and 
benefit recipients.
b Number of those who have been registered unemployed for less than 12 months di-
vided by the total number of working age people.
c Reference: 2008.
Dependent variable: Number of those who have been registered unemployed for 12 
months or over divided by the total number of working age people.
Standard errors in parentheses. * Significant at the 10 per cent level, ** five per cent level, 
*** one per cent level.
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Conclusion
The results suggest that the Road to Work Program reached the most disadvan-
taged long-term unemployed with the worst employment prospects. Although 
occasionally local councils tried to compensate for the sharp drop in their re-
sources with the Road to Work Program, this did not worsen the targeting sig-
nificantly – this would have been indicated by the increased involvement of 
more capable and educated public workers.
The Road to Work Program had a very high take-up and it significantly in-
creased in 2009. In the year of its introduction nearly all settlements and over 
a quarter of the eligible long-term unemployed participated in public works 
for some time. The program grew faster than expected probably as a result of 
the uncapped budget and the total absence of professional control. Local coun-
cils could use the additional resources provided by the Road to Work Program 
within broad limits and with favourable conditions to expand public services or 
reduce wage costs. There were no inbuilt mechanisms that would have limited 
the increase in spending either to ensure fiscal prudence or to allocate funding 
for other employment policy objectives.
The Road to Work Program has not been evaluated yet, but its effects will 
probably be similar to the public works programs of previous years. The litera-
ture and our analysis of settlement-level data clearly show that public works 
programs in Hungary did not bring about a reduction in long-term unemploy-
ment. It seems evident that public works schemes do not improve the employ-
ment prospects of participants. Therefore it is uncertain how the Road to Work 
Program could achieve its primary objective of improving the labour market 
situation of benefit claimants and thus increasing the level of employment.
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6. thE IMPLEMEntAtIon oF A coMPLEx LAbour MArkEt ProGrAM 
And ItS LocAL EFFEctS In thE South-trAnSdAnubIAn rEGIon
Gergely Kabai & Nándor Németh
Introduction
The South-Transdanubian region (apart from a few urban areas) is an area lag-
ging behind on a range of economic and social indicators. One of the most im-
portant indicators is the high rate of long-term unemployment in the hamlets 
that are characteristic settlements of this area. To address long-term unem-
ployment in these small settlements the (then) South-Transdanubian Region-
al Employment Service (STRES) launched the complex labour market pro-
gram Life Changing – Life Shaping (in Hungarian: Sorsfordító – sorsformáló) 
in March 2009. Initially the program was implemented in six localities in 
Tolna County, but later it was expanded to Somogy and Baranya counties 
and currently it covers over 30 localities. The participants in the Life Chang-
ing Program, over 200 former long-term unemployed, received training and 
were employed mainly in vegetable and fruit growing. They are employed by 
local councils, cooperatives and agricultural businesses. “Life shaping” was 
a work experience scheme using wage subsidies to support graduates with an 
agriculture-related degree.
The Life Changing – Life Shaping Program is a complex labour market pro-
gram.1 Its main characteristics are that it is a long term scheme (it runs for two 
years or longer) and it can offer assistance using the whole range of active la-
bour market policies including paid training, employment and mentoring.
This study presents the Life Changing – Life Shaping labour market program, 
highlights its good practices, compares it with other similar initiatives and also 
uncovers some of its weaknesses. The second part of the study highlights the 
results of the program using concrete examples from participating settlements 
and also considers what effects could be contributed to the program.
The study is based on a research project in which we interviewed staff from 
the relevant employment services who were responsible for coordinating the 
program, colleagues at Diófa Consortium who were responsible for the man-
agement and implementation of the program and other stakeholders. The in-
terviews aimed to explore the weakness of the program and any issues with 
management and implementation, and also future opportunities and plans. 
We also reviewed – mainly publicly available – documents to collect informa-
tion about the program and its implementation. Furthermore, we followed the 
implementation of the program for nearly 18 months: we participated (and 
made a presentation) at the evaluation conference in the spring of 2011 and 
half a dozen other program events including meetings, workshops and prod-
1 See the Introduction and Chap-
ter 2 of In Focus on the types of 
active labour market programs 
in general and on complex pro-
grams in particular.
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uct launch events. These provided valuable information that would have been 
impossible to obtain from other sources.2
Background of the Life Changing – Life Shaping Program
The program was officially launched in March 2009; however preparations had 
started much earlier. The key individuals of the programs had been discussing 
and planning an innovative program specially designed to address the employ-
ment problems and challenges of the South-Transdanubian hamlets. The long 
preparatory phase was also necessary because some of the staff of the regional 
employment services questioned the feasibility of the program; they doubted 
whether the long-term unemployed who already had lost some of their work 
capacity and had no or little previous agricultural experience would be suitable 
participants for an agricultural/horticultural project. Finally the director of 
STRES was won over to support the program in 2008 and he also persuaded 
his colleagues who initially had misgivings about the initiative.
Two forerunners of the Life Changing Program should also be mentioned 
here that had a key role in shaping the scheme. Successful, although slightly 
different horticultural programs had been running for more than 10 years in 
two localities of Tolna County: Belecska (Tamási Small Region) and Kisve-
jke (Bonyhád Small Region).In Belecska vegetable and fruit growing is part 
of a social employment program organised by the local council. The example 
of Belecska demonstrated to the organisers of the Life Changing Program that 
low educated long-term unemployed people can be successfully employed in 
horticulture and it might be worth expanding this. In the Kisvejke area there 
are a number of farmers who had achieved considerable international market 
share through their sale cooperative and are realising high profits. The example 
of Kisvejke demonstrated that fruit growing is viable in the region and with 
adequate knowledge this can be really successful. Therefore the first phase of 
the Life Changing Program was implemented around these settlements where 
it was less risky to test the feasibility of the ideas in practice.
A direct predecessor of the scheme was the Herbal Network project financed 
from Interreg in the South-Transdanubia Region in 2006–2007. The project, 
jointly implemented by partners from Croatia and Hungary, aimed to set up a 
business cluster to collect, produce and distribute medicinal herbs that would 
become a major source of jobs for people living in these disadvantaged rural ar-
eas. One of the aims was to create an economic development and agricultural in-
tegration model. In the end, the project which also provided training and men-
toring, had limited results, but it convinced SRES staff and other stakeholders 
about the viability of a job creation project based on the region’s agricultural 
heritage. The results also inspired the design of the Life Changing Program.3
By the second half of 2008 the basis of the Life Changing Program was laid 
down. The aim was to create a labour market and employment program that 
2 This study is based on Kabai 
(2010).
3 For more information on the 
Herbal Network Program see: 
http://www.bmmk.hu/herbal-
netw/interregnyito.html
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was more sustainable than previous initiatives, addressed local challenges and 
used local resources to tackle the complex issue of rural job creation.
Program structure and participants
The long term objective of the Life Changing Program was to provide jobs for 
people living in rural areas who had been excluded from the labour market, 
and equip them with the necessary skills to search and take up employment 
independently. The training provided as part of the scheme would give them 
the necessary knowledge and experience to earn their living or additional in-
come from growing and processing agricultural produce.
The structure of the program is simple. The long-term unemployed take part 
in a 1000-hour agricultural training program and then do work experience in a 
local council scheme or with local producers for one or two years. The program 
provides a wage subsidy (but its rate might vary according to the phase and em-
ployer). As far as possible the participants also undergo personal development 
to create an adequate attitude to work. The aim is that following the program 
as many of them as possible find a job on the primary labour market or convert 
their work experience job into long-term employment. The essence of the “life 
shaping” component was to provide paid work experience for eight agriculture 
graduates aged under 30 years for three years and thus launch them in their careers.
Municipalities aimed to become – at least partly – self-sufficient and produce 
goods that they could either use in their own kitchens or for welfare purposes 
and any surplus could be sold and thereby produce an income.
The agricultural producers in the program could employ trained workers for 
up to 12 months with a wage subsidy and use this time to reduce the burden 
or develop their business.
The program was not managed by the public employment service – unlike 
many similar programs – but an organisation, Diófa Consortium, set up spe-
cifically for this purpose at the beginning of 2009.
Initially the Consortium was made up of the following organisations:
– The Szekszárd-based Agrokonzult Training and Project Consultancy Ltd 
was responsible for the overall management of the Consortium and the 
program;
– The Szekszárd-based Ministry of Agriculture Agricultural Training Cen-
tre, Csapó Dániel High School and Agricultural College were responsi-
ble for organising training, and later they also took over the management 
of the Consortium;
– The local councils of Udvari and Závod were responsible for finding and 
coordinating work placements in the Tamási and Bonyhád small regions;
– The South-Transdanubian Regional Resource Centre public interest com-
pany was responsible for administration, monitoring and fund-raising ac-
tivities with the Consortium (Programterv, 2009).
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table 6.1: Settlements taking part in the Life changing Program and the initial 
number of participants
Settlement Number of participants* Note
Phase 1 (spring 2009 to fall 2010)
1 Udvari 5 Tamási Micro-Region, municipal and business employment
2 Szakadát 3 Tamási Micro-Region, municipal employment
3 Belecska 12 Tamási Micro-Region, municipal employment (one of the 
participants passed away and the number of participants 
dropped to 11)
4 Kisvejke 9 Bonyhád Micro-Region, participants employed by agricultural 
producers. (The number of participants increased slightly in 
the Kisvejke area later on.)
5 Závod 5
6 Lengyel 6
Phase 2 (January 2010 to fall 2011)
7 Nemesdéd 20 Marcali Micro-Region
8 Gyulaj 10 Dombóvár Micro-Region, municipal employment
9 Döbrököz 10
10 Gerényes 11 Sásd Micro-Region
11 Alsómocsolád 9
Phase 3 (April 2010 to January 2012)
12 Hegyszentmárton 20 Sellye Micro-Region
13 Csányoszró 10
14 Drávasztára 4
15 Sellye 6
16 Somogyjád 8 Kaposvár Micro-Region
17 Osztopán 2
18 Juta 2
19 Alsóbogát 2
20 Edde 1
21 Nagybajom 6 Csurgó, Kaposvár and Marcali Micro-Region
22 Szenyér 6
23 Berzence 8
24 Fadd 20 Tolna Micro-Region
25 Regöly 3 Tamási Micro-Region
26 Kisszékely 4
27 Kalaznó 3
28 Nagykónyi 5
29 Udvari 7
30 Szárazd 3
31 Varsád 3
32 Kocsola 3 Dombóvár Micro-Region
33 Szakcs 3
Total 229
* Initial or planned number of participants.
Source: Based on the project documentation of Life Changing – Life Shaping regional 
labour market program (http://www.ddrmk.hu/?id=20&subid=0&parent=2).
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Figure 6.1: Flow chart of the Life changing Program
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The Consortium was later expanded to include the Municipality of Fadd and 
as a sixth member the Institute of Medicinal Herb Research Ltd as well. The 
local council of Fadd provided work placements while the research institute 
contributed to the program by providing expert advice and buying the medici-
nal herbs produced in the program (Programterv, 2010a).
The program aimed to take into account local characteristics and opportu-
nities as much as possible. Therefore training was provided locally in most set-
tlements so that participants did not have to commute. More importantly pro-
duction was also set up taking into account the local context and opportunities. 
Where fruit production was more viable, training was based on that, where 
there was demand for vegetable growing then training was set up accordingly 
(lalthough not only fruit and vegetables but also medicinal herbs and small 
animal husbandry were possible options). Taking into account local charac-
teristics was one of the main pillars that ensured the efficiency of the program 
by not setting out to “simply” provide assistance but to produce value locally.
One of the main advantages of the Life Changing Program was its flexibil-
ity – apparent at all levels: training, finances, mentoring and organisational 
structure. One of the consequences of this flexibility was that the management 
and coordination of the program was much more labour-intensive than other 
employment schemes. To sustain a unique system tailored to specific needs re-
quired numerous negotiations, discussion and a lot of attention – a continuous 
challenge to the management organisation.
Also as a result of its flexibility the Life Changing Program was not a well-de-
fined and mature initiative at the outset (that turned out to be one of its main 
advantages). The management of the program learnt along the way, the original 
structure had a few failures that required correction. Shortly after the launch 
of the program it emerged that the long-term unemployed living in the small 
villages are very self-contained and their training needed more complex ap-
proaches than originally planned. Addressing this personal development was 
added to the program and was led by qualified psychologists. Also as a result of 
the introvert nature of participants, the training had to be reviewed continu-
ously. After a couple of initial pilots it became clear that only locally provided 
training could be really effective in their case. It also emerged that training 
should be hands-on and practice oriented because the knowledge transferred 
by theoretical training was not easily accessible for them. Due to the need for a 
special approach, the trainers received further training during the implemen-
tation of the program to make sure they could effectively deal with the unique 
challenges associated with the target group.
There were also problems in the first phase of the program that nobody could 
foresee. For example there were conflicts between the participants of the Road 
to Work Program (see Chapter 5 of In Focus) and the participants of Life Chang-
ing in a number of localities because public works participants were somewhat 
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jealous of Life Changing participants whose job was secured for two years. 
This was particularly the case where Life Changing participants were required 
– against the aims of the program – to undertake municipal maintenance jobs 
or public works participants had to take part in agricultural production. These 
difficulties were addressed by clearly separating job roles. Sometimes these 
problems were aggravated by local councils that often treated participants as 
“usual” public works participants in the absence of any prior experience with 
similar schemes. In comparison to other assistance schemes, one of the key 
features of this program was that it provided job seekers with long-term em-
ployment for approximately two years (although this is not at all uncommon 
among complex employment schemes).4 Longer term participation was also 
thought to increase the likelihood of re-employment on the open labour mar-
ket. Although post-program employment prospects are also closely related to 
the selection of participants the management of the program aimed to involve 
participants with the right attitude and skills.
Participants had to go through a selection process. First, the local job cen-
tre together with the local council identified potential participants from the 
given locality who were invited to apply for the program. First they had to go 
through a medical examination (people with long-term health condition and 
people with alcohol addiction were not eligible), and an assessment of their 
mental and cognitive status, motivation and social circumstances. Each local-
ity was allowed to recruit a certain number of participants, usually no more 
than 10 persons (see Table 6.1).
The selected participants then had to take part in training that lasted eight 
to nine months and, as far as possible, delivered locally or at a nearby locality. 
This comprised 200 hours theoretical and 800 hours practical training and it 
was very flexible – just like the rest of the program. The training was tailored 
to local characteristics in all cases: the curriculum was tailored to participants’ 
future area of work. For example for individuals that were going to be employed 
in fruit growing, most of their training focused on this subject. Trainers were 
also from the local area (as far as possible) to make sure that had an adequate 
knowledge of the local circumstances and could build trust in participants. 
Teaching did not aim to provide a deeper understanding of underlying issues 
but was practice-oriented and taught participants how to carry out certain 
tasks without necessarily understanding why it was done in a certain way. Work 
placements were provided by local councils and local businesses. At the end of 
the training all participants were required to sit an exam.
Following the training participants started a work placement that lasted up 
to two years. Placements were provided by local councils or agricultural busi-
nesses and producers. Workers always received the statutory minimum wage 
and were employed full time. Similarly to the training phases, changes in the 
participants’ personality and attitudes were continuously monitored.
4 Settlements that joined the 
program later could receive the 
subsidy for one year only.
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One of the major challenges in both public and private sector employment 
was that it was difficult to provide participants with adequate work during 
the autumn and winter seasons. Municipalities tried to deal with this by in-
volving participants in community jobs. For businesses this was more difficult 
and workers had to take leave during the winter period and make up for this 
time between spring and autumn (the Labour Code allows to average working 
hours over a longer period of time). This caused difficulties where the workers 
did not have the right attitudes and were unwilling to work more than eight 
hours a day during the summer.
Participants finished the program after the one- or two-year work place-
ment. As was mentioned earlier, the aim of the program was that many of the 
participants could retain their job long term. In the business sector this was 
possible if the individual performed well throughout the year and the busi-
ness could keep them on without the wage subsidy. In the public sector the 
aim was to create sustainable schemes that would employ a larger number of 
people. A third option for participants – now equipped with adequate qual-
ifications and work experience – was to start looking for a job or start their 
own production business.
The aforementioned mentoring activity can be potentially very important 
for the outcomes of the program and the satisfaction of participants. There-
fore the mental well-being of workers and psycho-social assistance were im-
portant elements of the program. Qualified mentors were part of the selection 
process as well to make sure those with the most appropriate attitudes were 
selected as participants. Later on designated mentors were in regular contact 
– in person and even over the phone – with the participants. Apart from work-
related issues they also offered assistance in other areas such as debt manage-
ment, budgeting advice etc.
The selection of settlements in the program happened through various chan-
nels. On the one hand organisers contacted villages with high unemployment 
where there was still a living tradition of agricultural production that could 
be effectively used in the program. Whether they decided to take part in the 
program depended on the openness of the local government or businesses. 
The opportunity was typically very well received also due to the personal net-
works and lobby activities of coordinators. On the other hand some (although 
not too many) localities put themselves forward to take part in the program.
Budget structure of the program
Due to its complex nature, Life Changing was slightly more costly than oth-
er labour market programs. The total cost of the program is expected to be 
around 660 million forints during the three years. Funding comes from the 
decentralised employment sub-fund of the Labour Market Fund and various 
SROP funded sources. Wage subsidies and training make up the largest part 
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of the cost (approximately 572 million forints), while the management of the 
program costs approximately 90 million forints.
The rate of wage subsidies paid to businesses and local councils varied depend-
ing on the locality and the program phase. In most cases it was 100% but for 
those who joined the program later at the third phase it was only 50% of the 
statutory minimum wage and contributions (Programterv, 2010b).
According to 2010 calculations the cost of an eight- or nine-month train-
ing for one participant was no more than 500,000 forints. During the train-
ing period participants were receiving training assistance that amounted to 
93,000 forints per month (a total of 837,000 forints during the nine-month 
period). The majority of the workers were employed by local councils which 
meant a 100% wage subsidy in the program. In 2010 this was 96,000 forints 
per month – for a 12-month employment period this totaled 1,152,000 forints 
(ibid idem). The per capita cost of the program excluding other costs (such as 
transport) was 2,489,000 forints at 2010 prices. Considering the total cost of 
the program (660 million forints) the per capita cost was 2.8 million forints.
With regards to the cost of the program it should be mentioned that par-
ticipants would have been receiving social assistance had they not been in the 
program; this reduces the real cost of the program by approximately 100–150 
million forints. Furthermore some of the costs of the program are returned to 
the state budget through taxation (for example income tax paid by the man-
agement, trainers etc.). If these factors are taken into account the program is 
comparable to an average-cost complex labour market program. Nevertheless 
the costing and the cost-efficiency of the program would require further in-
vestigation that is only possible after its closure.
Comparison of Life Changing and other labour market programs
County (later regional) employment services have had the possibility to initiate 
and implement their own labour market programs using active labour market 
policies (for example training, wage subsidy). Job centres have ample autonomy 
in the design and implementation of these programs; therefore there has been 
a wide variety of such programs over recent years.
So far there was only one comprehensive study on complex labour market 
programs that was conducted by the HAS Institute of Economics in 2007 
(Fazekas et al., 2007). The study also examined locally initiated labour market 
programs like (Simkó, 2007). The results of this study allow us to compare the 
Life Changing – Life Shaping Program with other, similar initiatives, identify 
its unique features and better assess its efficiency.
The main characteristics of complex labour market programs can be sum-
marised as follows. Joint working of the job centre and external organisations 
is an important part of the programs. Labor market programs are generally 
longer (up to three years), take into account individual needs and character-
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istics and use a combination of employment services and active labour mar-
ket policies. The unit cost of labour market programs is generally high due to 
their complexity but the programs might be more effective in achieving their 
objectives thanks to the combination of different types of assistance (Faze-
kas et al., 2007).
The comparison of different labour market programs is made difficult by the 
absence of clear categorisation. To resolve this we adopt the categories used by 
Fazekas et al. and attempt to classify the program in these. Considering that 
the life changing and life shaping components of the program are fundamen-
tally different, these should be analysed separately as well. The comparison 
uses the 149 complex labour market programs implemented in Hungary be-
tween 2000 and 2006.
The duration of complex labour market programs implemented between 
2000 and 2006 was between six and 36 months, on average around 24 months. 
The life changing component lasted three years which puts it among the longer 
programs. The differences in the program objectives do not allow us to direct-
ly compare the number of participants and this is made even more difficult by 
differences in the geographical scope of the programs (i.e. municipal, county 
and regional programs). The average number of participants in the 149 pro-
grams included in the study was 180 people which is similar to the number of 
participants in Life Changing.
The average per capita cost of the programs in the study was 453,00 forints. 
As has been shown the Life Changing Program was considerably more expen-
sive than this, the average per capita cost was nearly three million forints. This 
is only comparable to the cost of small-scale intensive mentoring programs that 
also had two to three million average per capita costs. (Taking into account the 
rate of inflation since the previous study Life Changing was somewhat cheaper 
than these programs.)
The life shaping component can be compared to graduate programs. These 
programs ran on average for 2.5 to three years with around 20–30 partici-
pants. Their primary aim was typically to keep young graduates in the local 
area or in some cases to retrain them to improve their employment prospects. 
The life shaping component was a unique initiative in that it provided work 
placements in agriculture. There was a similar program in Heves County in 
2000–2002 that provided work experience for 12 young agriculture gradu-
ates in agricultural business development with the longer-term aim of setting 
up their own business. All 12 participants found long-term employment after 
the program. As has been shown, the life shaping component is also expected 
to be similarly successful.
It is a lot more challenging to compare the life changing components because 
potentially there are many similar programs. It can be equally regarded as a 
program aimed at the low-educated, those aged 40 years or over or even the re-
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integration of disadvantaged people. Although there are countless programs 
in these categories (these groups are the most common target groups of com-
plex labour market programs), they might not be comparable meaningfully.
Looking at the objectives of the programs it might be argued that Sorfordito 
was innovative in that it offered long-term employment in agriculture that no 
other program did. Horticulture-related training and longer-term employment 
appeared in other programs (for example Bácsalmás, Jánoshalma 2003–2006), 
but these were smaller and did not focus on production.
Most labour market programs are based on training and/or wage subsidy but 
mentoring and personal development are also common elements. In this com-
parison the Life Changing Program was not at all unique. However it should 
be highlighted that mentoring in this program was much more effective than 
in other programs. Fazekas et al. (2007) argued that different advisory services 
and personal and skills development training that should have been a key part 
of the programs, were often implemented inadequately. Job centres usually 
used their own staff to provide services that had negative implications for the 
efficiency of programs. Nevertheless, relatively few job centres took advantage 
of the possibility to purchase external services or outsource program manage-
ment to ease pressure on internal capacities (Simkó, 2007). To the contrary, 
the Life Changing Program provided seemingly efficient psycho-social devel-
opment throughout its duration.
The Life Changing – Life Shaping Program is clearly unique in a sense that 
both its components are fully linked to agriculture and aims to provide long-
term jobs in this sector. Its effective mentoring provision also differentiates it 
from many other programs. Its complexity is not without examples and similar 
programs have been implemented efficiently before. It should be highlighted 
that the Life Changing Program, compared to other initiatives was somewhat 
more costly and this was mainly due to extended and combined use of multi-
ple active labour market policies.
Views about the program, the feedback and problems so far
Before presenting a more systematic evaluation of the program effects, it is 
worth considering the feedback and views about the program that might give 
an indication of its potential success.
The program ended in November 2010 in the settlements around Kisvejke 
that had been involved in its first phase. A total of 20 workers participated in 
the micro region. Initially it was expected that approximately half of them 
would be able to find a job locally, however this did not happen. Only a couple 
of people could find a job and local agricultural businesses would only employ 
workers on a seasonal basis. It is unlikely that other agricultural businesses 
involved in the program would provide many jobs to former participants and 
therefore only a few of them will break the cycle of unemployment.
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With regards to employment after the program, the organisers were also 
faced with some unforeseen challenges: some of the agricultural producers 
are, to a large extent, unfamiliar with lawful employment because they have 
always employed undeclared workers. It is likely that some of the participants 
will find undeclared work after the end of the program.
Most local councils are aiming to maintain the achievements of the pro-
gram over the long term and provide jobs to as many workers as possible; the 
scheme might become the foundation for social land programs and local so-
cial economy projects.
The majority of workers participating in the program are satisfied. The satis-
faction of 57 workers who joined the program in its second phase was surveyed 
in the autumn of 2010. Seventy per cent of respondents said that their financial 
situation improved thanks to the regular monthly income from the program. 
Eighty-six percent indicated that they would be willing to take part again and 
52 out of 57 said that they would like to remain in their current job (it is inter-
esting to note that four respondents were undecided on this question because 
they had achieved a higher income as undeclared workers previously). The ma-
jority of respondents (46 persons) were 80 per cent or more satisfied with the 
program. The fact that no workers rated their attitude lower than three (on a 
scale of five, 5 indicating the best possible score) is quite telling about the men-
toring activity (Anonim elégedettségi … 2010).
There were other unforeseen results as well. Most importantly real commu-
nities formed among the workers that had the effect of linking them outside 
work. This is extremely important in the life of these settlements which are 
facing multiple difficulties.
The graduate component of the program also seems successful based on the 
feedback. With this organisers aimed to revive the tradition of a once very 
popular graduate program in agriculture in Hungary and provide an example 
to follow for agricultural businesses. The program provided wage subsidies for 
eight agriculture graduates for three years. Despite various difficulties, in the 
end all participants found a job that was right for them and they are likely to 
stay in their job long term (the young people are mainly employed by agricul-
tural companies based in Szekszárd)
Until recently the Life Changing Program had very limited national public-
ity; employment policy makers and the press did not show much interest. This 
changed in the autumn of 2010 and since then the program has had a consid-
erable amount of media attention.
The management of the program would like to turn the results and the ex-
periences into a “best practice” model. This is based on two principles: on the 
one hand they are aiming to create a program that is not in conflict with the 
private sector, and on the other hand it places great emphasis on communi-
ty development because experience showed that the success of the program 
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largely depends on this. These principles were embraced by other initiatives: 
a pilot public works program is being launched in various regions at the time 
of the publication of this study, based at least partly on the example of the Life 
Changing Program.5 Furthermore, the organisers’ aims are linked to the objec-
tives of the Government’s rural development policy thus it is hoped that the 
experiences accumulated in the program will not be lost.
In many settlements the program ended in September 2011 and some prob-
lems were already visible that might hamper the sustainability of the results. 
First and foremost, the shortage of land; some local councils that are planning 
to continue production do not have enough land to expand. Generally local 
councils own so little land that this issue might require government interven-
tion. If decision makers would like to maintain the successful results achieved 
by the programs then some of the state-owned land will have to be handed 
over to local councils involved in agricultural production. (Or alternatively 
local landowners might concede a small part of their estate to local councils.)
One of the program objectives was to help previously unemployed partici-
pants to set up their own business. Unfortunately those who had such plans 
came to realise that the administrative and financial burdens were insurmount-
able. This could only be resolved by simplifying existing regulations that might 
encourage more people to start their own business.
Another obstacle to self-employment in agriculture is the uncertainty in the 
sale of produce. The renewal and strengthening of cooperatives in the future 
might address this problem (there have been some policy measures to improve 
this situation). Similarly to local councils, potential producers are also affected 
by the shortage of land. The size of gardens often does not allow a profitable 
production but without any capital these producers are unable to purchase or 
rent land. Again, government intervention might be necessary to address this 
issue. Furthermore it has been proposed that land sharing might allow those 
without land to start production.
For the sustainability of results the lack of funding was also a major prob-
lem. There were not many grant programs since the first half of 2010 for about 
a year and that also hindered the development of the Life Changing Program. 
Hopefully this will change in the future; different stakeholders of the program 
(primarily local councils, management organisations etc.) are putting great ef-
forts into mobilising external resources that might help to sustain the results.
Results of the Life Changing Program – a local case study
The full evaluation of the program will only be possible after its end in early 
2012. The most important result indicator will be the percentage of partici-
pants with a regular job after the end of the wage subsidy, either as a continua-
tion of their work placement in the same job or elsewhere including successful 
self-employment. This indicator will need to be compared to a re-employment 
5 This is the Start small regional 
work program, organised by the 
Ministry of the Interior.
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rate that we would have found in the absence of the program. This counter-
factual result could be measured using a control group of unemployed people 
from settlements that are similar to those in the program. Such program eval-
uation is yet to be carried out.
Feedback so far and the general results suggest that the implementation of 
the centrally designed program plan depended on the local context and dif-
fered from village to village, so results will probably differ too. Using a case 
study design this chapter presents the potential results of the program, under 
what conditions and through which mechanisms these might prevail.
The case study summarises the experiences of Gyulaj, a village in Tolna Coun-
ty. The village has been presented in more detail in our volume on the evalua-
tion of local economic development programs in the IES Book Series (Kabai–
Németh, 2010b), thus this chapter focuses on more recent trends since the 
publication of the earlier paper and explores the impact of the program on the 
village. Neither the history of the village nor its current social situation will 
be presented in detail here.6
In parallel with the socio-economic trends in rural Hungary, Gyulaj has 
slowly but steadily become increasingly poorer for the past 60 years. Apart from 
the many problems – the nationalisation of the forest that was a vital part of 
the local economy, the creation of a collective farm, then the negative impact 
of the land restitution, the gradual dismantling of local services – the biggest 
problem is that the village does not have a through road. Its only good quality 
road links the village with Dombóvár therefore its spatial relations are limited 
and that is thought to be the main obstacle of development.
There were various attempts to tackle this issue after the change of regime 
that all aimed to build a new through road towards the village of Szakály. The 
finally happened in 2000 but the new road did not meet expectations: the 
construction was financed by various public funds and the new road was too 
narrow which makes it impossible to run a regular bus service there. Further-
more the road goes through private property which generated numerous legal 
disputes. Therefore Tamási (and Szekszárd) are only accessible for Gyulaj res-
idents with a car although access to these settlements was the main rationale 
of the new road. Therefore Gyulaj still depends on Dombóvár; its spatial rela-
tions are as limited as ever.
There was another significant capital investment in the village during the 
last decade: the primary school was refurbished with a total budget of 160 
million forints financed by the South-Transdanubian Regional Operational 
Program. Certainly this is an important development in its category and un-
doubtedly it will have a positive effect that local children can attend a state-
of-the-art school. In parallel with the development of the infrastructure, the 
school is also aiming to reform the curriculum to tailor it to the needs of the 
mainly multiple disadvantaged pupils.
6 The Gyulaj-born author, Fer-
enc Bali Pap published a longer 
piece on the societal situation 
of the village (Bali Pap, 2011).
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Since the dissolution of the collective farm in the early nineties, there has 
been only one actor that can play a significant role in the development and 
prosperity of the village, and the improvement of living conditions: this is the 
local council and its primary school. The Catholic Church effectively aban-
doned the village around the early 1990s and there have been no significant 
religious activities in Gyulaj since then. There are no local charities in the vil-
lage; regional or national charities are also absent. The presence of public insti-
tutions is rather limited too. Since 1990 the village had a general practitioner 
for only short periods of time; currently the GP from the neighbouring vil-
lage visits the village on certain days. This has resulted, indirectly, in the de-
terioration of the health of Gyulaj residents. Today two thirds of the village’s 
residents are Roma – living in poverty, the majority of them are out of work 
and they do not have access to the necessary health care services. Nevertheless 
there is a full time health visitor in Gyulaj. The police – similarly to the gen-
eral practitioner – “left” the village in the early nineties and Gyulaj has had 
its own police officer again for two years. Gyulaj has very high levels of crime, 
anything left unattended is likely to disappear, and empty houses are sooner 
or later burgled. This hampers the little entrepreneurial drive that is left in a 
few people in or around Gyulaj.
Good quality land around the village is concentrated in the hands of a few 
individuals, the majority of whom are not from Gyulaj and have hardly any 
relationship with the village. Agriculture is no longer part of the local culture 
in the village.
Nowadays the residents of Gyulaj hardly own any land, only three or four 
families have 30–40 hectares supplemented with some small areas of rented 
land. The other families either do not own any land at all or only one or two 
hectares or a larger garden in the village. The land is not used to grow any pro-
duce (other than wheat). Furthermore, it might be argued that most Gyulaj 
residents would not be capable of starting agricultural production on their own 
because the younger generations lack the necessary skills.
In summary, human resources in the village are generally poor and many 
individuals are in a poor physical condition. If there was a sudden surge in the 
demand for unskilled labour in the village, it is unlikely that this would be 
satisfied hiring local unemployed because probably only a few of them have 
their full work capacity.
The Life Changing Program in Gyulaj achieved results in these areas and pro-
posed a viable development model. As has been mentioned earlier, the local 
council is the only organisation that can effectively do something to improve 
the employment prospects of the local population.7 The most influential figure 
in the local council is the mayor in such small settlements – Gyulaj has 1,000 
inhabitants. If the mayor can understand local challenges and act then the vil-
lage has the chance to develop. However, if the local leadership is not adequate 
7 The agricultural company that 
owns most of the land around the 
village has more resources than 
the local council however their 
production structure is such that 
they do not need many unskilled 
workers. The few other smaller-
scale agricultural producers can 
employ only a few workers on a 
regular basis.
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then the whole village is likely to stagnate. A number of case studies and local 
experience suggest two further conditions: first, the mayor needs a network 
of local allies – headed by the district notary and the management of local in-
stitutions – that is supportive of the development; and second there needs to 
be a general consensus behind the developments, any internal tensions (social, 
political) can undermine the initiative.
After the transition to a market economy there were no positive changes in 
the life of the community in Gyulaj, the social and economic situation of the 
village continued to deteriorate and deprivation became permanent. This is 
illustrated by trends in two commonly used regional development indicators: 
per capita income and unemployment rate (Figures 6.2 and 6.3). While the 
per capita income in the small region is around 75% of the national average, in 
Gyulaj it was under 40% between 2000 and 2008. Only two of the smallest 
hamlets with 100–200 inhabitants are “poorer” than Gyulaj in the Dombóvár 
Small Region: Jágó and Lápafő. The unemployment rate shows a similar trend: 
there was a clear deterioration until the mid-2000s then it stabilised at a level 
over 2.5 times above the national average. Similarly to income, Gyulaj has one 
of the highest unemployment levels in the small region.
Figure 6.2: Per capita average income in the settlements of dombóvár Small region, 
as a percentage of the national average, 1990–2009*
* National average = 100. The figure also includes the average for Dombóvár Small 
Region, Tolna County and the South-Transdanubia region as a percentage of the 
national average income.
Settlements are ranked from the highest rate to the lowest as follows: Dombóvár, Ka-
pospula, Kaposszekcső, Csikóstőttős, Attala, Döbrököz, Dalmand, Kurd, Szakcs, 
Nak, Várong, Kocsola, Csibrák, Gyulaj, Jágónak, Lápafő.
Source: Based on the Regional resource map of the IE HAS.
in focus
154
Figure 6.3: Estimated unemployment rate in the settlements of  
dombóvár Small region, percentage of the national average, 1990–2008*
* Estimated unemployment rate: the yearly average number of registered job seekers 
divided by the number of inhabitants aged between 18–59 years in the given set-
tlement or region (percentage). National average = 100 The figure also includes the 
average for Dombóvár Small Region, Tolna county and the South-Transdanubia 
region expressed as a percentage of the national average unemployment rate.
Settlements are ranked from the highest rate to the lowest as follows:
Kaposszekcső, Kapospula, Dombóvár, Attala, Csikóstőttős, Dalmand, Nak, Kurd, 
Döbrököz, Jágónak, Lápafő, Gyulaj, Kocsola, Szakcs, Csibrák, Várong.
Source: Based on the Regional resource map of the IE HAS.
As has been pointed out above the only actor that in our view is capable of tak-
ing significant action to improve the employment situation and the quality 
of life of the disadvantaged population is the local council. Therefore it is im-
portant to consider the measures that were available to them to influence the 
local jobs market – also as an employer – before the Life Changing Program. 
As in many similar villages these were mainly related to public works and sub-
sidies. The local village council tried to make use of the opportunities of pub-
lic works policies to provide – at least temporarily – work opportunities to as 
many people as possible. An overview of the public works programs in the vil-
lage over the past few years might give a good indication of the opportunities 
that would characterise the labour market policies of the local council in the 
absence of the Life Changing Program.
Between 2006 and 2008 a total of 50 people were employed in different 
forms of public works in the village (Table 6.2); most of them in jobs related 
to the statutory services provided by local councils (mainly water management, 
rainwater drainage, maintenance of the public cemetery and street cleaning). 
Thanks to the Road to Work Program in 2009 the number of people in public 
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works increased to 69 but their tasks did not change substantially compared 
to previous years as is highlighted by Table 6.3.
table 6.2: Public works in numbers, Gyulaj 2006–2008
Year
Municipal public works Communal public works Public works organized by PES
participants work hours (total) participants
work hours 
(total) participants
work hours 
(total)
2006 35 15,792 2 2,016 14 8,484
2007 38 15,802 3 3,024 17 6,468
2008 29 11,319 7 5,040 16 10,332
Source: the Public Works Plan of Gyulaj Village Council for 2009.
table 6.3: tasks carried out in public works and number of participants  
in Gyulaj, 2009
Task
Number of workers necessary 
to carry out task  
(full-time equivalent)
Person-hours used  
(total)
Social housing maintenance 2 1,512
Water management, rainwater drainage 12 8,064
Maintenance of public cemetery 5 5,376
Maintenance of local roads, parks and pub-
lic spaces 22 14,784
Street cleaning 4 2,688
Management of public works projects 3 3,528
Provision of social care 4 2,688
Culture and sport related activities 1 672
Administrative support 2 1,344
Implementation of national and ethnic mi-
nority rights 1 1,008
Tasks related to education 2 3,024
Tasks related to the maintenance of council 
buildings 8 5,376
Tasks related to public works 2 1,344
Total 68 51,408
Source: the Public Works Plan of Gyulaj Village Council for 2009.
The public works plans of the village for 2009 and 2010 give us an idea of what 
would have happened and what the situation would be like without the Life 
Changing Program. Considering the management and financing of public 
works policies, they would have provided only short-term results without any 
long-term effects and sustainability.
Apart from increased funding, three changes in public works policies in 
2009–2010 were important for Gyulaj: first, unemployed persons aged under 
35 years who had dropped out of primary school were required to return to 
school to complete primary education. This affected 13 people in Gyulaj. Pri-
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mary education forms the basis of any further education or training, therefore 
this was a useful measure.
The other important change was – potentially – the provision of long-term 
employment up to 12 months in the Road to Work Program. Local imple-
mentation plans had to be reviewed and submitted each year which involved 
the uncertainty of changing financial frameworks and conditions. One of 
the implicit aims of the Road to Work Program was to allow village councils 
to create “real” jobs locally and promote community production and the de-
velopment of social economy. Policy makers did not want to “penalise” set-
tlements where the local council was slower to change; therefore tasks that 
had been typically carried out in public works projects remained eligible 
for funding in the Road to Work Program. It was envisaged that the system 
would gradually shift towards job creation over three years. It is not known 
how they thought to implement this because the program was cancelled half-
way through, however it is certain that a major review of existing legislation 
would have been required to allow the startup of social cooperatives and com-
munity production in villages with the potential to employ a large number 
of unskilled job seekers. Even with these changes it is unlikely that Gyulaj 
could have developed a production system similar to its current one using 
previous financing schemes.
Finally, the third important change brought about by the Road to Work Pro-
gram in Gyulaj’s public works projects was the possibility to purchase a lim-
ited amount of equipment and work wear (Table 6.4). However the amount 
allowed for this would not be sufficient to purchase enough equipment for the 
cultivation of the current 3–4 hectares of land that is continuously increasing.
table 6.4: Planned measures for public works in Gyulaj, 2009
Measure Expenditure (HUF ‚000)
Occupational health and safety training 60
Occupational health assessment 50
Work wear, safety gloves 476
Tools and equipment 480
Purchase of tangible assets 150
Source: the Public Works Plan of Gyulaj Village Council for 2009.
At the same time the Life Changing Program brought about strategic change 
in the village. Gyulaj became involved in the program with 10 participants 
at the beginning of 2010 thanks to the efforts of the local mayor who was fa-
miliar with the program in Belecska (Kabai–Németh, 2010a) and wanted to 
organise and set up similar municipal agricultural production in Gyulaj. The 
main features of the Life Changing Program in Gyulaj were presented in our 
previous study (Kabai–Németh, 2010b); the subsidy period ended on the 30th 
of September 2011, at the time of writing this paper. During the two years the 
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program grew and provided the village’s kitchen with vegetables and could sell 
some of the produce (ground paprika and medicinal herbs)
Community production in Gyulaj follows the model developed in Belecs-
ka, similarly to the majority of participating villages where the main producer 
is the local council. The majority of Gyulaj residents participating in the pro-
gram – similarly to other villages – are probably not capable of starting their 
own business just yet and the external conditions are not favourable either 
– legislation, tax rules, market access – the role of the local council seems vital.
Probably one of the most important factors in the success of the Life Chang-
ing Program is that it allowed local governments to set up their own production. 
Before the launch of the program the business sector was unable to solve the 
employment problems of the village and the local council was the only actor 
that was capable of bringing about any change in this. However this was only 
possible with the local council setting up a system that is sustainable or at least 
viable in the long-run: based on real activity, work and production. Further-
more it allows paying a decent wage and enhancing the cohesion of the local 
community. Workers have individual responsibility but they can also have an 
individual sense of achievement. According to the initial experiences the Life 
Changing Program succeeded in creating such a system.
The planners of the program adequately recognised that in small settlements 
like Gyulaj, only the local council can tackle unemployment at least by improv-
ing the employability of local residents with impaired work capacity. In our view, 
the Life Changing Program laid down the foundations for the implementation 
of a comprehensive village development strategy. Community production is 
not simply public works but a social enterprise linked to the local economic de-
velopment strategy; the creation of a third sector business. Therefore its frame-
works are completely different from that of public works. There is a need for 
equipment and specialist knowledge in the social economy as well as the market 
production taking into account community interest. There is a qualitative dif-
ference between earlier public works projects and the Life Changing Program.
Partly due to the local results of the Life Changing Program, the primary 
school launched a two year agricultural vocational course for year 9–10 in 2011. 
Pupils do work experience on a communal allotment while their parents, rela-
tives and neighbours do similar work on municipal allotments. This initiative 
is the innovation of the new school headmaster and indicates the aspiration 
to revive agricultural traditions in the life of the village. By establishing com-
munity production and involving the primary school in the scheme Gyulaj 
might become a model settlement in South-Transdanubia or even nationally. 
The Life Changing Program has undoubtedly contributed to this by providing 
the initial impetus and the organisational framework.
The recognition of the village is indicated by the fact that Dombóvár Small 
Region was included in the public works model program (Start work scheme) 
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of the Ministry of Home Affairs largely thanks to the community production 
in Gyulaj. This might open up further opportunities for the village: the pos-
sibility to employ further workers, purchase equipment and the processing of 
fresh vegetables and fruit planned to be launched in the next couple of years 
might bring about significant changes in production as well.
Gyulaj also decided to join the program “Nyúl-unk a munkáért!” aiming to 
re-introduce small animal husbandry in the village that might be a further step 
towards strengthening the local community and promoting the labour market 
re-integration of participating families.
The need and the results also attracted community activity and the atten-
tion of independent non-profit organisations. The Hungarian Maltese Char-
ity Service became active in Gyulaj and the village was invited to take part in 
a community building project supporting long-term local development in set-
tlements with high levels of social exclusion.
These are obviously just the first steps of what – in our view – could be a re-
generation in Gyulaj (and other similar settlements) providing the opportu-
nity for a better life to its inhabitants. This will be a long process and will re-
quire decades of continuous and committed work, government support (not 
only financial), European Union funding and significant grass-roots activity.
Conclusion
The Life Changing – Life Shaping complex labour market program was launched 
in two small regions of Tolna county by the South-Transdanubia Regional Em-
ployment Service in the spring of 2009. The program built on the once success-
ful agricultural tradition of the region and provided long term unemployed 
participants with tailored training for eight months and work placement for 
one to two years with local councils or agricultural businesses using wage sub-
sidies. In the three counties of South-Transdanubia nearly 40 settlements and 
over 200 workers participated in the program.
The complexity of the Life Changing – Life Shaping Program can be cap-
tured in the simultaneous use of multiple active labour market policies: train-
ing, training assistance, work experience, wage subsidy and mentoring. The 
participating local councils could start their own production and apart from 
providing jobs to local residents, this could save a significant amount of mon-
ey. The program had an impact on local development; a good example of this 
is the case of Gyulaj.
The Life Changing Program had a number of positive side effects as well. Par-
ticipants built strong social networks that bring people together outside work 
too. The majority of participants went through real personal development 
which significantly improved their lifestyle and future employment prospects. 
The graduate component of the program was no less successful. The eight gradu-
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ate trainees in the agricultural sector did very well in their job and they all had 
the possibility to remain there after the end of the three-year subsidy period.
The Life Changing Program ends in 2012, therefore its overall assessment is 
not yet possible. It is hoped that as many workers as possible can stay in their 
job long term. It is promising that some of the local councils are already making 
plans to maintain the achieved results after the subsidy ends. Hopefully these 
will be successful and results will be sustained over the long term.
The content and approach of the Life Changing Program, together with the 
experiences gained through its implementation make it suitable for a national 
roll-out. This could significantly improve the employment situation in small 
settlements of rural Hungary.
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7. EvALuAtInG thE IMPAct oF hunGArIAn  
LAbour MArkEt PoLIcIES
Zsombor Cseres-Gergely & Ágota Scharle
This chapter of In Focus reviews evaluation studies of active labour market poli-
cies and unemployment benefits in Hungary. Somewhat unusually we focus on 
what was evaluated and especially how, rather than on the outcomes. We also 
briefly consider some obstacles to fulfilling the methodological requirements 
discussed in Chapter 1 of In Focus, and their consequences for Hungarian em-
pirical investigations. The review also provides some basis for reconstructing 
the evidence base available to the previous governments when they made de-
cisions regarding employment policies. We cannot claim to have uncovered 
all the information accessible to politicians, but we can safely say that at least 
this evidence was available to them.
Selection criteria for the studies
We confine our analysis to two types of studies: evaluations of wage subsidies, 
and those of unemployment benefits. Wage subsidies deserve special atten-
tion for several reasons. First, the few existing studies from Central and East-
ern Europe show either a neutral or a negative effect, while in developed coun-
tries this type of program has a mostly positive impact on employment (Kluve, 
2010). Second, these programs often have indirect effects which may override 
their positive effects: e.g. the subsidised employer could employ people with-
out the subsidy, or it puts other employees at a disadvantage by taking on the 
subsidized unemployed person. Finally, these programs are quite costly, thus 
even if their net impact turns out to be positive, the subsidy might not be cost-
efficient. The reason for including unemployment benefits is much simpler: 
these are the most frequently evaluated programs in Hungary.
The review covers evaluation studies in the narrow sense as well as reports 
where the title or the abstract makes an explicit reference to policy evaluation. 
Thus, we did not exclude studies which aim to analyse the impact of a program 
but are lacking in terms of methodological rigour as these may still offer im-
portant insights on program outcomes.
We know of no archive either public or private which provides a complete 
collection of evaluation studies. Therefore, we used online search engines to 
collect the relevant literature.1 This method restrains our findings, because 
such evaluations are typically prepared when commissioned by a government 
body (such as a ministry or the National Development Agency) or when the 
program promises to be interesting from an academic point of view. In the for-
mer case, results are not necessarily made public.2
1 On 15 September 2011, a 
web search under the “tanul-
mányok ” (research studies) 
label  i n t he docu ment a r-
chive of the new government 
homepage yielded zero results 
(http://www.kormany.hu/ hu/
dok?type=411#!Document-
Browse)
2 The Introduction of In Focus 
discusses the importance of pub-
lic access to of evaluation reports.
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Our list is therefore not complete, and it is most likely selective. Well-writ-
ten papers motivated by scientific interest are likely to be overrepresented in 
it.3 The possibility of a contractor restricting access to its paper (due to unfa-
vourable results which could e.g. divert funds from its program) can also cause 
bias. Finally, the same reason can introduce significant bias in the timing and 
subject of such evaluations.
Dimensions of the review
Appendix 7.1 lists the papers reviewed. We categorize unemployment benefits 
based on whether they pertain to insurance based benefits or social assistance. 
Studies analysing wage subsidies are classified into monitoring reports and 
econometric evaluations.
We highlighted those characteristics of the studies which can determine the 
expected quality of their contents. They are listed in a table in Appendix 7.2: 
size, structure, and information-content of the database, observation period, 
identification strategy, identified effect(s), success criteria, and indirect effects 
(if estimated in the paper). This part of the review only covers studies that actu-
ally measure program effects, i.e. monitoring reports are excluded.
The demand for evaluations
The list of studies surveyed in the review shows that during the period of roughly 
20 years, evaluations of main employment policy instruments were scarce, and 
were mostly written after 2000. The reason behind this may be partly methodo-
logical – since high-performance desktop computers only became widely avail-
able around this time – and partly political as the demand for evaluations rose 
after Hungary’s accession to the EU (Váradi, 2012). However, since we know 
that sufficient computing power had been available e.g. in the CSO (Központi 
Statisztikai Hivatal, Hungarian Central Statistical Office), and most analyses 
would not require exceptional capacities (sample sizes were not extraordinary 
and methods did not require much processing power), we are inclined to be-
lieve that the definitive reason in this case is on the demand side.4
Finally, it is important to note that the majority of these studies have been 
written by a handful of experienced, senior members of the Hungarian aca-
demic community. Even though an evaluation study needs serious thought and 
thus, senior experience also, we believe the above circumstance is due to the 
previously described lack of demand. It is quite understandable in the case of 
a small market if studies which are expected to have scientific value are carried 
out by the most experienced and well-connected researchers. But if the demand 
for evaluation studies in Hungary were in line with international trends, we 
should be able to find works of younger researchers. This suggests that policy-
makers of this period did not consider program evaluation a conventional tool 
of routine use in their decision making, neither before nor after the launch of 
3 One concern may be the so-
called publication bias: authors 
(and journals) tend to like to 
publish statistically significant 
results that conform prior ex-
pectations.
4 See e.g. Scharle (2008) on the 
decision making process in 
Hungarian employment policy-
making compared to the British 
practice.
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policy interventions. Nevertheless, the appearance of a few papers written by 
younger researchers around the end of the 2000s is promising /a hopeful sign.
The data sources
Most of the studies reviewed rely on the administrative data of the unemploy-
ment register. This is because alternative data sources, e.g. labour force surveys 
do not contain information on participation in employment policy programs; 
therefore, their use would greatly restrict or completely rule out evaluations 
(except maybe in the case of unemployment benefits). However, since the reg-
ister reveals nothing of the period following exiting the programs, using it as 
the sole source of data also significantly restricts research. Up until 2009, the 
monitoring of active programs provided this sort of surplus information, but 
only in a very particular form: exiting workers (or their employers, in the case 
of wage subsidies) were surveyed 3 months after leaving the programs. Thus, 
information on after-program status is very limited – practically non-existent 
on individual workers for wage subsidies. In light of the findings of Card et al. 
(2010), this suggests that using these data, the majority of program effects can 
only be estimated with a bias. To reduce these restrictions, some studies relied 
on supplementary data collected in a separate survey. That cannot provide a 
permanent solution to the lack of data because of the costs, but it helps create 
a more realistic view of program effects by enabling their estimation farther 
from the ending of the program.
The CI. law of 2007 allows studies to surpass the limitations of the unem-
ployment register by anonymously linking other administrative data sources 
(e.g. on social security contributions), and to follow the subsequent work his-
tory of participants or control for previous employment spells. We have not yet 
found such a paper however, maybe due to the shortness of the period and the 
frequency of policy changes. The National Employment Office (NEO) intro-
duced a reform in active program monitoring in 2009 to exploit the possibility 
that data from the register and social security contributions can be linked at 
the individual level. This could have improved the quality of the monitoring, 
but we have not yet seen its use in evaluations, and it is unrelated to the studies 
reviewed here. Administrative data (e.g. on tax contribution) could have also 
helped evaluation reports in the essential issue of making detailed work his-
tory (among other observable characteristics) controllable. Lately, the NEO 
collects data on the registered unemployed for four years retrospectively, but 
this is unavailable for those who participate in one of the programs but are 
not entitled to benefits. Therefore, supplementary data is needed in their case.
Identification and estimation methods
Most evaluations do not make a formal distinction between identification and 
estimation, nor do they systematically discuss identification conditions and 
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the implications when these are unmet – though several studies touch on these 
issues when discussing the estimation methods. The applicable identification 
strategies (see Chapter 1 of In Focus) are mostly determined by data availability. 
Small sample size makes parametric methods the most viable option. Control-
ling for heterogeneity is restricted by the number of observable individual char-
acteristics. Since the register only collects data necessary for administration, it 
does not contain information on other members of the household, which is a 
serious limitation. This is why the studies working with supplementary data 
can be more reliable than those relying solely on the register. Matching meth-
ods are rarely used in our sample of studies, despite the fact that matching is 
considered superior to parametric models when comparing treated and un-
treated individuals having similar observable characteristics.
We have found few attempts to control for unobserved heterogeneity; these 
include the modelling of selection, exploiting changes to administrative rules; 
and a genuine experiment in one case (see Appendix 7.2). Hungarian labour 
market policies change very often, but evaluations of the above sort have not 
yet accompanied these. Quasi-experimental situations arise because newly in-
troduced nationwide programs are grandfathered (i.e. only affect new entrants). 
The lack of experiments makes selection modelling hard to verify and leaves it 
to rest on disputable assumptions. Therefore, a rise in the number of experi-
mental studies would make a big difference. If the demand for evaluations in-
creased, this may generate an increase in the number of studies exploiting pol-
icy changes in space or time. We expect that such evaluations would generally 
outperform those that only use observable characteristics.
Publication of estimations and attention to detail
The presentation of estimation methods and results is quite varied. Publishing 
marginal effects or at least their average has now become common in interna-
tional practice, but not in the studies we have reviewed. Thus, estimates from 
nonlinear models are impossible5 to compare with previous research for refer-
ence. Some studies do not even present regression tables, though fortunately 
these are rare. Almost every paper interprets treatment effects in the form of 
average treatment effect or average treatment effect on the treated.
Further analysis
In order to evaluate a program completely and conduct a cost-benefit analysis, 
indirect or unintended effects also need to be measured in addition to direct 
impact. Such are substitution effects, which arise when a subsidised program 
participant replaces a non-subsidized worker who therefore loses his/her job. 
Few studies examine these program effects, but at least some do. Evaluations 
would be even more comprehensive if (1) treatment distribution was estimated, 
(2) treatment heterogeneity was measured by observable characteristics, or (3) 
5 In the case of nonlinear estima-
tions, coefficients do not show 
the effect itself, since it changes 
constantly with explanatory var-
iables’ values. This is the reason 
why average marginal effect is 
the only theoretically sound 
measure available here.
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program impacts on other relevant parts of the population were assessed. Indi-
rect effects should be of primary concern to institutions directly involved with 
the programs, since substitution effects can completely override the positive ef-
fects. Also, various features of the distributions can identify how and why the 
observed effect arises. The fact that analyses rarely investigate these suggests 
that, in most of the cases, contractors were simply not concerned by these issues.
Conclusions
Based on the evaluations reviewed above, we come to a number of conclusions 
which promote an optimistic outlook.
1. Though the number of evaluation reports on the employment policy instru-
ments in question is rather small, quite a few of these can adequately fufil its 
purpose. In other words, many of them can be used to determine how a given 
program has affected its participants. However, there remains some room for 
improvement, e.g. it would be useful if future evaluations considered compa-
rability with similar studies (Hungarian or international) an explicit priority.
2. It seems that the lack of methodological skills needed for evaluations does 
not hinder this kind of research. Considering the trends of the past, there are 
more than enough experts who would be able to conduct several analyses on a 
regular basis. However, it is undeniable that the integration of evaluation stud-
ies in labour market policy routine requires more experts of the same quality. 
Most university programs in Hungary do not provide for meeting this demand.
3. Data availability may also cease to be a problem if policymakers show inter-
est in program effects and contribute to making the required data anonymous. 
Besides, there is great potential in routinely collecting data from development 
projects and in small alterations of program design that would facilitate iden-
tification strategies. Short, well-organized questionnaires can yield valuable 
additional information which can even be linked to administrative data later. 
Finally, it is possible to put cut-off points deliberately into a program, or con-
duct experiments (e.g. by randomly including or dropping regions) which are 
not too costly but effectively solve several methodological problems.
4. Apparently, the demand from policymakers falls below the possibili-
ties. First, this damages the programs themselves, since their efficiency might 
not improve as much as it could, with the help of evaluations. Second, in the 
present legal environment, academic interest is not sufficient for conducting 
evaluations, because only politicians can initiate the anonymity status of the 
required administrative data. Thus, unless policymakers show more explicit 
interest in evaluations, they will not have the possibility to choose from a wide 
range of products. In order for this to change, data accessibility policies must 
be expanded, and policymakers must turn their attention toward this area of 
research. There is some reason to expect an improvement, signalled by the es-
tablishment of the new Government Centre for Impact Assessment charged 
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with such a mission. A single government institution, however, cannot make 
up for the sustained work effort of a competitive research community moti-
vated by academic interest. These two activities are complements rather than 
substitutes. Therefore, the increase in government efforts calls for increasing 
support for external research activities as well.
Appendix 7.1. List of papers reviewed
Out of work benefits
Unemployment insurance benefits
Bódis, Lajos, Micklewright, John. and Nagy, Gyula (2004): A munkanélküli 
ellátás indokoltsági feltételeinek érvényesítése: empirikus vizsgálat az elhelyezke-
dési készség ellenőrzésének hatásairól [Job Search Monitoring in Hungary]. BWP, 
2004/6. Labour Research Department, Institute of Economics Hungarian Acad-
emy of Sciences and the Department of Human Resources, Corvinus University 
of Budapest. http://www.econ.core.hu/doc/bwp/bwp/Bwp0406.pdf.
Galasi, Péter and Nagy, Gyula (2002a): Járadékjogosultsági időtartam és elhe-
lyezkedés, [Duration of Benefit Entitlement and Re-employment]. Közgazdasági 
Szemle, Vol. 49. No. 2. pp. 126–142.
Köllő János (2001): A járadékos munkanélküliek álláskilátásai 1994 és 2001 ta-
vaszán [Job Prospects of the Insured Unemployed in the Spring of 1994 and 2001]. 
BWP 2001/7 http://www.econ.core.hu/doc/bwp/bwp/bwp0107.pdf.
Köllő, János and Nagy, Gyula (1996) Earnings Gains and Losses from Insured 
Unemployment in Hungary, Labour Economics 3, pp. 279–298.
Micklewright, John and Nagy, Gyula (1995): Unemployment Insurance and 
Incentives in Hungary: Preliminary Evidence. CEPR Discussion Paper 1118, and 
in: Newbery, D. (ed.): Tax and Benefit Reform in Central and Eastern Europe, 
CEPR, London.
Micklewright, John and Nagy, Gyula (2010): The Effect of Monitoring Un-
employment Insurance Recipients on Unemployment Duration: Evidence from 
a Field Experiment, Labour Economics, Vol. 17. No. 1. January 2010, pp 180–187 
[essentially the same as Bódis, Micklewright and Nagy (2004) BWP 2004/6].
Wolff, Joachim (2001) The Hungarian Unemployment Insurance Benefit System 
and Incentives to Return to Work, LMU IS Discussion Paper No. 253. http://epub.
ub.uni-muenchen.de/1633/1/paper_253.pdf.
Social benefit and unemployment assistance
Firle, Réka and Szabó, Péter András (2007): Targeting and Labour Supply Effect 
of the Regular Social Assistance, Working Papers in Public Finance No. 18. http://
tatk.elte.hu/index.php?option=com_docman&task=doc_download&gid=805.
Galasi, Péter and Nagy, Gyula (2002b): Assistance Recipients and Re-employ-
ment Following the Exhaustion of UI Entitlement, in: The Hungarian Labour 
Market, IE HAS, pp 242–254. http://econ.core.hu/doc/mt/2002/eng/tan_3.pdf 
[more detailed version of 2003 available only in Hungarian in Közgazdasági Szemle, 
July–August 2003, pp 608–634].
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Micklewright, John and Nagy, Gyula (1998): The Implications of Exhausting 
Unemployment Insurance Entitlement in Hungary 1998. BWP, 1998/2. http://
www.econ.core.hu/doc/bwp/bwp/bwp982.pdf.
Review article on unemployment insurance and assistance
Galasi, Péter and Köllő, János (2002) The Disincentive and Re-employment 
Effects of Unemployment Benefits, The Hungarian Labour Market, IE HAS, pp 
197–201 http://econ.core.hu/doc/mt/2002/eng/tan_3.pdf.
Galasi, Péter and Köllő, János (2002): The Disincentive and Re-employment 
Effects of Unemployment Benefits In: Fazekas, Károly and Koltay, Jenő 
(eds.): The Hungarian labour market. Review and analysis, 2002. Institute of Eco-
nomics, HAS and Hungarian Employment Foundation, Budapest, pp. 197–204. 
http://econ.core.hu/doc/mt/2002/eng/tan_3.pdf.
Employment incentives
Monitoring reports of the ÁFSZ (PES)
Statistical data on the operation of the “major” ALMP instruments on the website of 
the ÁFSZ (PES): http://www.munka.hu/engine.aspx?page=afsz_stat_fobb_ak-
tiv_eszkozok
Summaries and reviews of ALMP efficiency
Frey, Mária (2007): A foglalkoztatáspolitika aktív eszközei hatásának elemzése 
2001–2006 [An Analysis of the Effects of Active Labour Market Measures in Hun-
gary in 2001–2006]. http://mukutir.telco-system.hu/kutat_dir/186/aktesz_z_
rtan07.doc.
Frey, Mária (2011): Aktív munkaerő-piaci politikák átfogó értékelése a 2004–2009 
közötti időszakban [Comprehensive Evaluation of Active Labour Market Pro-
grams in Hungary in the 2004–2009 period]. http://mukutir.telco-system.hu/
kutat_dir/500/m_d_Frey_akteszk_szint_zis.doc.
Evaluation reports
Csoba, Judit, Nagy, Zita Éva and Szabó, Fanni (2010): Aktív eszközök, 
munkaerő-piaci programok kontrollcsoportos, többváltozós értékelése [Evalua-
tion of Active Labour Market Programs with Control Groups – see revised ver-
sion in this volume].
Galasi, Péter and Nagy, Gyula (2005): Az aktív programokban résztvevők állásba 
lépési esélyei és az aktív programok időtartamát meghatározó tényezők a Monitor-
ing adatállománya alapján [Determinants of Transition to Work Probabilities of 
Active Program Participants on the Basis of “Monitoring” data].
Galasi, Péter and Nagy, Gyula (2008) Az aktív munkaerő-piaci programokba 
kerülés esélyei: képzés, bértámogatás, közhasznú munka [Outflows of Registered 
Unemployed to Active Labour Market Programmes]. BWP, 2008/7. http://www.
mtakti.hu/file/download/bwp/BWP0807.pdf.
Galasi, Péter, Lázár, György and Nagy, Gyula (1999): Az aktív foglalkozta-
táspolitikai eszökök hatásosságát meghatározó tényezők [Determinants of the Ef-
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ficiency of Active Labour Market Policy Instruments] BWP, 1999/4. http://www.
econ.core.hu/doc/bwp/bwp/bwp994.pdf.
Galasi, Péter and Lázár, György and Nagy, Gyula (2003): Az aktív foglalkoz-
tatáspolitikai programok eredményességét meghatározó tényezők [Factors associ-
ated with the effectiveness of active labour market programmes.]. OFA, Budapest.
O’Leary, Cristopher J. (1998): Evaluating the Effectiveness of Active Labor Pro-
grams in Hungary, Upjohn Institute Technical Reports http://research.upjohn.
org/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1016&context=up_technicalreports.
O’Leary, Cristopher J., Piotr Koledziejczyk and György Lázár (1998): The 
Net Impact of Active Labour Market Programs in Hungary and Poland, Interna-
tional Labour Review, Vol 137. No. 3. http://research.upjohn.org/jrnlarticles/79/ 
(varient of O’Leary, 1998).
O’Leary C., Nesporova A. and Samorodov A. (2001): Manual on Evaluation of 
Labour Market Policies in Transition Countries, International Labour Office, 
Geneva http://research.upjohn.org/externalpapers/31/ (variant of O’Leary 1998).
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Appendix 7.2.
table 7A1: out of work benefits*
Target group Database Sample size Observation period Identification method Quantitative findings
Impact of the receipt of unemployment insurance benefits on re-employment
Galasi and 
Nagy 
(2002a)
UI recipients UI register new 
entrants in 1 Jan 
– 15 March 2000 
Excluded volun-
tary quits and 
severance pay 
recipients.
31,031 control 
27,947 treatment 
group
9–12 months Quasi experiment: new claim-
ants after 1 Feb are entitled 
to UI for a period 25% shorter 
(worst case); Kaplan Meier 
survival functions, for treated 
and control group, right cen-
sored, by sex and four sub-
groups by prior employment 
spell, which determined 
length of UI entitlement.
No effect. Control group 
exit rates are even higher 
for some of the sub-
groups which may be 
explained by the higher 
share of recalled workers 
in January claims (control 
group).
Bódis and 
Micklewright 
and Nagy 
(2004) 
= Mickle-
wright and 
Nagy 
(2010)1
Entered UI 
register and 
entitled to 
75–179 days of 
UI benefit.
Interview surveys 
and PES registers 
Entrants between 
26 May and 26 
July 2003
479 w aged <30 
615 w aged >29 
1,037 men(longer 
entitlements ex-
cluded to control 
for the intro of a 
new incentive)
4–6 months 
following entry 
to register
Experiment. Treatment: 4 
visits to PES and questions on 
job search in 3 month (con-
trol: no visit in 3 months). 
Right censored (excl. exhaust-
ers) 
Conditional prob of exit to job 
or ALMP, proportional hazard 
with treatment dummy and 
controls for indiv.char. and 
local u.
Hazard ratio for women 
over 29 is 1.43 (43% over 
control group’s)
Köllő and 
Nagy 
(1996)2
UI recipients 
re-entering 
employment 
4 subgroups: 
(a) job losers 
with <181 days 
in UI 
(b) Job losers 
with 180+ days 
in UI,  
(c) voluntary 
quits,  
(d) recalled 
workers
interview survey 
of re-employed + 
PES register of UI  
recipients; 
exits from UI 
register to a job 
between March 
20 and April 20, 
1994
9,420 divided into 
4 subgroups.  
(a) 3,839,  
(b) 3,092,  
(c) 383  
(d) 2,106 
Q: tested selectivity 
of non-response 
(18%) 
Weighting observa-
tions with the 
inverse of the 
predicted non-
response rate does 
not affect the 
results.
NA, less than 
270 days 
(max duration 
of UI)
OLS on log(w1/w0) – ΔlogW, 
dep on individual and job 
characteristics, controlling for 
local u. Subgroups justified by 
Chow tests of pooling restric-
tions; parameters are jointly 
significant, heteroscedasticity 
is rejected; Ramsey test for 
omitted variables not rejected 
for (a) and (d).
The median unemployed 
lost 5.2 percent in real 
terms. 
Duration of UI spell: 
compared to a spell 
lasting for six months the 
new wage is estimated to 
be 5% higher if com-
pleted duration was 0–3 
months, and almost 5% 
lower if the spell lasted 
for one year.
Köllő (2001) UI recipients interview survey 
of re-employed (+ 
PES register of UI 
recipients) 
exits from UI pool 
between 18 
March and 7 April 
2001
1994: 8,549 
(238,841) 
2001: 8,339 
(105,924) 
(excluding those 
exhausting UI 
during period ob-
served and recalled 
workers)
9–12 months multinomial logit (1) stays in 
UI, (2) exit to new job, (3) exit 
to old job, (4) exit to unknown 
job, 
controls for indiv char, past 
lm experience (e, u), 
tests robustness with alterna-
tive specifications. Cross 
section.
Remaining benefit on exit 
to new job: –0.182 
Entitlement: for upper 
secondary &graduates: if 
E(UI)  
< 50, odds of exit is 1.56 
times higher towards end 
of eligibility.
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Target group Database Sample size Observation period Identification method Quantitative findings
Impact of the amount of unemployment insurance benefits on re-employment
Micklewright 
and Nagy 
(1995)
UI recipients UI register new 
entrants in Dec 
1992 and Jan 
1993 
Excluded volun-
tary quits and UI 
claims over 2 
month after job 
loss
50,441 control 
30,270 treatment 
group
3–19 months Quasi experiment: after 1 Jan, 
1st phase of UI is shorter (1/4 
of old system) but replace-
ment rate is higher (75 vs 
70%); Kaplan Meier survival 
functions and hazards, for 
treated and control group, 
right censored, by sex and 
four subgroups by prior em-
ployment spell, which deter-
mined length of UI entitlement.
No effect. Treatment 
group exit rates are high-
er for some of the sub-
groups, but this is most 
likely due to the higher 
share of recalled workers 
in January claims (the 
treatment group in this 
case).
Wolff (2001) 
I.
UI recipients UI register new 
entrants in Dec 
1992 and Jan 
1993 
Same as in 
M&N1995
18,995 w,  
7,031 (control) 
12,914 m,  
5,397 (treatment)
3–19 months Quasi experiment, Kaplan 
Meier survival as in M&N1995, 
but only for a sub-sample 
considered less likely to be 
recalled workers based on 
previous job history.
No effect
Wolff (2001) 
II.
UI recipients, 
excl. older 
workers
UI register new 
entrants in Dec 
1992 and Jan 
1993 
Same as in 
M&N1995
13,121(control) 
10,373 (treatment) 
m aged below 55 
6,162 (control) 
5,047 (treatment) 
w aged below 50
3–19 months Quasi experiment, data as in 
M&N1995, but using variation 
in entitlement and replace-
ment rates. ML estimate of 
semi-parametric continuous 
duration model, tests alterna-
tive specifications.
No robust effect for men, 
small robust effects for 
women: entitlement 
effect: job hazard is 53% 
higher than base (over 
270 days) in the last 30 
days. For women <30: 
Elasticity wrt UI –0.35, 
wrt wages 0.31
Impact of unemployment assistance on re-employment
Firle and 
Szabó 
(2007) I.
Exited UI Labour force 
survey 2001 
q1–2004 q4 
(stacked panel) 
received UI one 
quarter and not in 
the next quarter. 
Immediate exits 
to job not ex-
cluded
1,023 m 
607 w
3–15 months Jenkins logit (equivalent to 
discrete duration) and esti-
mates of alternative specifica-
tions (discrete and continuous 
duration) no attempt to deal 
with selection bias other than 
sampling, controls for past u, 
family income and local u but 
not eg for health, motivation
Average marginal effects 
of SB receipt on reem-
ployment prob. 
–0.0596 (m) (75%) 
–0.0557 (w) (82%)  
Duration on unemp 7 
quarters longer
Firle and 
Szabó 
(2007) II.
Non-employed 
(excluding 
those not seek-
ing a job be-
cause are in full 
time/ill/disa-
bled/caring for 
family member) 
aged 18–62
Labour force 
survey 2001 q1 
– 2004 q4 
(stacked panel)
22,153 m 
22,087 w
2 consecutive 
quarters
Probit with robust standard 
errors, on exit to job Param-
eters jointly significant, no 
specification testsno attempt 
to deal with selection bias, 
poor controls (as in I)
Average marginal effect of 
SB receipt on re-employ-
ment probability  
–0.0679 (m) 
–0.0530 (w)
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Target group Database Sample size Observation period Identification method Quantitative findings
Galasi and 
Nagy 
(2002b)
Exhausted UI Retrospective 
interview survey 
of a sample taken 
from PES register 
exhausted UI in 
April/May 2000
April: 11,259 (m) 
8,678 (w) 
May: 14,314 (m) 
12,372 (w)
7–8 month after 
April/May 2000
Quasi experiment: change in 
UA rules in May 2000, dis-
crete time duration for af-
fected and unaffected cohort 
(Jenkins logit for 2week 
spells), controls for indiv.char, 
local u. 
Benefit= actual or expected 
benefit = amount x P(takeup), 
the latter estimated in a 
separate logit. Parameters 
jointly significant, no specifi-
cation tests
Effects on odds ratio 
–0,043 (April, men) 
–0,070 (May, men) 
–0,043 (April, w) 
–0,062 (May, w)  
assumed to be constant 
during the observed 
period
Micklewright 
and Nagy 
(1998)
Registered 
unemployed 
who exhausted 
UI benefit
March–April 1994 
UI register inflow 
cohort of benefit 
recipients,  
+ interview survey 
of those who 
exhausted UI
4,661 
Only those with 
(nearly) complete 
employment history. 
Response rate to 
survey was almost 
90%
11/12 months 
(in UI) + 3–4 
months (after 
exhausting UI)
Discrete time duration model 
of post UI exhaustion hazard 
(Jenkins logit) by sex, esti-
mate coeff for expected Social 
Benefit. Controls for individual 
/ household char. and local u. 
no attempt to control for 
selection bias (variation in 
unobserved char)
Effects on odds ratio 
(logit)  
–0.144 (m) 
–0.157 (w) conditional on 
survival past 1st week 
after exhausting UI
*The Hungarian LFS is a rotating panel where an individual may be included for a maximum of 6 consecutive quar-
ters.
1 Analyzes the impact of the behavioral requirements for unemployment insurance benefits.
2 Success criterion: wage gain (compared to the average rise in wages for the UI pool in the same period).
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table 7A2: Wage subsidies
Type of program Target group Database Sample size Observation period
Identification 
method Quantitative findings
O’Leary 
(1998) (also 
in O’Leary 
and  
Nesporova 
(2001))1, 4
Wage subsidy 
paying up to 50% 
of the wage bill up 
to one year. Em-
ployment must be 
sustained for an 
indentical period 
after exit from 
program. (Pro-
vides a similar 
evaluation on 
training programs 
and public works 
too.)
Longer term 
registered 
unemployed5
Survey data col-
lected following-up 
supported individu-
als and a randomly 
selected control 
group. 
Treated: exit from 
program: Q2 1996, 
observed:up to Q2 
1997 
Control: entered 
registered status in 
Q2 1995
Whole sample: 
9,219 
treated: 1,131, 
control: 3,338 
(training: 
2,543; public 
works: 1,140; 
self-emp: 
1,067)
12 months OLS on exit with 
control group. 
Matched pairs, 
interaction terms 
in linear OLS. 
Personal and 
regional charac-
teristics used in 
OLS and match-
ing.
Effect on employment 
probability: 17–24%points 
if unadjusted/unmatched, 
0 to –6%point with con-
trols. No effect on earn-
ings. 
Also significant param-
eters on individual charac-
teristics
Galasi, 
Lázár and 
Nagy 
(2003)1
As in O’Leary 
(1998),
As in O’Leary 
(1998)
As in O’Leary 
(1998)
As in O’Leary 
(1998), but 
does not use 
control group
As in 
O’Leary 
(1998)
logit on partici-
pants of all 
programs with 
personal charac-
teristics
Significant and positive 
schooling (0.04–0.47) 
and 25+ age (0.27–0.52) 
and wage-subsidy program 
participation (1.87) coef-
ficient when compared to 
young uneducated public 
work participants
Galasi and 
Nagy 
(2005)2
As in O’Leary 
(1998)
Long term 
registered 
unemployed5
Monitoring data 
referring to em-
ployers of subsi-
dized workers.
Registered unem-
ployed exiting 
wage-subsidy 
program in 2002 
and 2003
N = 39,000 3 months probit corrected 
for nonresponse 
bias. Probit uses 
personal charac-
teristics, correc-
tion uses industry 
of employer and 
job type.
Significant and positive 
marginal effect for women 
(0.018), those not very 
young (above 25: 0.05–
0.06), with not very low or 
high education (0.08 as 
opposed to –0.05 and 
0.037 resp.) and partici-
pating for around the 
average duration of the 
program 0.045 for 180–
270 days), living in the 
central area and areas 
with lower unemployment 
rate (–0.5)
Csoba, Nagy 
and Szabó 
(2010)1
As in O’Leary 
(1998), but sup-
port payable up to 
100% of the wage 
bill (new regula-
tion)
Longer term 
registered 
unemployed5
Survey data col-
lected following-up 
supported individu-
als and a randomly 
selected control 
group. 
Treated: exit from 
program: between 
September 2009–
February 2010
Treatment 
group: 1,041; 
control group: 
1,068
6 months logit on exit with 
control group. 
Personal and 
regional charac-
teristics used in 
logit estimation.
No marginal effect, signifi-
cant positive effect on 
program parameter (odds 
ratio compared to the 
control group: 24)
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Type of program Target group Database Sample size Observation period
Identification 
method Quantitative findings
Galasi and 
Nagy 
(2008)3
As in O’Leary 
(1998), but also 
looking at public 
works and training
Registered 
unemployed
Individual data 
snapshots (sam-
pled from PES 
register) matched 
with monitoring 
data. Sampling: 
June 2005–January 
2006
N = 351,787 
(7.6% of which 
in one of the 
three types of 
programs)
6 months discrete time 
duration model 
of hazard to exit 
towards ALMP 
registry drop out 
hazard (Jenkins 
logit)
UI recipients have 33% 
higher probability of par-
ticipation than those who 
get no subsidy, social 
benefit recipients: 50% 
less
1 Success criteria: exit to employment.
2 Continued employment with the same employer.
3 Participated in one of the programs analysed.
4 Wage if employed and use of UI.
5 Six months, three months if labour market entrants.
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IntroductIon*
The recent financial crisis has also had a fundamental impact on labour mar-
kets. European countries were forced to re-think and often reform their labour 
market institutions with flexibility and security in mind, and all this amidst 
shrinking financial resources. In this context it is crucially important to give 
a clear and accurate overview of the policy tools that can influence the opera-
tion of the economy. Apart from these global events, the fact that Hungary has 
one of the lowest employment rates within the European Union also makes 
the overview of labour market institutions most timely. Low employment is a 
major obstacle to economic growth.
This chapter continues the tradition of the Hungarian Labour Market Year 
Book that has reviewed changes in the labour market institutions each year, 
however this time it is presented in a slightly different format. We have created 
a structure that is closely related to the labour market and its forces; measures 
influencing prices, quantities and costs.
Market prices (most importantly wages) are determined by transfers, tax-
es, contributions, alternative incomes are influenced by available insurance-
based (unemployment allowance, pension) or means-tested payments (for ex-
ample social benefit type assistance, children’s benefits), costs are determined 
by certain types of assistance (for example towards the cost of commuting or 
childcare provision) and services (such as human services provided for unem-
ployed people or job search services). The structure of the labour market and 
the relationships that are formed with the labour market are shaped by con-
tractual possibilities, transaction costs and mechanisms of dialogue between 
social partners. The effectiveness and stability of the above institutions are de-
termined by policy structures and policy-making mechanisms.
We classify employment policy measures according to the classification used 
by Eurostat in its Labour Market Policy (LMP) database. In addition catego-
ries from the LABREF database of the European Commission’s Directorate 
General for Economic and Financial Affairs (DG ECFIN) are also used here 
(European Commission, 2005). These include broader – labour market related – 
policies such as tax and social policies that are strongly inter-related. Overall, we 
can distinguish labour market and labour market related policies.1 Our choice 
The classification of em-
ployment policy measures 
according to the Labour 
Market Policy Database 
of Eurostat
* We would like to thank Zsu-
zsa Blaskó, Tibor Bors Borbély-
Pecze, Ágnes Hárs, Judit Hervay, 
Judit Nagy, László Neumann, 
Ágota Scharle, András Simono-
vits and Andrea Takácsné Tatos 
for their helpful comments. We 
also thank colleagues at the Em-
ployment Office for their help in 
putting this chapter together. 
For any errors or inaccuracy the 
authors bear sole responsibility.
1 To some extents these catego-
ries are arbitrary because “eve-
rything is related to everything” 
so most policy measures have 
an employment effect. However 
considering the model of labour 
supply and labour demand we 
can identify a limited number 
of parameters that inf luence 
decisions: prices, quantities, 
costs, market structures and 
uncertainty around demand 
and supply decisions. We are 
interested in all of those policy 
measures that directly influence 
one or more of these.
Busch & cseres-GerGely
182
has been influenced by two factors. First, so far there has been no comprehensive 
classification in Hungary, which is probably explained by the limited interest 
in this issue (see also Chapter 7 of In Focus on the evaluation of active labour 
market policies in Hungary). Second, we wanted to prepare the overview in a 
comparable format based on some existing practice that makes it possible to 
continue the overview even if policies change considerably.
We aim to give a balanced overview of each issue, however there are topics 
that will be discussed in more detail; these are key employment policy meas-
ures that are likely to have a large impact on the Hungarian labour market in 
their revised form. There are some categories and sub-categories in the inter-
national classification that do not have any corresponding policies or subsidies 
either because they no longer exist or have never existed in Hungary. These 
will be mentioned only briefly.
Beside the overview of employment policies another aim of the study was to 
indicate government expenditure in this area. However, this was impossible be-
cause we could not consolidate expenditure from European Union co-financed 
projects – that are highly important – with other labour market policies into 
a single structure. Without this, detailed financial data would be misleading.
It should be emphasised that this study does not aim to provide an evaluation 
of policies or in other words an assessment of whether they had an effect on the 
labour market or not, and whether they are adequate (achieve the intended aims 
and are efficient) or not. We provide an overview of policy measures that under 
certain conditions can have an effect on the labour market based on some the-
oretical considerations or empirical results or the perception of policymakers.
Nevertheless the evaluation of specific policy measures is very important and 
to facilitate this we briefly present their possible mechanism of action, highlight 
any existing evaluations and attempt to point out any differences between them 
and the measures discussed in the evaluation studies that might modify its effect. 
The interested reader can then make the judgment. Considering that this is the 
first time the chapter is presented in this format, we also provide a brief overview 
of the situation before the changes. The system and policies are presented accord-
ing to the situation in September 2011 and we acknowledge that there might be 
changes by the time the study is published. However, only policies that have ac-
tually been rolled out are presented, policy proposals and bills that have not been 
voted by the Parliament are not discussed here. For each measure we indicate 
when they come into force. The starting point of the study is September 2010.
We aimed for maximum clarity in the wording and tried to keep the length 
of study within reasonable limits. We also aimed to provide the most accu-
rate picture possible. This meant that some compromises were necessary: we 
do mention all important policy changes, however briefly. Some of the text is 
presented in bullet points that hopefully will facilitate clearer understanding. 
We considered four questions:
Four questions to con-
sider when analysing 
employment policy 
measures
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– Answering the question How does it work? we provide the theoretical basis 
of the policy measure: who does what and why. This does not address imple-
mentation or efficiency and it is assumed that the measure serves its intended 
purpose. This question is not asked for labour market related but not direct 
employment policies because it would be too far-reaching and divert us from 
our topic.2
– For the question What is the impact on employment? we present general in-
formation on the effectiveness of the measure based on empirical results. It is 
important to highlight that for labour market policies the employment effect 
is the primary, intended aim, but the intended aim of labour market related 
policies is usually something else and the employment effect is not necessarily 
intended even if it is sometimes very strong.
– Under the heading Situation in September 2010 we present the status quo 
on the 1st of September, 2010 according to the criteria outlined below.
– For the question Changes between September 2010 and September 2011 we 
provide an overview of the most important changes. Considering the limita-
tions of space this description does not aim for completeness for various rea-
sons. On the one hand the system of financial assistance and measures is very 
fragmented in Hungary and presenting all relatively minor (in terms of access 
and expenditure) interventions would be a disproportionately huge task both 
for the authors and the readers of the chapter. Therefore where necessary we 
were selective both in terms of the employment effect and the scope of interven-
tions. Second, there are so many rules for every intervention that presenting all 
of them would have made the already long text even longer (three or four times 
its current length) and thus very difficult to read. Third and most importantly 
our aim was not to present the legislation in detail, this can be found elsewhere, 
but to give an overview of the full range of measures and their most important 
characteristics. Therefore readers who are interested in the detailed rules for 
each measure should refer to the original legal texts.
Under the heading Main legislation we present the main laws and regula-
tions governing the given area and any legal amendments down to the level of 
ministerial regulations and any other, publicly available, information on im-
plementation. The main legislation is available free of charge on the Internet. 
Our main sources were the Hungarian Gazette (Magyar Közlöny; www.mag-
yarkozlony.hu) and the Official Journal of the European Union, but there are 
other useful sources such as the on-line collection of current legislation that 
is available free of charge to anyone (http://mkogy.complex.hu). Legislation 
under the level of a ministerial regulation is not readily available. They are ei-
ther available in a summary format for end users or can be obtained from the 
relevant authorities. Together with the exact reference to legislation we also 
provide the web addresses (where they exist) of relevant authorities to facili-
tate internet-based search.
2 In most cases this is not very 
different from the original 
aim, but sometimes it is. For 
example studies analysing the 
original documents from the 
introduction of child care allow-
ance clearly point it out that its 
introduction was motivated by 
the “peaceful” withdrawal of fe-
male workforce from the labour 
market. Today the same action 
is often justified with children’s 
developmental needs.
Sources of main legislation
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components of Labour market and Labour market reLated 
poLIcIes
Labour market policies are public interventions in the labour market that ex-
plicitly aim to improve the efficiency of the market, address disequilibria and 
typically selectively favour particular groups on the labour market. The term 
labour market policy is equivalent to the term employment policy commonly 
used in Hungary in its broadest meaning and it includes both active and pas-
sive policies as well as labour market services.
The “common denominator” of labour market policies of the EU and OECD 
member states is the Labour Market Policy (LMP) database, created under 
the direction of the Eurostat. This provides comparable data on expenditure 
and participants in labour market policies in each member state. The meth-
odology of the database distinguishes three types of interventions that are 
termed 1. services, 2.measures and 3. supports. Based on section 1.2 of Europe-
an Commission (2006, p. 6) these are defined as follows including the mixed 
interventions:
Services refer to labour market interventions related to the job-search activ-
ity of participants and where participation usually does not directly result in a 
change of labour market status (but often does indirectly). Services also cover 
functions of the Public Employment Service (PES) that are not directly linked 
to jobseekers. This includes placement and other services for employers, ad-
ministrative functions, and other activities delegated to the PES.
Measures are labour market interventions where the main task of participants 
is not job-search and where participation usually (but not necessarily) results 
in a change in labour market status. These include activation programs such 
as training, wage subsidy and different forms of public works.
Supports refer to interventions that provide financial assistance, directly or 
indirectly, to individuals for labour market reasons or which compensate indi-
viduals for their disadvantage on the labour market. These include unemploy-
ment benefits such as the jobseeker’s allowance and benefit or the means-tested 
income maintenance assistance.
Mixed interventions are those schemes that employ more than one interven-
tion – that might be in different groups or categories.
The target groups of labour market policy include the unemployed, employ-
ees at risk (those who are in employment but are at risk of involuntary job loss 
due to the economic circumstances of the employer, restructuring, or similar) 
and the inactive. The government delivers labour market policies primarily 
through specialist institutions that might include a public or private (or mixed) 
Employment Service and market-based service providers. Interventions have 
been classified according to the categories of LMP as follows.3
3 For the detailed methodology 
see KSH (2009).
Labour market policy 
– all employment policy 
measures
Target groups of labour 
market policies
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Classification of labour market policy interventions by type of action
Services
1. Labour market services
Measures
2. Training
3. Job rotation and job sharing
4. Employment incentives
5. Supported employment and rehabilitation / integration of people with 
reduced work capacity
6. Direct job creation
7. Start-up incentives
Supports
8. Out of work income maintenance and supports
9. Early retirement
Mixed interventions (complex programs)
Labour markets are also influenced indirectly by measures other than labour 
market / employment policies – for example by the tax system that influences 
the price of labour. If the government aims to promote the labour market in-
clusion of a group characterised by low employment levels then it might reduce 
the tax burden on their work. In most countries demand for unskilled labour 
as well as their work motivation is relatively sensitive to wage costs. In this con-
text the government might increase employment by the appropriate calibration 
of the tax system; reducing the tax burden on lower wages. The definition of 
these indirect measures is based on a simplified, but still comparable, version 
of the LABREF database. Definitions follow Part 3 of European Commission 
(2005) and supplementary areas are defined as follows.
Labour market related policy measures, excluding LMPs
10. Labour taxation
11. Other transfers
12. Job protection – contractual arrangements
13. Old age and disability pensions system – disability supports
14. Wage bargaining and wage regulation
15. Migration and mobility related measures
16. Management and evaluation of employment policy
Labour taxation. This includes personal income tax, social security contri-
butions paid by employees and employers, coverage and rates.
Other transfers. These include transfers that influence the cost and opportu-
nity cost of work. The first includes means-tested benefits such as the housing 
assistance and travel to work schemes (e.g. those targeted at commuters) and 
the second includes assistance with child care.
Policy measures with 
an indirect effect on the 
labour market
Labour taxation
Other transfers
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Job protection and contractual arrangements. These cover changes in the regu-
latory environment of work contracts, particularly rights and responsibilities 
related to different types of contracts, permanent and temporary contracts, 
as well as rules governing dismissal of workers. We also include working time 
related measures here.
Old-age and disability pension – disability assistance. This covers the avail-
ability of old-age and disability pensions, their starting rate and increments, 
the conditions of early retirement.
Wage bargaining and wage regulation. Includes the regulation of wage bar-
gaining and any direct or indirect wage regulations that influence the level of 
wages nationally or regionally.
Migration and mobility related measures. These include rules on the employ-
ment of foreigners, selective immigration policies and the formal recognition of 
qualifications gained abroad. It also includes measures related to internal mobil-
ity, such as measures influencing the share of rented housing and home ownership.
Institutions of management and evaluation of employment policy. These in-
clude institutions that make and implement policies (the relevant ministry and 
particular units, the National Employment Service and its agencies, the Na-
tional Development Agency or more recently the Ecostat Government Centre 
for Impact Assessment) and any changes related to them.
Labour market related policies might be – and if used consciously they are – 
tuned to the needs of specific target groups, but as a general principle they cover 
the whole of the population.
Labour market poLIcy measures
The foundations of the Hungarian labour market policy were laid down by 
Act 4 of 1991, commonly known as the Employment Act. The policies set out 
by the Act are commonly referred to as employment policy measures in the 
Hungarian technical terminology.
Services
1. Labour market services
A) Services of the National Employment Service
How does it work? Labour market services help the labour market integra-
tion of the unemployed and other job seekers, and help employers to recruit 
and select their workforce. Services thus partly address the lack of informa-
tion and partly enhance the adaptability of parties helping the matching of 
job seekers and employers.
What is the impact on employment? An efficient information provision ser-
vice can improve the lack of information and information asymmetry and 
Job protection and con-
tractual arrangements
Old age pension, disability 
pension and disability as-
sistance
Wage regulation
Mobility
Employment policy 
insitutions
Labour market integra-
tion, matching
Addressing lack of informa-
tion and information as-
symetry
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thus increase the flexibility of the labour market. This can directly or also in-
directly increase employment by reducing wages through increased competi-
tion. Information services need to be provided on an on-going basis but for 
automated systems the cost of maintenance can remain well under the initial 
cost of investment. There are no empirical studies on the labour market im-
pact of information services in Hungary. International results were reported 
for example by Calmfors (2004) and Martin and Grubb (2001). They found 
that information services had a positive effect but this could not be separated 
from sanctions and statutory functions.
Situation in September 2010. In Hungary labour market services can be ac-
cessed via the job centres and the website of the National Employment Service 
(NES) in two main forms:
a) Information services: are open services for job seekers providing ad hoc in-
formation and referral to opportunities for work, training and other forms of 
assistance; it also includes job brokerage services for employers.
b) Client services: Cover provision of individualised case management ser-
vices (for example intensive counselling and guidance, job search assistance 
and personalised action plans) and follow-up for jobseekers. It also includes 
financial supports provided to jobseekers (such as the cost of travel to job in-
terviews, other job search related costs etc.).
Information services and client services might cover various areas, for ex-
ample the provision of labour market and employment information; job, ca-
reer, job search and rehabilitation advice, local (area) employment services. 
The most important information service is job brokerage. It can be provided 
as self-service with direct access to information (i.e. websites such as http://
www.munka.hu, http://epalya.hu and its more recent version http://eletpalya.
munka.hu, or http://eures.europa.eu), or through specialist human services 
(e.g. job search clubs, guidance etc.). These can be provided on an individual 
basis or for groups of jobseekers. Information services can be provided inde-
pendently or as part of guidance,a job fair, job brokerage or referral for train-
ing. They can be provided on job centre premises or on external premises such 
as rehabilitation information centres, work information centres, job advisors or 
the EUROFIT network that provides international work information, em-
ployment information points and the EURES network, the European job mo-
bility service, European employment services. The network of career services 
provides advice for choosing and changing career.4
Some of the services for jobseekers and employers are provided jointly by the 
NES and its partner organisations or are contracted out to accredited service 
providers.5 The NES does not have a statutory role in most services, however 
in the case of job brokerage it does because jobseekers can lose their eligibility 
for jobseeker’s allowance if they do not accept suitable job offers.
Changes between September 2010 and September 2011. There were no substan-
4 In the first phase of SROP 2.2 
project the procedures of Life-
long Guidance were prepared. 
The National Career Orientation 
Portal has been operational since 
September 2010 that is the inte-
grated career information por-
tal of lifelong career guidance 
(http://eletpalya.munka.hu/).
5 The priority project SROP 2.6.1 
Establishing the system of service 
provider accreditation ended on 
December 31, 2010. The part-
ners of the project together with 
representatives of independent 
employment service provid-
ers developed definition and 
standards for 48 labour market 
services, defined accreditation 
criteria and procedures. More 
details can be found on the web-
site of the project (http://www.
tamop261.hu/)
Provision of information 
and individualised services
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tial changes during this period; the statute of the NES confirmed the activities of 
the NES in the provision of labour market services and all services were available.
Main legislation
The scope of labour market services are set out by Act 4 of 1991, Article 13/A, 
paragraph 2. The types of services are listed in MoE Ministerial Regulation 
no. 30/2000. (15. 11). Job brokerage is delegated to the NES by Article 7 of the 
Government Regulation no. 315/2010. (27. 12).
New legislation: Government Regulation no. 315/2010. (27. 12) on the Stat-
ute of the National Employment Service and the Employment Office (Official 
Journal, issue 9, 2011. February 8. pp. 1065–1068.
On-line resources: http://www.munka.hu/engine.aspx?page=allaskeresoknek, 
http://www.munka.hu/engine.aspx?page=munkaadoknak, http://www.ta-
mop261.hu/.
B) Other activities of the National Employment Service
How do they work? Activities other than the provision of services by the 
employment service include administration, and they are often statutory or 
related to the management and implementation of policies at the local level. 
Accordingly they are concerned with the efficient management and imple-
mentation of policies.
What is their impact on employment? Besides the provision of services, oth-
er activities of the employment service can also help re-employment of the 
unemployed if implemented efficiently. For example using client profiling 
to provide the most adequate services to different unemployed clients (e.g. 
in terms of education, work experience). Also adequate monitoring of job-
search activity and sanctions for non-compliance can also be very useful – see 
Card, Kluve and Weber (2010) for more on this. There is limited information 
on the impact of other activities. The potential impact of their reform was 
examined by the evaluation study of the PES modernisation (Cseres-Gergely 
& Scharle, 2010). It was found that the development of services might have 
contributed to the positive impact of the modernisation; however it was not 
possible to isolate its impact. Micklewright and Nagy (2005) experiment-
ed with the implementation of stricter sanctions in Hungary. Their results 
showed that increased sanctions – that were still considerably less stringent 
than sanctions used in some other countries – had a more limited impact in 
Hungary than elsewhere.
Situation in September 2010. The three areas of the employment service’s 
other activities are as follows:
1. The administration of labour market measures: the management / co-ordi-
nation of employers and services providers engaged as direct recipients in these 
measures, other activities related to the management and implementation of 
labour market measures – e.g. planning, co-ordination, monitoring, evaluation, 
Administrative and 
statutory roles
Client profiling, moni-
toring and sanctions
Administration, coordi-
nation, monitoring, eval-
uation, decision-making
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decision making, etc., and any other functions directly related to the provision 
of labour market measures but which cannot be attributed to a specific measure.
2. The administration of labour market supports: covers activities related to 
the administration and payment of supports and / or the supervision by the 
NES of other bodies that undertake the payment and administration functions. 
Activities include for example the registration and monitoring of beneficiaries 
(where not directly linked to on-going monitoring of job-search activity), and 
the payment of benefits, validation of claims, etc.
3. Other services / activities: covers all other services, activities and general 
overheads of the public employment service which are not covered in any oth-
er category of the LMP database. For example vocational health assessment, 
wage guarantees and issuing work permits for foreign workers.
Important stages in the individual case management of clients are the ini-
tial assessment, drawing up a jobseeker’s action plan based on the needs and 
characteristics of the individual jobseeker, assessing the entitlement and el-
igibility for financial support and payment of support, the monitoring of 
job-search activity and the closure of the case or referral for social assistance 
(currently public works, income maintenance assistance or regular social as-
sistance). The jobseeker’s agreement was binding for those claiming financial 
supports from the PES until December 31, 2010 and those who breached the 
agreement lost their eligibility for the allowance/assistance. After signing the 
agreement jobseekers were required to attend interviews with their job cen-
tre advisor on a regular basis but no less than once every three months and 
report on their job-search activity. Not only jobseekers, but other clients of 
the job centre (such as people with reduced work capacity) were also required 
to sign a binding agreement.
Changes between September 2010 and September 2011. As of January 1, 2011 
the seven independent regional job centres were transformed into 20 job centres 
and incorporated into the county government offices. An important change 
in the organisation of job centres after September 2011 was that about half of 
the staff has been dealing with the administration of public works.
The jobseeker’s agreement has no longer been a requirement since January 
1, 2011, nevertheless it is still useful (although not mandatory) to plan and re-
cord each step of the cooperation. Those claiming rehabilitation allowance are 
still required to sign a rehabilitation agreement.
Main legislation
Activities related to registered unemployed (registered jobseekers) are set out 
by Act 4 of 1991 (Employment Act).
New legislation: Government Regulation no. 315/2010. (27. 12) on the Ac-
tivities of the National Employment Service. Its budget is set out by Act 169 
of 2010 on the 2011 budget of the Republic of Hungary. The statues for the 
new job centres were published in the Official Journal, 2011, issue 9. Ministry 
Job search plan, jobseeker’s 
agreement – compulsory 
until the end of 2010
Seven instead of tweny 
job centres, shorter peri-
od with no compulsory 
requirements
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for National Economy Regulation (MfNER) no. 2/2011. (14. 1) on register-
ing and de-registering as a jobseeker.
On-line resources: http://www.munka.hu.
Active labour market policies (Lmp measures)
2. Training programs
How do they work? Training programs aim to improve the employability of 
participants by providing new skills that are sought after on the labour mar-
ket and increase the likelihood of finding or keeping a job, or increase partici-
pants’ earnings potential
What is their impact on employment? Training can have an impact on employ-
ment if its curriculum is relevant and the participants are capable of learning 
new skills. In this case training can have a lasting positive impact on the em-
ployability of participants and possibly their earning potential which might 
help to increase employment without increasing public expenditure. Kluve 
(2010) argued that training programs are less effective forms of active measures 
if they do not improve considerably the employability of participants. The long 
term analysis of training programs by Card, Kluve and Weber (2010) slightly 
changed this picture by showing that adequately targeted training can have 
a positive effect, although this develops over a longer period of time. O’Leary 
(1998) analysed the effect of training programs in Hungary over a decade ago, 
and a similar analysis was presented by Csoba, Nagy and Szabó (2010) more re-
cently (see also Chapter 4 of In Focus). Galasi, Nagy and Lázár (1999) also ad-
dressed the effectiveness of training programs. Results from Hungary showed 
that training programs slightly improved the employability of participants; 
however none of the studies followed the participants as long as Card, Kluve 
and Weber (2010) to find significant positive labour market effects.
Situation in September 2010 (July – August 2010). Training supports can be 
claimed by jobseekers and employees at risk and the economically inactive. En-
titlement and eligibility for the support is assessed by the job centre. The sup-
port can take various forms such as income maintenance assistance (or income 
support for those in work), the reimbursement of training and exam costs and 
expenses related to accommodation, food and travel.
Training can be aimed at improving the employability of unemployed or 
help employees to remain in work. Training can be provided by public or pri-
vate providers.
Changes between September 2010 and September 2011. There were no changes 
in the structure and availability of training in this period, however a number 
of important decisions were made for the future.
The network of training institutions are to be re-organised. The nine inde-
pendent regional training centres were merged into the Budapest Centre for 
Aim: increasing em-
ployment prospects
Major institutional 
changes
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Labour Market Interventions (BCLMI) and thus ceased to exist as of Decem-
ber 18, 2011. The name of BCLMI changed to István Türr Training and Re-
search Institute as of June 30, 2011. The Institute replaced the previous public 
agencies and took over its activities in the areas of training, regional and social 
development and public works.
With the reallocation of European Union resources (see the description of 
other measures and complex programs) a greater emphasis has been placed on 
training programs within Priority 2 – Improving adaptability – of the Social 
Renewal Operational Program (SROP). As opposed to programs under Pri-
ority 1 these are not managed by the employment service but the Managing 
Authority of the Human Resources Program.
Main legislation
Labour market training is regulated by Article 14 of Act 4 of 1991 (Employ-
ment Act) and Article 1 of Ministry of Labour (MoL) Regulation no. 6/1996. 
(16. 07.).
New legislation: Training centres are regulated by the Ministry of Public Ad-
ministration and Justice (MoPAJ) Regulation no. 3/2011. (11. 02) and Article 
6 of MoPAJ Regulation 19/2011. (24. 06) on its amendment. The action plan 
for Priority 2 of SROP is published in Government Regulation no. 1013/2011.
On-line resources: http://www.munka.hu/engine.aspx?page =allas kere-
soknek_kepzes, http://www.munka.hu/engine.aspx?page =munkaadoknak_
kepzes, http://www.tkki.hu.
3. Job rotation and job sharing
How does it work? These measures support the (re-)employment of the un-
employed or people from other target groups by dividing the working hours 
of already existing jobs and thus allowing them to work.
What is the impact on employment? This measure can increase the employ-
ment level if the employment of additional workers on the same job does not 
result in the job loss of others. Job sharing is only possible if the job is suitable 
for sharing, the workers are motivated to job share and they are satisfied with 
their wages. If the wage adjustment cancels out the effect of increased employ-
ment then job sharing is not an effective employment policy measure (Layard, 
Nickell and Jackman 1991). The impact of job sharing is less clear-cut on smaller 
and dense labour markets as well as rigid wage structures.
Situation in September 2010. No job sharing and job rotation labour market 
measures existed in Hungary before the end of 2010.
Changes between September 2010 and September 2011. As of January 1, 2011 
employers pay only 20% social security contributions instead of the 27% for 
eligible employees. To be eligible for the support the wages should be no more 
than 200% of the statutory minimum wage and the employee should be re-
turning from child care leave. Further conditions are that the job should be 
Criterion of success: re-
employment without 
crowding out others
Reduced social security 
contributions for job 
sharers
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shared between the returning employee and the worker who had been hired for 
their temporary replacement (or a new worker) and the working time should 
be shared equally between them (20 hours for each). These conditions should 
be met for at least one year. The support can be paid for up to three years and 
it cannot be combined with other supports or reliefs.
Main legislation
Article 8/B of ‘Start’ Act (Act 123 of 2004)
New legislation: Act 123 of 2010 on taxation.
4. Employment incentives
How does it work? The aim of employment incentives is to support the em-
ployment of unemployed people or other target groups or help to ensure the 
continued employment of workers at risk of involuntary job loss by covering 
some or all of the labour costs or reducing other costs associated with their 
employment.
What is the impact on employment? The main impact of employment incen-
tives is that it is less costly for employers to recruit individuals from the target 
group that might help to increase employment levels. The other impact, al-
though indirect but more important in the long run, is that it makes it possible 
for the target group to enter the labour market which might not be possible oth-
erwise due to their disadvantaged situation. During the course of employment 
the employee and the employer can get to know the skills of the employee and 
thus it might also have a lasting impact after the end of the support. The effect 
of employment incentives is largely dependent on market conditions and their 
actual regulation, particularly its targeting and “crowding-out” effect. O’Leary 
(1998) analysed the effect of wage subsidy schemes in Hungary over a decade 
ago and a similar analysis was carried out more recently by Csoba, Nagy and 
Szabó (2010) (see also Chapter 4 of In Focus). The authors concluded that the 
significant positive effect of wage subsidies was not primarily due to the de-
sign of the programs but to the fact that the participants had better than aver-
age employment prospects. To date there has been no empirical analysis of job 
retention support schemes in Hungary. The OECD (2009) expected that the 
measures used after the 2008 crisis would have a limited impact.
Situation in September 2010. There are many types of employment incen-
tives; the two main types are recruitment incentives and employment main-
tenance incentives. The measures include support towards the cost of labour 
(wage subsidy, wage and contributions subsidy, contribution reliefs including 
the Start, Start-extra, Start-plus and Start-region schemes as well), supports 
towards certain forms of working (for example tele-work), and supports reduc-
ing to the cost of working (different travel-to-work schemes). The measures are 
managed by job centres where the claims should also be submitted. However 
incentives can also take an indirect form (such as the Start-card).
Decreasing contribu-
tions for beneficiaris
Subsidies to encourage 
hiring and retention of 
jobs
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Changes between September 2010 and September 2011.
– Starting from 2011 the Start-region was phased out. This could be used 
as part of the Start-extra scheme for recruiting workers claiming income re-
placement assistance. Supports awarded prior to January 1, 2011 are paid un-
til their expiry.
– As of January 1, 2011 part-time workers can also take part in Start-schemes.
– Restrictions were introduced on the entitlement conditions for the Start-
extra scheme in 2011: apart from the long-term unemployed only people aged 
over 50 years with a basic level education and who had been registered as job-
seekers for at least three months prior to enrolment in the scheme were enti-
tled to take part.
– Applications for new Start-plus and Start-extra cards had to be submitted 
at the latest by December 31, 2011 and employers are eligible for contribution 
relief until December 31, 2013.
Main legislation
The rules of employment incentive schemes are set out in Articles 11 and 18 
of Act 4 of 1991 (Employment Act), Articles 11 and 18 of MoL regulation no. 
6/1996. (16. 07), Government Regulation no. 39/1998. (04. 03) and Act 123 
of 2004 (“Start” Act).
New legislation: Government decree no. 1013/2011. (19. 01) on the Action 
Plan of the Social Renewal Operational Program for 2011–2013 that includes 
the detailed outline of Project SROP 1.2.1; Act 105 of 2011 on the Regula-
tory Alignment of Certain Labour Legislation and other Related Acts; Act 
106 of 2011 on Public Works and the Amendment of Public Works and other 
Related Legislation; MfNER regulation no. 27/2010. (31. 12) on the Amend-
ment of Certain MfNER Regulations in Relation to the Establishment of 
Government Offices.
On-line resources: http://www.munka.hu/engine.aspx?page=ma_tamogatas, 
http://www.munka.hu/engine.aspx?page=ak_tamogatasok, http://www.afsz.
hu/engine.aspx?page=full_tamop121
5. Sheltered employment and rehabilitation
How does it work? These measures aim to develop the existing work capacity 
of people with reduced work capacity by providing adaptations and adequate 
services and facilitate their return to work or continued employment.
What is the impact on employment? The primary aim of rehabilitation is to 
develop existing skills and competencies of people with reduced work capac-
ity that can prepare them to move on to work. It can also help to combat dis-
crimination arising from prejudice or lack of information. After successful re-
habilitation people can take up work on the open labour market or in special 
settings. If implemented adequately, rehabilitation can also increase the inde-
pendence of people with reduced work capacity, who can perform at the same 
Rehabilitation can pro-
mote the independence 
of people with reduced 
work capacity
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level as non-disabled workers, and this can increase the level of employment in 
the long run without increasing public expenditure. Scharle (2011) compared 
different forms of sheltered employment and rehabilitation in Hungary and 
found that the wage and other subsidies of sheltered workshops do not signifi-
cantly improve the employment prospects of participants while the rehabilita-
tion services of non-profit providers do.
How did it work previously? The distinction between sheltered employment 
and rehabilitation in Hungarian practice is as follows:
Sheltered employment: covers those sheltered work measures that have the 
aim of preparing people for integration into the open labour market: for ex-
ample the physical adaptation of the workplace, both building and equipment, 
or the provision of mentors or other specialist assistants.
Rehabilitation: covers measures providing guidance, training and develop-
ment that help participants to adjust to their disability or condition, develop 
competencies that prepare them to move on to work, and find and retain a 
suitable job and workplace.
Two types of organisations can provide sheltered employment in Hungary: 
sheltered workshops and accredited rehabilitation employers.6 It is a require-
ment for both types of organisations that a large proportion of their workforce 
has a reduced work capacity. The government provides two types of support 
towards the cost of rehabilitation: wage subsidy that can cover from 40 to 100 
per cent of the wage and contributions, and assistance to work placement, job 
retention, vocational rehabilitation and the provision of assistants at the work-
place. The other type of rehabilitation support is a cost reimbursement: the 
partial reimbursement of allowable and approved expenses directly related to 
the employment of people with reduced work capacity that the employer would 
not have incurred with the employment of non-disabled workers. This can be 
claimed by sheltered employers only. Job centres make the decision about the 
payment of rehabilitation wage subsidy.
Rehabilitation is supported via European Union programs and ad hoc grant 
programs for non-profit organisations. The SROP priority project 1.1.1 Pro-
moting the rehabilitation and employment of people with reduced work capac-
ity provides services and support to help labour market (re-)integration and 
job retention. The priority project is implemented by the public employment 
service. The process of rehabilitation is closely related to the payment of reha-
bilitation allowance that is paid for those with a 50–79% loss of work capac-
ity. This is discussed in more detail under heading 13 Old age and disability 
pensions – disability supports.
Changes between September 2010 and September 2011. The accreditation of 
employers of people with reduced work capacity was carried out by the Em-
ployment Office since its introduction (on November 1, 2005). As of January 
1, 2011 this, together with other activities related to the payment of public sub-
6 Accredited employers are those 
that have received a special ac-
creditation to employ people 
with reduced work capacity. 
There are different levels of ac-
creditation (basic or rehabili-
tation, and high level or condi-
tional).
Physical adaptations, 
workplace mentors
Wage subsidy and 
vocational rehabil-
itation subsidy
Priority projects are 
implemented by local 
offices of job centres
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sidies, has been the responsibility of the National Rehabilitation and Social 
Office (NRSO) together with other public bodies.
Main legislation
Government regulation no. 177/2005. (02. 09) on Public Subsidies for the 
Employment of Workers with Reduced Work Capacity; Ministry of Employ-
ment and Labour (MoEL) regulation no. 15/2005. (02. 09) on the Activities 
of the Employment Office in Relation to Rehabilitation; Government regu-
lation no. 176 /2005. (02. 09) on the Accreditation of Organisations Employ-
ing Workers with Reduced Work Capacity and the Inspection of Accredited 
Employers; and MoEL regulation no. 14/2005. (02. 09) on the Procedure and 
Requirements of the Accreditation Process.
New legislation: Government regulation no. 121/2011. (15. 07) Amending 
Government Regulation no. 177/2005. (02. 09) on Public Subsidies for the 
Employment of Workers with Reduced Work Capacity; Government regu-
lation no. 332/2010. (27. 12) Amending Certain Government Regulations 
in Relation to the Activities of the National Rehabilitation and Social Of-
fice; Ministry of National Resources (MoNR) regulation no. 46/2011. (15. 
07) Amending MoEL Regulation no. 15/2005. (02. 09) on the Assessment of 
Eligibility for Public Subsidy for the Employment of Workers with Reduced 
Work Capacity; MoNR regulation no. 25/2010. (30. 12) Amending Certain 
Ministerial Regulations in Relation to the Activities of the National Rehabili-
tation and Social Office.
On-line resources: http://www.munka.hu/engine.aspx?page=ma_
tamo ga tas &switch-content=ma_tamogatas_megvaltozott_mun ka-
kepz_091026&switch-zone=Zone1&switch-render-mode=full; http://www.
orszi.hu/html/pdf/tajekoztatok/Megvaltozott_munkakepesseguek_foglal-
koztatasanak_tamogatasa_2011.pdf
6. Direct job creation
How does it work? These programs create new jobs, usually of community 
benefit or socially useful, in order to create employment opportunities for the 
long-term unemployed or people who are otherwise struggling to find work. 
The jobs are usually in the public or non-profit sector, but projects of commu-
nity interest or similar within the private sector may also be eligible and no 
distinction should be made. Therefore this covers all forms of public works 
schemes – municipal and communal public works as well as centrally organ-
ised public works programs.
What is the impact on employment? The primary employment effect of direct 
job creation is that workers in non-market jobs are considered employed and 
count towards the employment rate. Nevertheless the indirect and possibly 
the most important effect of direct job creation might be that it provides an 
opportunity for people to enter the labour market. Labour market integration 
Jobs are created mainly 
in the public sector and 
in the non-profit sector
Criterion of success: la-
bour market integration
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is facilitated by adequate services and supports as well as the nature of work – 
among others by providing relevant work experience. O’Leary (1998) analysed 
the effect of public works schemes in Hungary over a decade ago and a similar 
analysis was carried out more recently by Csoba, Nagy and Szabó (2010) (see 
also Chapter 4 of In Focus). The Road to Work Program was examined by Bu-
dapest Institute and Hétfa (2011). None of these studies found a positive em-
ployment effect over the studied period.
Situation in September 2010. Until December 31, 2010 the public works 
scheme Road to Work was in effect. In this program participants were paid 
means-tested income maintenance assistance if they signed on as jobseekers 
with the jobcentre and were willing to accept job offers, including public works. 
There were also some municipal and centrally organised public works projects 
until the end of 2010.
Changes between September 2010 and September 2011. The previous system 
of public works was replaced by a completely new system in 2011. A new four-
pillar public works program replaced the three types of public works – cen-
trally organised, community and municipal public works. The four pillars 
are: short-term public works, longer term public works, mobility within pub-
lic works and nationwide public works programs.7 Employers can be – apart 
from the state – local councils, churches, social cooperatives and some speci-
fied businesses (water companies, forest management, national rail network). 
The program was overseen by the Ministry for National Economy in the first 
half of 2011, but from July 1, 2011 this was taken over by the Ministry of the 
Interior. As of September 1, 2011 the regulatory framework of public works 
were aligned with the conditions of unemployment assistance. A new type of 
employment relationship was created, the public works contract that removes 
participants of a public works program from the coverage of labour legislation 
in many aspects (such as the statutory minimum wage). The previous income 
maintenance assistance was replaced by the income maintenance assistance.
Different types of assistance are available for public works programs. Assis-
tance can be paid for short- and long-term and nationwide public works pro-
gram. Public interest agency work is also eligible for assistance if it employs 
people claiming income replacement assistance and also provides training and 
mentoring. In these cases the assistance equals to the amount of public works 
minimum wage. Furthermore, any employer recruiting workers claiming in-
come replacement assistance is eligible for assistance; these workers should be 
paid the statutory minimum wage and there is also a requirement of contin-
ued employment.
Main legislation
The status quo on December 31, 2010 was set out by Government regulation 
no. 23/2001 on Assistance for Public Works. The financial framework for 2011 
was defined by Act 169 of 2010 on the 2011 Budget of the Republic of Hungary.
7 The minister responsible for 
public works can launch pilot 
schemes for short term, longer 
term and national public works 
programs. Pilot schemes are im-
plemented in water management, 
agriculture, waste management 
(clearing up illegal waste dump-
ing sites), the maintenance of un-
paved roads used for agricultural 
purposes, road maintenance, 
winter employment.
Road to Work: public 
works programs
Four pillars of the new 
public works program
New type of employment 
contract: public works 
contract with public 
works wage
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New legislation: Rules after January 1, 2011 were laid down by Government 
regulation no. 375/2010 (31. 12) on Assistance for Public Works; rules after 
September 1, 2011 were defined by Act 106 of 2011 that also amended a number 
of other acts such as the Employment Act and Labour Code. Further rules can 
be found in: Government regulation no. 170/2011. (24. 08) on Wage Setting 
and Statutory Minimum Wage in Public Works and Government regulation 
no. 171/2011. (24. 08) on the Amendment of Certain Government Regula-
tions in Relation to Public Works.
On-line resources: http://www.munka.hu/engine.aspx?page=nfsz_kozfoglal-
koztatas
7. Start-up incentives
How does it work? Start-up measures provide financial support to promote 
entrepreneurship by encouraging the unemployed and other target groups to 
start their own business or to become self-employed.
What is the impact on employment? Unemployed people successfully starting 
their own business will reduce the unemployed count and increase the level 
of employment, potentially by employing others. According to the evaluation 
by O’Leary (1998) business start-up schemes significantly improved the labour 
market situation of participants. Galasi, Lázár and Nagy (2003) found the 
highest re-employment rates among participants of business start-up schemes. 
However results were explained by the more favourable than average charac-
teristics of beneficiaries.
Situation in September 2010. The target group of business start-up meas-
ures can include registered jobseekers and people claiming rehabilitation al-
lowance who become self-employed, set up a company or become an agricul-
tural producer.
The assistance can be paid as an interest-free non-repayable capital grant or re-
payable working capital loan and / or a non-repayable assistance up the amount 
of the statutory minimum wage and assistance towards the cost of business 
advisory services.
Changes between September 2010 and September 2011. The measure has been 
unchanged for years and there were no changes in this period either.
Main legislation
The measure is regulated by Article 17 of Act 4 of 1991 (Employment Act) 
and Article 10 of MoL regulation no. 6/1996. (16. 07).
On-line resources: http://www.munka.hu/engine.aspx?page=ak_tamoga-
tasok.
Business start-up can 
reduce the number of 
unemployed
Self-employment as a 
private entrepreneur, as 
part of a business corpo-
ration or as an agricul-
tural producer
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Supports
8. Unemployment (jobseeker’s) benefits
How does it work? Unemployment benefits and supports aim to compensate 
individuals for loss of wage or salary through the provision of cash benefits 
when a person is capable of working and available for work but is unable to 
find suitable employment. Entitlement to unemployment benefit is normally 
conditional upon the beneficiary actively seeking work but, in certain cases 
– for example older workers – the condition may be relaxed.
What is the impact on employment? People who lose their job usually face a 
loss of earnings for some months if they are not willing to take up a new job 
that is less favourable than the one they have just lost. The impact of unemploy-
ment benefit is not clearcut: on the one hand it provides out-of-work income 
that might reduce willingness to work. On the other hand adequate assistance 
– level and duration – allows more efficient job-search and thus reduces the du-
ration of unemployment, increases employment and leads to better job-match-
ing than in the absence of assistance. Galasi and Nagy (2002), Micklewright 
andNagy (1995), Köllő and Nagy (1995), Wolff (2001) wrote about the impact 
of unemployment benefit on employment. These studies showed that shorten-
ing the duration of the benefit period did not or only slightly increased labour 
supply while the financial situation of claimants deteriorated substantially.
Situation in September 2010. There were two types of benefit:
1. Unemployment assistance: is paid to (former) workers satisfying criteria 
for membership in an unemployment insurance scheme. It is often paid only 
for a limited period.
2. Unemployment assistance: is usually paid to workers who either fail to sat-
isfy criteria for membership in an unemployment insurance scheme (have not 
paid contributions for long enough) or who have exhausted insurance-based 
unemployment benefit entitlement. Unemployment assistance is normally 
means tested.
Between November 1, 2005 and August 31, 2011 there were three types of 
unemployment benefit and assistances. These were primarily insurance-based 
provisions with some means-tested elements. The public employment service 
was responsible for the administration of both supports. There was a gradu-
al shift towards the requirement of job search or as a minimum, cooperation 
with the job centre in the eligibility conditions for social assistance during the 
2000s, and this is still the case. Unemployment benefits are directly linked to 
the current public works scheme; they are managed by local councils that re-
quire claimants (apart from people claiming regular social assistance) to co-
operate with the employment service. The main characteristics of supports are 
summarised in Table 1.
Shortening the benefit 
period has only slightly 
increased labour supply 
but the financial situa-
tion of claimants got 
significantly worse
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table 1: main characteristics of jobseeker’s and working age benefits and supports between september 1, 2010 
and august 31, 2011*
Benefit Entitlement conditions Minimum Maximum
Jobseeker’s allowance
Phase 1 (half of the benefit 
period or up to 91 days)
A minimum of 365 days of contribution payment 
within the previous four years (employee, self-
employed, business owner who has paid business 
contribution)
Sixty per cent of taxable wage, 
no less than 60% of the statu-
tory minimum wage applicable 
on the first day of benefit pe-
riod: 46,800 HUF / month – 
1,560 HUF / day
Sixty per cent of taxable wage, 
no more than 120% of the 
statutory minimum wage ap-
plicable on the first day of 
benefit period: 93,600 HUF / 
month – 3,120 HUF / day
Phase 2 (the remaining ben-
efit period, up to 179 days)
More than 365 days of contribution payment 
within the previous four years
Sixty per cent of the statutory 
minimum wage applicable on 
the first day of benefit period: 
46,800 HUF / month – 1,560 
HUF / day
Jobseeker’s assistance
Type 1: 90 days; 180 days for 
people aged over 50
Entitled to Jobseeker’s Allowance for no less than 
180 day but has exhausted benefit entitlement 
and not found a job
Forty per cent of the minimum 
wage: 31,200 HUF / month – 
1,040 HUF / month
Type 2: 90 days Has been employed for 200–365 days within the 
previous four years.
Type 3: up to old age pension 
age but no more than five 
years
Within five years from old age pension age and 
has received Jobseeker’s Allowance for at least 
140 days but has exhausted benefit entitlement.
Income maintenance assis-
tance (until December 31, 
2010)
If more than one of the following apply: lack of 
job vacancies, low income, has exhausted entitle-
ment for Jobseeker’s Assistance, available to 
start work and willingness to cooperate with the 
job centre and accept suitable jobs in the previ-
ous year
The minimum amount of old 
age pension: 28,500 HUF / 
month
Income replacement assis-
tance (Between January 1 
and August 31, 2011)
Participation in work or labour market program 
for at least 30 days, willingness to accept any job.
Regular social assistance Reduced work capacity (long term condition, 
aged 55 or over, lack of suitable childcare for 
child(ren) aged under 14, other conditions as set 
out in the regulation) and on a low income (also 
do not have savings above a certain amount), 
exhausted entitlement to Jobseeker’s Assistance, 
not required to cooperate with the NES
Dependent on family income 
but up to the net full-time 
minimum wage (60,600 HUF / 
month)
* The amounts indicate rates applicable on August 31, 2011.
Changes between September 2010 and September 2011. The system of unemploy-
ment (jobseeker’s) benefits changed radically as of September 1, 2011: the higher 
amount and benefit period of Jobseeker’s Allowance was reduced significantly 
and there were also changes in the entitlement conditions. Type 1 (paid after 
Jobseeker’s Allowance) and Type 2 (200 days of employment) of Jobseeker’s As-
sistance were phased out. Entitlement conditions to Type 3 assistance changed 
and now it can be paid only to people within five years of old age pension age. 
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With the introduction of the new public works scheme social benefits changed 
too. The Income Replacement Assistance was replaced by Out-of-work Assis-
tance with stricter entitlement conditions. The characteristics and rates of new 
jobseeker’s and social supports as of September 1, 2011 are presented in Table 2.
table 2: main characteristics of jobseeker’s and other working age supports as of 
september 1, 2011
Benefit Entitlement conditions Amount
Jobseeker’s Allowance 
(benefit period minimum 
36, maximum 90 days)
Paid contributions for at least 360 days 
within the previous five years, a 10-day 
contribution period corresponds to one day 
benefit period.
Sixty per cent of the taxable wage, 
up to 100% of the statutory mini-
mum wage effective on the first day 
of benefit period: 78,000 HUF / 
month – 2,600 HUF / day
Pre-pension Jobseeker’s 
Assistance
Within five years from old age pension age 
and has received Jobseeker’s Allowance for 
at least 90 days but has exhausted benefit 
entitlement within the previous three years, 
has enough qualifying years for old age 
pension
Forty per cent of the statutory 
minimum wage: 31,200 HUF / 
month – 1,040 HUF / day
Out-of-work Assistance Eligible for working age assistance, except 
those eligible for regular social assistance. 
Participation in work or labour market 
program for at least 30 days, willingness to 
accept any job and keeps living environ-
ment clean if required by the local council
The minimum amount of old age 
pension: 28,500 HUF / month
Regular social assistance No change Dependent on family income but 
up to the net full-time minimum 
wage (60,600 HUF / month)
* Entitlement to benefits can be gained through employment, self-employment or busi-
ness ownership provided they satisfied the requirement of paying unemployment 
contributions.
Main legislation
Unemployment benefits are set out in Chapter 5 of Act 4 of 1991 (Employ-
ment Act) and Article 25.1 of Act 3 of 1993 on Social Administration and So-
cial Provisions. Social assistance is regulated by Act 3 of 1993 and Government 
regulation no. 63/2006. (27. 03) on Detailed Rules for Claiming, Awarding 
and Paying Cash and In-Kind Benefits.
New legislation: Act 106 of 2011 on Public Works and the Amendment of 
Public Works and other Related Legislation.
On-line resources: http://www.munka.hu/engine.aspx?page =allas kere-
soknek_munkanelkuli_ellatasok
9. Early retirement
How does it work? These programs facilitate the full or partial early retirement 
of older workers who are assumed to have little chance of finding a job or whose 
retirement facilitates the placement of an unemployed person or a person from 
Partial early retirement 
for those whose chances of 
re-employment are small
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another target group. This does not include pension paid to beneficiaries over 
the standard retirement age as established in the reference pension scheme or 
pre-retirement pension that is discussed in more detail under Old age pensions.
What is the impact on employment? Although conditional early retirement 
increases the level of inactivity the obligation to replace a retiree reduces un-
employment in the short run. This measure has not been studied in Hungary, 
however analysing the long-term effect of early retirement Layard, Nickell 
and Jackman (1991) concluded that if it is used extensively its short-term effect 
soon disappears through wage adjustment and unemployment increases again.
Situation in September 2010. This measure no longer exists in Hungary, it 
is mentioned here as a matter of interest. (Previously the early pension was a 
similar measure.) Two types of early retirement:
1. Conditional early retirement: facilitates the early retirement of older work-
ers and obliges the employer to replace the retiree with an unemployed person 
or a person from another target group.
2. Unconditional early retirement: facilitates the early retirement of older per-
sons and, for those retiring from employment, where there is no obligation for 
the employer to replace the retiree. Unconditional early retirement supports 
can only be included when they offer benefits due to unemployment or to job 
reduction caused by economic measures such as the restructuring of an indus-
trial sector or of a business enterprise.
Changes between September 2010 and September 2011. No changes in this 
area.
Mixed interventions (complex programs)
Mixed interventions encompass the joint and synergic application of more than 
one of the above measure and support. They are distinguished from a simple 
combination of measures by using the potential synergies of different meas-
ures that enhance their positive effect.
The main building blocks of mixed interventions are the labour market pol-
icy measures presented above; so at least the same measure-specific effects can 
be expected. However in well-designed mixed interventions the components 
enhance each other’s effects. This might also mean that measures which have 
no effect or negative effect on their own, might have a positive effect as part 
of a mixed intervention. Evaluation studies of labour market policies often 
point out that isolated programs are not effective (enough). However, a com-
mon conclusion is that well-designed complex programs can potentially be ef-
fective in cases where individual measures failed to achieve any results (Kézdi 
and Hudomiet, 2008). The impact of complex programs in Hungary has not 
yet been studied.
The most important complex programs of the studied period were co-fi-
nanced by the EU within the framework of the Social Renewal Operational 
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Program (SROP). These were SROP 1.1.1 (Promoting the Rehabilitation and 
Employment of People with Reduced Work Capacity) and SROP 1.1.2/1.1 (De-
centralised Programs for the Employment of Disadvantaged People in the Con-
vergence Regions / Promoting the Employment of Disadvantaged People in the 
Central Hungary Region) and SROP 1.1.3 (Road to the World of Work). SROP 
project 1.1.1 supports people with reduced work capacity, project 1.1.2 and pro-
ject 1.1.4 supports young entrants, people aged 50 years or over, low-educated 
and returning to work after having a child / children. The only target group of 
project 1.1.3 are registered jobseekers receiving social assistance (i.e. income 
maintenance assistance and later income replacement assistance).
The participants of SROP program 1.1.1 can chose services and supports from 
a range of measures that support training, work experience and work practice 
through supported employment, work trials, and self-employment. These are 
accompanied by supports and services that help the rehabilitation and improve 
the employability and adaptability of participation. The direct objective of 
SROP program 1.1.2 is to support the labour market entry of disadvantaged 
people using mixed interventions that are tailored to individual characteris-
tics and local opportunities and demands. The program started on January 1, 
2008 and ended on April 30, 2011. After April 20, 2009 jobseekers who had 
lost their job as a result of the economic recession also became eligible to enrol. 
The program was re-launched on May 1, 2011 including new target groups such 
as people claiming income replacement assistance and out-of-work assistance.
Participants of SROP programs, 1.1.2, 1.1.3 and 1.1.4 can access the whole 
range of LMP measures, and they are also eligible to receive a reimbursement 
of their expenditures (e.g. travel costs) to access the selected services. However 
in some cases there is no synergy between the individual program components.
Main legislation
SROP priority projects 1.1.1, 1.1.2 and 1.1.4 are set out in Government de-
cree no. 1013/2011. (19. 01) on the Action Plan of the Social Renewal Opera-
tional Program for 2011–2013
Labour market reLated poLIcy measures
Labour markets are also influenced indirectly by measures other than labour 
market / employment policies – for example by the tax system that influences 
the price of labour. The definition of these indirect measures is based on a sim-
plified, but still comparable, version of the LABREF database.
10. Labour taxation
Tax system
What is the impact on employment? Taxes influence prices on the labour mar-
ket and they directly reduce the income of the affected parties. The extent of 
Main complex programs 
with EU funding – 
SROP
Corporate incomes and 
labour taxation
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this is usually dependent on the wage elasticity of labour demand and supply, 
which is influenced by the distribution of the tax burden between the em-
ployer and the employee, as well as the taxes influencing the revenue of the 
company at the given output. This chapter considers corporate taxes and tax-
es on labour. Income tax increases the wage cost and reduces the net income 
that in turn reduces demand for labour. The tax rate on labour and capital 
influences their share in production. Not only the rate but the structure of 
income tax is important: the different tax burden on certain groups can in-
fluence the structure of the labour supply. As an indirect labour market effect, 
it can be expected that services financed from tax revenues contribute to the 
operation of the economy including the labour market, for example by pro-
viding adequate infrastructure and public services. If there is no substantive 
relationship between taxation and public services, then tax morale declines 
and undeclared employment rises. It is important to note that work can be 
remunerated in many ways and many of these are exempt from corporation 
and income tax: for example business income that is not paid out, simplified 
business tax or the income of some primary producers in agriculture. Many 
of these are relevant in employment but are not discussed here.
Scharle et al. (2010) considered the effect of taxes on labour supply. The la-
bour demand of the business sector according to industries was discussed by 
Kőrösi (2005) and according to education levels by Kertesi and Köllő (2002). 
Bakos, Benczúr and Benedek (2008) analysed the impact of income reporting, 
however it was not possible to separate the impact of labour supply and under-
reporting of income. The general finding of these studies was that both the 
price and elasticity of labour demand was similar to those in developed market 
economies, and among high earners a medium wage elasticity of labour supply 
was measured (that could not be separated from the effect of income reporting).
Situation in September 2010. The corporation tax is payable on the taxable 
revenue of the company and its rate was 10% up to 250 million forints and 
19% above that (effective from July 1, 2010). In economic terms the taxable 
revenue is the company’s profit, the exact definition is laid out in the law. The 
self-employed and corporations can also opt for the simplified business tax. 
Its rate is 30% of the turnover and it redeems all other taxes. The tax on sav-
ing interests is 20%.
There were two personal income tax rates in 2010 and the taxable income was 
based on the so-called “semi supergross” income (127% of the pre-tax wage) 
that is the total amount of the pre-tax wage and employee contributions. In-
come tax rates and tax-brackets are as follows: 21.6% for an annual income 
up to 3,937 million forints (17% of the taxable income), and 40.6% includ-
ing additional tax on incomes above that (32% of the taxable income with-
out that). People earning less than 3,188 million forints per year are entitled 
to write off 15,100 forints per month from their pre-tax wage which reduces 
Dual-rate taxation 
in 2010
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the effective lower tax rate. This is gradually reduced up to an annual income 
of 4,698 million forints, which is the upper limit for this allowance. There are 
various income tax reliefs, but their extent does not significantly influence the 
tax burden for the majority of taxpayers.
Changes between September 2010 and September 2011. Corporate tax and 
income tax changed in 2011. There are still two rates for corporate tax, but the 
tax bracket for the 10% rate were extended to 500 million forints, and above 
this the tax rate is 19%. Thus the tax burden of employers with taxable revenue 
between 250 and 500 million forints nearly halved. The tax on saving inter-
est was reduced to 16%.
There were important changes in the system of personal income tax. First, 
the two rates were replaced by a single rate that is 20.3% of the pre-tax wage 
(16% of the taxable income). Moreover, families with children receive consid-
erable tax relief: families with one child / two children can write off 62,500 
forints, families with three or more children 206,240 forints per month from 
their taxable income. The relief can be shared by both parents so it might auto-
matically reduce the tax burden of the second earner just returning to work.8 
The amount that can be written off the taxable income by lower earners was 
reduced to 12,110 forints per month and can be used up to an annual taxable 
income of 2.75 million forints and then it is gradually reduced up to an an-
nual income of 3.96 million forints. Thus, changes have a mixed effect. First, 
the nominal tax rate was reduced slightly in the previous lower tax bracket and 
significantly in the previous upper tax bracket. Second, reducing the amount 
that can be written off the taxable income by lower earners increases their ef-
fective tax rate, which ultimately increases their tax burden. Third, the income 
tax of families with children decreased significantly regardless of the effect of 
the above changes, and if their taxable income is large enough they might not 
even have to pay income tax.
Apart from changes to taxation, the rules of simplified employment were re-
viewed too. People who work under the terms of simplified employment need 
to fill in a tax return form and pay income tax only if they had other sources of 
taxable income or their total annual income was more than 840,000 forints.
Main legislation
Corporation tax: Act 81 of 1996; personal income tax: Act 117 of 1995
New legislation: Amendment of Tax Law: Act 123 of 2010; Amendment of 
Simplified Employment: Act 75 of 2010
On-line resources: http://www.apeh.hu/adokulcsok_jarulekmertekek/fize-
tendo_jar
Contributions
What is the impact on employment? Contributions, similarly to taxes, influ-
ence prices on the labour market and reduce the income of the affected parties. 
8 It is important to note that the 
discount can be used jointly by 
both parents therefore it does 
not create a gap between the 
marginal tax rate of first and 
second earners (for example 
parents returning to work after 
caring for children) over a broad 
income range.
Income tax reliefs and 
tax credits
Link between contribution 
payment and services re-
ceived – motivation
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Their effect is similar to that of taxes (see description above). As an indirect 
labour market effect it can be expected that systems financed by contribution 
payments help to maintain and improve the work capacity of the population. 
Also, personalised future entitlements based on contribution payments might 
enhance willingness to pay compared to taxes as the use of tax revenues is more 
difficult to trace. However, if there is no clear relationship between contribu-
tion payments and the services received, then undeclared work or different 
employment statuses (business owner, subcontractor, consultancy, simplified 
employment etc.) become more common, particularly for second jobs.
Situation in September 2010: The rates of employer’s and employee’s contri-
butions in 2010 are summarised in Table 3.
table 3: employer’s and employee’s contribution as a percentage of pre-tax wages
Per cent
Contributions paid by employers
Social security contribution
Pension contribution 24.0
Health care and labour 
market contribution
Health care services 1.5
Health benefits 0.5
Labour market contribution 1.0
Pre-retirement pension contri-
bution*
13.0
Contributions paid by employees
Pension contribution** 9.5
Health care and labour market 
contribution
Health care services 4.0
Health benefits 2.0
Labour market contribution 1.5
* Twenty-five per cent of the pre-retirement pension contribution is paid by the state 
budget, therefore employers and self-employed pay only 9.75%. This contribution is 
paid only by people employed in certain professions.
** Contributions paid by members and non-members of voluntary pension funds are 
not shown separately.
Source: adapted from nav.hu.
Changes between September 2010 and September 2011. With the reform of 
the pension system as of January 1, 2011 the previously separate statutory con-
tributions (paid from the pre-tax wage of earners) to the state and private pen-
sion pillars were replaced by a single contribution. The rate increased from a 
combined 9.5% to 10% and contributions paid from other incomes – simplified 
employment, simplified business tax – increased accordingly too. There were 
no other changes, previous rates and taxable bands remain in effect.
In a separate reform, the rules of simplified employment changed to allow 
the payment of a flat-rate contribution – 500 or 1,000 forints per day. If some-
body only works in simplified employment, they are not insured but they qual-
ify for a pension, health provision for work-related accidents and unemploy-
ment assistance.
Single pension 
contribution
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Main legislation
The pension system, including payment of all types of contributions and eli-
gibility for private pension are set out in Act 80 of 1997, the simplified busi-
ness tax is set out in Act 120 of 2005 on simplified contribution payments.
New legislation: pension reform: Act 100 of 2010 on the Freedom of Choice 
of Pension Funds; Act 101 of 2010 on the Amendment of Certain Laws on Pri-
vate Pension Contributions; simplified employment: Act 75 of 2010; Changes 
in Contribution Rates: Act 123 of 2010 on the Amendment of Tax Law and 
Accounting Law.
On-line resources: http://www.apeh.hu/adokulcsok_jarulekmertekek/fize-
tendo_jar
11. Other transfers
Means-tested social assistance
What is the impact on employment? Means-tested social cash benefits re-
duce labour supply in two ways. First, they provide an income without work; 
although this is a disincentive to work but it is in accordance with their aims. 
However, their perverse effect is that they impose a high tax on earnings around 
the means testing limits and can lead to welfare trap – for more on this see 
Semjén (1996) and Cseres-Gergely and Scharle (2008). Social transfers that in-
fluence prices or can only be spent on certain goods interfere with individual 
choice that might also be related to the labour market. This distortion can be 
explicit (for example cooked meal vouchers can increase demand for cooked 
meals), a direct side effect (for example instead of the provision of social hous-
ing supporting house building and home ownership might reduce geographi-
cal mobility) or an indirect side effect (for example if transport capacities are 
limited the universal and unlimited free travel of old age pensioners can create 
obstacles for travelling to work).
Situation in September 2010. The number of social benefits in Hungary is 
very high – there are approximately 350 different types of assistance available 
(see Cseres-Gergely et al., 2009). These are typically limited in scope and they 
have a moderate labour market impact. Two main types of transfers that have 
significant impact on the labour market, child care benefits and regular social 
assistance – increasingly becoming integrated into the unemployment assis-
tance system – are discussed separately.
Changes between September 2010 and September 2011. There were no signifi-
cant changes in minor transfers, but changes in housing assistance might be 
worth highlighting. Previously housing assistance could only be used to pay 
for winter fuel but as of September 1, 2011 it can also be used to pay for rent, 
utility bills and other housing related costs.
Main legislation
Act 3 of 1993 on Social Administration and Social Provisions.
Direct and indirect ef-
fects of social transfers
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New legislation: Act 171 of 2010 Amending Certain Social, Child Protec-
tion, Family Benefits and Disability-Related Acts.
Child care benefits
What is the impact on employment? The labour market effect of cash benefits 
– similarly to other social assistance – reduces labour supply in the target group. 
However, benefits related to the number of qualifying years can increase will-
ingness to work before claiming the assistance. The primary effect of these ben-
efits is that they can reduce child poverty and that has an indirect employment 
effect: reducing future labour market disadvantages (this is a strong effect but it 
develops over a very long term, see for example Carneiro and Heckman [2003]). 
The impact of cash benefits on the labour market was discussed by Bálint and 
Köllő (2008). They found that cash benefits had a negative impact on the em-
ployment prospects of mothers returning to work and they also hampered 
the trend of wage increase that started at the beginning of their career. Non-
cash assistance, on the contrary, improves labour market prospects for women.
Situation in September 2010. The main child care provisions can be grouped 
into three categories (Table 4). The first group includes benefits that provide 
an income replacement during times when labour market participation is lim-
ited: these include the maternity benefit, child care allowance (depending on 
the legislation in force), child care pay and child care assistance. The second 
group includes assistance that rewards labour market participation: these are 
different forms of tax credits and reliefs. The third group includes assistance 
targeted at families that are not linked to labour market status: such as the fam-
ily benefit and the child care allowance (depending on the legislation in force). 
Maternity benefit and child care pay are the highest amount, while child care 
allowance, child care assistance and family benefit are paid at lower rates but 
for a longer period. Their primary target group is expectant mothers, mothers 
who have just given birth or are caring for children, therefore they are mainly 
affected by their secondary effects (except for the family benefit).9 The amount 
and importance of tax credits is limited but they have a wider target group that 
includes fathers and mothers as well.
The most important child care service is nursery provision for which all chil-
dren under three are eligible however its availability is extremely limited.
Changes between September 2010 and September 2011. There were various 
changes in the system of child care assistance after January 1, 2011. Firstly, child 
care allowance and child care assistance regulations that entered into force 
on May 1, 2010 were abolished with a retroactive effect and previous benefit 
periods were restored. These benefits did not rise in 2011 compared to their 
2010-level. The family benefit was split into two benefits: child benefit and 
schooling benefit (for children of compulsory school age). In the latter case if 
parents fail to make sure that their children receive school education and at-
9 Both child care allowance and 
child care pay can be claimed by 
fathers and grandparents, al-
though their take-up is minimal: 
according to the CSO’s Labour 
Force Survey 2.4% of people re-
ceiving child care allowance and 
1.2% of recipients of child care 
pay were men.
Can reduce child 
poverty and future 
labour market dis-
advantages
Parental leave and 
family benefits
The amount of benefits 
will not increase, tax 
credits given a more 
prominent role
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tend school regularly they might lose their eligibility for the benefit. A strong 
emphasis was placed on tax credits and reliefs that increased significantly more 
than other provisions. There were no changes in the availability or eligibility 
for nursery provision. The possibility to take up paid work while receiving 
child care allowance was restricted to 30 hours per week or full-time if work-
ing from home, while people claiming child care assistance can now work up 
to 30 hours compared to 20 hours previously.
table 4: main child care provisions in september 2010
Maternity 
assistance Maternity benefit
Child care 
allowance Child care pay
Child care assis-
tance Family benefit
Family tax 
credit Nursery
Entitle-
ment 
condi-
tions
Legal 
residency 
in Hungary, 
at least 
four ante-
natal care 
visits
Previous contribu-
tion payment: 180 
days within the two 
years before claim-
ing the benefit for 
claims before May 
1, 2010, 365 days 
for claims after 
that. Paid during 
maternity leave, up 
to 168 days
Universal 
entitlement 
after May 1, 
2010, paid up 
to the second 
birthday of the 
child, previ-
ously until the 
third birthday
Previous contri-
bution pay-
ment: 180 days 
within the two 
years before 
claiming the 
benefit for 
claims before 
May 1, 2010, 
365 days for 
claims after 
that.
Universal entitle-
ment, for parents 
caring for 3 or 
more children. As 
of May 1, 2010 it 
can be claimed 
from the second 
(previously third) 
birthday of the 
youngest child 
until the child 
reaches 8
Caring for a child or 
young person – own 
or adopted – aged 
under 20
Caring for at 
least three 
children, tax-
able band 
dependent on 
number of 
children (three 
children: 
8,580,7000 
forints; seven 
children: 
12,400,000 
forints)
Universal entitle-
ment for children 
aged 0–3; eligibil-
ity: mother is not 
claiming child 
care pay and there 
are places avail-
able locally. Local 
councils with more 
than 10,000 
inhabitants are 
obliged to provide 
nursery
Rate One-off flat 
rate pay-
ment, 
225% of 
the mini-
mum state 
pension 
(64,125 
forints in 
2010)
Paid according to 
rules on sick leave 
but only if there is 
a loss of income. 
Seventy per cent of 
the daily average 
wage in the year 
before the child is 
born; no upper 
limit applies
At the rate of 
minimum state 
pension 
(28,500 forints 
in 2010 and 
2011). Flat-
rate, does not 
depend on the 
number of 
children except 
for twins.
Seventy per 
cent of the 
daily average 
wage in the 
year before the 
child is born, 
up to twice the 
statutory mini-
mum wage
At the rate of 
minimum state 
pension (28,500 
forints in 2010 
and 2011). Flat-
rate, does not 
depend on the 
number of chil-
dren except for 
twins
The amount increas-
es with the number of 
children. 12,200 
forints a month for 
one child, 14,800 
forints per child for 
three or more chil-
dren. Higher amounts 
for children with long 
term condition and 
single parents.
4,000 forints 
per child and 
per month, 
amount de-
pendent on 
total income –
Other 
advan-
tages
– Qualifies for social 
security benefits
Qualifies for 
social security 
benefits
Qualifies for 
social security 
benefits
Qualifies for 
social security 
benefits
– – –
Work 
permitted
Not appli-
cable
Not permitted Not permitted 
until the first 
birthday of 
child, no re-
strictions 
afterwards
Not permitted 
except for work 
under intellec-
tual property 
rights
Up to 20 hours 
per week or no 
restriction if 
working from 
home
Not applicable Not applicable 
(but it can only 
be used if 
paying income 
tax)
Due to limited 
capacities it is 
often a de facto 
requirement and 
proof of contract 
of employment is 
required
Other 
condi-
tions
Various exemp-
tions, special 
conditions
– – – – – –
Related 
expenses – – – –
Non-taxable but 
taken into account 
when calculating 
taxable income
–
Financial contribu-
tion often required 
from parents
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table 5: main child care provisions in september 2011
Maternity 
assistance
Maternity 
benefit
Child care 
allowance
Child care 
pay
Child care 
assistance Family benefit
Family tax 
credit Nursery
Entitle-
ment 
condi-
tions
Legal resi-
dency in 
Hungary, at 
least four 
antenatal 
care visits
Previous con-
tribution pay-
ment: 365 
days within the 
two years 
before claim-
ing the benefit. 
Paid during 
maternity 
leave, up to 
168 days.
Universal 
entitlement, 
until the child 
reaches 3
Previous 
contribution 
payment: 365 
days within 
the two years 
before claim-
ing the ben-
efit
Universal 
entitlement, 
for parents 
caring for 3 or 
more children, 
from the third 
birthday of the 
youngest child 
until the child 
reaches 8.
Caring for a child or 
young person – own 
or adopted – aged 
under 20
Caring for a 
child or chil-
dren
Universal entitle-
ment for children 
aged 0–3; eligibil-
ity: mother is not 
claiming child 
care pay and 
there are places 
available locally. 
Local councils 
with more than 
10,000 inhabit-
ants are obliged 
to provide nursery
Rate One-off flat 
rate payment, 
225% of the 
minimum 
state pen-
sion (64,125 
forints in 
2011)
Paid according 
to rules on 
sick leave but 
only if there is 
a loss of in-
come. Seventy 
per cent of the 
daily average 
wage in the 
year before the 
child is born; 
no upper limit 
applies.
At the rate of 
minimum state 
pension 
(28,500 forints 
in 2010 and 
2011). Flat-
rate, does not 
depend on the 
number of 
children ex-
cept for twins.
Seventy per 
cent of the 
daily average 
wage in the 
year before 
the child is 
born, up to 
twice the 
statutory 
minimum 
wage
At the rate of 
minimum state 
pension 
(28,500 forints 
in 2010 and 
2011). Flat-
rate, does not 
depend on the 
number of 
children ex-
cept for twins.
The amount in-
creases with the 
number of children. 
12,200 forints a 
month for one child, 
14,800 forints per 
child for three or 
more children. 
Higher amounts for 
children with long 
term condition and 
single parents.
Amount can be 
written-off 
from taxable 
income: first 
and second 
child 62,500 
forints per 
child per 
month, from 
third child 
upwards 
206,250 for-
ints per month
–
Other 
advan-
tages
–
Qualifies for 
social security 
benefits
Qualifies for 
social security 
benefits
Qualifies for 
social secu-
rity benefits
Qualifies for 
social security 
benefits
– – –
Work 
permitted
Not applica-
ble
Not permitted Not permitted 
until the first 
birthday of 
child, up to 30 
hours after 
that or no 
restrictions if 
working from 
home
Not permitted 
except for 
work under 
intellectual 
property 
rights
Up to 30 hours 
per week or no 
restriction if 
working from 
home
Not applicable 
(but it can only 
be used if 
paying income 
tax)
Due to limited 
capacities it is 
often a de facto 
requirement and 
proof of contract 
of employment is 
required
Other 
condi-
tions –
Various exemp-
tions, special 
conditions
For children of 
compulsory school 
age the benefit can 
be withdrawn or 
paid in kind if fails 
to attend school
–
Related 
expenses –
Taxable but no 
contribution 
payment is 
required
– – –
Non-taxable but 
taken into account 
when calculating 
taxable income
–
Financial contri-
bution often 
required from 
parents
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Main legislation
Social assistance is set out in Act 3 of 1993, taxes in Act 117 of 1995, contri-
butions and qualifying for pensions in Act 80 of 1997. For child care provisions 
see Act 31 of 1997, for family supports see Act 84 of 1998.
New legislation: Act 171 of 2010.
12. Contracts of employment, labour law
What is the impact on employment? The impact of labour law can range from 
simply defining employment relationships to shifting the balance of bargain-
ing power on the labour market. A legal framework that gives strong rights 
to employees over wage settlement, not only protects from employers but also 
provides more security for workers who are more embedded in the structures 
of the labour market. A more permissive regulation on the other hand favours 
“outsiders” and employers. Labour law does not extend to illegal employment 
so stricter conditions might push workers who are unwilling to commit them-
selves to a formal employment relationship towards undeclared work. Hun-
gary ranked 11th on the OECD’s employment protection index: with a score 
of 1.82 compared to the OECD average of 2.11, Poland’s 2.01, Slovakia’s 2.45 
and the Czech Republic’s 3.0 value (lower scores indicating more flexibility). 
We have no information about the impact of the legal environment but we can 
draw some conclusions based on the behaviour of the labour market – Kőrösi 
(2005) suggested that its flexibility was average by international comparison. 
Horváth and Szalai (2008) analysed the flexibility of the Hungarian labour 
market and they concluded that inflexibility was not the result of the institu-
tional structure but the low probability of transition between labour market 
statuses and weaknesses of institutions supporting this transition.
Situation in September 2010. Labour law is highly complex; its discussion 
would go beyond the scope of this chapter. One of the main features of labour 
law is that a different set of rules apply for private and public sector employment 
– and within this for public sector workers and civil servants. These rules cover 
the majority of lawfully employed workers: out of the 3.781 million workers 
in 2010, 3,317 worked 60 hours or more a week (CSO Stadat), the majority of 
them all year round. Various studies put the extent of undeclared work at around 
15% of total employment (e.g. Elek et al., 2009) and the protection of labour 
law does not extend to them. At the same time in some groups of workers the 
number of seasonal workers, workers with second jobs and domestic workers is 
above the average and atypical forms of employment, part time work and agency 
work are increasing rapidly. Simplified employment is a distinct legal category.
Changes between September 2010 and September 2011. The government re-
viewed the regulation of simplified employment. The use of this form of em-
ployment is limited by activity, frequency of work and size of the employer. 
In the case of simplified employment the general rules on working time, paid 
Flexible regulation 
according to OECD’s 
Employment Protec-
tion Index
Separate legislation for 
the business sector and 
the public sector
Reviewing the regulation 
of simplified employment
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leave, agency work, sick leave and reference period. However according to the 
reviewed regulation pay should be no less than the statutory minimum wage – 
this was not explicit in the previous regulation. The amendment of the labour 
code entered into force in the first half of 2011. It is worth highlighting some 
of the changes: the default length of the probationary period is 30 days, this 
can be extended to three months in a contract of employment or to six months 
in a collective agreement; new rules allow more flexibility in setting the week-
ly reference period and without changes in the wage. Paid leave became more 
flexible and temporary agency work was defined more clearly emphasising the 
temporary nature of work and the obligation of equal pay for work of equal 
value. There were also changes in the strike law that created an obligation to 
provide a satisfactory service during strikes in sectors of key importance. This 
includes utility companies and public transport companies.
It is very important because it will probably affect many people that special 
rules apply for public works participants in a number or areas as of September 
1, 2011 as a result of the integration of public works into labour market and so-
cial provisions. Notably permanent contracts of employment will no longer be 
the standard in public works however there is no probationary period and assis-
tance should be offered with travel to work or accommodation if further away.
Main legislation
Act 22 of 1992 (Labour Code), Act 33 of 1992 on the Legal Status of Public 
Sector Workers, Act 23 of 1992 on the Legal Status of Civil Servants.
New legislation: Act 75 of 2010 on Simplified Employment and Government 
regulation no. 223/2010 on the Implementing of Regulations of the Act; Ag-
riculture: Government regulation no. 218/2011 on Simplified Employment; 
Act 178 of 2011 on Strike Action; Act 105 of 2011 on the Regulatory Align-
ment of Certain Labour Legislation and Other Related Acts.
13. Old age and disability pension – disability assistance
Old age pension
What is the impact on employment? Pensions, similarly to benefits, provide 
an income without actual work for eligible people and thus depending on its 
elasticity reduces labour supply. The extent of the reduction in labour supply 
depends, among other things, on the size of the pension (or often its relative 
size to potential earnings from work). The timing of this effect depends on the 
entitlement conditions, mainly the pension age. If the pension age is low from 
a labour market perspective and people can retire without a penalty (malus) 
then the pension system might cause disruptions: if people can retire “too early” 
and with “too favourable” conditions then people who are otherwise capable 
of working will exit the labour market. Withdrawal from the labour market 
might be encouraged by a secure income without work or there might be legal 
restrictions on work.
Special rules for public 
works programs
“Too early” and “too 
good” conditions en-
courage the early exit 
of people who are capa-
ble of working
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An indirect labour market effect might be that old age security might reduce 
willingness to save. If there is no substantive relationship between the amount 
of pension contributions and the size of pension (or the worker does not see this 
relationship), then the worker might try to avoid the burden of contribution 
payment and work illegally or if it is a secondary income, finds legal alternatives, 
for example operates as a business. Finally, some special pension arrangements 
can have further effects: it can be part of the remuneration package offered to 
the worker and provide further incentives to accept inconveniences of certain 
jobs and thus facilitate the filling of these positions. Cseres-Gergely (2008) ana-
lysed the labour market effect of the main characteristics of the pension system 
in Hungary and found that both the availability and the replacement rate of 
pensions had a significant impact on the likelihood of retirement.
Situation in September 2010. During most of 2010 the pension system com-
prised of three “pillars”: the first pillar the pay-as-you-go state pillar, the second 
pillar the compulsory private pension fund and the third pillar the voluntary 
private pension fund. Contribution to the first two pillars was obligatory; par-
ticipation in the third pillar as well as the amount of contribution was volun-
tary. Compulsory pension contributions have been discussed in the section on 
Taxation above. The increase of pensions during payment is set by the govern-
ment based on a combination of price and wage increases. The rate of increase 
was set in 2010 as the average of consumer price index and wage increase if the 
growth of GDP is 3.5% or above. However, if the growth rate of GDP is smaller 
than this, pensions are increased according to the consumer price index. Com-
pulsory private pensions have not yet been paid and annual increases of private 
pensions are not regulated.
People are entitled to old age pension if they reach a certain age and have 
enough qualifying years. The starting pension is calculated according to a for-
mula that is primarily based on post-1988 employment history. There are no 
eligibility conditions attached to the payment of old age pensions. Pre-pensions 
can be paid at a reduced rate if the claimant does not have enough qualifying 
years. Nevertheless the regulations set fairly general conditions and as a result 
the majority of workers retire before the nominal state pension age without 
reducing the amount of their pension. People receiving pre-pension are only 
permitted a limited amount of work: if their annual earnings exceed 18 times 
the statutory minimum wage the payment of pension must be suspended un-
til they reach state pension age.
Different from the pre-pension is the pre-retirement pension that can be 
paid to people in hazardous or dangerous jobs. For these workers there are 
job-specific pension ages that should not be considered as exceptions but are 
part of their work contract.
Changes between September 2010 and September 2011. There were funda-
mental changes in the pension system in the autumn of 2010 and these were 
The link between pen-
sion contribution and 
actual pension should 
be clear
Three pillars: pay as you 
go public, compulsory 
private pension and vol-
untary private pension
Two pillars instead 
of three
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particularly unfavourable for people contributing to compulsory private pen-
sion funds. As of January 1, 2011 members of these funds have been obligated 
to pay the full contribution to the state pension pillar but this does not count 
as a qualifying period for them. Although they were given the opportunity to 
leave the private pension fund and return to the state-only system where their 
contributions are used in full. As a result of these changes the second pillar 
basically ceased to exist, there were only about 100,000 members left and no 
new membership is possible. As of January 2011 women can retire regardless 
of their age if they have enough qualifying years and no longer pay social se-
curity contributions. The number of qualifying years required to retire is re-
duced by one year for five children and by a further year for each additional 
child up to seven years.
Main legislation
Act 81 of 1997 on social security pensions.
New legislation: Act 154 of 2010 on Changes in the Second Pillar; Act 170 
of 2010 on the Amendment of Certain Pension Related Acts and Related 
Laws (this includes changes in pension entitlement for women). Government 
regulation no. 353/2010 on Pension and Accident-Related Pension Increases.
On-line resources: http://www.onyf.hu.
Disability pension – disability provision
What is the impact on employment? Disability pension, similarly to old age 
pension and benefits provide an income without work and thus reduce labour 
supply as well as the number of hours worked. Its indirect effects are similar to 
those of the old age pension but probably more limited because it is less likely 
to happen. The size of its effect strongly depends on its availability and amount. 
Scharle (2008) looked at the relationship between the number of disability 
pension claims and the labour market situation using geographical data and 
found a significant negative relationship between the employment rate and 
the number of disability pension claims.
Situation in September 2010. People are entitled to disability pension if they 
have enough qualifying years and lost more than 79% of their work capacity, or 
between 50 and 79% of their work capacity and they cannot be rehabilitated. 
For accident-related disability pensions previous contribution payment is not 
necessary. A further condition is that claimants are out of work or if they work 
they are earning less than twice the disability pension or less than the statutory 
minimum wage. The starting pension is based on the length of the qualifying 
period. Disability pensions are increased in the same manner as the old age 
pensions. If the re-assessment of disability finds that the loss of work capacity 
is less than 79%, entitlement to disability pension stops.
People with a loss of work capacity between 50–79% are eligible for reha-
bilitation allowance for the length of rehabilitation – up to three years. The 
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amount of this is 120% of the disability pension the claimant would be enti-
tled to, and no less than 120% of the minimum rate of disability pension. To 
be eligible for the allowance people have to participate in vocational rehabili-
tation and cooperate with the employment service.
Changes between September 2010 and September 2011. There were no signifi-
cant changes in disability pensions in the studied period.
Main legislation
Act 84 of 2007 on Rehabilitation Contribution, Government regulation no. 
353/2010 on Pension and Accident-Related Pension Increases.
On-line resources: http://www.orszi.hu/index.php?ID=76
14. Wage bargaining and wage regulation, interest representation
What is the impact on employment? The impact of wage bargaining and wage 
regulation heavily depends on their characteristics (the level of coverage: na-
tional, sectoral or company-level collective agreement), whether it facilitates 
or hinders the adjustment of wages to the equilibrium value – defined by oth-
er factors – and also the structure of the national economy and its level of in-
tegration into the global economy. Therefore there is no one optimum model 
(Calmfors, 1993).
A special institution of wage regulation is the statutory or contractual mini-
mum wage which is the lowest wage an employee or specific groups of employ-
ees must be paid. The employment effect of this is usually negative but it can 
be neutral if the employer has considerable market strength (Manning, 2003). 
The impact of wage setting on employment has not been explored in Hungary. 
The effect of wage coordination on employment during the economic crisis 
was briefly discussed by Köllő (2011). The impact of the statutory minimum 
wage on employment was analysed by Köllő (2001), Reizer (2011) and relevant 
results are also reported by Kézdi and Kónya (2009).
Situation in September 2010. There is a dual system of wage bargaining in 
Hungary. Public sector pay is defined by a separate pay scale in the annual state 
budget. Wages in the business sector – apart from the statutory minimum wage 
mentioned above – are decided freely through decentralised negotiations. The 
lowest amount of pay is limited by the statutory minimum wage set at different 
levels for skilled and unskilled workers since 2006. The minimum wage was 
negotiated in the tri-partite National Interest Conciliation Council (NICC) 
with representatives of the government, employers and employees before Janu-
ary 1, 2011. Union membership is low in Hungary and instead of the sectoral 
wage negotiations, common in some parts of Western Europe (although there 
are some of these in Hungary as well), wages are influenced predominately by 
company level collective agreements. The impact of these on wages however, is 
not significant (Neumann, 2001), and is more common in dense markets and 
state owned companies (Kertesi and Köllő 2003).
Different rates of mini-
mum wage for different 
groups of employees
Tripartite National 
Interest Conciliation 
Council
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Changes between September 2010 and September 2011. There were two im-
portant changes in the system of wage bargaining in 2010. First, the National 
Interest Conciliation Council ceased to exist and was replaced by the Nation-
al Economic and Social Council. This replaces tri-partite negotiations with 
a multi-partite system that includes churches, chambers and representatives 
of non-governmental organisations. Second, the minimum wage is no longer 
decided in negotiations but is set by the government. Furthermore there is a 
new, indirect institution of government intervention: employers that do not 
compensate their workers (earning up to 300,000 forints a month) for any de-
cline in net wages after changes in taxation will be excluded from public pro-
curements and subsidies for two years. Another important change is that the 
statutory minimum wage does not apply to public works participants but is 
set separately by the government. Its amount was 57,000 forints a month in 
2011, 73% of the statutory minimum wage.
Main legislation
Act 22 of 1992 on the Labour Code, Act 7 of 1989 on Strike Action, Act 
73 of 2009 on the National Interest Conciliation Council, Act 74 of 2009 on 
Sectoral Dialogue Committees and Meso-Level Social Dialogue.
New legislation: Act 93 of 2011 on the National Economic and Social Coun-
cil, Government regulation no. 337/2010 on the Statutory Minimum Wage, 
Government regulation no. 352/2010 on the Salary Compensation of Public 
Sector Workers, Act 99 of 2011 on Amending Certain Laws to Encourage the 
Wage Increase of Low-Paid Workers, Act 106 of 2011 on Public Works and 
the Amendment of Public Works Related Regulations, Government regula-
tion no. 170/2011 on Wage Setting and Statutory Minimum Wage in Public 
Works, Act 178 of 2011 on the Amendment of Act 7 of 1989 on Strike Action.
On-line resources: http://www.liganet.hu/
15. Measures related to migration and mobility
What is the impact on employment? The primary effect of internal, external 
and temporary mobility, migration and commuting is that they influence the 
geographical distribution of labour. Its impact on employment is strongly re-
lated to the velocity of capital mobility and price adjustment and flexibility. If 
this is fast then areas with a high migration output would shortly become at-
tractive for capital investment and relocation of workers. If this is slow, then 
increased mobility can preserve the disadvantaged situation of these areas. In-
ternational experience suggests that if this compensating mechanism is very 
slow and changes that could substantially reduce existing disparities can be 
measured in decades (Cseres-Gergely, 2003, Hárs, 2011). Our understanding 
of the recent relationship between mobility and the labour market in Hun-
gary is very limited, but it is likely that the direction and extent of mobility in 
the 1990s was influenced by economic incentives (local wages and unemploy-
Multi-partite National 
Economic and Social 
Council
Limited mobility
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ment (Cseres-Gergely, 2005, 2002). There has been no evaluation of mobility 
schemes to date.
Situation in September 2010.Schemes designed to influence mobility are 
typically small scale and provide assistance for travel to work arrangements, 
living costs and recruitment of workers. There are no special programs to sup-
port international labour mobility; the information system supporting labour 
mobility within Europe has been discussed under section 1 on labour market 
services. Citizens of the European Economic Area and recognised refugees do 
not need a work permit to take up employment in Hungary, however they need 
to register themselves at the local job centre.10 Others can be employed with 
a valid work permit for which the first step is the publication of the vacancies. 
There is a simplified procedure to renew existing work permits.
Changes between September 2010 and September 2011. The citizens of Hun-
gary can take up employment in Austria and Germany without any restrictions 
as of May 1, 2011. The EU Blue Card can be used in Hungary from 2011 – this 
entitles skilled migrants from outside the EU to live and work in a Member 
State under certain conditions.
Mobility can be enhanced by changes in the housing assistance that can now 
be used to pay for rent as well rather than for winter fuel only.
Main legislation
Act 4 of 1991 on Promoting Employment and Unemployment Benefits, Gov-
ernment Regulation no. 39/1998. (04. 03) on Supports to Reduce the Cost of 
Travel to Work for Workers, and Government regulation no. 355/2007 on the 
Recruitment of Workers and Transitional Provisions on the Free Movement of 
Workers in Hungary, Government regulation no. 355/2009 on the Employ-
ment of Third Country Nationals in the Republic of Hungary, and Ministry 
of Social Affairs and Employment (MoSAE) regulation no. 16/2010 on Issu-
ing Work Permits for Third Country Nationals in Hungary.
New legislation: Government regulation no. 168/2011 on Issuing the EU 
Blue Card and the Amendment of Certain Migration-Related Government 
Regulations.
16. Management, funding and evaluation of employment policy
The management of employment policy sets the policy objectives, elaborates 
programs, monitors implementation and coordinates evaluation. An impor-
tant part of this is the allocation of funding to policy measures and deciding 
about the evaluation of policies – whether it should be continuous monitor-
ing or pre- or post-evaluations.
What is the impact on employment? Effective employment policy that also 
takes into account the economic context can increase employment and reduce 
unemployment contributing to the growth of the economy. To ensure that 
policy interventions are effective they need to be based on the understanding 
10 But this often does not happen 
in the absence of sanctions.
EU Blue Card
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of the existing situation, the potential impact of possible interventions needs 
to be considered and the appropriate interventions need to be selected and im-
plemented. The relationship between policy making and labour market out-
comes has not been investigated empirically.
Situation in September 2010. The top level management of Hungarian em-
ployment policy was the state secretariat responsible for employment policy 
within the Ministry for National Economy. The state secretariat covers two 
main policy areas: vocational and adult education and training (served by a 
department and a ministerial commissioner) and employment policy. This 
field is served by the department of employment strategy and methods and a 
department responsible for the management of labour market programs and 
the Labour Market Fund. These units support the implementation of political 
decisions and prepare policy proposals as required. They are responsible for the 
regulation of employment programs and the policy management of SROP pri-
orities 1 and 2. They also managed certain public works programs (until June 
2011). The Public Employment Service with its regional job centres, local job 
offices and the central Employment and Social Office supported their work. 
The employment service had a dual aim: the administration of unemployment 
benefits and the provision of services to eligible job seekers on the one hand, 
and the implementation of employment policy at the local level on the other. 
The activities of employment policy were supported by various agencies such 
as the National Family- and Social Affairs Institute.
The system was entirely financed from the Labour Market Fund in 2010 that 
provided funding for the majority of employment policy measures.
Changes between September 2010 and September 2011. There were a num-
ber of important changes in this period. The name of the PES changed to Na-
tional Employment Service (NES) and the Employment and Social Office is 
now called the Employment Office. The re-structuring of regional job centres 
took place in two phases. First they were divided into priority and non-priori-
ty county job centres (the 170 local job offices were temporarily put under the 
management of the latter) and merged into county government offices. As of 
October 1, 2010 county offices were again responsible for the management of 
the local job offices in their own catchment area. The role and possibility of 
the Employment Office to influence policy making and propose measures in-
creased according to its new statute.
With the launch of the new public works program the earlier distinction be-
tween different types of public works schemes ceased to exist from July 1, 2011. 
The Ministry of Interior became responsible for this program, although the lo-
cal administration is carried out by the employment service. The allocation of 
funding to employment policy within the state budget changed significantly: 
a number of items are no longer funded by the Labour Market Fund and as a 
result of the re-structuring the NES no longer has its own budget – except for 
Employment policy 
institutions
Organisational changes
Single public works pro-
gram under the manage-
ment of the Ministry of 
Interior
Major changes in funding
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the Employment Office: the budget of job centres and offices were merged into 
the budget of government offices.
The government adopted the action plan for the new SROP programs that 
sets out the most important components of employment policy for the com-
ing years with hundreds of millions of forints allocated to them.
On January 1, 2011 the Ecostat Government Centre for Impact Assessment 
was established with the objective of assisting government policy making in all 
areas with analytical services, ex ante and ex post program evaluations.
As of January 1, the name of the National Rehabilitation and Social Assess-
ment Institute was changed to the National Rehabilitation and Social Office. 
The new regulation expanded the scope of activities and authority of the office. 
The Office is a forensic and rehabilitation assessment authority, social author-
ity and is also responsible for the inspection of services.
There were changes in the government’s labour market research structure: 
the National Family and Social Affairs Institute is no longer involved in la-
bour market research and labour market researchers were transferred to the 
Employment Office.
Main legislation
Government regulation no. 1250/2010 on the Draft National Reform Pro-
gram for the Implementation of Europe 2020 Strategy and the Preparation 
of the Final Action Plan, Government regulation no. 1114/2011 on the Na-
tional Reform Program of Hungary and its Implementation, Act 153 of 2010 
on the Amendment of Certain Acts in Preparation for the 2011 Budget, Act 
169 of 2010 on the 2011 Budget, Government regulation no. 357/2010 on the 
Amendment of Certain Government Regulations on Social Services in Rela-
tion to the Amendment of Act 171 of 2010, Government decree no. 1246/2011 
on SROP Priority Project 1.1.2 “Improving the employability of disadvan-
taged people (decentralised programs in Convergence regions)”, Government 
decree no. 1148/2011 on Government Measures in Relation to the Introduc-
tion of Electronic Exchange of Data Based on EC regulation no. 883/2004 
on the Coordination of Social Security Systems, Government Regulation no. 
331/2010 on the National Rehabilitation and Social Office, 332/2010. (27. 12) 
Amending Certain Government regulations in Relation to the Activities of 
the National Rehabilitation and Social Office.
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Statistical tables on labour market trends that have been published in The Hungarian 
Labour Market Yearbooks since 2000 can be downloaded in full from the website of 
the Institute of Economics: http://adatbank.mtakti.hu/tukor
DATA SourCeS
ALMPs Active Labour Market Policies
CIRCA Communication & Information Resource Centre Administrator
NMH NLO [National Labour Office]
NMH BT NLO Wage Survey
NMH REG NLO Unemployment Register
NMH SREG NLO Unemployment Benefit Register
NMH PROG NLO Short-term Labour Market Projection Survey
KSH Table compiled from regular CSO-publications [Central Statistical Office]
KSH IMS CSO institution-based labour statistics
KSH MEF CSO Labour Force Survey
KSH MEM CSO Labour Force Account
MPA Labour Market Fund
NAV NTCA [National Tax and Customs Administration]
NEFMI Ministry of National Resources
NEFMI STAT Ministry of National Resources, Educational Statistics
NFSZ NEO [National Employment Service]
NFSZ IR NFSZ and NMH integrated tracking system
NGM Ministry of National Economy
NSZ Population Census
NYUFIG Pension Administration
ONYF Central Administration of National Pension Insurance
TB Social Security Records
expLAnATIon of SymboLS
( – ) Non-occurence
( .. ) Not available
( n.a. ) Not applicable
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Table 1.1: Basic economic indicators
Year GDP
a Industrial pro-
ductiona Export
a Importa Real earningsa Employmenta Consumer price indexa
Unemployment 
rate
1989 100.7 95.0 100.3 101.1 99.7 98.2 117.0 ..
1990 96.5 90.7 95.9 94.8 94.3 97.2 128.9 ..
1991 88.1 81.6 95.1 105.5 93.0 92.6 135.0 ..
1992 96.9 84.2 101.0 92.4 98.6 90.3 123.0 9.8
1993 99.4 103.9 86.9 120.9 96.1 93.8 122.5 11.9
1994 102.9 109.7 116.6 114.5 107.2 98.0 118.8 10.7
1995 101.5 104.6 108.4 96.1 87.8 98.1 128.2 10.2
1996 100.5 103.2 104.6 105.5 95.0 99.1 123.6 9.9
1997 104.1 111.1 129.9 126.4 104.9 100.1 118.3 8.7
1998 104.7 112.5 122.1 124.9 103.6 101.4 114.3 7.8
1999 104.1 110.4 115.9 114.3 102.5 103.2 110.0 7.0
2000 104.9 118.1 121.7 120.8 101.5 101.0 109.8 6.4
2001 103.8 103.7 107.7 104.0 106.4 100.3 109.2 5.7
2002 104.1 103.2 105.9 105.1 113.6 100.1 105.3 5.8
2003 104.0 106.9 109.1 110.1 109.2 101.3 104.7 5.9
2004 104.5 107.8 118.4 115.2 98.9 99.4 106.8 6.1
2005 103.2 106.8 111.5 106.1 106.3 100.0 103.6 7.2
2006 103.6 109.9 118.0 114.4 103.5 100.7 103.9 7.5
2007 100.8 107.9 115.8 112.0 95.4 99.9 108.0 7.4
2008 100.8 100.0 104.2 104.3 100.8 98.8 106.1 7.8
2009 93.3 82.2 87.3 82.9 97.6 97.5 104.2 10.0
2010 101.2 110.5b 116.8 115.0 101.5 100.0 104.9 11.2
a Previous year = 100.
b Manufacturing production index: based on sub-annual data, subsample of at least 5 employees, 2001–2009: with-
out water and waste management, including entreprises with less than 5 employees.
Source: Employment: 1989–1991: KSH MEM; 1992–: KSH MEF. Other data: KSH; import-export: volume index.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2012ent01_01
Source: KSH.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2012ena01_01
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Figure 1.2: Annual GDP time series (2000 = 100%)
Source: Eurostat.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2012ena01_02
Figure 1.3: Employment rate of population aged 15–64
Source: Eurostat.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2012ena01_03
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Table 2.1: Populationa
Year
In thousands 1992 = 100 Annual  changes
Population age 
15–64,  
in thousands
Demographic dependency rate
Total  
populationb Old age
c
1990 10,375 100.4 –0.2 6,870.4 0.51 0.20
1995 10,337 99.6 –0.1 6,986.9 0.48 0.21
1998 10,280 99.1 –0.2 6,980.0 0.47 0.21
1999 10,253 98.8 –0.3 6,969.6 0.47 0.21
2000 10,221 98.5 –0.3 6,961.3 0.47 0.21
2001 10,200 98.3 –0.2 6,963.3 0.46 0.22
2002 10,175 98.1 –0.2 6,962.8 0.46 0.22
2003 10,142 97.8 –0.3 6,949.4 0.46 0.22
2004 10,117 97.5 –0.3 6,943.5 0.46 0.23
2005 10,098 97.3 –0.2 6,940.3 0.45 0.23
2006 10,077 97.1 –0.2 6,931.8 0.45 0.23
2007 10,066 97.0 –0.1 6,931.3 0.45 0.23
2008 10,045 96.8 –0.2 6,912.7 0.45 0.24
2009 10,031 96.7 –0.1 6,898.1 0.45 0.24
2010 10,014 96.5 –0.1 6,874.0 0.46 0.24
2011 9,986 96.3 –0.2 6,857.4 0.46 0.24
a January 1st. Recalculated on the basis of Population Census 2001.
b (population age 0–14 + 65 and above) / (population age 15–64)
c (population age 65 and above) / (population age 15–64)
Source: KSH.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2012ent02_01
Table 2.2: Population by age groups, in thousandsa
Year
0–14 15–24 25–54 55–64 65+
Total
years old
1990 2,130.5 1,445.5 4,231.4 1,193.5 1,373.9 10,374.8
1995 1,891.7 1,610.1 4,250.6 1,126.2 1,458.0 10,336.7
2000 1,729.2 1,526.5 4,291.4 1,143.4 1,531.1 10,221.6
2001 1,692.0 1,480.1 4,338.5 1,144.7 1,545.0 10,200.3
2002 1,660.1 1,436.9 4,378.0 1,147.9 1,551.9 10,174.9
2003 1,633.7 1,392.5 4,390.8 1,166.1 1,559.2 10,142.4
2004 1,606.1 1,355.0 4,401.6 1,186.9 1,567.1 10,116.7
2005 1,579.7 1,322.0 4,409.1 1,209.2 1,577.6 10,097.6
2006 1,553.5 1,302.0 4,399.8 1,230.0 1,590.7 10,076.6
2007 1,529.7 1,285.9 4,393.9 1,251.5 1,605.1 10,066.1
2008 1,508.8 1,273.3 4,377.1 1,262.3 1,623.9 10,045.4
2009 1,492.6 1,259.9 4,346.1 1,292.0 1,640.3 10,030.9
2010 1,476.9 1,253.4 4,293.7 1,326.9 1,663.5 10,014.4
2011 1,457.2 1,231.7 4,257.7 1,367.8 1,671.3 9,985.7
a January 1st. Recalculated on the basis of Population Census 2001.
Source: KSH.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2012ent02_02
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Figure 2.1: Age structure of the Hungarian population, 1980, 2011
Source: KSH.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2012ena02_01
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Table 2.3: Male population by age groups, in thousandsa
Year
0–14 15–24 25–59 60–64 65+
Total
years old
1980 1,205.4 749.9 2,475.6 170.5 587.3 5,188.7
1990 1,090.4 740.3 2,366.9 259.9 527.5 4,984.9
1997 933.0 822.4 2,366.2 233.9 560.5 4,916.0
1998 916.8 815.4 2,375.5 229.3 564.7 4,901.8
1999 901.5 805.0 2,383.2 226.1 568.6 4,884.4
2000 885.0 780.9 2,403.8 224.8 570.8 4,865.2
2001 865.7 757.0 2,425.2 228.9 574.2 4,851.0
2002 850.1 733.9 2,446.1 233.0 573.8 4,837.0
2003 836.8 711.3 2,456.5 239.9 574.0 4,818.5
2004 823.0 691.9 2,470.3 244.4 574.5 4,804.1
2005 809.5 674.6 2,480.0 252.2 576.8 4,793.1
2006 796.7 664.0 2,493.7 249.3 580.9 4,784.6
2007 784.5 655.4 2,503.7 249.4 586.1 4,779.1
2008 773.9 649.2 2,501.3 252.5 592.8 4,769.6
2009 765.8 642.7 2,497.0 258.4 599.2 4,763.1
2010 757.7 640.4 2,488.8 261.7 608.3 4,756.9
2011 747.6 629.7 2,480.4 274.7 611.5 4,743.9
a January 1st. Recalculated on the basis of Population Census 2001.
Source: KSH.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2012ent02_03
Table 2.4: Female population by age groups, in thousandsa
Year
0–14 15–24 25–54 55–59 60+
Total
years old
1980 1,135.8 714.5 2,232.8 365.3 1,072.4 5,520.8
1990 1,040.1 705.2 2,144.4 327.6 1,172.5 5,389.9
1997 891.4 784.8 2,155.6 318.3 1,235.1 5,385.3
1998 876.0 777.6 2,156.0 324.4 1,243.9 5,378.0
1999 861.0 768.2 2,159.3 326.7 1,253.8 5,369.0
2000 844.3 745.6 2,170.5 334.8 1,261.3 5,356.5
2001 826.3 723.1 2,193.4 330.4 1,276.1 5,349.3
2002 810.0 703.0 2,211.6 328.6 1,284.7 5,337.9
2003 796.9 681.2 2,217.4 330.7 1,297.8 5,323.9
2004 783.1 663.1 2,220.8 338.5 1,307.1 5,312.6
2005 770.2 647.4 2,221.9 341.7 1,323.1 5,304.3
2006 756.8 638.6 2,213.0 356.6 1,327.0 5,292.0
2007 745.1 630.6 2,206.8 369.6 1,335.0 5,287.1
2008 734.9 624.1 2,194.5 373.2 1,349.1 5,275.8
2009 726.8 617.2 2,176.0 381.8 1,366.1 5,267.9
2010 719.2 613.1 2,145.5 396.8 1,382.8 5,257.4
a January 1st. Recalculated on the basis of Population Census 2001.
Source: KSH.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2012ent02_04
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Table 3.1: Labour force participation of the population above 14 years, in thousandsa
Year
Population of male 15–59 and female 15–54 Population of male above 59  and female above 54
Employed Unem-ployed
Inactive
Total Employed Unem-ployed
Pensioner, 
other  
inactive
Total
Pensioner Full time student
On child 
care 
leave
Other  
inactive
Inactive 
total
1980 4,887.9 0.0 300.8 370.1 259.0 339.7 1,269.6 6,157.5 570.3 0.0 1,632.1 2,202.4
1990 4,534.3 62.4 284.3 548.9 249.7 297.5 1,380.4 5,977.1 345.7 0.0 1,944.9 2,290.6
1991 4,270.5 253.3 335.6 578.2 259.8 317.1 1,490.7 6,014.5 249.5 0.0 2,045.2 2,294.7
1992 3,898.4 434.9 392.7 620.0 262.1 435.9 1,710.7 6,044.0 184.3 9.8 2,101.7 2,295.8
1993 3,689.5 502.6 437.5 683.9 270.5 480.1 1,872.0 6,064.1 137.5 16.3 2,141.2 2,295.0
1994 3,633.1 437.4 476.5 708.2 280.9 540.7 2,006.3 6,076.8 118.4 11.9 2,163.8 2,294.1
1995 3,571.3 410.0 495.2 723.4 285.3 596.1 2,100.0 6,081.3 107.5 6.4 2,180.6 2,294.5
1996 3,546.1 394.0 512.7 740.0 289.2 599.4 2,141.2 6,081.3 102.1 6.1 2,184.6 2,292.8
1997 3,549.5 342.5 542.9 752.0 289.0 599.9 2,183.8 6,075.8 96.9 6.3 2,189.0 2,292.2
1998 3,608.5 305.5 588.8 697.0 295.5 565.7 2,147.0 6,061.0 89.3 7.5 2,197.6 2,294.4
1999 3,701.0 283.3 534.7 675.6 295.3 549.8 2,055.4 6,039.6 110.4 1.4 2,185.2 2,297.0
2000 3,745.9 261.4 517.9 721.7 281.4 571.4 2,092.4 6,099.7 130.3 2.3 2,268.0 2,400.6
2001 3,742.6 231.7 516.3 717.9 286.6 601.6 2,122.4 6,096.7 140.7 2.4 2,271.8 2,414.9
2002 3,719.6 235.7 507.1 738.3 286.8 593.0 2,125.2 6,080.5 164.1 3.2 2,263.9 2,431.2
2003 3,719.0 239.6 485.0 730.7 286.9 595.0 2,097.6 6,056.2 202.9 4.9 2,245.6 2,453.4
2004 3,663.1 247.2 480.5 739.8 282.4 622.4 2,125.1 6,035.4 237.3 5.7 2,236.1 2,479.1
2005 3,653.9 296.0 449.7 740.8 278.6 590.3 2,059.4 6,009.3 247.6 7.9 2,258.3 2,513.8
2006 3,679.6 308.8 432.9 810.9 270.0 500.7 2,014.5 6,002.9 250.5 8.4 2,268.0 2,526.9
2007 3,676.6 303.7 426.8 832.6 267.2 475.8 2,002.4 5,982.7 249.5 8.2 2,296.1 2,553.8
2008 3,631.4 318.5 408.6 819.6 279.8 493.1 2,001.1 5,951.0 248.1 10.7 2,327.7 2,586.5
2009 3,516.8 406.4 364.5 814.6 278.7 529.3 1,987.1 5,910.3 265.1 14.3 2,348.0 2,627.4
2010 3,485.7 455.2 338.7 814.6 267.0 500.7 1,921.0 5,861.9 295.5 19.6 2,356.0 2,671.1
a Annual average figures.
Note: Up to 1999 the weighted figures are based on the 1990 population census, since 2000 the data is updated based 
on the 2001 population census. Data on ‘employed’ includes conscripts and those working while receiving pension 
or child support. The data on students for 1995–97 are estimates. ‘Other inactive’ is a residual category, so it in-
cludes the institutional population not observed by MEF.
Source: Pensioners: 1980–91: NYUFIG, 1992–: KSH MEF. Child care recipients: Up to 1997 TB and estimation, 
after 1997 MEF. Unemployment: 1990–91: NMH REG, 1992–: KSH MEF.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2012ent03_01
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Table 3.2: Labour force participation of the population above 14 years, males, in thousandsa
Year
Population of male 15–59 Population of male 60 and above
Employed Unem-ployed
Inactive
Total Employed Unem-ployed
Pensioner, 
other  
inactive
Total
Pensioner Full time student
On child 
care 
leave
Other  
inactive
Inactive 
total
1980 2,750.5 0.0 173.8 196.3 0.0 99.1 469.2 3,219.7 265.3 0.0 491.8 757.1
1990 2,524.3 37.9 188.4 284.2 1.2 80.3 554.1 3,116.3 123.7 0.0 665.5 789.2
1991 2,351.6 150.3 218.7 296.5 1.5 115.0 631.7 3,133.6 90.4 0.0 700.7 791.1
1992 2,153.1 263.2 252.0 302.4 1.7 174.8 730.9 3,147.2 65.1 3.2 722.1 790.4
1993 2,029.1 311.5 263.2 346.9 2.0 203.3 815.4 3,156.0 47.9 4.5 735.7 788.1
1994 2,013.4 270.0 277.6 357.1 3.7 239.6 878.0 3,161.4 41.6 3.8 740.0 785.4
1995 2,012.5 259.3 282.2 367.4 4.9 237.8 892.3 3,164.1 37.1 2.1 742.6 781.8
1996 2,007.4 242.4 291.9 372.8 3.3 248.3 916.3 3,166.1 28.9 1.3 746.3 776.5
1997 2,018.0 212.2 306.0 377.6 1.5 251.6 936.7 3,166.9 25.5 1.9 743.5 770.9
1998 2,015.5 186.5 345.4 350.4 1.0 264.2 961.0 3,163.0 26.2 2.8 737.3 766.3
1999 2,068.4 170.3 312.7 338.8 4.2 261.5 917.2 3,155.9 34.7 0.4 727.2 762.3
2000 2,086.0 158.2 315.2 358.2 4.1 261.7 939.2 3,183.4 39.8 0.7 758.8 799.3
2001 2,087.6 141.6 311.0 353.4 4.3 283.2 951.9 3,181.1 41.1 0.9 763.0 805.0
2002 2,080.4 137.3 307.5 370.3 5.0 273.4 956.2 3,173.9 45.2 0.7 764.4 810.3
2003 2,073.5 137.6 293.6 367.9 4.3 288.1 953.9 3,165.0 53.0 0.9 762.5 816.4
2004 2,052.7 136.2 293.5 371.2 4.6 300.2 969.5 3,158.4 64.6 0.6 758.8 824.0
2005 2,050.7 158.2 278.8 375.4 5.8 288.8 948.8 3,157.7 65.4 0.9 763.9 830.2
2006 2,076.5 163.6 268.1 404.1 7.0 239.3 918.5 3,158.4 60.5 1.0 770.9 832.8
2007 2,082.6 163.2 267.7 412.3 3.8 225.2 909.0 3,154.8 60.4 1.0 779.0 840.4
2008 2,052.0 173.4 266.3 408.2 4.8 240.4 919.7 3,145.1 58.8 0.9 791.7 851.4
2009 1,983.6 232.3 241.8 410.8 4.6 261.6 918.8 3,134.4 61.6 1.3 800.7 863.6
2010 1,960.1 262.5 228.3 410.2 4.6 254.0 897.1 3,119.7 62.6 1.9 813.6 878.1
a Annual average figures.
Note: Up to 1999 the weighted figures are based on the 1990 population census, since 2000 the data is updated based 
on the 2001 population census. Data on ‘employed’ includes conscripts and those working while receiving pension 
or child support. The data on students for 1995–97 are estimates. ‘Other inactive’ is a residual category, so it in-
cludes the institutional population not observed by MEF.
Source: Pensioners: 1980–91: NYUFIG, 1992–: KSH MEF. Child care recipients: Up to 1997 TB and estimation, 
after 1997 MEF. Unemployment: 1990–91: NMH REG, 1992–: KSH MEF.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2012ent03_02
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Table 3.3: Labour force participation of the population above 14 years, females, in thousandsa
Year
Population of female 15–54 Population of female 55 and above
Employed Unem-ployed
Inactive
Total Employed Unem-ployed
Pensioner, 
other  
inactive
Total
Pensioner Full time student
On child 
care 
leave
Other  
inactive
Inactive 
total
1980 2,137.4 0.0 127.0 173.8 259.0 240.6 800.4 2,937.8 305.0 0.0 1,140.3 1,445.3
1990 2,010.0 24.5 95.8 264.7 248.5 217.3 826.3 2,860.8 222.0 0.0 1,279.4 1,501.4
1991 1,918.9 103.1 116.9 281.8 258.3 201.9 858.9 2,880.9 159.1 0.0 1,344.5 1,503.6
1992 1,745.3 171.7 140.8 317.6 260.4 261.1 979.9 2,896.9 119.2 6.6 1,379.6 1,505.4
1993 1,660.4 191.1 174.3 337.0 268.5 276.8 1,056.6 2,908.1 89.6 11.8 1,405.5 1,506.9
1994 1,619.7 167.4 198.9 351.1 277.2 301.1 1,128.3 2,915.4 76.8 8.1 1,423.8 1,508.7
1995 1,558.8 150.7 213.0 356.0 280.4 358.3 1,207.7 2,917.2 70.4 4.3 1,438.0 1,512.7
1996 1,538.7 151.6 220.7 367.2 285.9 351.1 1,224.9 2,915.2 73.2 4.8 1,438.3 1,516.3
1997 1,531.5 130.3 236.9 374.4 287.5 348.3 1,247.1 2,908.9 71.4 4.4 1,445.3 1,521.1
1998 1,593.0 119.0 243.4 346.6 294.5 301.5 1,186.0 2,898.0 63.1 4.7 1,460.3 1,528.1
1999 1,632.6 113.0 222.0 336.8 291.1 288.3 1,138.2 2,883.8 75.8 1.0 1,458.0 1,534.8
2000 1,659.9 103.2 202.7 363.5 277.3 309.7 1,153.2 2,916.3 90.5 1.6 1,509.2 1,601.3
2001 1,655.0 90.1 205.3 364.5 282.3 318.3 1,170.4 2,915.5 99.6 1.5 1,508.8 1,609.9
2002 1,639.2 98.4 199.6 368.0 281.8 319.6 1,169.0 2,906.6 118.9 2.5 1,499.5 1,620.9
2003 1,645.6 102.0 191.4 362.8 282.6 306.9 1,143.7 2,891.2 149.9 4.0 1,483.2 1,637.1
2004 1,610.2 111.0 186.8 368.6 277.8 322.2 1,155.4 2,876.6 172.8 5.1 1,477.3 1,655.2
2005 1,603.2 137.8 170.9 365.4 272.8 301.5 1,110.6 2,851.6 182.2 7.0 1,494.4 1,683.6
2006 1,603.1 144.8 164.8 406.8 263.0 262.0 1,096.6 2,844.5 189.6 7.4 1,497.1 1,694.1
2007 1,594.0 140.5 159.1 420.3 263.4 250.6 1,093.4 2,827.9 189.1 7.2 1,517.1 1,713.4
2008 1,579.4 145.1 142.3 411.4 276.0 252.7 1,082.4 2,806.9 189.3 9.8 1,536.0 1,735.1
2009 1,533.5 174.1 122.7 403.8 274.1 267.7 1,068.3 2,775.9 203.5 13.0 1,547.3 1,763.8
2010 1,525.6 192.8 110.4 404.4 262.4 246.6 1,023.8 2,742.2 233.0 17.7 1,542.3 1,793.0
a Annual average figures.
Note: Up to 1999 the weighted figures are based on the 1990 population census, since 2000 the data is updated based 
on the 2001 population census. Data on ‘employed’ includes conscripts and those working while receiving pension 
or child support. The data on students for 1995–97 are estimates. ‘Other inactive’ is a residual category, so it in-
cludes the institutional population not observed by MEF.
Source: Pensioners: 1980–91: NYUFIG, 1992–: KSH MEF. Child care recipients: Up to 1997 TB and estimation, 
after 1997 MEF. Unemployment: 1990–91: NMH REG, 1992–: KSH MEF.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2012ent03_03
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Table 3.4: Labour force participation of the population above 14 years, per cent
Year
Population of male 15–59 and female 15–54 Population of male above 59  and female above 54
Employed Unem-ployed
Inactive
Total Employed Unem-ployed
Pensioner, 
other  
inactive
Total
Pensioner Full time student
On child 
care 
leave
Other  
inactive
Inactive 
total
1980 79.4 0.0 4.9 6.0 4.2 5.5 20.6 100.0 25.9 0.0 74.1 100.0
1990 75.9 1.0 4.8 9.2 4.2 5.0 23.1 100.0 15.1 0.0 84.9 100.0
1995 58.7 6.7 8.1 11.9 4.7 9.8 34.5 100.0 4.7 0.3 95.0 100.0
1996 58.3 6.5 8.4 12.2 4.8 9.9 35.2 100.0 4.5 0.3 95.3 100.0
1997 58.4 5.6 8.9 12.4 4.8 9.9 35.9 100.0 4.2 0.3 95.5 100.0
1998 59.5 5.0 9.7 11.5 4.9 9.3 35.4 100.0 3.9 0.3 95.8 100.0
1999 61.3 4.7 8.9 11.2 4.9 9.1 34.0 100.0 4.8 0.1 95.1 100.0
2000 61.4 4.3 8.5 11.8 4.6 9.4 34.3 100.0 5.4 0.1 94.5 100.0
2001 61.4 3.8 8.5 11.8 4.7 9.9 34.8 100.0 5.8 0.1 94.1 100.0
2002 61.2 3.9 8.3 12.1 4.7 9.8 35.0 100.0 6.7 0.1 93.1 100.0
2003 61.4 4.0 8.0 12.1 4.7 9.8 34.6 100.0 8.3 0.2 91.5 100.0
2004 60.7 4.1 8.0 12.3 4.7 10.3 35.2 100.0 9.6 0.2 90.2 100.0
2005 60.8 4.9 7.5 12.3 4.6 9.8 34.3 100.0 9.8 0.3 89.8 100.0
2006 61.3 5.1 7.2 13.5 4.5 8.3 33.6 100.0 9.9 0.3 89.8 100.0
2007 61.5 5.1 7.1 13.9 4.5 7.9 33.5 100.0 9.8 0.3 89.9 100.0
2008 61.0 5.3 6.9 13.8 4.7 8.3 33.6 100.0 9.6 0.4 90.0 100.0
2009 59.5 6.9 6.2 13.8 4.7 9.0 33.6 100.0 10.1 0.5 89.4 100.0
2010 59.5 7.8 5.8 13.9 4.6 8.5 32.8 100.0 11.1 0.7 88.2 100.0
Source: Pensioners: 1980–90: NYUFIG, 1995–: KSH MEF. Child care recipients: Up to 1997 TB and estimation, 
after 1997 MEF. Unemployment: 1990: NMH REG, 1995–: KSH MEF.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2012ent03_04
Figure 3.1: Labour force participation of population at male 15–59 and female 15–54, total
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Source: Pensioners: 1990–91: NYUFIG, 1992–: KSH MEF. Child care recipients: Up to 1997 TB and estimation, 
after 1997 MEF. Unemployment: 1990–91: NMH REG, 1992–: KSH MEF.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2012ena03_01
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Table 3.5: Labour force participation of the population above 14 years, males, per cent
Year
Population of male 15–59 Population of male 60 and above
Employed Unem-ployed
Inactive
Total Employed Unem-ployed
Pensioner, 
other  
inactive
Total
Pensioner Full time student
On child 
care 
leave
Other  
inactive
Inactive 
total
1980 85.4 0.0 5.4 6.1 0.0 3.1 14.6 100.0 35.0 0.0 65.0 100.0
1990 81.0 1.2 6.0 9.1 0.0 2.6 17.8 100.0 15.7 0.0 84.3 100.0
1996 63.4 7.7 9.2 11.8 0.1 7.8 28.9 100.0 3.7 0.2 96.1 100.0
1997 63.7 6.7 9.7 11.9 0.0 7.9 29.6 100.0 3.3 0.2 96.4 100.0
1998 63.7 5.9 10.9 11.1 0.0 8.4 30.4 100.0 3.4 0.4 96.2 100.0
1999 65.5 5.4 9.9 10.7 0.1 8.3 29.1 100.0 4.6 0.1 95.4 100.0
2000 65.5 5.0 9.9 11.3 0.1 8.2 29.5 100.0 5.0 0.1 94.9 100.0
2001 65.6 4.5 9.8 11.1 0.1 8.9 29.9 100.0 5.1 0.1 94.8 100.0
2002 65.5 4.3 9.7 11.7 0.2 8.6 30.1 100.0 5.6 0.1 94.3 100.0
2003 65.5 4.3 9.3 11.6 0.1 9.1 30.1 100.0 6.5 0.1 93.4 100.0
2004 65.0 4.3 9.3 11.8 0.1 9.5 30.7 100.0 7.8 0.1 92.1 100.0
2005 64.9 5.0 8.8 11.9 0.2 9.1 30.0 100.0 7.9 0.1 92.0 100.0
2006 65.7 5.2 8.5 12.8 0.2 7.6 29.1 100.0 7.3 0.1 92.6 100.0
2007 66.0 5.2 8.5 13.1 0.1 7.1 28.8 100.0 7.2 0.1 92.7 100.0
2008 65.2 5.5 8.5 13.0 0.2 7.6 29.2 100.0 6.9 0.1 93.0 100.0
2009 63.3 7.4 7.7 13.1 0.1 8.3 29.3 100.0 7.1 0.2 92.7 100.0
2010 62.8 8.4 7.3 13.1 0.1 8.1 28.8 100.0 7.1 0.2 92.7 100.0
Source: Pensioners: 1980–90: NYUFIG, 1996–: KSH MEF. Child care recipients: Up to 1997 TB and estimation, 
after 1997 MEF. Unemployment: 1990: NMH REG, 1996–: KSH MEF.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2012ent03_05
Figure 3.2: Labour force participation of population at male 15–59
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Source: Pensioners: 1990–91: NYUFIG, 1992–: KSH MEF. Child care recipients: Up to 1997 TB and estimation, 
after 1997 MEF. Unemployment: 1990–91: NMH REG, 1992–: KSH MEF.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2012ena03_02
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Table 3.6: Labour force participation of the population above 14 years, females, per cent
Year
Population of female 15–54 Population of female 55 and above
Employed Unem-ployed
Inactive
Total Employed Unem-ployed
Pensioner, 
other  
inactive
Total
Pensioner Full time student
On child 
care 
leave
Other  
inactive
Inactive 
total
1980 72.8 0.0 4.3 5.9 8.8 8.2 27.2 100.0 21.1 0.0 78.9 100.0
1990 70.3 0.9 3.3 9.3 8.7 7.6 28.9 100.0 14.8 0.0 85.2 100.0
1996 52.8 5.2 7.6 12.6 9.8 12.0 42.0 100.0 4.8 0.3 94.9 100.0
1997 52.6 4.5 8.1 12.9 9.9 12.0 42.9 100.0 4.7 0.3 95.0 100.0
1998 55.0 4.1 8.4 12.0 10.2 10.4 40.9 100.0 4.1 0.3 95.6 100.0
1999 56.6 3.9 7.7 11.7 10.1 10.0 39.5 100.0 4.9 0.1 95.0 100.0
2000 56.9 3.5 7.0 12.5 9.5 10.6 39.5 100.0 5.7 0.1 94.2 100.0
2001 56.8 3.1 7.0 12.5 9.7 10.9 40.1 100.0 6.2 0.1 93.7 100.0
2002 56.4 3.4 6.9 12.7 9.7 11.0 40.2 100.0 7.3 0.2 92.5 100.0
2003 56.9 3.5 6.6 12.5 9.8 10.6 39.6 100.0 9.2 0.2 90.6 100.0
2004 56.0 3.9 6.5 12.8 9.7 11.2 40.2 100.0 10.4 0.3 89.3 100.0
2005 56.2 4.8 6.0 12.8 9.6 10.6 38.9 100.0 10.8 0.4 88.8 100.0
2006 56.4 5.1 5.8 14.3 9.2 9.2 38.6 100.0 11.2 0.4 88.4 100.0
2007 56.4 5.0 5.6 14.9 9.3 8.9 38.7 100.0 11.0 0.4 88.6 100.0
2008 56.3 5.2 5.1 14.7 9.8 9.0 38.6 100.0 10.9 0.6 88.5 100.0
2009 55.2 6.3 4.4 14.5 9.9 9.6 38.5 100.0 11.5 0.8 87.7 100.0
2010 55.6 7.0 4.0 14.7 9.6 9.0 37.5 100.0 13.0 1.0 86.0 100.0
Source: Pensioners: 1980–90: NYUFIG, 1996–: KSH MEF. Child care recipients: Up to 1997 TB and estimation, 
after 1997 MEF. Unemployment: 1990: NMH REG, 1996–: KSH MEF.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2012ent03_06
Figure 3.3: Labour force participation of population at female 15–54
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Source: Pensioners: 1990–91: NYUFIG, 1992–: KSH MEF. Child care recipients: Up to 1997 TB and estimation, 
after 1997 MEF. Unemployment: 1990–91: NMH REG, 1992–: KSH MEF.
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Table 3.7: Population aged 15–64 by labour market status (self-categorised), in thousands
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Together
In work 3,710.8 3,778.9 3,827.4 3,827.1 3,843.6 3,834.4 3,852.2 3,864.1 3,857.2 3,800.7 3,715.3 3,709.8
Unemployed 473.5 448.1 414.5 410.4 431.8 451.0 488.2 468.1 448.3 481.4 592.5 676.0
Student, pupils 753.9 749.9 739.9 763.1 767.7 783.8 792.0 847.8 870.4 868.9 864.5 861.8
Pensioner 1,079.7 991.8 990.8 940.4 856.4 800.3 755.6 617.8 568.6 611.0 600.9 579.3
Disabled 195.5 223.8 251.0 284.4 338.3 370.4 359.7 520.4 560.3 530.0 495.5 482.1
On child care 
leave 289.0 272.4 272.3 278.3 281.7 274.7 272.4 273.5 279.7 292.4 290.5 280.5
Dependent 167.5 165.9 170.7 160.4 135.1 133.3 134.6 116.1 111.9 106.2 105.6 100.4
Out of work for 
other reason 113.1 133.6 184.7 185.7 181.7 178.4 160.0 108.0 103.3 103.6 106.4 79.3
Total 6,783.0 6,764.4 6,851.3 6,849.8 6,836.3 6,826.3 6,814.7 6,815.8 6,799.7 6,794.2 6,771.2 6,769.2
Males
In work 2,042.7 2,075.4 2,089.5 2,090.2 2,087.3 2,082.8 2,088.3 2,105.0 2,108.9 2,074.0 2,013.1 1,989.1
Unemployed 286.1 270.4 255.2 239.3 244.2 247.7 265.2 251.6 241.9 257.5 334.2 376.5
Student, pupils 375.9 371.4 363.6 380.9 383.7 391.1 398.5 418.9 430.2 431.5 432.9 431.2
Pensioner 426.4 388.6 386.3 368.1 337.4 322.5 304.5 236.0 205.2 233.8 235.1 240.4
Disabled 106.0 120.4 134.2 148.1 169.9 184.5 178.7 250.4 269.9 259.4 237.1 231.0
On child care 
leave 3.9 3.8 4.0 4.9 4.7 4.9 6.1 5.5 4.1 5.8 6.0 6.7
Dependent 6.5 5.3 6.3 5.1 5.3 6.0 7.0 5.8 6.6 7.2 7.3 10.3
Out of work for 
other reason 67.4 77.6 100.8 101.2 97.5 89.6 80.1 54.9 52.1 52.1 50.1 36.1
Total 3,314.9 3,312.9 3,339.9 3,337.8 3,330.0 3,329.1 3,328.4 3,328.1 3,318.9 3,321.3 3,315.8 3,321.3
Females
In work 1,668.1 1,703.5 1,737.9 1,736.9 1,756.3 1,751.6 1,763.9 1,759.1 1,748.3 1,726.6 1,702.2 1,720.7
Unemployed 187.4 177.7 159.3 171.1 187.6 203.3 223.0 216.5 206.4 223.8 258.3 299.5
Student, pupils 378.0 378.5 376.3 382.2 384.0 392.7 393.5 428.9 440.2 437.4 431.6 430.6
Pensioner 653.3 603.2 604.5 572.3 519.0 477.8 451.1 381.8 363.4 377.2 365.7 338.9
Disabled 89.5 103.4 116.8 136.3 168.4 185.9 181.0 270.0 290.4 270.6 258.4 251.1
On child care 
leave 285.1 268.6 268.3 273.4 277.0 269.8 266.3 268.0 275.6 286.7 284.5 273.9
Dependent 161.0 160.6 164.4 155.3 129.8 127.3 127.6 110.3 105.3 99.1 98.3 90.1
Out of work for 
other reason 45.7 56.0 83.9 84.5 84.2 88.8 79.9 53.1 51.2 51.4 56.3 43.1
Total 3,468.1 3,451.5 3,511.4 3,512.0 3,506.3 3,497.2 3,486.3 3,487.7 3,480.8 3,472.8 3,455.3 3,447.9
Note: Up to 2000 data are weighted on the basis of the 1990 Population Census.
Source: KSH MEF.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2012ent03_07
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Table 3.8: Population aged 15–64 by labour market status (self-categorised), per cent
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Together
In work 54.7 55.9 55.9 55.9 56.2 56.2 56.5 56.7 56.7 55.9 54.9 54.8
Unemployed 7.0 6.6 6.0 6.0 6.3 6.6 7.2 6.9 6.6 7.1 8.8 10.0
Student, pupils 11.1 11.1 10.8 11.1 11.2 11.5 11.6 12.4 12.8 12.8 12.8 12.7
Pensioner 15.9 14.7 14.5 13.7 12.5 11.7 11.1 9.1 8.4 9.0 8.9 8.6
Disabled 2.9 3.3 3.7 4.2 4.9 5.4 5.3 7.6 8.2 7.8 7.3 7.1
On child care 
leave 4.3 4.0 4.0 4.1 4.1 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.1 4.3 4.3 4.1
Dependent 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.3 2.0 2.0 2.0 1.7 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.5
Out of work for 
other reason 1.7 2.0 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.6 2.3 1.6 1.5 1.5 1.6 1.2
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Males
In work 61.6 62.6 62.6 62.6 62.7 62.6 62.7 63.2 63.5 62.4 60.7 59.9
Unemployed 8.6 8.2 7.6 7.2 7.3 7.4 8.0 7.6 7.3 7.8 10.1 11.3
Student, pupils 11.3 11.2 10.9 11.4 11.5 11.7 12.0 12.6 13.0 13.0 13.1 13.0
Pensioner 12.9 11.7 11.6 11.0 10.1 9.7 9.1 7.1 6.2 7.0 7.1 7.2
Disabled 3.2 3.6 4.0 4.4 5.1 5.5 5.4 7.5 8.1 7.8 7.2 7.0
On child care 
leave 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.2
Dependent 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.3
Out of work for 
other reason 2.0 2.3 3.0 3.0 2.9 2.7 2.4 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.5 1.1
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Females
In work 48.1 49.4 49.5 49.5 50.1 50.1 50.6 50.4 50.2 49.7 49.3 49.9
Unemployed 5.4 5.1 4.5 4.9 5.4 5.8 6.4 6.2 5.9 6.4 7.5 8.7
Student, pupils 10.9 11.0 10.7 10.9 11.0 11.2 11.3 12.3 12.6 12.6 12.5 12.5
Pensioner 18.8 17.5 17.2 16.3 14.8 13.7 12.9 10.9 10.4 10.9 10.6 9.8
Disabled 2.6 3.0 3.3 3.9 4.8 5.3 5.2 7.7 8.3 7.8 7.5 7.3
On child care 
leave 8.2 7.8 7.6 7.8 7.9 7.7 7.6 7.7 7.9 8.3 8.2 7.9
Dependent 4.6 4.7 4.7 4.4 3.7 3.6 3.7 3.2 3.0 2.9 2.8 2.6
Out of work for 
other reason 1.3 1.6 2.4 2.4 2.4 2.5 2.3 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.6 1.3
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Note: Up to 2000 data are weighted on the basis of the 1990 Population Census.
Source: KSH MEF.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2012ent03_08
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Table 4.1: Employment
Year In thousands 1992 = 100 Annual changes Employment ratioa
1980 5,458.2 133.7 .. 65.3
1990 4,880.0 119.5 .. 59.0
1993 3,827.0 93.7 –6.3 45.8
1994 3,751.5 91.9 –2.0 44.8
1995 3,678.8 90.1 –1.9 43.9
1996 3,648.2 89.4 –0.8 43.6
1997 3,646.4 89.3 0.0 43.6
1998 3,697.8 90.6 1.4 44.3
1999 3,811.4 93.4 3.1 45.7
2000 3,849.1 94.3 1.0 46.2
2001 3,883.3 95.1 0.3 45.6
2002 3,883.7 95.1 0.0 45.6
2003 3,921.9 96.1 1.2 46.2
2004 3,900.4 95.5 –0.5 45.8
2005 3,901.5 95.6 0.0 45.7
2006 3,930.1 96.3 0.7 46.0
2007 3,926.2 96.2 0.0 46.0
2008 3,879.4 95.0 –1.2 45.4
2009 3,781.9 92.6 –2.4 44.3
2010 3,781.2 92.6 0.0 44.3
a Per cent of the population above 14 year.
Note: Up to 2000 data are weighted on the basis of the 1990 Population Census.
Source: 1980–90: KSH MEM, 1993–: KSH MEF.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2012ent04_01
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Table 4.2: Employment by gender
Year
Males Females
Share of females (%)
In thousands 1992 = 100 In thousands 1992 = 100
1980 3,015.8 136.0 2,442.4 131.0 44.7
1990 2,648.0 119.4 2,232.0 119.7 45.7
1993 2,077.0 93.6 1,750.0 93.9 45.7
1994 2,055.0 92.6 1,696.5 91.0 45.2
1995 2,049.6 92.4 1,629.2 87.4 44.3
1996 2,036.3 91.8 1,611.9 86.5 44.2
1997 2,043.5 92.1 1,602.9 86.0 44.0
1998 2,041.7 92.0 1,656.1 88.8 44.8
1999 2,103.1 94.8 1,708.4 91.6 44.8
2000 2,122.4 95.7 1,726.7 92.6 44.9
2001 2,128.7 96.0 1,754.6 94.1 45.2
2002 2,125.6 95.8 1,758.1 94.3 45.3
2003 2,126.5 95.6 1,795.4 96.2 45.8
2004 2,117.3 95.5 1,783.1 95.6 45.7
2005 2,116.1 95.4 1,785.4 95.8 45.8
2006 2,137.4 96.4 1,792.7 96.1 45.6
2007 2,143.0 96.6 1,783.2 95.6 45.5
2008 2,110.8 95.2 1,768.6 94.9 45.6
2009 2,044.9 92.2 1,737.0 93.2 45.9
2010 2,022.6 91.2 1,758.6 94.4 46.5
Note: Up to 2000 data are weighted on the basis of the 1990 Population Census.
Source: 1980–90: KSH MEM, 1993–: KSH MEF.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2012ent04_02
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Table 4.3: Composition of the employed by age groups, males, per cent
Year
15–19 20–24 25–49 50–54 55–59 60+
Total
years old
1980 5.1 12.6 55.4 10.2 8.0 8.7 100.0
1990 5.0 10.8 64.1 8.6 6.8 4.7 100.0
1996 2.5 11.6 69.3 9.6 5.6 1.4 100.0
1997 2.3 12.3 68.9 9.9 5.4 1.2 100.0
1998 2.3 13.4 67.6 10.3 5.1 1.3 100.0
1999 1.9 13.2 67.1 10.5 5.6 1.6 100.0
2000 1.5 12.4 67.3 10.6 6.4 1.8 100.0
2001 1.2 10.4 68.6 11.1 6.7 2.0 100.0
2002 0.9 9.4 69.4 11.3 6.9 2.1 100.0
2003 0.7 8.6 69.1 11.8 7.3 2.5 100.0
2004 0.7 7.4 69.5 12.0 7.3 3.0 100.0
2005 0.6 6.8 68.9 12.7 7.9 3.1 100.0
2006 0.6 6.6 68.5 13.0 8.4 2.9 100.0
2007 0.5 6.5 68.7 13.0 8.5 2.8 100.0
2008 0.5 6.3 69.0 13.1 8.3 2.8 100.0
2009 0.4 5.6 69.6 12.2 9.2 3.0 100.0
2010 0.3 5.7 69.3 12.0 9.6 3.1 100.0
Note: Up to 2000 data are weighted on the basis of the 1990 Population Census.
Source: 1980–90: Census based estimates. 1996–: KSH MEF.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2012ent04_03
Table 4.4: Composition of the employed by age groups, females, per cent
Year
15–19 20–24 25–49 50–54 55+
Total
years old
1980 5.3 9.7 61.8 10.7 12.5 100.0
1990 5.2 8.6 66.2 10.0 10.0 100.0
1996 2.4 9.9 72.2 11.0 4.5 100.0
1997 2.0 10.8 72.2 10.5 4.5 100.0
1998 2.3 12.2 71.2 10.5 3.8 100.0
1999 1.7 12.1 70.2 11.6 4.4 100.0
2000 1.4 11.1 69.6 12.7 5.2 100.0
2001 1.1 9.6 70.5 13.1 5.7 100.0
2002 0.8 9.2 69.4 13.8 6.8 100.0
2003 0.5 8.2 68.8 14.0 8.5 100.0
2004 0.5 7.1 68.2 14.6 9.7 100.0
2005 0.4 6.4 67.6 15.4 10.2 100.0
2006 0.4 6.1 66.8 16.2 10.6 100.0
2007 0.3 5.8 67.3 16.0 10.6 100.0
2008 0.3 5.5 67.4 16.1 10.7 100.0
2009 0.3 5.4 67.2 15.4 11.7 100.0
2010 0.3 5.3 66.3 14.8 13.2 100.0
Note: Up to 2000 data are weighted on the basis of the 1990 Population Census.
Source: 1980–90: Census based estimates. 1996–: KSH MEF.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2012ent04_04
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Table 4.5: Composition of the employed by level of education, males, per cent
Year
8 grades of primary 
school or less
Vocational  
school
Secondary  
school
College,  
university Total
1980 40.8 32.3 18.2 8.7 100.0
1990 37.6 30.5 20.1 11.8 100.0
1997 20.1 39.4 26.5 14.1 100.0
1998 20.3 39.4 25.7 14.7 100.0
1999 16.8 41.5 26.8 14.9 100.0
2000 16.1 41.6 26.7 15.6 100.0
2001 15.6 42.8 26.0 15.6 100.0
2002 14.6 43.2 26.4 15.8 100.0
2003 14.0 41.3 27.7 17.0 100.0
2004 13.0 40.4 28.0 18.6 100.0
2005 13.0 40.8 27.7 18.5 100.0
2006 12.3 40.8 28.3 18.6 100.0
2007 11.8 40.8 28.7 18.7 100.0
2008 11.7 39.4 29.0 19.8 100.0
2009 10.9 38.6 30.1 20.3 100.0
2010 10.7 38.2 30.6 20.5 100.0
Note: Up to 2000 data are weighted on the basis of the 1990 Population Census. Since 1999, 
slight changes have occurred in the categorisation system by highest education level.
Source: 1980–90: Census based estimates. 1997–: KSH MEF.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2012ent04_05
Table 4.6: Composition of the employed by level of education, females, per cent
Year
8 grades of primary 
school or less
Vocational  
school
Secondary 
school
College,  
university Total
1980 53.1 12.3 27.5 7.2 100.0
1990 43.4 13.4 31.4 11.8 100.0
1997 25.1 20.6 37.9 16.4 100.0
1998 23.6 20.2 38.2 18.0 100.0
1999 20.6 20.3 40.6 18.5 100.0
2000 19.1 20.9 40.8 19.2 100.0
2001 19.1 21.3 40.3 19.3 100.0
2002 18.5 21.5 40.2 19.8 100.0
2003 16.4 21.5 40.9 21.2 100.0
2004 15.9 20.5 40.2 23.4 100.0
2005 15.4 20.2 40.0 24.4 100.0
2006 14.3 20.7 40.1 24.9 100.0
2007 13.6 21.2 40.1 25.1 100.0
2008 13.3 20.3 39.3 27.1 100.0
2009 12.5 19.9 39.2 28.4 100.0
2010 12.4 20.2 38.7 28.7 100.0
Note: Up to 2000 data are weighted on the basis of the 1990 Population Census. Since 1999, 
slight changes have occurred in the categorisation system by highest education level.
Source: 1980–90: Census based estimates. 1997–: KSH MEF.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2012ent04_06
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Table 4.7: Employed by employment status, in thousands
Year Employees
Member  
of cooperatives
Member of other 
partnerships
Self-employed and as-
sisting family members Total
1995 2,978.9 84.2 167.9 391.8 3,622.8
1996 2,961.2 79.0 151.8 413.1 3,605.1
1997 2,989.7 68.9 137.4 414.3 3,610.3
1998 3,088.5 55.8 132.5 397.9 3,674.7
1999 3,201.3 42.5 111.8 435.9 3,791.5
2000 3,255.5 37.1 129.4 407.1 3,829.1
2001 3,313.6 31.4 118.9 404.4 3,868.3
2002 3,337.2 22.5 109.9 401.0 3,870.6
2003 3,399.2 8.6 114.7 399.4 3,921.9
2004 3,347.8 8.1 136.6 407.8 3,900.3
2005 3,367.3 5.8 146.7 381.7 3,901.5
2006 3,431.4 4.8 126.7 367.2 3,930.1
2007 3,439.7 4.4 123.2 358.9 3,926.2
2008 3,405.1 2.3 122.5 349.5 3,879.4
2009 3,309.9 2.0 136.8 333.2 3,781.9
2010 3,317.5 3.0 140.0 320.7 3,781.2
Note: Up to 2000 data are weighted on the basis of the 1990 Population Census. Con-
scripts are excluded.
Source: 1995–: KSH MEF.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2012ent04_07
Table 4.8: Composition of the employed persons by employment status, per cent
Year Employees
Member  
of cooperatives
Member of other 
partnerships
Self-employed and as-
sisting family members Total
1995 82.2 2.3 4.6 10.8 100.0
1996 82.1 2.2 4.2 11.5 100.0
1997 82.8 1.9 3.8 11.5 100.0
1998 84.0 1.5 3.6 10.8 100.0
1999 84.4 1.1 2.9 11.5 100.0
2000 85.0 1.0 3.4 10.6 100.0
2001 85.7 0.8 3.1 10.5 100.0
2002 86.2 0.6 2.8 10.4 100.0
2003 86.7 0.2 2.8 10.3 100.0
2004 85.8 0.2 3.5 10.5 100.0
2005 86.3 0.1 3.8 9.8 100.0
2006 87.3 0.1 3.2 9.4 100.0
2007 87.6 0.1 3.1 9.2 100.0
2008 87.7 0.1 3.2 9.0 100.0
2009 87.5 0.1 3.6 8.8 100.0
2010 87.7 0.1 3.7 8.5 100.0
Note: Up to 2000 data are weighted on the basis of the 1990 Population Census. Con-
scripts are excluded.
Source: 1995–: KSH MEF.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2012ent04_08
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Table 4.9: Composition of employed persons by sector,a by gender, per cent
2008 2009 2010
Males Females Together Males Females Together Males Females Together
Agriculture, forestry and fishing 4.8 1.7 3.4 5.0 1.8 3.5 5.0 1.6 3.4
Mining and quarrying 0.4 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.0 0.2 0.6 0.1 0.4
Manufacturing 27.6 19.7 23.7 26.8 18.3 22.7 26.1 18.3 22.2
Electricity, gas, steam and air conditioning supply 1.4 0.5 1.0 1.7 0.6 1.2 1.5 0.7 1.1
Water supply; sewerage, waste management and re-
mediation activities 2.0 0.7 1.4 2.0 0.6 1.3 2.3 0.6 1.4
Construction 12.8 1.3 7.3 12.3 1.2 7.0 11.7 1.2 6.6
Wholesale and retail trade; repair of motor vehicles 
and motorcycles 11.9 16.1 13.9 11.4 15.9 13.6 11.4 16.1 13.6
Transportation and storage 9.6 3.9 6.9 9.6 4.1 6.9 10.1 3.8 7.1
Accommodation and food service activities 3.1 4.9 4.0 3.1 4.8 3.9 3.2 5.0 4.1
Information and communication 2.9 1.8 2.4 2.8 1.7 2.3 3.0 1.7 2.4
Financial and insurance activities 1.4 3.4 2.4 1.5 3.6 2.5 1.3 3.6 2.4
Real estate activities 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.5 0.4
Professional, scientific and technical activities 2.1 3.7 2.8 2.2 3.4 2.8 2.4 3.4 2.9
Administrative and support service activities 2.9 2.5 2.7 3.4 2.7 3.1 3.3 2.8 3.0
Public administration and defence; compulsory social 
security 7.8 9.1 8.4 8.3 10.2 9.2 8.5 9.8 9.1
Education 3.7 14.9 9.0 4.0 15.3 9.4 4.1 15.0 9.4
Human health and social work activities 2.5 11.5 6.8 2.6 11.5 6.9 2.8 12.2 7.3
Arts, entertainment and recreation 1.5 1.7 1.6 1.4 1.6 1.5 1.3 1.7 1.5
Other services 1.2 2.1 1.6 1.1 2.0 1.6 1.0 2.0 1.5
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
a By TEÁOR’08.
Source: KSH MEF.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2012ent04_09
Table 4.10: Employed in their present job since 0–6 months, per cent
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Hungary 8.2 8.5 6.8 7.2 6.3 6.6 7.2 6.8 7.0 6.7 7.5 7.6 7.4 7.9
Source: MEF, IV. quarterly waves.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2012ent04_10
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Table 4.11: Distribution of employees in the competitive sectora by firm size, per cent
Year
Less than 20 20–49 50–249 250–999 1000 and more
employees
2000 20.2 7.0 23.5 22.5 26.8
2001 18.5 7.5 24.3 23.0 26.7
2002 21.6 14.0 21.5 20.1 22.9
2003 23.0 15.3 20.5 19.3 21.8
2004 23.6 14.8 21.3 18.3 22.0
2005 27.0 15.0 20.5 17.5 20.0
2006 15.7 10.7 25.7 24.3 23.6
2007 25.2 14.2 20.0 18.4 22.2
2008 26.0 15.7 20.7 18.9 18.6
2009 23.4 15.7 19.7 18.4 22.8
2010 23.5 15.7 18.6 18.0 24.2
a Firms employing 5 or more workers.
Source: NMH BT.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2012ent04_11
Table 4.12: Employment rate of population aged 15–74 by age group, males, per cent
Year 15–19 20–24 25–49 50–54 55–59 60–64 65–74 Total
1992 14.6 64.7 82.8 71.8 48.7 17.1 9.9 58.9
1998 11.4 59.9 78.8 66.0 38.3 10.0 3.2 54.4
1999 10.6 60.3 80.5 69.0 44.0 10.4 3.8 56.2
2000 8.4 58.9 80.9 69.6 49.6 11.8 3.8 56.8
2001 7.9 56.7 81.6 68.2 51.3 13.1 3.1 57.1
2002 5.6 53.1 81.9 68.6 52.8 14.4 3.4 57.1
2003 4.8 51.8 82.2 69.7 55.2 16.8 3.8 57.6
2004 4.5 46.5 82.7 69.7 54.0 20.1 4.3 57.5
2005 4.0 43.6 82.5 70.1 56.6 20.9 4.2 57.4
2006 4.2 43.9 83.3 70.3 58.6 19.2 4.3 58.0
2007 3.7 43.8 83.7 70.7 58.2 18.9 4.7 58.0
2008 3.5 42.2 83.1 71.2 55.1 16.8 4.9 57.2
2009 2.5 36.6 80.5 70.5 57.1 17.2 5.0 55.5
2010 2.1 36.8 79.6 69.6 57.4 16.9 4.8 54.9
Note: Up to 2000 data are weighted on the basis of the 1990 Population Census.
Source: KSH MEF.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2012ent04_12
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Table 4.13: Employees of the competitive sectora by the share of foreign ownership,  
per cent
Share of foreign 
ownership 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
100% 17.5 19.0 17.7 16.5 17.7 18.6 19.0 19.4 20.4 17.5 19.2
Majority 11.7 11.0 9.2 8.8 7.8 8.5 7.5 7.4 6.4 6.3 5.4
Minority 5.3 4.9 3.6 3.9 3.8 3.1 2.2 2.9 2.2 1.7 1.9
0% 65.5 65.1 69.5 70.8 70.7 69.8 71.3 70.3 71.0 74.6 73.5
a Firms employing 5 or more workers.
Source: NMH BT.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2012ent04_13
Figure 4.3: Employees of the corporate sector by firm size and by the share of foreign ownership
Source: NMH BT.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2012ena04_03
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Table 4.14: Employment rate of population aged 15–74 by age group, females, per cent
Year 15–19 20–24 25–49 50–54 55–59 60–64 65–74 Total
1992 16.0 54.0 72.2 58.4 18.2 10.7 5.3 46.6
1998 10.7 47.5 66.3 52.3 13.6 5.0 1.2 41.0
1999 8.7 48.1 67.3 59.4 16.2 5.5 1.6 42.3
2000 8.0 45.9 67.8 62.5 20.0 5.1 1.8 43.0
2001 6.3 44.2 68.0 62.1 23.2 5.5 1.3 43.1
2002 4.3 44.2 67.0 64.0 28.3 6.0 1.5 43.3
2003 3.1 41.9 67.8 65.8 35.1 7.3 2.0 44.3
2004 2.7 37.4 67.2 66.0 39.8 9.0 1.9 44.1
2005 2.6 34.7 67.4 66.6 41.7 9.6 1.5 44.2
2006 2.5 33.9 67.5 67.9 42.6 8.9 1.6 44.4
2007 2.1 32.5 67.8 68.3 40.0 9.7 2.1 44.3
2008 1.9 31.0 67.7 68.7 38.7 10.0 2.3 44.0
2009 1.5 30.0 66.6 68.5 41.1 10.0 2.2 43.4
2010 1.9 30.3 66.5 69.7 46.9 9.8 2.5 43.9
Note: Up to 2000 data are weighted on the basis of the 1990 Population Census.
Source: KSH MEF.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2012ent04_14
Table 4.15: Employment rate of population aged 15–64 by level of education, males, 
per cent
Year
8 grades of primary 
school or less
Vocational  
school
Secondary  
school
College,  
university Total
1993 35.6 75.8 71.8 86.3 60.0
1998 35.0 75.3 67.0 84.9 60.4
1999 33.6 76.8 68.3 86.8 62.4
2000 33.6 77.4 67.9 87.1 63.1
2001 33.0 77.6 67.3 87.4 62.9
2002 32.0 77.6 67.1 85.8 62.9
2003 32.4 76.5 67.8 86.4 63.4
2004 31.0 75.7 67.3 87.1 63.1
2005 31.6 74.7 66.9 86.9 63.1
2006 31.5 75.2 67.5 85.7 63.8
2007 31.6 74.6 67.5 85.9 64.0
2008 31.3 72.6 66.5 84.7 63.0
2009 29.0 69.9 65.1 83.1 61.1
2010 28.7 68.1 64.6 82.1 60.4
Note: Up to 2000 data are weighted on the basis of the 1990 Population Census.
Source: KSH MEF.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2012ent04_15
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Figure 4.4: Activity rate by age groups, males aged 15–64, quarterly
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Source: KSH MEF.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2012ena04_04
Figure 4.5: Activity rate by age groups, females aged 15–64, quarterly
Source: KSH MEF.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2012ena04_05
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Table 4.16: Employment rate of population aged 15–64 by level of education,  
females, per cent
Year
8 grades of primary 
school or less
Vocational  
school
Secondary  
school
College,  
university Total
1998 26.6 60.5 58.1 76.9 47.3
1999 26.1 61.4 59.0 77.5 49.0
2000 26.0 61.0 59.3 77.8 49.7
2001 26.1 60.8 59.2 77.8 49.8
2002 26.0 60.4 58.6 77.9 49.8
2003 25.3 59.7 59.5 78.3 50.9
2004 25.0 58.8 58.1 78.1 50.7
2005 25.1 57.6 57.9 78.9 51.0
2006 24.5 58.2 57.5 77.6 51.1
2007 24.0 57.8 57.2 75.4 50.9
2008 23.9 55.5 56.4 75.5 50.6
2009 23.0 54.3 54.9 74.4 49.9
2010 23.6 56.4 54.3 74.6 50.6
Note: Up to 2000 data are weighted on the basis of the 1990 Population Census.
Source: KSH MEF.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2012ent04_16
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Table 5.1: Unemployment rate by gender and share of long term unemployed, per cent
Year
Unemployment rate Share of long term 
unemployedaMales Females Total
1994 11.8 9.4 10.7 43.2
1995 11.3 8.7 10.2 50.6
1996 10.7 8.8 9.9 54.4
1997 9.5 7.8 8.7 51.3
1998 8.5 7.0 7.8 48.8
1999 7.5 6.3 7.0 49.5
2000 7.0 5.6 6.4 49.1
2001 6.3 5.0 5.7 46.7
2002 6.1 5.4 5.8 44.9
2003 6.1 5.6 5.9 43.9
2004 6.1 6.1 6.1 45.0
2005 7.0 7.5 7.2 46.2
2006 7.2 7.8 7.5 46.8
2007 7.1 7.6 7.4 48.2
2008 7.6 8.1 7.8 47.6
2009 10.3 9.7 10.0 43.0
2010 11.6 10.7 11.2 50.9
a Long term unemployed are those who have been without work for 12 months or more, 
the denominator does not include those starting new jobs.
Note: Up to 2000 data are weighted on the basis of the 1990 Population Census.
Source: KSH MEF.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2012ent05_01
Figure 5.1: Unemployment rates by gender
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Source: KSH MEF.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2012ena05_01
statistical data
250
Table 5.2: Unemployment rate by level of education, males, per cent
Year
8 grades of primary 
school or less
Vocational  
school
Secondary  
school
College,  
university Total
1993 20.3 15.0 9.7 2.9 13.5
1998 14.6 9.1 5.9 2.2 8.5
1999 14.3 8.2 5.0 1.5 7.5
2000 13.4 7.7 4.8 1.6 7.0
2001 13.6 6.4 4.3 1.2 6.3
2002 14.1 6.2 4.0 1.4 6.1
2003 13.6 6.6 3.9 1.6 6.1
2004 14.3 6.4 4.1 1.7 6.1
2005 15.6 7.4 4.9 2.3 7.0
2006 17.3 7.0 5.2 2.7 7.2
2007 18.4 6.8 5.1 2.4 7.1
2008 19.8 7.6 5.3 2.3 7.6
2009 24.4 10.6 7.7 3.8 10.3
2010 26.9 12.1 8.4 4.9 11.6
Note: Up to 2000 data are weighted on the basis of the 1990 Population Census. Since 1999 
slight changes have occurred in the categorisation system by highest education level.
Source: KSH MEF.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2012ent05_02
Table 5.3: Composition of the unemployed by level of education, males, per cent
Year
8 grades of primary 
school or less
Vocational  
school
Secondary  
school
College,  
university Total
1993 39.0 40.8 17.3 2.8 100.0
1994 37.3 42.7 15.8 4.3 100.0
1995 37.7 44.0 14.7 3.6 100.0
1996 37.6 44.0 15.1 3.3 100.0
1997 38.9 43.7 15.4 2.0 100.0
1998 37.4 42.0 17.2 3.4 100.0
1999 34.5 45.3 17.4 2.8 100.0
2000 32.9 45.8 17.9 3.4 100.0
2001 36.5 43.2 17.5 2.8 100.0
2002 36.7 43.3 16.7 3.3 100.0
2003 34.0 44.7 17.2 4.1 100.0
2004 33.9 42.6 18.6 4.9 100.0
2005 32.1 43.1 19.0 5.8 100.0
2006 33.4 40.0 20.0 6.6 100.0
2007 34.9 38.8 20.3 6.0 100.0
2008 35.2 39.4 19.8 5.6 100.0
2009 31.0 40.1 21.9 7.0 100.0
2010 30.1 40.2 21.5 8.2 100.0
Note: Up to 2000 data are weighted on the basis of the 1990 Population Census. Since 1999 
slight changes have occurred in the categorisation system by highest education level.
Source: KSH MEF.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2012ent05_03
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Table 5.4: Unemployment rate by level of education, females, per cent
Year
8 grades of primary 
school or less
Vocational  
school
Secondary  
school
College,  
university Total
1993 14.6 12.8 8.1 3.2 10.4
1998 11.6 7.8 5.8 1.8 7.0
1999 10.5 8.0 5.2 1.3 6.3
2000 9.1 7.4 4.9 1.5 5.6
2001 8.4 6.4 4.0 1.6 5.0
2002 9.3 6.5 4.4 2.4 5.4
2003 10.5 7.2 4.4 1.9 5.6
2004 10.3 8.0 5.3 2.9 6.1
2005 13.0 9.8 6.7 3.1 7.5
2006 15.8 10.1 6.4 2.8 7.8
2007 16.0 9.4 6.2 3.3 7.6
2008 17.5 9.5 6.9 3.2 8.1
2009 21.6 12.4 7.7 4.1 9.7
2010 22.8 12.6 9.5 4.5 10.7
Note: Up to 2000 data are weighted on the basis of the 1990 Population Census. Since 1999 
slight changes have occurred in the categorisation system by highest education level.
Source: KSH MEF.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2012ent05_04
Table 5.5: Composition of the unemployed by level of education, females, per cent
Year
8 grades of primary 
school or less
Vocational  
school
Secondary  
school
College,  
university Total
1993 45.8 22.6 27.4 4.2 100.0
1994 44.4 23.1 29.4 3.1 100.0
1995 41.0 24.3 29.7 5.0 100.0
1996 38.2 24.9 31.6 5.4 100.0
1997 44.2 23.2 28.4 4.2 100.0
1998 41.6 22.7 31.4 4.3 100.0
1999 36.2 26.2 33.8 3.8 100.0
2000 31.8 28.2 35.0 5.0 100.0
2001 33.7 28.0 32.2 6.1 100.0
2002 33.2 26.0 32.2 8.5 100.0
2003 32.7 28.3 32.0 7.0 100.0
2004 27.8 27.4 34.2 10.6 100.0
2005 28.2 27.1 35.2 9.5 100.0
2006 31.5 27.5 32.5 8.5 100.0
2007 31.2 26.6 31.7 10.5 100.0
2008 32.2 24.3 33.3 10.2 100.0
2009 32.1 26.1 30.3 11.4 100.0
2010 30.5 24.3 34.0 11.2 100.0
Note: Up to 2000 data are weighted on the basis of the 1990 Population Census. Since 1999 
slight changes have occurred in the categorisation system by highest education level.
Source: KSH MEF.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2012ent05_05
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Figure 5.2: Intensity of quarterly flows between labour market status, population between 15–64 years
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Note: The calculations were carried out for the age group between 15–64 based on KSH labour 
force survey microdata. The probability of transition is given by the number of people who tran-
sitioned from one status to the other in the quarter, divided by the initial size of the group in the 
previous quarter, which were then corrected to preserve the consistency of stock flows. The red 
curves show the trend smoothed using a 4th degree polynomial.
Source: KSH MEF.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2012ena05_02
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Table 5.6: The number of unemployeda by duration of job search, in thousands
Year
Length of job search, weeks [month]
Total1–4  
[<1]
5–14  
[1–3]
15–26 
[4–6]
27–51 
[7–11]
52  
[12]
53–78 
[13–18]
79–104 
[19–24]
105– 
[>24]
1992 43.9 90.9 96.4 110.7 10.6 41.7 38.4 n.a. 432.6
1993 36.2 74.8 87.9 120.5 14.7 75.1 83.7 n.a. 492.9
1994 30.5 56.5 65.0 91.9 8.4 63.0 73.8 40.4 429.5
1995 23.0 51.0 56.5 69.4 20.2 57.2 34.3 93.2 404.8
1996 19.9 46.4 49.3 61.5 18.2 56.1 37.1 100.2 388.7
1997 16.1 43.7 45.9 54.4 15.7 44.5 31.1 77.3 328.7
1998 12.9 44.2 44.5 45.7 16.0 39.0 27.6 63.5 293.4
1999 15.4 44.1 38.8 46.0 13.2 38.1 26.8 62.3 284.7
2000 16.7 38.5 35.1 42.8 12.7 36.9 23.6 55.4 261.3
2001 14.9 37.0 33.2 38.6 11.5 31.6 20.9 44.2 231.9
2002 15.5 39.4 34.8 40.7 11.6 32.7 19.8 42.5 237.0
2003 15.9 42.1 38.9 42.0 14.5 27.6 17.6 43.0 241.6
2004 13.0 42.0 39.9 41.8 13.5 33.4 19.6 47.2 250.4
2005 14.8 48.9 44.1 51.3 14.1 41.0 27.4 54.3 295.9
2006 13.3 50.7 48.3 51.9 17.4 41.5 26.6 58.8 308.5
2007 13.8 49.4 44.3 50.1 12.7 43.3 26.0 64.9 304.5
2008 13.7 50.4 47.8 53.5 13.4 39.6 27.2 74.8 320.4
2009 18.8 71.9 67.0 77.4 18.1 51.2 19.8 88.4 412.6
2010 16.9 64.9 63.1 84.3 23.6 75.9 43.3 95.4 467.4
a Not including those unemployed who will got a new job within 30 days; since 2003: 
within 90 days.
Note: Up to 2000 data are weighted on the basis of the 1990 Population Census.
Source: KSH MEF.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2012ent05_06
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Figure 5.3: Unemployment rate by age groups, males aged 15–59, quarterly
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Source: KSH MEF.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2012ena05_03
Figure 5.4: Unemployment rate by age groups, females aged 15–59, quarterly
Source: KSH MEF.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2012ena05_04
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Table 5.7: Registered unemployeda and LFS unemployment
Year
Registered unemployed LFS unemployed, total LFS unemployed, age 15–24
In thousands rate in % In thousands rate in % In thousands rate in %
1990 47.7 – .. .. .. ..
1993 671.8 12.9 518.9 11.9 141.3 21.3
1994 568.4 11.3 451.2 10.7 124.7 19.4
1995 507.7 10.6 416.5 10.2 114.3 18.6
1996 500.6 11.0 400.1 9.9 106.3 17.9
1997 470.1 10.5 348.8 8.7 95.8 15.9
1998 423.1 9.5 313.0 7.8 87.6 13.4
1999 409.5 9.7 284.7 7.0 78.6 12.4
2000 390.5 9.3 262.5 6.4 70.7 12.1
2001 364.1 8.5 232.9 5.7 55.7 10.8
2002 344.7 8.0 238.8 5.8 56.5 12.3
2003 357.2 8.3 244.5 5.9 54.9 13.4
2004 375.9 8.7 252.9 6.1 55.9 15.5
2005 409.9 9.4 303.9 7.2 66.9 19.4
2006 393.5 9.0 316.8 7.5 64.1 19.1
2007 426.9 9.7 311.9 7.4 57.6 18.0
2008 442.3 10.0 329.2 7.8 61.0 19.9
2009 561.8 12.8 420.7 10.0 79.2 26.4
2010 582.7 13.3 474.8 11.2 79.2 26.6
a Since 1st of November, 2005: database of registered jobseekers. From the 1st of Novem-
ber, 2005 the Employment Act changed the definition of registered unemployed to reg-
istered jobseekers.
Note: the denominator of registered unemployment/jobseekers’ rate in the economically 
active population on 1st January the previous year.
Source: Registered unemployment/jobseekers: NMH; LFS unemployment: KSH MEF.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2012ent05_07
Figure 5.5: Registered and LFS unemployment rates
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Note: Since 1st of November, 2005: database of registered jobseekers.
Source: Registered unemployment/jobseekers: NMH; LFS unemployment: KSH MEF.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2012ena05_05
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Table 5.8: Composition of the registered unemployeda by educational attainment, yearly averages, per cent
Educational attainment 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
8 grades of primary 
school or less 41.2 40.8 40.6 40.4 41.0 42.0 42.4 42.7 42.3 41.9 42.0 42.4 43.3 40.1 39.3
Vocational school 35.1 35.6 36.0 35.7 34.9 34.1 33.5 32.9 32.3 32.4 32.1 31.5 30.9 32.5 31.4
Vocational secondary 
school 12.7 12.8 12.9 13.2 13.2 13.1 13.2 13.1 13.4 13.5 13.4 13.3 13.1 14.4 15.0
Grammar school 8.3 8.0 7.9 8.0 8.0 7.7 7.6 7.5 7.7 7.9 8.0 8.2 8.2 8.5 9.1
College 2.0 2.0 1.9 2.0 2.1 2.2 2.4 2.7 3.1 3.2 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.2 3.7
University 0.8 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.3 1.2 1.2 1.5
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
a Since 1st of November, 2005: registered jobseekers. From the 1st of November, 2005 the Employment Act changed 
the definition of registered unemployees to registered jobseekers.
Source: NMH.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2012ent05_08
Table 5.9: The distribution of registered unemployed school-leaversa by educational attainment,  
yearly averages, per cent
Educational attainment 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
8 grades of primary 
school or less 4.6 20.2 23.4 25.3 26.8 31.1 33.7 34.7 35.2 36.1 38.2 40.1 41.3 37.7 35.2
Vocational school 41.9 35.7 34.1 30.9 27.8 23.7 20.6 20.4 20.2 20.5 19.7 18.1 17.3 18.9 18.9
Vocational secondary 
school 27.0 23.9 24.2 25.0 25.4 25.3 25.5 23.2 22.1 21.5 20.3 20.7 21.2 23.1 23.9
Grammar school 21.8 15.5 14.0 13.6 13.7 12.6 11.6 10.8 10.7 10.8 11.7 12.8 13.3 13.7 14.3
College 3.6 3.5 3.4 4.0 4.8 5.5 6.2 7.7 8.1 7.8 6.9 5.8 4.9 4.5 4.8
University 1.1 1.1 1.0 1.2 1.5 1.8 2.4 3.3 3.6 3.4 3.0 2.5 2.0 2.1 2.8
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
a Since 1st of November, 2005: registered school-leaver jobseekers. From the 1st of November, 2005 the Employment 
Act changed the definition of registered unemployed to registered jobseekers.
Source: NMH.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2012ent05_09
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Table 5.10: Registered unemployeda by economic activity as observed in the LFS, per cent
Year Employed LFS-unemployed Inactive Total
1992 5.1 71.6 23.3 100.0
1993 10.0 63.6 26.4 100.0
1994 14.4 54.5 31.1 100.0
1995 11.8 53.7 34.5 100.0
1996 13.7 51.8 34.5 100.0
1997 18.7 44.1 37.2 100.0
1998 24.8 35.1 40.1 100.0
1999 6.7 55.8 37.5 100.0
2000 4.7 54.3 41.0 100.0
2001 6.5 45.2 48.3 100.0
2002 4.4 47.4 48.2 100.0
2003 9.4 44.1 46.5 100.0
2004 3.0 53.5 43.5 100.0
2005 2.3 59.7 38.0 100.0
2006 3.9 58.7 37.5 100.0
2007 3.7 62.6 33.7 100.0
2008 3.7 63.1 33.2 100.0
2009 3.7 67.5 28.8 100.0
2010 3.0 71.1 25.9 100.0
a Since 1st of November, 2005: database of registered jobseekers. From the 1st of Novem-
ber, 2005 the Employment Act changed the definition of registered unemployed to reg-
istered jobseekers.
Note: Up to 2000 data are weighted on the basis of the 1990 Population Census. The data 
pertain to those who consider themselves registered jobseekers in the KSH MEF. From 
1999 those who reported that their last contact with the employment center was more 
than two months ago were filtered from among those who reported themselves as regis-
tered unemployed.
Source: KSH MEF.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2012ent05_10
Table 5.11: Selected time series of registered unemployment, monthly averages, in thousands and per cent
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Registered unemploymenta 671.7 568.4 507.7 500.6 470.1 423.1 409.5 390.5 364.1
Of which: School-leavers 59.7 62.1 54.5 46.2 42.4 32.5 29.9 26.0 26.8
Non school-leavers 612.0 506.2 453.2 454.4 427.7 390.6 379.6 364.4 337.4
Male 395.3 333.0 293.8 284.1 267.1 233.4 221.4 209.7 196.4
Female 276.4 235.3 213.8 216.5 203.0 189.7 188.1 180.8 167.7
25 years old and younger 174.8 153.3 134.2 124.0 105.8 89.9 85.4 79.1 75.6
Manual workers 556.0 467.6 414.3 407.4 386.3 349.0 336.8 321.2 302.0
Non manual workers 115.8 100.7 93.4 93.2 83.8 74.1 72.7 69.3 62.1
Unemployment benefit recipientsb 404.8 228.9 182.8 171.7 141.7 130.7 140.7 131.7 119.2
Unemployment assistance recipientsc 89.3 190.3 210.0 211.3 201.3 182.2 148.6 143.5 131.2
Unemployment rated 12.9 11.3 10.6 11.0 10.5 9.5 9.7 9.3 8.5
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1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Shares within registered unemployed, per cent
School-leavers 8.9 10.9 10.7 9.2 9.0 7.7 7.3 6.7 7.3
Male 58.8 58.6 57.9 56.7 56.8 55.2 54.1 53.7 53.9
25 years old and younger 26.0 27.0 26.4 24.8 22.5 21.3 20.9 20.3 20.8
Manual workers 82.8 82.3 81.6 81.4 82.2 82.5 82.3 82.2 82.9
Flows, in thousands
Inflow to the Register 48.6 42.3 45.7 52.8 56.1 55.4 57.2 54.1 57.0
Of which: School-leavers 7.6 7.8 8.0 7.5 9.2 9.8 9.3 8.0 7.8
Outflow from the Register 51.2 51.7 47.6 54.3 57.3 60.4 57.2 56.8 59.4
Of which: School-leavers 6.6 7.9 8.5 8.9 9.0 11.0 9.4 8.2 7.7
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Registered unemploymenta 344.7 357.2 375.9 409.9 393.5 426.9 442.3 561.8 582.7
Of which: School-leavers 28.5 31.3 33.8 40.9 38.7 40.4 41.4 49.3 52.6
Non school-leavers 316.2 325.9 342.2 369.1 354.7 386.5 400.9 512.5 530.1
Male 184.6 188.0 193.3 210.4 200.9 219.9 228.3 297.9 305.0
Female 160.1 169.2 182.6 199.5 192.5 207.0 214.0 263.9 277.7
25 years old and younger 71.1 71.6 71.4 78.9 75.8 80.3 75.9 104.3 102.8
Manual workers 286.3 296.2 308.5 336.2 321.9 .. .. .. ..
Non manual workers 58.4 61.0 67.4 73.7 71.6 .. .. .. ..
Unemployment benefit recipientsb 114.9 120.0 124.0 134.4 151.5 134.6 136.5e 202.1 187.7
Unemployment assistance recipientsc 113.4 116.2 120.4 133.4 121.8 133.0 147.5 156.0 167.8
Unemployment rated 8.0 8.3 8.7 9.4 9.0 9.7 10.0 12.8 13.3
Shares within registered unemployed, per cent
School-leavers 8.3 8.8 9.0 10.0 9.8 9.5 9.4 8.8 9.0
Male 53.5 52.6 51.4 51.3 51.1 51.5 51.6 53.0 52.3
25 years old and younger 20.6 20.0 19.0 19.2 16.5 18.8 17.2 18.6 17.6
Manual workers 83.1 82.9 82.1 82.0 81.8 .. .. .. ..
Flows, in thousands
Inflow to the Register 56.0 54.8 57.8 60.7 50.8 51.4 54.0 69.0 65.3
Of which: School-leavers 7.8 7.7 7.6 8.2 7.0 6.2 6.3 7.5 7.9
Outflow from the Register 55.8 53.5 54.4 59.8 51.4 48.4 51.3 58.4 66.4
Of which: School-leavers 7.5 7.6 7.1 7.9 7.1 6.0 6.2 6.7 7.5
a Since 1st of November, 2005: registered jobseekers instead of registered unemployed. (The data concern the closing 
date of each month.) From the 1st of November, 2005 the Employment Act changed the definition of registered 
unemployed to registered jobseekers.
b Since 1st of November, 2005: jobseeker benefit recepients.
c Only recipients who are in the NMH register. Those receiving the discontinued income support supplement were 
included in the number of those receiving income support supplement up to 2004, and in the number of those re-
ceiving regular social assistance from 2005 to 2008. From 2009, those receiving social assistance were included in a 
new support type, the on call support.
d Relative index: registered unemployment rate in the economically active population. From 1st of November, 2005, 
registered jobseekers’ rate in the economically active population.
e The new IT system introduced at the NFSZ in 2008 made the methodological changes possible:
1) The filtering out of those returning after or starting a break from the number of those entering or leaving the dif-
ferent types of jobseeking support. The main reasons for a break are work for short time periods, receipt of child 
support (GYES) or TGYÁS, or involvement in training.
2) Taking into account in the previous period the number of those entrants, for whom the first accounting of the 
jobseeking support was delayed due to missing documentation.
2008 data, comparable to 2009: 141.5 thousand people.
Source: NMH REG.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2012ent05_11
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Table 5.12: Monthly entrants to the unemployment registera, monthly averages, in thousands
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
First time entrants 17.0 13.4 12.8 11.2 11.2 10.4 10.0 10.5 10.8 8.6 8.0 7.1 8.3 7.2
Previously registered 39.2 42.0 44.4 42.9 45.8 45.6 44.8 47.3 50.0 42.2 43.4 46.9 60.7 58.1
Together 56.1 55.4 57.2 54.1 57.0 56.0 54.8 57.8 60.7 50.8 51.4 54.0 69.0 65.3
a Since 1st of November, 2005: database of jobseekers. From the 1st of November, 2005 the Employment Act changed 
the definition of registered unemployed to registered jobseekers.
Source: NMH REG.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2012ent05_12
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Figure 5.6: Entrants to the unemployment register, in thousands
Source: NMH REG.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2012ena05_06
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Table 5.13: Benefit recepients and participation in active labour market programs
Year
Unemploy-
ment benefita
Regular social 
assistance b
UA for school-
leavers
Do not receive 
provision
Public 
workc Retraining
c Wage sub-
sidyc
Other pro-
grammesc Total
1990 In thousands 42.5 – – 18.6 .. .. .. .. 61.0
Per cent 69.6 n.a. n.a. 30.4 .. .. .. .. 100.0
2000 In thousands 117.0 139.7 0.0 106.5 26.7 25.3 27.5 73.5 516.2
Per cent 22.7 27.1 0.0 20.6 5.2 4.9 5.3 14.2 100.0
2001 In thousands 111.8 113.2 0.0 105.2 29.0 30.0 25.8 37.2 452.2
Per cent 24.7 25.0 0.0 23.3 6.4 6.6 5.7 8.2 100.0
2002 In thousands 104.8 107.6 – 115.3 21.6 23.5 21.2 32.8 426.8
Per cent 24.6 25.2 – 27.0 5.1 5.5 5.0 7.7 100.0
2003 In thousands 105.1 109.5 – 125.0 21.2 22.5 20.1 36.6 440.0
Per cent 23.9 24.9 – 28.4 4.8 5.1 4.6 8.3 100.0
2004 In thousands 117.4 118.4 – 132.3 16.8 12.6 16.8 28.5 442.8
Per cent 26.5 26.7 – 29.9 3.8 2.8 3.8 6.4 100.0
2005 In thousands 125.6 127.8 – 140.2 21.5 14.7 20.8 31.0 481.6
Per cent 26.1 26.5 – 29.1 4.5 3.1 4.3 6.4 100.0
2006 In thousands 117.7 112.9 – 146.4 16.6 12.3 14.6 13.8 434.3
Per cent 27.1 26.0 – 33.7 3.8 2.8 3.4 3.2 100.0
2007 In thousands 128.0 133.1 – 151.8 19.3 14.6 23.4 6.8 477.0
Per cent 27.6 28.7 – 32.7 2.7 2.3 3.7 2.3 100.0
2008 In thousands 120.7d 145.7 – 158.2 21.2 21.2 25.0 14.1 506.1
Per cent 23.8 28.8 – 31.3 4.2 4.2 4.9 2.8 100.0
2009 In thousands 202.8 151.9 – 215.0 135.3 13.6 17.8 54.1 790.5
Per cent 25.7 19.2 – 27.2 17.1 1.7 2.3 6.8 100.0
2010 In thousands 159.6 163.5 – 222.4 164.5 17.8 26.7 40.3 794.8
Per cent 20.1 20.6 – 28.0 20.7 2.2 3.4 5.1 100.0
a Since 1st of November, 2005: jobseeker benefit recepients.
b Only recipients who are in the NMH register. Those receiving the discontinued income support supplement were 
included in the number of those receiving income support supplement up to 2004, and in the number of those re-
ceiving regular social assistance from 2005 to 2008. From 2009, those receiving social assistance were included in a 
new support type, the on call support.
c Up to 2008 the number financed from the MPA Decentralized Base, since 2009 the number financed from MPA, 
TAMOP.
Public-type employment: community service, public service, public work programmes.
Wage subsidy: wage subsidy, wage-cost subsidy, work experience acquisition assstance to career-starters, support for 
employment of availability allowance recipients, part-time emplolyment, wage support for those losing their job 
due to the crisis.
Other support: job preservation support, support to would-be entrepreneurs, contribution to costs related to com-
muting to work, job creation support, jobseeker’s clubs.
d The new IT system introduced at the NFSZ in 2008 made the methodological changes possible:
1) The filtering out of those returning after or starting a break from the number of those entering or leaving the dif-
ferent types of jobseeking support. The main reasons for a break are work for short time periods, receipt of child 
support (GYES) or TGYÁS, or involvement in training.
2) Taking into account in the previous period the number of those entrants, for whom the first accounting of the 
jobseeking support was delayed due to missing documentation.
2008 data, comparable to 2009: 134.1 thousand people.
Note: The closing numbers from October of each year. For the percentage data, the sum of those registered and 
those taking part in labour market programs ≈100.0.
Source: NMH.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2012ent05_13
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Table 5.14: The number of registered unemployeda who became employed  
on subsidised and non-subsidised employmentb
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Persons Per cent Persons Per cent Persons Per cent Persons Per cent Persons Per cent Persons Per cent Persons Per cent
Subsidised 
employ-
ment
119,448 40.5 137,136 42.7 130,081 37.4 104,842 32.7 118,703 34.0 170,464 40.0 198,974 38.5
Non-subsi-
dised em-
ployment
175,393 59.5 184,389 57.3 217,606 62.6 215,686 67.3 230,558 66.0 255,356 60.0 317,622 61.5
Total 294,841 100.0 321,525 100.0 347,687 100.0 320,528 100.0 349,261 100.0 425,820 100.0 516,596 100.0
a Since 1st of November, 2005: registered jobseekers. From the 1st of November, 2005 the Employment Act changed 
the definition of registered unemployed to registered jobseekers.
b Yearly total.
Source: NMH.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2012ent05_14
Table 5.15: The ratio of those who are employed among the former participants of ALMPs, per cent
Active labour market programmes 1997a 1998a 1999a 2000a 2001a 2002a 2003a 2004a 2005a 2006a 2007a 2008a 2009b 2010b
Suggested training programmesc 46.3 46.8 46.8 48.4 45.4 43.3 43.0 45.5 43.8 41.1 37.5 42.2 40.4 49.4
Accepted training programmesd 51.1 51.5 50.0 52.0 49.3 45.8 46.0 45.6 51.4 50.9 47.6 48.0 41.9 48.8
Retrainig of those who are em-
ployede 90.4 94.7 94.8 94.9 94.2 92.7 93.3 92.1 90.4 .. 92.3 93.9 .. 59.9
Support for self-employmentf 88.1 91.7 90.5 89.4 89.2 90.7 89.6 90.7 89.6 86.4 87.6 83.6 73.1 76.4
Wage subsidy programmesg 66.3 59.1 59.7 62.3 59.7 62.9 62.0 64.6 62.6 62.3 63.4 65.0 72.4 90.9
Work experience programmesh 65.7 59.1 55.8 57.9 64.5 66.9 66.1 66.5 66.8 66.6 66.3 74.6 .. ..
Further employment programmei 72.1 75.1 68.5 73.8 71.6 78.4 78.2 71.5 70.9 65.0 77.5 – .. ..
a Three months after the end of programmes.
b Six months after the end of programmes.
c Suggested training: group traning programmes for jobseekers organized by the NFSZ.
d Accepted training: participation in programmes initiated by the jobseekers and accepted by NFSZ for full or partial 
support.
e Training for employed persons: training for those whose jobs are at risk of termination, if new knowledge allows 
them to adapt to the new needs of the employer.
f Support to help entrepeneurship: support of jobseekers in the amount of the monthly minimum wage or maximum 
HUF 3 million lumpsum support (to be repaid or not), aimed at helping them become individual entrepreneurs or 
self-employed.
g Wage support: aimed at helping the employment of disadvantaged persons, who would not be able to, or would 
have a harder time finding work without support.
h Work experience programmes: to aid first time jobseekers (new entrants) for 6–9 months, the support covers the 
wage and 50–80% of additional work-related costs. Discontinued from December 31, 2006.
i Further employment programmes: to support the continued employment of new entrants under the age of 25 for 9 
months. Discontinued from December 31, 2006.
Source: NMH.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2012ent05_15
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Table 5.16: Distribution of registered unemployed,a unemployment benefit recipientsb  
and unemployment assistance recipientsc by educational attainment
Educational attainment 1995 2001 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2008e 2009 2010
Registered unemployed
8 grades of primary school or less 43.6 42.3 42.7 41.8 41.5 42.8 43.8 – 40.0 39.2
Vocational school 34.5 34.2 32.2 32.6 32.3 31.5 30.7 – 33.1 31.4
Vocational secondary school 11.7 13.0 13.4 13.6 13.6 13.2 12.8 – 14.4 15.0
Grammar school 7.9 7.7 7.8 8.0 8.2 8.2 8.1 – 8.3 9.1
College 1.5 2.1 2.8 2.9 3.2 3.1 3.2 – 3.0 3.7
University 0.7 0.7 1.0 1.0 1.2 1.2 1.2 – 1.1 1.5
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 – 100.0 100.0
482.7 359.6 350.7 388.1 359.6 402.7 415.6 – 549.0 546.0
Unemployment benefit recipientsd
8 grades of primary school or less 36.9 29.7 28.9 28.2 25.4 25.4 24.4 26.3 25.7 24.1
Vocational school 36.6 40.7 39.2 39.3 39.5 37.4 37.0 39.2 39.4 36.2
Vocational secondary school 14.9 16.7 17.7 17.9 18.7 19.2 19.3 18.3 18.5 19.7
Grammar school 8.3 9.0 9.3 9.5 10.1 10.9 11.0 10.6 10.1 11.6
College 2.2 2.9 3.6 3.7 4.5 5.0 6.0 5.7 4.5 5.8
University 1.0 1.0 1.3 1.4 1.8 2.1 2.3 2.1 1.7 2.6
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
164.1 110.3 100.3 104.9 91.5 119.3 92.5 126.9 200.5 165.8
Unemployment assistance recipientsc
8 grades of primary school or less 56.8 55.5 61.1 60.4 60.1 60.3 60.3 – 59.4 56.4
Vocational school 30.6 30.0 27.6 27.8 27.7 27.1 26.5 – 26.6 27.4
Vocational secondary school 6.9 7.4 6.1 6.4 6.5 6.8 6.8 – 7.5 8.6
Grammar school 4.5 5.1 4.2 4.3 4.5 4.4 4.7 – 4.8 5.6
College 0.8 0.9 0.8 0.9 1.0 1.1 1.2 – 1.2 1.5
University 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.4 – 0.4 0.5
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 – 100.0 100.0
220.7 136.9 114.6 127.8 116.5 130.9 145.8 – 144.1 161.7
a Since 1st of November, 2005: registered jobseekers. From the 1st of November, 2005 the Employment Act changed 
the definition of registered unemployed to registered jobseekers.
b Since 1st of November, 2005: those receiving jobseeking support.
c Only recipients who are in the NMH register. Those receiving the discontinued income support supplement were 
included in the number of those receiving income support supplement up to 2004, and in the number of those re-
ceiving regular social assistance from 2005 to 2008. From 2009, those receiving social assistance were included in a 
new support type, the on call support.
d After 1st of November, 2005: jobseeking support. Does not contain those receiving unemployment aid prior to pen-
sion in 2004.
e The new IT system introduced at the NFSZ in 2008 made the methodological changes possible:
1) The filtering out of those returning after or starting a break from the number of those entering or leaving the dif-
ferent types of jobseeking support. The main reasons for a break are work for short time periods, receipt of child 
support (GYES) or TGYÁS, or involvement in training.
2) Taking into account in the previous period the number of those entrants, for whom the first accounting of the 
jobseeking support was delayed due to missing documentation.
The right-hand column of 2008 contains the 2008 data in a form comparable to the 2009 data.
Note: Data from the closing date of June in each year.
Source: NMH.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2012ent05_16
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Table 5.17: Outflow from the Register of Beneficiaries
Year
Total number  
of outflows
Of which:
Year
Total number of 
outflows
Of which:
became  
employed, %
benefit period 
expired, %
became  
employed, %
benefit period 
expired, %
1993 580,880 32.1 .. 2003 297,640 26.7 65.2
1994 485,045 27.8 .. 2004 308,027 27.4 64.6
1995 370,941 27.7 .. 2005 329,738 27.2 63.0
1996 408,828 24.2 58.4 2006 234,273 33.2 53.7
1997 327,486 26.8 58.7 2007 251,889 33.4 46.9
1998 322,496 26.5 64.5 2008 232,151 40.0 48.7
1999 320,132 26.0 67.4 2008a 261,573 43.4 48.9
2000 325,341 28.1 64.6 2009 345,216 37.9 56.0
2001 308,780 27.2 65.1 2010 352,535 38.9 55.8
2002 303,288 27.6 66.7
a The new IT system introduced at the NFSZ in 2008 made the methodological changes possible:
1) The filtering out of those returning after or starting a break from the number of those entering or leaving the dif-
ferent types of jobseeking support. The main reasons for a break are work for short time periods, receipt of child 
support (GYES) or TGYÁS, or involvement in training.
2) Taking into account in the previous period the number of those entrants, for whom the first accounting of the 
jobseeking support was delayed due to missing documentation.
The row of 2008 a contains the data from 2008 in the form comparable to the 2009 data.
Source: NMH.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2012ent05_17
Table 5.18: The distribution of the total number of labour market training participantsa
Groups of training participants 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Participants in suggested training 44,988 48,558 52,045 52,198 53,447 46,802 45,261
Participants in accepted training 26,522 26,906 28,311 30,949 32,672 31,891 28,599
One Step Forward (OFS) programme – – – – – – –
Non-employed participants together 71,509 75,465 80,356 83,147 86,211 78,693 73,859
Of which: school-leavers 21,658 24,359 25,260 22,131 20,592 19,466 18,320
Employed participants 4,484 4,139 4,408 5,026 5,308 4,142 9,036
Total 75,993 79,604 84,764 88,173 91,519 82,835 82,895
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Participants in suggested training 33,002 29,252 36,212 32,747 48,561 41,373 50,853
Participants in accepted training 19,406 9,620 7,327 5,766 4,939 8,241 6,853
One Step Forward (OFS) programme – – – 270 59,347 11,169 2,316
Non-employed participants together 52,407 38,872 43,539 38,783 112,847 60,783 57,706
Of which: school-leavers 12,158 9,313 1,365 1,111 18,719 21,103 12,030
Employed participants 7,487 4,853 3,602 3,467 37,466 12,496 336
Total 59,894 43,725 47,141 42,250 150,313 73,279 60,358
a The data contain the number of those financed from the MPA decentralized employment base, as well as those in-
volved in training as a part of the HEFOP 1.1 and the TÁMOP 1.1.2 programs.
Source: NMH.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2012ent05_18
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Table 5.19: Employment ratio of participants ALMPs by gender, age groups and educational attainment  
for the programmes finished in 2010, per cent
Non-employed participants Supported  
self-employmenta
Wage subsidy  
programmesuggested training accepted training total
By gender
Males 51.0 50.7 51.0 77.2 90.5
Females 47.8 46.8 48.0 75.7 91.5
By age groups
–20 43.6 46.0 44.1 76.9 90.9
20–24 54.2 52.1 54.1 77.5 98.2
25–29 55.4 54.5 55.6 80.6 92.5
–29 together 53.8 52.7 53.9 79.3 95.9
30–34 51.6 50.1 51.6 77.9 93.1
35–39 49.1 44.4 48.5 78.1 93.8
40–44 47.2 44.9 47.0 75.3 87.3
45–49 43.8 46.2 44.2 72.7 85.6
50–54 39.2 44.7 39.7 67.7 88.8
55+ 36.5 39.2 37.0 76.4 83.9
By educational attainment
Less than primary school 35.7 31.5 35.1 80.0 78.6
Primary school 43.2 41.8 43.1 65.6 88.3
Vocational school for skilled workers 50.8 52.3 50.9 77.2 90.1
Vocational school 45.9 45.1 45.9 72.3 89.3
Special vocational school .. .. .. .. ..
Vocational secondary school 53.5 54.5 53.7 78.0 95.1
Technicians secondary school 59.0 53.0 58.0 77.3 94.9
Grammar school 48.1 45.8 48.2 75.9 91.7
College 53.9 48.6 53.4 79.4 97.1
University 52.8 49.7 53.2 78.7 94.3
Total 49.4 48.8 49.5 76.4 90.9
a Survival rate.
Note: 6 months after the end of each programme.
Source: NMH.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2012ent05_19
Table 5.20: The distribution of the yearly number of labour market training participants,  
according to the type of traning, per cent
Types of training 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Approved qualification 80.4 77.9 79.8 79.6 78.8 78.7 77.6 78.3 75.1 72.9 71.5 69.0 65.8 63.6 65.2
Non-approved qualifica-
tion 15.8 16.0 14.4 14.7 14.7 14.0 13.6 12.6 15.0 14.5 16.9 19.9 22.8 26.4 25.4
Foreign language learning 3.8 6.1 5.7 5.7 6.5 7.3 8.8 9.1 9.9 12.6 11.5 11.1 11.4 10.0 9.4
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: NMH.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2012ent05_20
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Table 5.21: The distribution of those entering into the training programmes by age groups and educational level
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Total number of entrants 45,092 25,760 27,727 26,459 25,353 42,710 37,467 39,780
By age groups, %
–20 10.4 9.0 9.7 8.7 7.0 8.1 4.9 3.8
20–24 24.1 22.3 23.1 23.0 24.7 26.9 25.1 23.9
25–44 54.7 54.9 52.3 52.0 51.3 48.3 51.5 52.4
45–49 6.5 7.9 7.8 7.8 8.0 7.0 8.5 8.8
50+ 4.3 5.9 7.1 8.4 9.2 9.7 10.0 11.0
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
By level of education, %
Less than primary school 1.3 1.7 2.3 1.2 1.6 2.1 7.5 3.0
Primary school 23.1 23.8 26.3 25.1 24.0 28.1 22.8 24.5
Vocational school 26.9 26.6 25.7 26.8 24.5 21.9 22.0 25.5
Vocational and technical secondary 
school 25.7 24.5 23.3 23.5 23.9 22.6 24.8 23.7
Grammar school 15.5 14.2 14.4 15.0 16.3 15.9 15.3 15.8
College, university 7.6 9.2 8.1 8.4 9.8 9.4 7.6 7.5
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: NMH.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2012ent05_21
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Table 6.1: Nominal and real earnings
Year
Gross earnings Net earnings Gross earnings index
Net earnings 
index
Consumer 
price index
Real earnings 
index
HUF previous year = 100
1990 13,446 10,108 128.6 121.6 128.9 94.3
1991 17,934 12,948 130.0 125.5 135.0 93.0
1992 22,294 15,628 125.1 121.3 123.0 98.6
1993 27,173 18,397 121.9 117.7 122.5 96.1
1994 33,939 23,424 124.9 127.3 118.8 107.2
1995 38,900 25,891 116.8 112.6 128.2 87.8
1996 46,837 30,544 120.4 117.4 123.6 95.0
1997 57,270 38,145 122.3 124.1 118.3 104.9
1998 67,764 45,162 118.3 118.4 114.3 103.6
1999 77,187 50,076 116.1 112.7 110.0 102.5
2000 87,645 55,785 113.5 111.4 109.8 101.5
2001 103,553 64,913 118.0 116.2 109.2 106.4
2002 122,482 77,622 118.3 119.6 105.3 113.6
2003 137,187 88,751 112.0 114.3 104.7 109.2
2004 145,520 93,715 106.0 105.6 106.8 99.0
2005 158,343 103,149 108.8 110.1 103.6 106.3
2006 171,239 110,896 108.1 107.5 103.9 103.5
2007 185,004 114,112 108.0 103.0 108.0 95.4
2008 198,964 122,267 107.5 107.0 106.1 100.8
2009 199,775 124,086 100.5 101.7 104.2 97.6
2010 202,576 132,628 101.4 106.9 104.9 101.9
Source: KSH IMS.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2012ent06_01
Figure 6.1: Annual changes of gross and net real earnings
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Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2012ena06_01
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Table 6.2.a: Gross earnings ratios in the economy, HUF/person/month
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Agriculture, forestry and 
fishing 59,362 72,261 84,542 89,446 97,219 103,190 112,388 122,231 133,570 137,101 143,861
Mining and quarrying 109,046 124,755 135,770 142,882 158,945 171,465 190,530 202,985 225,650 244,051 233,985
Manufacturing 88,031 100,964 113,707 123,914 136,354 145,997 158,597 172,277 183,081 190,331 200,748
Electricity, gas, steam 
and air conditioning 
supply
133,658 153,100 176,269 198,733 223,541 243,039 265,912 294,241 321,569 345,035 363,900
Water supply; sewerage, 
waste management and 
remediation activities
83,938 95,214 108,585 119,341 129,486 140,699 151,912 164,572 178,049 181,818 193,605
Construction 64,288 79,368 86,324 94,193 100,124 106,608 117,626 136,301 146,475 152,204 153,003
Wholesale and retail 
trade; repair of motor 
vehicles and motorcy-
cles
78,417 91,303 106,709 115,922 122,538 131,068 145,243 158,077 171,780 175,207 185,695
Transportation and stor-
age 87,473 100,148 112,577 124,419 137,526 149,068 162,091 173,776 186,376 196,350 200,111
Accommodation and 
food service activities 55,276 66,358 77,756 87,115 90,089 95,823 102,908 112,222 120,600 122,561 122,691
Information and commu-
nication 169,984 203,466 234,040 250,308 273,606 288,876 306,792 328,902 358,217 366,752 368,115
Financial and insurance 
activities 189,818 217,018 241,654 274,081 324,295 349,809 401,580 390,511 431,601 427,508 433,442
Real estate activities 89,468 94,671 111,627 122,087 126,388 134,409 145,550 159,225 169,845 177,747 182,747
Professional, scientific 
and technical activities 110,626 136,522 149,544 167,758 182,970 200,830 212,963 244,998 281,150 292,974 297,559
Administrative and sup-
port service activities 73,108 89,575 102,693 107,250 113,276 119,555 128,486 139,127 147,125 149,131 145,574
Public administration 
and defence; compul-
sory social security
104,288 131,731 167,856 180,866 184,357 207,356 223,009 253,335 267,657 234,696 243,401
Education 81,160 97,580 128,536 162,293 159,803 181,444 191,211 193,250 204,600 194,958 195,928
Human health and social 
work activities 68,372 78,796 103,149 129,995 130,509 144,100 151,889 160,050 169,977 161,265 142,337
Arts, entertainment and 
recreation 75,318 87,630 112,894 137,826 141,957 154,312 161,416 183,898 183,813 179,199 179,981
Other service activities 66,946 80,752 91,198 103,554 127,136 133,846 140,893 153,512 157,950 160,375 150,045
National economy, total 87,750 103,554 122,481 137,193 145,523 158,343 171,351 185,018 198,741 199,837 202,576
Of which:
– Business sector 88,424 102,834 116,596 127,032 138,926 148,555 162,531 177,415 192,044 200,304 206,848
– Budgetary institutions 86,573 105,944 136,844 160,844 161,559 182,185 193,949 206,225 219,044 201,632 196,186
Note: The data are recalculated based on the industrial classification system in effect from 2008.
Source: KSH mid-year IMS.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2012ent06_02a
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Table 6.2.b: Gross earnings ratios in the economy, per cent
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Agriculture, forestry and 
fishing 67.6 69.8 69.0 65.2 66.8 65.2 65.6 66.1 67.2 68.6 71.0
Mining and quarrying 124.3 120.5 110.8 104.1 109.2 108.3 111.2 109.7 113.5 122.1 115.5
Manufacturing 100.3 97.5 92.8 90.3 93.7 92.2 92.6 93.1 92.1 95.2 99.1
Electricity, gas, steam 
and air conditioning 
supply
152.3 147.8 143.9 144.9 153.6 153.5 155.2 159.0 161.8 172.7 179.6
Water supply; sewerage, 
waste management and 
remediation activities
95.7 91.9 88.7 87.0 89.0 88.9 88.7 88.9 89.6 91.0 95.6
Construction 73.3 76.6 70.5 68.7 68.8 67.3 68.6 73.7 73.7 76.2 75.5
Wholesale and retail 
trade; repair of motor 
vehicles and motorcy-
cles
89.4 88.2 87.1 84.5 84.2 82.8 84.8 85.4 86.4 87.7 91.7
Transportation and stor-
age 99.7 96.7 91.9 90.7 94.5 94.1 94.6 93.9 93.8 98.3 98.9
Accommodation and 
food service activities 63.0 64.1 63.5 63.5 61.9 60.5 60.1 60.7 60.7 61.3 60.6
Information and commu-
nication 193.7 196.5 191.1 182.4 188.0 182.4 179.0 177.8 180.2 183.5 181.7
Financial and insurance 
activities 216.3 209.6 197.3 199.8 222.8 220.9 234.4 211.1 217.2 213.9 214.0
Real estate activities 102.0 91.4 91.1 89.0 86.9 84.9 84.9 86.1 85.5 88.9 90.2
Professional, scientific 
and technical activities 126.1 131.8 122.1 122.3 125.7 126.8 124.3 132.4 141.5 146.6 146.9
Administrative and sup-
port service activities 83.3 86.5 83.8 78.2 77.8 75.5 75.0 75.2 74.0 74.6 71.9
Public administration 
and defence; compulso-
ry social security
118.8 127.2 137.0 131.8 126.7 131.0 130.1 136.9 134.7 117.4 120.2
Education 92.5 94.2 104.9 118.3 109.8 114.6 111.6 104.4 102.9 97.6 96.7
Human health and social 
work activities 77.9 76.1 84.2 94.8 89.7 91.0 88.6 86.5 85.5 80.7 70.3
Arts, entertainment and 
recreation 85.8 84.6 92.2 100.5 97.5 97.5 94.2 99.4 92.5 89.7 88.8
Other service activities 76.3 78.0 74.5 75.5 87.4 84.5 82.2 83.0 79.5 80.3 74.1
National economy, total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Of which:
– Business sector 100.8 99.3 95.2 92.6 95.5 93.8 94.9 95.9 96.6 100.2 102.1
– Budgetary institutions 98.7 102.3 111.7 117.2 111.0 115.1 113.2 111.5 110.2 100.9 96.8
Note: The data are recalculated based on the industrial classification system in effect from 2008.
Source: KSH mid-year IMS.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2012ent06_02b
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Table 6.3: Regression-adjusted earnings differentials
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Male 0.1800 0.1600 0.1620 0.1410 0.1480 0.1490 0.1500 0.1520 0.1810 0.1720 0.1460 0.1480
Less than primary school –0.6030 –0.5740 –0.4870 –0.4550 –0.4110 –0.3900 –0.4800 –0.4090 –0.4350 –0.4030 –0.5580 –0.3700
Primary school –0.4660 –0.4120 –0.3650 –0.3640 –0.3550 –0.3670 –0.3730 –0.3830 –0.4160 –0.4050 –0.4500 –0.3740
Vocational school –0.3210 –0.2780 –0.2530 –0.2730 –0.2550 –0.2650 –0.2750 –0.2840 –0.2940 –0.2800 –0.3020 –0.2440
College, university 0.5300 0.5570 0.5310 0.5400 0.6190 0.5870 0.5900 0.5790 0.5620 0.5560 0.6220 0.5750
Estimated labour market 
experience 0.0248 0.0250 0.0212 0.0213 0.0216 0.0237 0.0238 0.0254 0.0256 0.0250 0.0258 0.0231
Square of estimated la-
bour market experience –0.0004 –0.0004 –0.0003 –0.0003 –0.0003 –0.0004 –0.0004 –0.0004 –0.0004 –0.0004 –0.0004 –0.0004
Public servant –0.1990 –0.1230 –0.1140 –0.0581 0.1120 0.1600 0.1130 0.0918 0.0031 0.0224 –0.1310 –0.0589
Note: the results indicate the earnings differentials of the various groups relative to the reference group in log points 
(approximately percentage points). All parameters are significant at the 0.01 level.
All equation specifications control for industrial classification. We do not include the parameter estimates of the 
industrial classification variables, since the classification changed several times between 1998 and 2009. The region 
parameters can be seen in Table 9.6.
Reference category: women, with leaving certificate (general education certificate), not in the public sector, working 
in the Central-Transdanubia region.
Source: NMH BT.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2012ent06_03
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Figure 6.2: The percentage of low paid workers by gender, per cent
Source: NMH BT.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2012ena06_02
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Table 6.4: Percentage of low paid workersa by gender, age groups, level of education and industries
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
By gender
Males 15.6 18.1 18.1 18.8 22.1 20.7 22.3 24.8 25.1 25.4 26.7 21.9 21.2 21.1 21.2
Females 26.5 25.7 25.9 26.4 26.8 25.0 22.5 21.6 22.8 22.9 21.9 21.3 20.8 21.7 21.2
By age groups
–24 37.8 39.1 37.7 37.9 37.0 35.5 37.6 39.9 43.9 44.2 46.3 40.1 34.6 38.9 38.2
25–54 19.4 20.2 20.6 21.3 22.8 21.9 21.8 22.3 23.6 24.0 24.2 21.4 20.6 21.0 20.9
55+ 11.0 11.8 12.7 17.2 19.8 18.1 16.2 15.3 16.5 16.5 16.4 15.8 15.5 17.6 18.1
By level of education
8 grades of primary school or less 40.1 40.6 42.9 43.9 43.4 40.4 38.3 37.1 39.6 41.2 40.1 41.4 41.3 47.4 43.4
Vocational school 23.7 27.0 26.9 28.6 31.2 29.4 32.1 35.4 35.7 36.8 37.9 32.9 32.1 33.5 33.3
Secondary school 13.1 14.0 14.2 15.4 18.8 18.0 16.5 17.7 18.6 18.6 19.7 16.1 15.4 16.4 17.3
Higher education 3.2 3.0 3.4 3.2 4.7 4.7 3.6 3.5 3.9 3.8 4.3 2.5 2.4 2.3 2.9
By industriesb
Agriculture, forestry, fishing 30.1 36.7 36.7 38.1 38.0 34.3 37.9 37.3 37.1 37.5 41.6 37.9 36.6 36.7 34.6
Manufacturing 15.8 18.5 18.9 18.9 20.0 19.1 19.4 25.4 24.7 22.1 24.1 20.8 23.5 23.0 20.5
Construction 26.7 32.7 32.6 36.7 42.9 41.7 44.8 49.8 51.2 50.2 55.2 43.1 37.5 38.1 43.0
Trade, repairing 31.7 36.0 37.7 36.8 42.8 41.3 44.0 49.0 49.3 51.5 49.4 40.9 35.9 35.2 36.4
Transport, storage, communication 8.5 8.8 8.8 9.0 11.3 10.6 10.5 13.6 12.6 13.8 15.1 13.2 14.6 11.2 13.3
Financial intermediation 17.0 19.9 19.9 21.1 25.3 22.6 20.7 23.1 23.9 24.6 26.2 20.9 20.0 20.5 20.7
Public administration and defence, 
compulsory social security 25.9 19.0 15.5 16.0 13.7 13.8 9.3 6.6 8.2 6.0 6.3 7.4 6.7 8.7 8.8
Education 25.6 21.7 23.2 23.8 21.5 22.6 16.0 4.8 6.9 8.8 6.1 9.0 7.2 11.9 10.6
Health and social work 25.9 24.1 25.8 28.0 26.7 19.9 16.1 6.3 8.4 10.3 8.6 12.6 11.1 14.5 13.8
Total 21.0 21.9 22.0 22.7 24.4 22.8 22.4 23.2 24.0 24.2 24.3 21.6 21.0 21.4 21.2
a Percentage of those who earn less than 2/3 of the median earning.
b 1995–2008: by TEÁOR’03, 2009–: by TEÁOR’08.
Source: NMH BT.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2012ent06_04
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Figure 6.3: The dispersion of gross monthly earnings
Source: NMH BT.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2012ena06_03
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Figure 6.4: Age-income profiles by education level in 1998 and 2010, women and men
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Source: NMH BT.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2012ena06_04
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Figure 6.5: The dispersion of the logarithm of gross real earnings (2010 = 100%)
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Source: NMH BT.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2012ena06_05
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Table 7.1: School-leavers by level of education
Year Primary school Vocational school Secondary school College, university
1980 119,809 49,232 43,167 14,859
1989 170,891 53,724 52,573 15,699
1990 164,614 54,933 53,039 15,963
1991 158,907 59,302 54,248 16,458
1992 151,287 66,261 59,646 16,201
1993 144,200 66,342 68,607 16,223
1994 136,857 62,902 68,604 18,041
1995 122,333 57,057 70,265 20,024
1996 120,529 54,209 73,413 22,128
1997 116,708 46,868 75,564 24,411
1998 113,651 42,866 77,660 25,338
1999 114,302 38,822 73,965 27,049
2000 114,250 35,500a 72,200a 29,843a
2001 114,200a 33,500a 70,441 29,746
2002 113,923 26,941 69,612 30,785
2003 117,747 26,472 71,944 31,911
2004 113,179 26,620 76,669 31,633
2005 115,626 25,519 77,025 32,732
2006 114,240 24,427 76,895 29,871
2007 108,889 17,967 77,527 29,059
2008 106,426 19,289 68,453 28,957
2009 102,798 20,138 78,004 36,064
2010 103,643 20,693 77,930 38,456
a Estimated data.
Note: Primary school: completed the 8th grade. Other levels: received certificate. Ex-
cludes special schools. College, university: from 2007 includes those completing basic 
higher education, combined, and masters programs.
Source: NEFMI STAT.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2012ent07_01
Figure 7.1: Full time studens as a percentage of the different age groups
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Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2012ena07_01
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Table 7.2: Pupils/students entering the school system by level of education
Year Primary school Vocational school Secondary school College, university
1980 171,347 60,865 57,213 17,886
1990 125,665 87,932 83,939 22,662
1995 123,997 65,352 82,665 42,433
1996 124,554 58,822 84,773 44,698
1997 127,214 53,083 84,395 45,669
1998 125,875 39,965 86,868 48,886
1999 121,424 33,570 89,184 51,586
2000 117,000 33,900a 90,800a 54,100a
2001 112,144 34,210 92,393 56,709
2002 112,345 33,497 94,256 57,763
2003 114,020 33,394 92,817 59,699
2004 101,021 32,645 93,469 59,783
2005 97,810 33,114 96,181 61,898
2006 95,954 32,732 95,989 61,231
2007 98,766 31,897 92,957 55,789
2008 97,345 32,774 90,667 52,755
2009 97,083 34,177 87,731 61,948
2010 95,469 35,177 88,644 68,715
a Estimated data.
Source: NEFMI STAT.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2012ent07_02
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Figure 7.2: Flows of the educational system by level
Source: NEFMI STAT.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2012ena07_02
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Table 7.3: The number of full time pupils/students by level of education
Year Primary school Vocational school Secondary school College, university
1990/91 1,130,656 222,204 291,872 76,601
1996/97 965,998 158,407 361,395 142,113
1997/98 963,997 143,911 368,645 152,889
1998/99 964,248 128,203 376,626 163,100
1999/00 960,601 117,038 386,579 171,612
2001/02 905,932 124,615 420,889 184,071
2002/03 893,261 123,069 426,384 193,155
2003/04 874,296 123,206 437,909 204,910
2004/05 854,930 123,008 438,496 212,292
2005/06 828,594 121,815 441,002 217,245
2006/07 800,635 119,520 443,166 224,616
2007/08 783,948 122,973 441,886 227,118
2008/09 765,822 123,640 439,957 224,894
2009/10 752,896 128,479 443,078 222,564
2010/11 736,977 129,076 438,892 218,057
Note: Excludes special education schools. Beginning with the 2001/2002 schoolyear, 
students in grades 5–8 who attend a 6 or 8 year high school are included in the number 
of high school students. The reason for the missing data in 2000/01 is that the NEFMI 
was unable to carry out the analysis based in the source data due to technical difficul-
ties. College, university: from the 2005/2006 schoolyear, includes those completing 
basic higher education, combined, and masters programs.
Source: NEFMI STAT.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2012ent07_03
Table 7.4: The number of pupils/students not in full time by level of education
Year Primary school Vocational school Secondary school College, university
1990/91 11,536 – 68,162 25,786
1996/97 4,099 – 74,653 56,919
1997/98 3,165 – 78,292 80,768
1998/99 3,016 – 84,862 95,215
1999/00 3,146 – 88,462 107,385
2000/01 2,940 1,070 91,700 118,994
2001/02 2,793 2,453 95,231 129,167
2002/03 2,785 3,427 93,172 148,032
2003/04 3,190 3,216 93,322 162,037
2004/05 2,766 3,505 90,321 166,174
2005/06 2,543 4,049 89,950 163,387
2006/07 2,319 4,829 91,035 151,203
2007/08 2,245 5,874 83,008 132,273
2008/09 2,083 4,983 74,008 115,957
2009/10 2,035 6,594 70,124 105,511
2010/11 1,997 8,068 76,404 99,962
Note: College, university: from the 2005/2006 schoolyear, includes those completing 
basic higher education, combined, and masters programs.
Source: NEFMI STAT.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2012ent07_04
statistical data
276
Table 7.5: Number of high school applicants, full time
Year
Applied Admitted
Admitted as a 
percentage  
of applied
Applied Admitted
as a percentage of the secondary 
school graduates in the given year
1980 33,339 14,796 44.4 77.2 34.3
1989 44,138 15,420 34.9 84.0 29.3
1990 46,767 16,818 36.0 88.2 31.7
1991 48,911 20,338 41.6 90.2 37.5
1992 59,119 24,022 40.6 99.1 40.3
1993 71,741 28,217 39.3 104.6 41.1
1994 79,805 29,901 37.5 116.3 43.6
1995 86,548 35,081 40.5 123.2 49.9
1996 79,369 38,382 48.4 108.1 52.3
1997 81,924 40,355 49.3 108.4 53.4
1998 81,065 43,629 53.8 104.4 56.2
1999 82,815 44,538 53.8 112.0 60.2
2000 82,957 45,546 54.9 114.9 63.1
2001 84,380 49,874 59.1 119.8 70.8
2002 88,978 52,552 59.1 127.8 75.5
2003 87,110 52,703 60.5 121.1 73.3
2004 95,871 55,179 57.6 125.0 72.0
2005 91,583 52,863 57.7 118.9 68.6
2006 84,262 53,983 64.1 109.6 70.2
2007 74,849 50,941 68.1 96.5 65.7
2008 66,963 52,081 77.8 97.8 76.1
2009 90,878 61,262 67.4 116.5 78.5
2010 100,777 65,503 65.0 129.3 84.1
Note: Including those applying to and accepted to basic higher education, combined, 
and masters programs. From 2008, includes the number of those accepted during late 
and cross-semester admissions.
Source: NEFMI STAT.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2012ent07_05
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Table 8.1: The number of vacanciesa reported to the local offices of the NFSZ
Year
Number of vacancies  
at closing day
Number of registered  
unemployedb at closing date
Vacancies per 100  
registered unemployedb
1991 14,343 227,270 6.3
1992 21,793 556,965 3.9
1993 34,375 671,745 5.1
1994 35,569 568,366 6.3
1995 28,680 507,695 5.6
1996 38,297 500,622 7.6
1997 42,544 470,112 9.0
1998 46,624 423,121 11.0
1999 51,438 409,519 12.6
2000 50,000 390,492 12.8
2001 45,194 364,140 12.4
2002 44,603 344,715 12.9
2003 47,239 357,212 13.2
2004 48,223 375,950 12.8
2005 41,615 409,929 10.2
2006 41,677 393,465 10.6
2007 29,933 426,915 7.0
2008 25,386 442,333 5.7
2009 20,739 561,768 3.7
2010 22,241 582,664 3.8
a Monthly average stock figures.
b Since 1st of November, 2005: registered jobseekers instead of registered unemployed.
Source: NMH.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2012ent08_01
Figure 8.1: The number of vacancies reported to the local offices of the NFSZ
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Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2012ena08_01
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Table 8.2: Firms intending to increase/decrease their staff,a per cent
Year
Intending  
to decrease
Intending  
to increase Year
Intending  
to decrease
Intending  
to increase
1993 I. 34.7 23.6 2000 I. 24.4 41.0
II. 28.5 22.3 II. 27.2 36.5
1994 I. 24.5 29.1 2001 I. 25.3 40.0
II. 21.0 29.7 II. 28.6 32.6
1995 I. 30.1 32.9 2002 I. 25.6 39.2
II. 30.9 27.5 II. 27.9 35.4
1996 I. 32.9 33.3 2003 I. 23.6 38.5
II. 29.4 30.4 II. 32.1 34.3
1997 I. 29.6 39.4 2004 30.0 39.8
II. 30.7 36.8 2005 25.3 35.0
1998 I. 23.4 42.7 2006 26.6 36.2
II. 28.9 37.1 2007 20.4 27.0
1999 I. 25.8 39.2 2008 26.9 23.2
II. 28.8 35.8 2009 18.4 26.8
2010 15.4 26.0
a In the period of the next half year after the interview date, in the sample of NMH 
PROG, since 2004: 1 year later from the interview date.
Source: NMH PROG.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2012ent08_02
Figure 8.2: Firms intending to increase/decrease their staff
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Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2012ena08_02
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Table 9.1: Regional inequalities: Employment ratea
Year
Central 
Hungary
Central  
Transdanubia
Western 
Transdanubia
Southern 
Transdanubia
Northern 
Hungary
Northern 
Great Plain
Southern 
Great Plain Total
1993 58.4 55.2 60.5 52.9 49.3 48.4 53.4 54.5
1994 57.2 54.4 59.9 52.4 47.7 47.5 53.0 53.5
1995 57.1 53.1 58.5 48.8 46.3 46.4 53.0 52.5
1996 56.8 52.7 59.3 50.3 45.7 45.6 52.8 52.4
1997 56.8 53.6 59.8 50.0 45.7 45.2 53.6 52.5
1998 57.7 56.0 61.6 51.5 46.2 46.4 54.2 53.7
1999 59.7 58.5 63.1 52.8 48.1 48.8 55.3 55.6
2000 60.5 59.2 63.4 53.5 49.4 49.0 56.0 56.3
2001 60.6 59.3 63.1 52.3 49.7 49.5 55.8 56.2
2002 60.9 60.0 63.7 51.6 50.3 49.3 54.2 56.2
2003 61.7 62.3 61.9 53.4 51.2 51.6 53.2 57.0
2004 62.9 60.3 61.4 52.3 50.6 50.4 53.6 56.8
2005 63.3 60.2 62.0 53.4 49.5 50.2 53.8 56.9
2006 62.7 61.4 62.8 53.6 50.4 51.1 54.3 57.3
2007 62.7 61.8 63.4 51.2 50.8 50.5 55.2 57.3
2008 62.7 60.3 62.1 51.0 49.5 49.9 54.5 56.7
2009 61.6 57.8 59.7 52.1 48.6 48.1 53.2 55.4
2010 60.3 57.3 59.0 53.1 48.7 49.3 54.4 55.4
a Age: 15–64.
Note: Up to 2000 data are weighted on the basis of the 1990 Population Census.
Source: KSH MEF.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2012ent09_01
Figure 9.1: Regional inequalities: Labour force participation rates, gross monthly 
earnings and gross domestic product in NUTS-2 level regions
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Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2012ena09_01
statistical data
280
Table 9.2: Regional inequalities: LFS-based unemployment ratea
Year
Central 
Hungary
Central  
Transdanubia
Western 
Transdanubia
Southern 
Transdanubia
Northern 
Hungary
Northern 
Great Plain
Southern 
Great Plain Total
1996 8.2 10.4 7.1 9.4 15.5 13.2 8.4 10.0
1997 7.0 8.1 6.0 9.9 14.0 12.0 7.3 8.8
1998 5.7 6.8 6.1 9.4 12.2 11.1 7.1 7.8
1999 5.2 6.1 4.4 8.3 11.6 10.2 5.8 7.0
2000 5.3 4.9 4.2 7.8 10.1 9.3 5.1 6.4
2001 4.3 4.3 4.1 7.7 8.5 7.8 5.4 5.7
2002 3.9 5.0 4.0 7.9 8.8 7.8 6.2 5.8
2003 4.0 4.6 4.6 7.9 9.7 6.8 6.5 5.9
2004 4.5 5.6 4.6 7.3 9.7 7.2 6.3 6.1
2005 5.2 6.3 5.9 8.8 10.6 9.1 8.2 7.2
2006 5.1 6.1 5.7 9.0 11.0 10.9 7.8 7.5
2007 4.7 5.0 5.0 10.0 12.3 10.8 7.9 7.4
2008 4.6 5.8 5.0 10.3 13.4 12.0 8.8 7.8
2009 6.6 9.3 8.6 11.0 15.2 14.2 10.9 10.0
2010 8.9 10.3 9.2 12.1 16.0 14.5 10.6 11.2
a Age: 15–74.
Note: Up to 2000 data are weighted on the basis of the 1990 Population Census.
Source: KSH MEF.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2012ent09_02
Table 9.3: Regional differences: The share of registered unemployeda  
relative to the economically active populationb, per cent
Year
Central 
Hungary
Central  
Transdanubia
Western 
Transdanubia
Southern 
Transdanubia
Northern 
Hungary
Northern 
Great Plain
Southern 
Great Plain Total
1996 6.4 10.7 8.0 12.6 16.7 16.8 11.3 11.0
1997 5.6 9.9 7.3 13.1 16.8 16.4 11.0 10.5
1998 4.7 8.6 6.1 11.8 16.0 15.0 10.1 9.5
1999 4.5 8.7 5.9 12.1 17.1 16.1 10.4 9.7
2000 3.8 7.5 5.6 11.8 17.2 16.0 10.4 9.3
2001 3.2 6.7 5.0 11.2 16.0 14.5 9.7 8.5
2002 2.8 6.6 4.9 11.0 15.6 13.3 9.2 8.0
2003 2.8 6.7 5.2 11.7 16.2 14.1 9.7 8.3
2004 3.2 6.9 5.8 12.2 15.7 14.1 10.4 8.7
2005 3.4 7.4 6.9 13.4 16.5 15.1 11.2 9.4
2006 3.1 7.0 6.3 13.0 15.9 15.0 10.7 9.0
2007 3.5 6.9 6.3 13.6 17.6 16.6 11.7 9.7
2008 3.6 7.1 6.3 14.3 17.8 17.5 11.9 10.0
2009 5.4 11.5 9.5 17.8 20.9 20.2 14.4 12.8
2010 6.6 11.8 9.3 17.1 21.5 20.9 15.2 13.3
a Since 1st of November, 2005: the ratio of registered jobseekers. From the 1st of Novem-
ber, 2005 the Employment Act changed the definition of registered unemployed to reg-
istered jobseekers.
b The denominator of the ratio is the economically active population on January 1st of 
the previous year.
Source: NMH REG.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2012ent09_03
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Figure 9.2: Regional inequalities: LFS-based unemployment rates in NUTS-2 level regions
Source: KSH MEF.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2012ena09_02
Figure 9.3: Regional inequalities: The share of registered unemployed  
relative to the economically active population, per cent, in NUTS-2 level regions
Source: NMH REG.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2012ena09_03
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Table 9.4: Annual average registered unemployment ratea by counties, per cent
County 1990 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Budapest 0.1 5.7 5.7 4.8 4.0 3.7 3.0 2.6 2.2 2.4 2.8 2.9 2.6 3.0 3.1 4.6 5.9
Baranya 1.1 11.8 12.2 13.3 11.8 11.6 11.6 11.1 11.2 11.9 11.6 13.4 13.3 12.9 13.6 14.7 17.1
Bács-Kiskun 1.1 11.0 10.9 10.7 9.7 10.0 10.0 9.3 8.8 9.4 9.9 10.4 10.2 11.4 12.0 17.9 15.6
Békés 1.1 14.0 14.0 13.5 13.0 13.0 13.1 11.9 11.2 11.5 12.0 13.0 13.5 15.0 14.8 17.3 18.1
Borsod-Abaúj-Zemplén 2.3 16.7 18.0 19.0 17.9 19.5 20.3 19.0 19.1 19.6 18.3 18.9 18.0 19.9 20.1 23.1 23.7
Csongrád 1.0 9.9 9.3 9.2 8.1 8.5 8.6 8.3 8.1 8.5 9.7 10.7 8.8 9.2 9.3 11.6 12.4
Fejér 1.0 10.6 10.4 9.4 8.4 8.3 7.2 6.4 6.4 7.1 7.3 7.4 7.3 7.1 7.5 11.5 12.4
Győr-Moson-Sopron 0.5 6.8 7.4 6.4 5.1 4.8 4.6 4.1 4.0 4.1 4.6 5.4 4.6 4.1 4.1 6.9 6.8
Hajdú-Bihar 0.9 14.2 15.6 15.0 14.0 15.6 14.7 13.6 12.8 13.1 12.9 14.0 13.9 15.6 16.5 19.1 20.3
Heves 1.6 12.5 13.6 12.1 11.7 12.3 12.0 10.6 9.8 10.0 10.6 11.3 11.1 12.2 12.7 15.8 16.1
Jász-Nagykun-Szolnok 1.6 14.6 14.8 14.8 13.5 13.7 13.4 11.5 10.2 10.7 11.2 12.0 11.4 11.8 12.2 15.5 16.4
Komárom-Esztergom 1.0 11.3 12.0 11.4 9.8 10.1 8.3 7.0 6.7 6.0 5.8 6.8 5.8 5.4 5.5 10.2 10.4
Nógrád 2.4 16.3 17.0 16.3 15.6 16.2 14.9 14.3 13.8 14.6 14.6 16.1 16.1 17.7 17.8 21.2 22.0
Pest 0.5 7.6 7.8 7.3 6.3 6.0 5.2 4.4 3.7 3.7 3.8 4.2 3.9 4.3 4.4 6.7 7.7
Somogy 1.4 11.2 12.5 12.7 11.3 12.2 11.9 11.6 11.5 12.2 13.4 14.5 14.6 16.2 16.9 19.4 18.9
Szabolcs-Szatmár-Bereg 2.6 19.3 19.7 18.9 17.2 18.7 19.5 17.8 16.7 17.7 17.5 18.6 18.8 21.0 22.4 24.7 24.8
Tolna 1.6 12.2 13.4 13.5 12.3 12.9 11.8 11.0 10.0 10.7 11.6 11.8 10.5 11.5 12.1 15.2 14.7
Vas 0.4 7.2 7.2 6.7 5.6 5.6 5.2 4.9 4.5 5.0 6.0 6.8 6.1 6.2 6.1 9.8 9.6
Veszprém 0.9 10.0 9.9 9.2 7.9 8.2 7.2 6.9 6.6 7.0 7.3 8.0 7.7 8.0 8.2 12.6 12.3
Zala 0.8 9.2 9.8 9.2 8.1 7.7 7.2 6.5 6.4 7.0 7.4 9.3 9.0 9.3 9.4 13.0 12.9
Total 1.0 10.6 11.0 10.5 9.5 9.7 9.3 8.5 8.0 8.3 8.7 9.4 9.0 9.7 10.0 12.8 13.3
a Since 1st of November, 2005: the ratio of registered jobseekers. From the 1st of November, 2005 the Employment 
Act changed the definition of registered unemployed to registered jobseekers. The denominator of the ratio is the 
economically active population on January 1st of the previous year.
Source: NMH REG.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2012ent09_04
Figure 9.4: Regional inequalities: Means of registered unemployment rates in the counties, 2010
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Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2012ena09_04
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Table 9.5: Regional inequalities: Gross monthly earningsa
Year
Central 
Hungary
Central  
Transdanubia
Western 
Transdanubia
Southern 
Transdanubia
Northern 
Hungary
Northern 
Great Plain
Southern 
Great Plain Total
1997 70,967 56,753 52,934 51,279 51,797 50,021 50,245 58,022
1998 86,440 68,297 64,602 60,736 60,361 58,208 58,506 69,415
1999 101,427 77,656 74,808 70,195 70,961 68,738 68,339 81,067
2000 114,637 87,078 83,668 74,412 77,714 73,858 73,591 90,338
2001 132,136 100,358 96,216 86,489 88,735 84,930 84,710 103,610
2002 149,119 110,602 106,809 98,662 102,263 98,033 97,432 117,672
2003 170,280 127,819 121,464 117,149 117,847 115,278 113,532 135,472
2004 184,039 137,168 131,943 122,868 128,435 124,075 121,661 147,111
2005 192,962 147,646 145,771 136,276 139,761 131,098 130,406 157,770
2006 212,001 157,824 156,499 144,189 152,521 142,142 143,231 171,794
2007 229,897 173,937 164,378 156,678 159,921 153,241 153,050 186,229
2008 245,931 185,979 174,273 160,624 169,313 160,332 164,430 198,087
2009 254,471 187,352 182,855 169,615 169,333 160,688 164,638 203,859
2010 258,653 194,794 183,454 171,769 173,696 162,455 169,441 207,456
a Gross monthly earnings (HUF/person), May.
Note: The data refer to full-time employees in the budgetary sector and firms employing 
at least 10 workers (1997–99), and at least 5 workers (2000–), respectively.
Source: NMH BT.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2012ent09_05
Table 9.6: Regression-adjusted earnings differentials
Year
Central  
Hungary
Western  
Transdanubia
Southern 
Transdanubia
Northern  
Hungary
Northern  
Great Plain
Southern  
Great Plain
1996 0.0894 –0.0408 –0.0857 –0.1090 –0.1190 –0.1060
1997 0.0730 –0.0473 –0.1050 –0.1010 –0.1160 –0.1170
1998 0.0759 –0.0501 –0.1120 –0.1250 –0.1500 –0.1350
1999 0.1000 –0.0175 –0.1120 –0.1070 –0.1340 –0.1220
2000 0.0729 –0.0067 –0.1610 –0.1320 –0.1500 –0.1660
2001 0.0739 –0.0200 –0.1500 –0.1400 –0.1550 –0.1630
2002 0.0903 –0.0378 –0.1120 –0.0950 –0.1170 –0.1070
2003 0.0493 –0.0542 –0.1220 –0.1220 –0.1400 –0.1410
2004 0.0648 –0.0313 –0.1410 –0.0953 –0.1400 –0.1270
2005 0.0291 –0.0372 –0.1310 –0.1010 –0.1450 –0.1390
2006 0.0691 –0.0191 –0.1430 –0.0856 –0.1300 –0.1130
2007 0.0659 –0.0826 –0.1380 –0.1260 –0.1570 –0.1440
2008 0.0467 –0.0926 –0.1820 –0.1380 –0.1930 –0.1640
2009 0.0732 –0.0468 –0.1300 –0.1220 –0.1470 –0.1450
2010 0.0599 –0.0773 –0.1480 –0.1220 –0.1700 –0.1600
Note: the results indicate the earnings differentials of the various groups relative to the 
reference group in log points (approximately percentage points). All parameters are 
significant at the 0.01 level.
Reference category: women, with leaving certificate (general education certificate), not 
in the public sector, working in the Central-Transdanubia region.
Source: NMH BT.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2012ent09_06
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Table 9.7: Regional inequalities: Gross domestic product
Year
Central 
Hungary
Central  
Transdanubia
Western 
Transdanubia
Southern 
Transdanubia
Northern 
Hungary
Northern 
Great Plain
Southern 
Great Plain Total
Thousand HUF/person/month
1997 1,254 801 871 641 554 569 640 830
1998 1,474 969 1,083 754 662 660 742 983
1999 1,710 1,051 1,275 859 731 707 819 1,113
2000 2,014 1,255 1,468 957 827 815 918 1,290
2001 2,311 1,372 1,539 1,074 947 965 1,031 1,458
2002 2,701 1,462 1,703 1,204 1,050 1,062 1,136 1,648
2003 2,940 1,719 2,001 1,321 1,186 1,213 1,254 1,841
2004 3,237 1,953 2,143 1,468 1,366 1,351 1,439 2,021
2005 3,564 2,056 2,169 1,517 1,439 1,390 1,483 2,185
2006 3,921 2,127 2,359 1,591 1,505 1,487 1,563 2,359
2007 4,182 2,319 2,455 1,711 1,566 1,572 1,652 2,518
2008 4,424 2,398 2,594 1,825 1,643 1,657 1,783 2,665
2009 4,395 2,232 2,416 1,782 1,568 1,605 1,716 2,600
Per cent
1997 149.1 96.0 105.2 77.6 67.3 69.1 77.9 100.0
1998 147.8 98.1 110.5 77.2 68.0 67.7 76.3 100.0
1999 151.1 93.7 114.9 77.7 66.3 64.1 74.5 100.0
2000 152.2 97.3 113.9 74.8 64.6 63.4 71.8 100.0
2001 158.5 94.1 105.6 73.7 64.9 66.2 70.7 100.0
2002 163.9 88.7 103.4 73.0 63.7 64.4 68.9 100.0
2003 161.1 92.4 107.6 71.6 64.0 65.3 68.0 100.0
2004 157.9 95.3 104.5 71.6 66.6 65.9 70.2 100.0
2005 163.2 94.0 99.2 69.4 65.9 63.6 67.8 100.0
2006 166.2 90.2 100.0 67.4 63.8 63.0 66.3 100.0
2007 166.1 92.1 97.5 67.9 63.5 62.4 65.6 100.0
2008 166.0 90.0 97.3 68.5 61.6 62.2 66.9 100.0
2009 159.1 85.9 93.0 68.6 60.3 61.7 66.0 100.0
Source: KSH.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2012ent09_07
Table 9.8: Commutinga
Year
Working in the residence Commuter
in thousands per cent in thousands per cent
1980 3,848.5 76.0 1,217.2 24.0
1990 3,380.2 74.7 1,144.7 25.3
2001 2,588.2 70.1 1,102.1 29.9
2005 2,625.1 68.2 1,221.3 31.8
2008 2,645.2 70.9 1,085.1 29.1
a For methodological notes see Dr. Lakatos Miklós – Váradi Rita: A foglalkoztatottak 
napi ingázásának jelentősége a migrációs folyamatokban (The role of daily commuting 
in geographical mobility). Statisztikai Szemle. (87), 2009. 7–8., 763–794.
Source: 1980–2005 NSZ, microcensus, 2008 MEF ad-hoc modul.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2012ent09_08
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Figure 9.5: The share of registered unemployed relative to the population aged 15–64, 1. quarter 2007, per cent
Source: Registered unemployed: NFSZ IR. Population: KSH T-Star.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2012ena09_05
Figure 9.6: The share of registered unemployed relative to the population aged 15–64, 1. quarter 2011, per cent
Source: Registered unemployed: NFSZ IR. Population: KSH T-Star.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2012ena09_06
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Figure 9.7: The share of registered unemployed relative to the population aged 15–64, 2. quarter 2007, per cent
Source: Registered unemployed: NFSZ IR. Population: KSH T-Star.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2012ena09_07
Figure 9.8: The share of registered unemployed relative to the population aged 15–64, 2. quarter 2011, per cent
Source: Registered unemployed: NFSZ IR. Population: KSH T-Star.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2012ena09_08
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Figure 9.9: The share of registered unemployed relative to the population aged 15–64, 3. quarter 2007, per cent
Source: Registered unemployed: NFSZ IR. Population: KSH T-Star.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2012ena09_09
Figure 9.10: The share of registered unemployed relative to the population aged 15–64, 3. quarter 2011, per cent
Source: Registered unemployed: NFSZ IR. Population: KSH T-Star.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2012ena09_10
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Figure 9.11: The share of registered unemployed relative to the population aged 15–64, 4. quarter 2007, per cent
Source: Registered unemployed: NFSZ IR. Population: KSH T-Star.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2012ena09_11
Figure 9.12: The share of registered unemployed relative to the population aged 15–64, 4. quarter 2011, per cent
Source: Registered unemployed: NFSZ IR. Population: KSH T-Star.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2012ena09_12
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Table 10.1: Strikes
Year Number of strikes Number of involved persons Hours lost, in thousands
1994 4 31,529 229
1995a 7 172,048 1,708
1996 8 4,491 19
1997 5 853 15
1998 7 1,447 3
1999 5 16,685 242
2000 5 26,978 1,192
2001 6 21,128 61
2002 4 4,573 9
2003 7 10,831 19
2004 8 6,276 116
2005 11 1,425 8
2006 16 24,670 52
2007 13 64,612 189
2008 8 8,633 ..
2009 9 3,134 8.6
2010 8 3,263 133.1
a Teachers strikes number partly estimated.
Source: KSH strike statistics.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2012ent10_01
Table 10.2: National agreements on wage increase recommendationsa
Year
ÉT Recommendations Actual indexes
Minimum Maximum Budgetary sector Competitve sector
1995 – – 110.7 119.7
1996 113.0 124.0 114.6 123.2
1997 114.0 122.0 123.2 121.8
1998 113.5 116.0 118.0 118.5
1999 112.0 115.0 119.2 114.8
2000 108.5 111.0 112.3 114.2
2001 .. .. 122.9 116.3
2002 108.0 110.5 129.2 113.3
2003 4.5 % real wage growth n.a. 117.5 108.9
2004 107.0 108.0 100.4 109.3
2005 106.0 n.a. 112.8 106.9
2006 104.0 105.0 106.4 109.3
2007 105.5 108.0 106.4 109.1
2008 105.0 107.5 106.2 108.4
2009 103.0 105.0 92.1 104.3
2010 real wage preservation n.a. 100.5b 102.6b
a Average increases of gross wages: recommendations accepted by the National Interest 
Reconciliation Council (ÉT). Previous year = 100.
b Mean real wage index.
Source: KSH, NEFMI.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2012ent10_02
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Table 10.3: Minimum wage, guaranteed wage minimuma
Date
Monthly amount,  
HUF
Average gross  
earnings = 100
Monthly amount of the  
guaranteed minimum wageb
Monthly amount of the  
guaranteed minimum wagec
Monthly amount of the  
guaranteed minimum waged
1992. I. 1. 8,000 35.8 – – –
1993. II. 1. 9,000 33.1 – – –
1994. II. 1. 10,500 30.9 – – –
1995. III. 1. 12,200 31.4 – – –
1996. II. 1. 14,500 31.0 – – –
1997. I. 1. 17,000 29.7 – – –
1998. I. 1. 19,500 28.8 – – –
1999. I. 1. 22,500 29.1 – – –
2000. I. 1. 25,500 29.1 – – –
2001. I. 1. 40,000 38.6 – – –
2002. I. 1. 50,000 40.8 – – –
2003. I. 1. 50,000 36.4 – – –
2004. I. 1. 53,000 37.2 – – –
2005. I. 1. 57,000 33.6 – – –
2006. I. 1. 62,500 36.5 – – –
2006. VII. 1. 62,500 36.5 65,700 68,800 –
2007. I. 1. 65,500 35.4 72,100 75,400 –
2008. I. 1. 69,000 34.7 82,800 86,300 –
2009. I. 1. 71,500 35.8 – – 87,000
2009. VII. 1. 71,500 .. – – 87,500
2010. I. I. 73,500 36.3 – – 89,500
2011. I. I. 78,000 .. – – 94,000
a The guaranteed minimum wage pertains to employees who have completed at least a secondary education level and 
are employed in an occupation requiring skills.
b Guaranteed minimum wage of skilled workers less than 2 years of practical experience.
c Guaranteed minimum wage of skilled workers with at least 2 years of practical experience, or who are above the age 
of 50.
d Beginning in 2009. January 1, the specification regarding the 2 years of practical experience and those above the age 
of 50 was dropped from the legislation.
Note: As of September 2002, minimum wage earners do not pay personal income tax. (As a result of this measure, 
the net minimum wage increased by 15.9 per cent.)
Source: KSH.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2012ent10_03
Table 10.4: Single employer collective agreements in the business sector
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Number of agree-
ments 1,303 1,358 1,333 1,277 1,272 1,295 1,025 1,033 1,032 1,027 962 966
Number of persons 
covered 743,259 730,107 698,262 667,634 649,861 637,508 513,118 489,568 532,065 467,964 432,086 448,138
Source: NGM, Registry of collective agreements.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2012ent10_04
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Table 10.5: Single institution collective agreements in the public sector
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Number of agree-
ments 2,084 2,079 2,077 2,019 2,026 2,020 1,750 1,435 1,711 1,710 1,737 1,751
Number of persons 
covered 274,329 272,051 268,139 251,849 251,352 250,492 228,080 203,497 224,246 222,547 225,434 224,651
Source: NGM, Registry of collective agreements.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2012ent10_05
Table 10.6: Multi-employer collective agreements in the business sector
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Number of agree-
ments 52 70 68 66 71 79 71 75 74 78 80 82
Number of persons 
covered 338,354 246,734 213,443 206,729 261,848 263,752 92,196 86,079 83,117 80,506 222,236 221,627
Source: NGM, Registry of collective agreements.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2012ent10_06
Table 10.7: Multi-institution collective agreements in the public sector
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Number of agreements 11 12 10 9 9 10 5 4 2 1 1 1
Number of persons covered 2,177 2,357 2,081 2,045 2,042 2,072 403 360 238 .. .. ..
Source: NGM, Registry of collective agreements.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2012ent10_07
Table 10.8: The number of firm wage agreements, the number of affected firms,  
and the number of employees covered
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Number of agree-
ments 827 572 471 531 545 515 298 302 214 202 785 905
Number of persons 
covered 587,476 334,056 259,033 279,753 316,585 347,223 169,639 151,022 171,259 100,206 377,677 414,522
Source: NGM, Registry of collective agreements.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2012ent10_08
Table 10.9: The number of multi-employer wage agreements, the number of affected firms,  
and the number of covered companies and employees
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Number of agree-
ments 41 23 19 18 22 19 40 44 40 45 62 68
Number of compa-
nies 3,231 211 181 172 243 145 145 162 147 150 2,350 2,460
Number of persons 
covered 328,774 125,327 68,882 76,129 88,855 25,175 35,039 42,817 33,735 40,046 191,258 211,753
Source: NGM, Registry of collective agreements.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2012ent10_09
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Table 11.1: Family benefits
Year
Tax credit for familiesa Child benefitb Regular child protection allowancec
Wage related maternity 
benefitd
Flat rate maternity  
benefitsd
Average 
monthly 
amount, 
HUF
Average 
number of 
recipient 
families
Average 
monthly 
amount per 
family, HUF
Average 
number of 
recipient 
families
Average 
monthly 
amount, 
HUF
Average 
number of 
recipient 
families
Average 
monthly 
amount, 
HUF
Average 
number of 
recipients
Average 
monthly 
amount, 
HUF
Average 
number of 
recipients
2001 6,547 1,172,862 8,617 1,295,800 4,193 780,000 39,274 62,904 17,828 234,221
2002 6,588 1,069,911 10,034 1,277,900 4,338 758,000 44,901 70,167 19,842 222,104
2003 6,841 1,009,660 11,283 1,292,000 4,705 704,000 48,742 77,942 22,091 214,640
2004 6,941 969,512 11,971 1,290,200 5,236 670,000 54,322 83,678 24,174 210,509
2005 6,979 924,263 12,597 1,264,500 5,619 663,000 58,484 87,172 25,706 208,708
2006 9,392 122,883 21,637 1,269,000 – – 62,684 91,678 27,102 212,741
2007 .. .. 23,031 1,224,000 – – 68,394 93,973 28,496 207,608
2008 .. .. 24,521 1,246,600 – – 73,902 94,515 30,880 208,652
2009 .. .. 24,524 1,245,900 – – 78,725 95,050 30,328 214,416
2010 .. .. 24,442 1,224,000 – – 81,356 94,682 .. ..
a Introduced in 1999. Beginning in 2006, this became a part of family benefits, only families with 3 or more children 
are entitled to tax credits in the amount of 4,000 HUF per child.
b Annual mean. From 1999 to 2002. November 8, the child care benefit includes the family allowance and schooling 
support. Beginning in 2002, the benefits paid in the 13th month are included as well.
c Annual average. Was in use from 1998 to 2005.
d Annual average.
Source: NAV, KSH Welfare Statistics.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2012ent11_01
Table 11.2: Unemployment benefits and average earnings
Year
Insured unemployment benefit and 
other non-means tested benefitsa
Means tested unemployment  
assistanceb Net monthly earnings, HUF
c
Average monthly 
amount, HUF
Average number 
of recipients
Average monthly 
amount, HUF
Average number 
of recipients Male Female Together
2001 25,677 119,210 14,749 142,001 69,910 59,059 64,750
2002 30,113 114,934 14,869 132,895 82,745 72,036 77,770
2003 34,762 107,226 15,010 138,127 94,612 84,632 89,906
2004 37,107 109,654 15,864 144,853 98,101 87,710 93,233
2005 39,593 111,732 16,991 158,565 108,139 98,625 103,727
2006 43,344 109,095 23,771 160,426 .. .. 110,951
2007 46,208 96,463 25,703 194,716 .. .. 114,282
2008 49,454 97,047 27,347 213,436 .. .. 122,267
2009 51,831 152,197 26,817 71,816 .. .. 124,116
2010 50,073 125,651 .. .. .. .. 132,628
a Average of headcount at the end of the month. Includes the pre-pension allowance (2000–2002).
b This scheme changed substantially in July 2006, therefore figures for 2006 are given for the period July-December 
2006.
c Net earnings for the whole economy (including the public sector). The average net wage refers to the entire econo-
my. Competitive sector prior to 1998: at least 19 employees, after 1998: at least 4 employees.
Source: NFSZ: Labour Market Report, 2001. KSH: Welfare systems 2007, Welfare Statistics, Yearbook of Demographics. 
KSH Social Statistics Yearbooks.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2012ent11_02
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Table 11.3: Number of those receiving self-entitled pension, and the mean sum  
of the provisions they received in January of the given year
Year
Old age pension Disability pension under and above retirement age
Number of recipi-
ents
Average amount be-
fore increase, HUF
Average amount af-
ter increase, HUF
Number of recipi-
ents
Average amount be-
fore increase, HUF
Average amount af-
ter increase, HUF
2000 1,671,090 33,258 35,931 762,514 29,217 31,556
2001 1,667,945 37,172 41,002 772,286 32,381 35,705
2002 1,664,062 43,368 47,561 789,544 37,369 40,972
2003 1,657,271 50,652 54,905 799,966 43,185 46,801
2004 1,637,847 57,326 60,962 806,491 48,180 51,220
2005 1,643,409 63,185 67,182 808,107 52,259 55,563
2006 1,658,387 69,145 72,160 806,147 56,485 58,935
2007 1,676,477 74,326 78,577 802,506 59,978 63,120
2008 1,716,315 81,975 87,481 794,797 65,036 69,160
2009 1,731,213 90,476 93,256 779,130 70,979 73,166
2010 1,719,001 94,080 98,804 750,260 73,687 77,500
Source: ONYF.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2012ent11_03
Table 11.4: Number of those receiving social annuities for people with damaged health,  
and the mean sum of the provisions they received after the increase, in January of the given year
Year
Temporary annuity Regular social annuity Health damage annuity for miners Total
Number of re-
cipients
Average 
amount, HUF
Number of re-
cipients
Average 
amount, HUF
Number of re-
cipients
Average amount, 
HUF
Number of re-
cipients
Average 
amount, HUF
2000 15,491 18,309 196,689 14,435 2,852 48,581 215,032 15,167
2001 15,640 20,809 198,820 15,610 3,304 53,379 217,764 16,556
2002 11,523 26,043 200,980 17,645 3,348 59,558 215,851 18,744
2003 12,230 30,135 203,656 19,907 3,345 65,380 219,231 21,171
2004 11,949 33,798 207,300 21,370 2,950 69,777 222,199 22,681
2005 13,186 36,847 207,091 22,773 2,839 74,161 223,116 24,259
2006 14,945 40,578 195,954 23,911 2,786 77,497 213,685 25,776
2007 19,158 42,642 184,845 25,050 2,693 80,720 206,696 27,406
2008 21,538 46,537 170,838 27,176 2,601 85,805 194,977 30,096
2009 21,854 46,678 159,146 27,708 2,533 86,165 183,533 30,774
2010 20,327 47,060 148,704 27,645 2,448 86,252 171,479 30,783
Source: ONYF.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2012ent11_04
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Table 11.5: The number of those receiving a disability annuity and the  
mean sum of the provisions they received after the increase, in January of the given year
Year
Disability annuity
Year
Disability annuity
Number of recipients Average amount, HUF Number of recipients Average amount, HUF
2003 27,058 23,884 2007 30,039 30,219
2004 27,923 25,388 2008 30,677 32,709
2005 28,738 27,257 2009 31,263 33,434
2006 29,443 28,720 2010 31,815 33,429
Source: ONYF.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2012ent11_05
Table 11.6: The median age for retirement and the number of pensioners
Pension
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Age Persons Age Persons Age Persons Age Persons Age Persons
Females
Old age and similar 57.6 14,388 56.8 25,730 58.8 13,591 57.6 36,806 57.7 45,115
Disability and accident-related disability pension 47.8 24,836 48.1 23,649 48.5 21,507 48.7 19,901 49.1 19,250
Total 51.4 39,224 52.6 49,379 52.5 35,098 54.5 56,707 55.1 64,365
Males
Old age and similar 60.1 28,932 60.1 30,217 59.7 32,611 60.1 36,111 59.9 30,560
Disability and accident-related disability pension 49.6 30,820 49.7 29,013 50.0 27,115 50.1 24,915 50.5 24,565
Total 54.7 59,752 55.0 59,230 55.3 59,726 56.0 61,026 55.7 55,125
Together
Old age and similar 59.3 43,320 58.6 55,947 59.5 46,202 58.9 72,917 58.6 75,675
Disability and accident-related disability pension 48.8 55,656 49.0 52,662 49.3 48,622 49.5 44,816 49.9 43,815
Total 53.4 98,976 53.9 108,609 54.3 94,824 55.3 117,733 55.4 119,490
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Females
Old age and similar 57.5 46,093 57.8 62,015 57.3 39,290 59.9 15,243 60.6 13,195
Disability and accident-related disability pension 49.3 18,488 49.8 15,837 50.5 8,565 51.1 9,065 50.9 9,935
Rehabilitation annuity – – – – 44.1 1,604 44.9 6,574 47.6 6,752
Total 55.2 64,581 56.2 77,852 55.7 49,459 54.1 30,882 54.4 29,882
Males
Old age and similar 59.9 33,134 59.7 50,878 59.8 25,749 59.7 37,116 60.1 36,517
Disability and accident-related disability pension 50.6 23,045 51.1 19,032 51.9 11,069 52.3 11,992 52.1 12,542
Rehabilitation annuity – – – – 44.5 1,556 44.8 6,278 47.4 6,080
Total 56.1 56,179 57.4 69,910 56.9 38,374 56.4 55,386 56.9 55,139
Together
Old age and similar 58.5 79,227 58.7 112,893 58.3 65,039 59.7 52,359 60.3 49,712
Disability and accident-related disability pension 50.0 41,533 50.5 34,869 51.3 19,634 51.8 21,057 51.5 22,477
Rehabilitation annuity – – – – 44.3 3,160 44.9 12,852 47.5 12,832
Total 55.6 120,760 56.8 147,762 56.2 87,833 55.6 86,268 56.0 85,021
Note: The source of these statistics is data from the pension determination system of the ONYF (NYUGDMEG), so 
these do not include the data for the armed forces and the police. Data on MÁV is included from 2008.
Source: ONYF.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2012ent11_06
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Table 11.7: Newly determined disability pension claims and detailed data  
on the number of newly determined old-age pension claims
Year
Disability and accident-re-
lated disability pension Old-age and old-age type pensions
a From the total: at the age limit From the total: under the age limit
Total Male Female Together Male Female Together Male Female Together
1996 59,967 31,770 59,939 91,709 9,893 20,073 29,966 18,681 31,857 50,538
1997 48,262 37,886 32,614 70,500 10,630 1,138 11,768 24,308 28,154 52,462
1998 42,975 12,908 17,841 30,749 385 882 1,267 11,461 15,244 26,705
1999 46,701 15,181 24,418 39,599 2,601 5,808 8,409 11,494 16,922 28,416
2000 55,558 18,071 29,526 47,597 613 813 1,426 16,089 26,859 42,948
2001 54,645 28,759 14,267 43,026 2,200 4,882 7,082 25,175 7,396 32,571
2002 52,211 30,209 25,719 55,928 2,593 646 3,239 26,346 23,503 49,849
2003 48,078 32,574 13,574 46,148 3,058 5,098 8,156 28,064 6,537 34,601
2004 44,196 35,940 36,684 72,624 3,842 989 4,831 30,234 33,817 64,051
2005 41,057 33,175 48,771 81,946 4,035 6,721 10,756 27,719 40,142 67,861
2006 36,904 34,207 47,531 81,738 4,013 732 4,745 29,025 45,675 74,700
2007 34,991 51,037 62,168 113,205 3,722 6,660 10,382 45,731 54,177 99,908
2008 19,832 25,912 39,423 65,335 3,154 288 3,442 22,180 38,761 60,941
2009 21,681 37,468 15,468 52,936 4,193 6,692 10,885 32,452 8,289 40,741
2010 22,477 36,517 14,195 50,712 6,117 7,066 13,183 29,668 5,643 35,311
a Old-age type pensions include: old-age pensions given with a retirement age threshhold allowance (early retire-
ment), artists’ pensions, pre-pension up until 1997, miners’ pensions.
Note: Pensions disbursed in the given year (determined according to the given year’s rules). The source of these sta-
tistics is data from the pension determination system of the ONYF (NYUGDMEG), so these do not include the 
data for the armed forces and the police.
Source: ONYF.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2012ent11_07
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LAbour mArkeT poLICIeS
Labour market policies can be grouped into two catego-
ries. The role of passive measures is the replacement of 
foregone income due to loss of employment, while that of 
active programmes is to decrease the duration of unem-
ployment, to better the chances of exit to employment, 
and in a small part to maintain employment.The current 
chapter provides information on active programs, dis-
cussed in the chapter titled ’Changes in the institutional 
environment of the labour market between September 
2010 and September 2011’. In the case of those who lost 
their jobs, registration with an employment centre is 
a precondition for becoming part of the institutional 
system of labour market policy and the programmes 
just mentioned. In the case of the employed, the em-
ployer can initiate involvement in active programmes 
(such as labour market training, job retaining support 
and commuting support) through grant application or 
requests. The law makes it possible for an unemployed/
employed person to be involved with more than one ac-
tive programme at the same time (for example, training 
and cost of communting support). In these cases, the 
given person is counted multiple times. Therefore, the 
number of program participants may exceed the number 
of registered unemployed.
In order to evaluate the tables it is important to note that 
the tables shown here are derived from the public em-
ployment service’s monitoring system, which provides 
raw data, and thus is not suitable for the estimation of the 
effects of the programmes in the way discussed in the first 
chapter of the In Focus section, because it does not use a 
basis for comparison, and does control for selection into 
the programmes. In line with this, both the exit shares 
and the per capita support amounts of those remain-
ing in employment should be evaluated very cautiously, 
and under no circumstances as the cost of successful em-
ployment via the programme. Such calculations require 
highly evolved statistical and econometric methods, we 
can read about these in the chapters of the In Focus sec-
tion. Further, certain terms need to be clarified.
Taking part in active labour market programmes: all those 
people, who recieve some type of support aimed at aid-
ing employment as outlined in Employment law (FIt.). 
In case of registered unemployed, participants are not 
considered to be in registered unemployed status for the 
duration of the support.
Number of active labour market programme participants 
effected: the number of persons who receive supoort on at 
least one day (are in the register) in the given time period; 
method of calculation: the sum of the number of those 
supported (included in the register) at the beginning of 
the given period and those who enter supported status 
(the register) during the time period. This measure devi-
ates from the frequently used „average number,” which is 
used, for example, to measure the number of employed 
or unemployed, as well as from the number of registered 
unemployed, which is generally a number measured on 
a given day. Compared to these, it is an important differ-
ence that the number of those effected cannot decrease 
within a given year, but it will not increase if a person 
who was earlier in the year included as effected returns 
to a given programme. The interpretation of the effected 
and average measures, as well as those calculated from 
current stock data should be undertaken with caution.
Exiters from active programmes: those persons whose sup-
port via a given programme ends during the time period. 
In the case that the supported person receives several 
different forms of support concurrently, we consider him 
or her to be exiting the programme in which support 
has ended (in the other, continued supports they will be 
counted among those effected). The measures of exiters 
will always refer to the given programme (programme 
participant) that they exited from.
Monthly support per capita for those exiting active pro-
grammes: the full support amount paid to those exiting 
the given active programme (for example, for training 
of the given person, or for keeping exiters in the given 
active programme, their employment, etc.) divided my 
the number of exiters. The measure therefore reflects 
how much, on average, the active programme costs per 
exiting person.
Average length of time of support for those exiting active 
programmes: in the given year, the average length of time 
(in months) spent receiving support for those who exit 
the given programme.
Job placement rate: the share of those who are employed 
on the 180th day after the end of the support, or the end 
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of the mandatory continued employment period. In case 
of job placement, only the fact of employment is con-
sidered, irregardless of whether the person works at the 
same company, or a different one, and of whether they are 
employed at a workplace receiving (wage) support. Full 
amount of support paid to those exiting completed active 
programmes per person continued to be employed: the full 
amount of support paid to those exiting a given active 
programme (for training of the given person, for keeping 
exiters in the programme, for their employment) divided 
by the number of those who are employed 6 months after 
exiting (and the end of the mandatory continued employ-
ment period). The measure thus shows how much it cost 
to place one person in employment via the given active 
programme, in a way that this situation remains after the 
end of the support.
Description of the programmes
Recommended training: training that the employment 
centre recommends to the jobseeker for improving 
chances of successful placement. The training may be 
organized by the employment centre, or the regional 
training centres.
Accepted training: training that the jobseeker seeks out 
for improving chances of placement, and asks for the 
support from the employment centre, which accepts it 
and supports the training costs. The condition of support 
is the accreditation of the training and the institution 
providing the training.
Training support of the employed:
– qualified employers: employers that submit a request 
for support of training that will enable continued em-
ployment of current employees;
– amount: maximum 100% of costs related to the train-
ing, and wage supplements;
– time length: the length of the theoretical and applied 
training, preparation for the exam, and the day of the 
exam.
Support for aiding jobseekers in becoming entrepeneurs:
– qualified persons: those who have been registered job-
seekers for at least 3 months or receive rehabilitation 
support, and ensure their own employment through 
sole proprietorship or as a participant in a joint venture;
– amount: provision of capital up to 3 million Forints, or 
support in the amount of the minimum wage for up to 6 
months, or the costs of expert consultation – separately 
or in combination;
– time length: given in the call for the grant.
Wage support aimed at aiding the expansion of employ-
ment:
– qualified employers: those employers that undertake 
employment of disadvantaged or disabled persons;
– amount: in the case of disadvantaged jobseekers it is 
up to 50% of the wage and employer contributions, in 
the case of disabled persons up to 60%;
– time length: for disadvantaged up to 1, for disabled, 
up to 2 years.
Wage cost support:
– support that can only be given within the framework 
of a labour market programme;
– makes possible the payment of up to 100% of the wage 
and employer contributions, for a maximum of 3 years. 
In the new programme, not only the wage and contribu-
tion costs of the target group, but also those arising in 
relation to employment of programme management.
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Table 12.1: Share of participants in active programmes in 2010 relative  
to the number of registered unemployed by county, per cent
County
Not employed Those receiving 
entrepeneurial 
support
Employed with 
wage support
Those receiv-
ing wage cost  
support
Monthly aver-
age number  
of registered 
unemployed
recommend-
ed training
accepted 
training unknown total
Budapest 5.6 1.4 0.1 7.1 1.4 0.6 2.4 46,663
Baranya 10.7 3.1 0.6 14.3 1.6 1.9 4.7 27,893
Bács-Kiskun 6.8 1.3 1.0 9.0 0.7 2.0 2.8 35,125
Békés 5.9 0.9 1.1 7.9 0.6 1.1 2.7 27,470
Borsod-Abaúj-Zemplén 3.1 0.5 0.5 4.0 0.3 1.1 1.4 68,038
Csongrád 8.6 0.7 0.4 9.8 0.9 1.9 4.5 22,301
Fejér 4.8 2.9 0.7 8.4 1.3 1.5 2.8 24,074
Győr-Moson-Sopron 13.2 1.9 1.4 16.6 1.6 1.7 6.2 13,786
Hajdú-Bihar 5.3 0.4 0.6 6.2 1.3 2.0 4.0 45,135
Heves 7.4 1.1 0.8 9.3 1.9 2.7 6.5 21,360
Jász-Nagykun-Szolnok 5.5 0.5 0.2 6.1 1.0 1.8 3.8 28,291
Komárom-Esztergom 28.1 1.3 10.0 39.4 4.3 27.4 25.4 15,260
Nógrád 7.7 0.5 1.6 9.8 1.3 6.6 6.3 19,368
Pest 3.5 0.1 0.7 4.2 0.3 2.9 3.2 41,120
Somogy 14.9 0.0 1.7 16.6 2.6 5.8 4.5 25,840
Szabolcs-Szatmár-Bereg 3.8 0.0 0.4 4.2 0.5 1.4 1.6 56,850
Tolna 35.3 0.0 2.8 38.2 4.2 15.8 14.9 15,135
Vas 15.9 11.7 7.5 35.0 2.5 8.9 17.4 11,465
Veszprém 13.3 1.7 1.9 16.9 1.2 8.3 9.9 19,976
Zala 12.0 1.1 0.8 13.9 1.8 5.8 7.8 17,513
Total 8.1 1.1 1.1 10.4 1.2 3.5 4.8 582,664
Note: The 1991. IV. Law on the aiding of employment and the provisions for the unemployed changed the concept of 
registered unemployed to „registered jobseekers”. Deviating from the official terminology, we use the term regis-
tered unemployed in the tables.
A more detailed description of the programmes can be found in the following analysis: http://www.munka.hu/en-
gine.aspx?page=afsz_stat_fobb_aktiv_eszkozok.
Source: NFSZ IR.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2012ent12_01
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Table 12.2: Share of participants in active programmes in 2010 relative to the number of registered unemployed 
by gender, age, education level, entry status, and status prior to the support, per cent
Not employed Those receiving 
entrepeneurial 
support
Employed with 
wage support
Those receiv-
ing wage cost 
support
Monthly aver-
age number of 
registered  
unemployed
recommend-
ed training
accepted 
training unknown total
By gender
Males 7.6 1.0 1.2 9.8 1.1 3.3 4.0 305,012
Females 8.6 1.2 1.1 10.9 1.3 3.8 5.7 277,652
By age group
–20 17.8 2.1 1.8 21.7 0.2 4.5 2.3 12,167
20–24 15.9 2.0 2.0 19.8 1.1 5.5 5.4 75,623
25–29 9.7 1.4 2.1 13.2 1.5 2.9 5.1 70,781
30–34 7.9 1.2 2.0 11.1 1.8 2.9 4.6 78,586
35–39 7.5 1.1 0.9 9.4 1.7 2.9 4.5 76,921
40–44 7.1 1.0 0.6 8.7 1.3 2.5 4.8 72,256
45–49 6.2 0.8 0.6 7.5 1.1 2.1 5.3 66,245
50–54 5.0 0.6 0.4 6.0 0.8 5.0 5.5 72,835
55+ 2.4 0.3 0.2 3.0 0.6 4.4 3.5 57,250
By level of education
8 grades of primary 
school or less 5.0 0.7 1.5 7.1 0.3 2.8 2.5 228,973
Vocational school 6.7 0.8 0.6 8.1 1.2 3.5 4.8 182,982
Vocational second-
ary school 13.7 1.9 1.3 16.9 2.3 4.6 7.3 87,332
Grammar school 15.2 1.7 1.3 18.2 2.3 4.6 7.1 52,930
College, university 11.1 2.5 1.3 15.0 3.7 4.3 11.0 30,401
Unknown .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 46
By entry status
School-leavers 18.7 2.4 1.8 22.9 1.1 7.7 5.5 52,637
Non school-leavers 7.1 1.0 1.1 9.1 1.2 3.1 4.7 530,027
By status prior to the support
Jobseeking support 14.1 1.8 1.6 17.5 2.6 4.9 6.9 186,334
On call support 2.3 0.3 1.3 3.9 0.3 1.2 1.0 165,890
Regular social assis-
tance 12.7 2.0 2.3 17.0 2.2 17.4 15.9 1,894
Not supported 7.4 1.1 0.6 9.2 0.8 4.0 5.8 228,546
Total 8.1 1.1 1.1 10.4 1.2 3.5 4.8 582,664
Note: The 1991. IV. Law on the aiding of employment and the provisions for the unemployed changed the concept of 
registered unemployed to „registered jobseekers”. Deviating from the official terminology, we use the term regis-
tered unemployed in the tables.
A more detailed description of the programmes can be found in the following analysis: http://www.munka.hu/en-
gine.aspx?page=afsz_stat_fobb_aktiv_eszkozok.
Source: NFSZ IR.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2012ent12_02
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Table 12.3: Monthly average number of registered unemployed in 2010 by length of 
continuous time spent seeking work prior to receiving the support
Continuous length of time 
spent seeking work
Monthly average  
number of persons
Continuous length of time 
spent seeking work
Monthly average  
number of persons
6 months 290,049 More than 12 months 164,955
6–12 months 127,659 Total 582,664
Note: The 1991. IV. Law on the aiding of employment and the provisions for the unem-
ployed changed the concept of registered unemployed to „registered jobseekers”. Devi-
ating from the official terminology, we use the term registered unemployed in the ta-
bles.
Source: NFSZ IR.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2012ent12_03
Table 12.4: Monthly support of those exiting active programmes in 2010 per capita by county, thousand HUF
County
Not employed Those receiving 
entrepeneurial 
support
Employed with 
wage support
Those receiving 
wage cost  
support
recommended 
training
accepted 
training unknown total
Budapest 143 92 36 130 148 56 99
Baranya 116 101 114 112 65 54 109
Bács-Kiskun 140 97 22 120 71 51 89
Békés 135 98 45 118 70 54 87
Borsod-Abaúj-Zemplén 133 86 3 111 76 46 86
Csongrád 92 53 2 84 71 46 104
Fejér 95 92 5 86 77 49 109
Győr-Moson-Sopron 113 127 4 103 87 50 107
Hajdú-Bihar 112 74 10 101 1,062 49 98
Heves 114 80 4 103 110 48 94
Jász-Nagykun-Szolnok 118 72 11 114 77 44 93
Komárom-Esztergom 116 64 44 97 94 47 107
Nógrád 118 64 6 96 81 46 95
Pest 119 143 31 107 86 44 91
Somogy 107 .. 1 96 129 40 102
Szabolcs-Szatmár-Bereg 143 .. .. 126 197 45 97
Tolna 103 .. 1 93 87 43 104
Vas 85 91 4 78 71 46 108
Veszprém 89 41 3 75 91 44 96
Zala 95 59 10 88 71 45 101
Total 114 88 20 101 177 46 100
A more detailed description of the programmes can be found in the following analysis: http://www.munka.hu/en-
gine.aspx?page=afsz_stat_fobb_aktiv_eszkozok.
Source: NFSZ IR.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2012ent12_04
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Table 12.5: Monthly support of those exiting active programmes in 2010 per capita  
by gender, age, education level, entry status, and status prior to the support, thousand HUF
Not employed Those receiving 
entrepeneurial 
support
Employed with 
wage support
Those receiving 
wage cost  
support
recommended 
training
accepted  
training unknown total
By gender
Males 117 92 18 103 180 47 100
Females 111 84 22 99 174 45 100
By age group
–20 241 183 23 218 579 83 195
20–24 111 87 23 100 149 45 104
25–29 112 89 19 95 174 47 109
30–34 117 86 14 95 202 45 102
35–39 112 95 22 103 139 44 101
40–44 111 84 32 103 144 44 99
45–49 114 93 31 106 237 44 94
50–54 107 85 18 100 214 49 93
55+ 370 91 27 347 283 145 281
By level of education
8 grades of primary 
school or less 208 158 15 118 257 82 169
Vocational school 225 173 61 211 359 89 181
Vocational secondary 
school 216 167 73 200 324 98 209
Grammar school 114 80 46 106 178 47 105
College, university 238 176 98 217 430 117 247
Unknown 99 80 2 86 213 46 99
By entry status
School-leavers 111 84 23 101 207 45 105
Non school-leavers 118 90 19 103 175 46 100
By status prior to the support
Jobseeking support 121 93 26 110 161 48 103
On call support 114 89 4 71 284 41 96
Regular social assistance 98 72 15 83 69 43 110
Not supported 102 81 49 97 197 46 98
Total 114 88 20 101 177 46 100
A more detailed description of the programmes can be found in the following analysis: http://www.munka.hu/en-
gine.aspx?page=afsz_stat_fobb_aktiv_eszkozok.
Source: NFSZ IR.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2012ent12_05
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Table 12.6: Average length of support of those exiting the active programmes in 2010 by county, months
County
Not employed Those receiving 
entrepeneurial 
support
Employed with 
wage support
Those receiving 
wage cost  
support
recommended 
training
accepted  
training unknown total
Budapest 4.8 5.6 7.7 5.0 5.1 6.5 5.9
Baranya 4.4 5.1 2.9 4.5 5.2 6.6 6.3
Bács-Kiskun 4.2 5.0 4.4 4.4 4.7 6.1 8.0
Békés 4.1 5.1 4.7 4.3 5.0 6.4 7.9
Borsod-Abaúj-Zemplén 3.1 4.7 3.7 3.4 4.3 6.2 7.9
Csongrád 3.6 5.8 3.5 3.8 4.6 6.6 7.1
Fejér 4.2 3.7 5.7 4.2 4.0 5.5 7.2
Győr-Moson-Sopron 4.5 3.9 3.8 4.4 4.3 6.8 7.2
Hajdú-Bihar 5.5 3.8 6.2 5.5 5.3 6.4 8.3
Heves 6.2 3.9 5.7 5.9 5.9 5.5 8.3
Jász-Nagykun-Szolnok 5.9 3.8 7.0 5.8 6.0 6.0 8.5
Komárom-Esztergom 5.1 3.1 3.6 4.7 5.7 7.3 6.0
Nógrád 4.9 5.5 5.1 5.0 5.6 6.9 5.7
Pest 5.5 2.5 4.6 5.3 5.7 6.8 6.0
Somogy 6.0 .. 4.7 5.9 5.7 6.5 8.3
Szabolcs-Szatmár-Bereg 5.0 .. 3.9 4.9 5.0 5.5 7.8
Tolna 5.6 .. 4.6 5.5 5.9 6.7 8.1
Vas 4.0 5.1 7.0 4.8 5.3 6.6 6.5
Veszprém 5.0 4.8 4.1 4.9 5.5 5.9 6.9
Zala 4.7 5.5 5.7 4.8 5.0 6.0 6.4
Total 4.9 4.8 4.5 4.8 5.3 6.5 7.1
A more detailed description of the programmes can be found in the following analysis: http://www.munka.hu/en-
gine.aspx?page=afsz_stat_fobb_aktiv_eszkozok.
Source: NFSZ IR.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2012ent12_06
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Table 12.7: Average length of support of those exiting the active programmes in 2010  
by gender, age, education level, entry status, and status prior to the support, months
Not employed Those receiving 
entrepeneurial 
support
Employed with 
wage support
Those receiving 
wage cost  
support
recommended 
training
accepted  
training unknown total
By gender
Males 4.8 4.5 4.5 4.7 5.2 6.5 6.7
Females 5.0 5.0 4.6 5.0 5.3 6.6 7.3
By age group
–20 5.9 6.1 5.4 5.9 5.6 5.9 6.7
20–24 5.4 5.1 4.5 5.3 5.4 6.6 7.0
25–29 5.2 4.9 4.5 5.0 5.2 6.6 7.3
30–34 5.0 4.6 4.4 4.9 5.3 6.7 7.2
35–39 4.9 4.6 4.5 4.8 5.2 6.5 7.2
40–44 4.7 4.7 5.0 4.7 5.2 6.5 7.0
45–49 4.0 4.4 4.7 4.1 5.2 6.5 7.0
50–54 3.7 4.3 5.0 3.9 5.2 6.5 6.8
55+ 2.4 6.3 4.0 2.6 5.4 6.8 7.3
By level of education
8 grades of primary 
school or less 4.0 5.4 4.6 4.3 5.3 6.1 6.5
Vocational school 4.5 4.7 5.1 4.6 5.3 6.5 6.8
Vocational secondary 
school 5.3 5.0 4.4 5.2 5.2 6.8 7.1
Grammar school 5.6 5.1 4.4 5.5 5.3 6.8 7.3
College, university 4.9 5.6 4.1 5.0 5.3 7.2 7.7
Unknown 5.1 4.7 6.1 5.2 5.1 6.5 7.3
By entry status
School-leavers 5.6 5.3 4.2 5.4 5.5 6.7 7.0
Non school-leavers 3.3 4.5 4.9 3.5 5.2 6.5 6.9
By status prior to the support
Jobseeking support 4.9 4.5 4.6 4.8 5.2 6.3 6.9
On call support 4.4 4.3 4.5 4.4 5.5 6.7 6.4
Regular social assis-
tance 5.2 8.0 6.0 5.6 5.8 7.7 8.6
Not supported 5.0 5.3 4.5 5.0 5.4 6.6 7.2
Total 4.9 4.8 4.5 4.8 5.3 6.5 7.1
A more detailed description of the programmes can be found in the following analysis: http://www.munka.hu/en-
gine.aspx?page=afsz_stat_fobb_aktiv_eszkozok.
Source: NFSZ IR.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2012ent12_07
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Table 12.8: Job placement shares of those exiting completed active programmes in 2010 by county, per cent
County
Not employed Those receiving 
entrepeneurial 
support
Employed with 
wage support
Those receiving 
wage cost  
support
recommended 
training
accepted  
training unknown total
Budapest 35.4 42.1 78.9 54.2 65.1 100.0 86.9
Baranya 40.3 48.5 86.2 59.6 70.3 100.0 89.8
Bács-Kiskun 54.4 40.6 80.1 65.7 81.7 87.9 99.8
Békés 57.6 54.0 80.8 68.6 77.5 93.5 94.0
Borsod-Abaúj-Zemplén 54.1 45.0 83.0 69.9 83.9 93.9 97.6
Csongrád 46.0 50.7 80.7 60.4 78.5 93.5 88.4
Fejér 63.3 53.4 94.2 73.3 87.5 100.0 91.2
Győr-Moson-Sopron 47.1 49.7 80.8 61.7 83.6 89.9 78.3
Hajdú-Bihar 44.7 51.8 78.0 63.8 75.4 100.0 87.3
Heves 52.6 51.3 82.3 70.3 76.6 91.6 95.5
Jász-Nagykun-Szolnok 43.1 75.0 87.0 67.0 82.6 94.4 96.8
Komárom-Esztergom 59.4 60.4 78.0 72.6 85.5 88.8 86.9
Nógrád 54.4 43.0 88.9 76.3 87.0 97.6 90.7
Pest 60.3 100.0 76.1 71.8 85.2 81.5 80.1
Somogy 45.7 .. 76.8 62.4 69.3 91.1 85.9
Szabolcs-Szatmár-Bereg 48.8 .. 74.9 64.1 66.8 92.1 87.0
Tolna 46.5 .. 72.1 61.3 74.2 87.0 81.7
Vas 47.3 53.1 80.3 67.3 81.2 91.8 88.2
Veszprém 54.6 42.5 75.5 67.9 75.4 86.0 85.3
Zala 48.6 56.4 79.9 68.2 74.6 92.3 94.5
Total 49.5 50.1 79.2 66.3 76.4 90.9 88.3
A more detailed description of the programmes can be found in the following analysis: http://www.munka.hu/en-
gine.aspx?page=afsz_stat_fobb_aktiv_eszkozok.
Source: NFSZ IR.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2012ent12_08
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Table 12.9: Job placement shares of those exiting completed active programmes in 2010  
by gender, age, education level, and entry status, per cent
Not employed Those receiving 
entrepeneurial 
support
Employed with 
wage support
Those receiving 
wage cost  
support
recommended 
training
accepted  
training unknown total
By gender
Males 51.1 51.8 81.2 67.7 77.2 90.5 89.8
Females 48.0 48.3 78.2 65.3 75.7 91.5 87.3
By age group
–20 43.6 46.0 63.1 50.9 76.9 90.9 67.7
20–24 54.2 52.3 82.3 66.3 77.5 98.2 89.4
25–29 55.3 55.5 84.0 69.5 80.6 92.5 93.2
30–34 51.8 51.3 83.9 68.8 77.9 93.1 92.2
35–39 49.4 45.4 80.9 66.9 78.1 93.8 89.3
40–44 47.1 46.8 80.0 65.9 75.3 87.3 88.8
45–49 44.4 47.6 76.1 63.9 72.7 85.6 87.2
50–54 39.7 49.0 77.7 66.2 67.7 88.8 82.9
55+ 37.1 44.6 73.4 66.5 76.4 83.9 84.6
By level of education
8 grades of primary 
school or less 43.3 43.2 70.3 59.3 65.8 87.8 81.5
Vocational school 50.7 53.3 81.2 69.0 77.0 90.0 88.4
Vocational secondary 
school 54.4 54.6 84.5 69.8 77.9 95.0 91.8
Grammar school 48.2 46.0 80.7 64.4 75.9 91.7 87.1
College, university 52.5 51.8 85.5 72.3 79.2 96.4 93.2
By entry status
School-leavers 50.6 48.3 86.7 62.9 77.1 100.0 86.5
Non school-leavers 49.5 50.2 79.0 66.4 76.4 90.6 88.4
Total 49.5 50.1 79.2 66.3 76.4 90.9 88.3
A more detailed description of the programmes can be found in the following analysis: http://www.munka.hu/en-
gine.aspx?page=afsz_stat_fobb_aktiv_eszkozok.
Source: NFSZ IR.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2012ent12_09
statistical data
308
Table 12.10: Full amount of support paid to those exiting completed active programmes in 2010  
per person continued to be employed by county, thousand HUF
County
Not employed Those receiving 
entrepeneurial 
support
Employed with 
wage support
Those receiving 
wage cost  
support
recommended 
training
accepted  
training unknown total
Budapest 1,696 1,194 .. 1,555 556 508 851
Baranya 1,442 727 .. 1,403 556 432 1,244
Bács-Kiskun 790 796 .. 793 489 419 958
Békés 793 392 198 752 557 370 1,005
Borsod-Abaúj-Zemplén 1,076 349 439 971 635 490 967
Csongrád 931 484 .. 892 492 376 864
Fejér 1,359 1,189 1,224 1,325 415 425 948
Győr-Moson-Sopron 748 651 .. 740 421 393 1,003
Hajdú-Bihar 1,669 .. .. 1,669 774 402 1,268
Heves 1,116 746 787 1,087 561 432 763
Jász-Nagykun-Szolnok 1,198 .. .. 1,198 795 327 1,036
Komárom-Esztergom 1,111 752 2,889 1,076 450 481 955
Nógrád 1,269 447 1,230 1,231 649 457 765
Pest 1,467 1,223 816 1,391 490 417 901
Somogy 1,424 550 .. 1,330 558 371 1,092
Szabolcs-Szatmár-Bereg 1,462 .. 736 1,461 615 410 1,247
Tolna 1,715 541 .. 1,644 576 340 1,074
Vas 658 633 .. 650 397 348 1,013
Veszprém 985 819 .. 956 417 374 1,015
Zala 1,077 664 .. 1,028 384 447 1,128
Total 1,208 823 682 1,147 554 420 1,005
A more detailed description of the programmes can be found in the following analysis: http://www.munka.hu/en-
gine.aspx?page=afsz_stat_fobb_aktiv_eszkozok.
Source: NFSZ IR.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2012ent12_10
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Table 12.11: Full amount of support paid to those exiting completed active programmes in 2010 per person 
continued to be employed by gender, age, education level, and entry status, thousand HUF
Not employed Those receiving 
entrepeneurial 
support
Employed with 
wage support
Those receiving 
wage cost  
support
recommended 
training
accepted  
training unknown total
By gender
Males 1,186 798 726 1,126 558 424 949
Females 1,231 851 646 1,169 550 416 1,048
By age group
–20 1,671 1,179 838 1,605 521 406 1,169
20–24 1,254 842 638 1,191 533 419 1,013
25–29 1,159 734 524 1,078 516 437 1,134
30–34 1,188 776 602 1,117 564 409 1,004
35–39 1,189 903 844 1,147 524 404 1,012
40–44 1,205 841 677 1,147 547 411 986
45–49 1,095 800 884 1,053 604 416 933
50–54 1,112 796 1,995 1,076 647 418 953
55+ 1,356 945 1,214 1,298 581 447 984
By level of education
8 grades of primary school 
or less 1,268 1,042 1,013 1,235 624 384 830
Vocational school 1,065 676 1,153 1,015 535 417 842
Vocational secondary school 1,207 772 514 1,132 552 433 1,070
Grammar school 1,427 881 566 1,338 565 436 1,118
College, university 1,132 838 524 1,056 550 523 1,365
By entry status
School-leavers 1,474 964 306 1,364 540 427 1,021
Non school-leavers 1,195 813 698 1,135 554 420 1,005
Total 1,208 823 682 1,147 554 420 1,005
A more detailed description of the programmes can be found in the following analysis: http://www.munka.hu/en-
gine.aspx?page=afsz_stat_fobb_aktiv_eszkozok.
Source: NFSZ IR.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2012ent12_11
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Table 13.1: Employment and unemployment rate of population  
aged 15–64 by gender in the EU, 2010
Country
Employment rate Unemployment rate
males females together males females together
Austria 77.1 66.4 71.7 4.6 4.3 4.5
Belgium 67.4 56.5 62.0 8.2 8.6 8.4
Denmark 75.8 71.1 73.4 8.4 6.6 7.6
United Kingdom 74.5 64.6 69.5 8.8 7.0 7.9
Finland 69.4 66.9 68.1 9.3 7.7 8.5
France 68.3 59.9 64.0 9.0 9.7 9.3
Greece 70.9 48.1 59.6 10.1 16.4 12.7
Netherlands 80.0 69.3 74.7 4.5 4.5 4.5
Ireland 63.9 56.0 60.0 17.1 9.6 13.7
Luxembourg 73.1 57.2 65.2 3.8 5.1 4.4
Germany 76.0 66.1 71.1 7.6 6.6 7.2
Italy 67.7 46.1 56.9 7.7 9.7 8.5
Portugal 70.1 61.1 65.6 10.4 12.5 11.4
Spain 64.7 52.3 58.6 19.8 20.6 20.2
Sweden 75.1 70.3 72.7 8.7 8.4 8.6
EU-15 71.4 59.5 65.4 9.6 9.6 9.6
Hungary 60.4 50.6 55.4 11.6 10.8 11.2
Bulgaria 63.0 56.4 59.7 11.0 9.5 10.3
Cyprus 76.6 63.0 69.7 6.2 6.5 6.4
Czech Republic 73.5 56.3 65.0 6.5 8.5 7.4
Estonia 61.5 60.6 61.0 19.9 14.7 17.3
Poland 65.6 53.0 59.3 9.4 10.1 9.7
Latvia 59.2 59.4 59.3 21.9 16.0 19.0
Lithuania 56.8 58.7 57.8 21.5 14.6 18.0
Malta 72.3 39.2 56.0 6.9 7.1 7.0
Romania 65.7 52.0 58.8 8.2 6.9 7.6
Slovakia 65.2 52.3 58.8 14.3 14.6 14.4
Slovenia 69.6 62.6 66.2 7.6 7.2 7.4
EU-25 70.4 58.6 64.5 9.8 9.8 9.8
EU-27 70.1 58.2 64.2 9.7 9.7 9.7
Source: CIRCA.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2012ent13_01
international comParison
311
Table 13.2: Employment composition of the countries in the EUa, 2010
Country Self employed Part time Fix term contr. Service Industry Agriculture
Austria 11.3 24.3 9.3 70.1 25.2 4.7
Belgium 13.0 23.7 8.1 75.2 23.5 1.3
Denmark 8.1 25.8 8.6 77.8 19.7 2.3
United Kingdom 13.0 25.7 6.0 79.0 19.2 1.1
Finland 12.2 13.9 15.4 72.0 23.3 4.1
France 10.7 17.5 15.1 74.5 22.2 2.9
Greece 29.6 6.2 12.4 68.2 19.9 11.9
Netherlands 13.8 48.3 18.3 71.8 16.1 2.6
Ireland 15.3 21.9 9.3 75.9 19.7 4.0
Luxembourg 7.2 17.5 7.1 81.2 12.0 1.0
Germany 10.5 25.5 14.7 69.9 28.5 1.5
Italy 22.7 14.8 12.8 67.5 28.9 3.6
Portugal 17.5 8.4 23.0 63.8 29.2 7.0
Spain 15.7 13.1 25.0 72.6 23.2 4.2
Sweden 9.8 25.3 15.4 77.8 20.1 1.9
EU-15 14.1 21.4 14.1 72.5 24.0 2.8
Hungary 11.7 5.5 9.6 64.8 30.8 4.4
Bulgaria 11.5 2.2 4.4 59.9 33.4 6.7
Cyprus 15.5 8.1 13.6 76.1 21.1 2.8
Czech Republic 16.8 5.1 8.2 58.7 38.3 3.1
Estonia 7.9 9.8 3.7 64.7 30.7 4.1
Poland 18.5 7.6 27.2 57.1 30.5 12.4
Latvia 9.9 9.3 6.8 66.9 24.3 8.5
Lithuania 9.1 7.7 2.4 66.1 24.6 8.9
Malta 13.7 11.6 5.6 72.7 24.8 1.2
Romania 19.5 9.7 1.1 43.1 30.0 26.9
Slovakia 15.8 3.8 5.6 59.5 37.2 3.2
Slovenia 11.6 10.3 17.1 59.5 33.1 7.0
EU-25 14.5 18.5 13.9 69.3 25.5 4.7
EU-27 14.4 19.2 14.5 70.6 25.2 3.7
a All employed = 100.
Source: Eurostat (Newcronos) Labour Force Survey.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2012ent13_02
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DeSCrIpTIon of THe mAIn DATA SourCeS
The data have two main sources in terms of who gath-
ered them: the regular institutional and population sur-
veys of the Hungarian Central Statistical Office, and 
the register and surveys of the National Labour Office.
mAIn DATA SourCeS of THe CSo
CSO Labour Force Survey – KSH MEF
The Hungarian Central Statistical Office has been con-
ducting a new statistical survey since January 1992 to 
obtain ongoing information on the labour force status 
of the Hungarian population. The Labour Force Sur-
vey is a household survey which provides quarterly in-
formation on the non-institutional population aged 
15–74. The aim of the survey is to observe employment 
and unemployment according to international statisti-
cal recommendations based on the concepts and defi-
nitions recommended by the ILO, independently from 
existing national labour regulations or their changes.
In international practice, the labour force survey is 
a widely used statistical tool to provide simultaneous, 
comprehensive, and systematic monitoring of employ-
ment, unemployment, and underemployment. The sur-
vey techniques minimise the subjective bias in classi-
fication (since people surveyed are classified by strict 
criteria), and provide freedom to also consider national 
characteristics.
In the Labour Force Survey, the surveyed population 
is divided into two main groups according to the eco-
nomic activity performed by them during the reference 
week (up to 2003, this was always on the week contain-
ing the 19th of the month): economically active persons 
(labour force), and economically inactive persons.
The group of economically active persons consists of 
those in the labour market either as employed or unem-
ployed persons during the reference week.
The definitions used in the survey follow ILO rec-
ommendations. According to these, those designated 
employed are persons who, during the reference week 
worked one hour or more earning some form of income, 
or had a job from which they were only temporarily ab-
sent (on leave, illness, etc.).
Work providing income includes all activities that:
– result in monetary income, payment in kind, or
– that were carried out in the hopes of income realized 
in the future, or
– were performed without payment in a family business 
or on a farm (i.e. unpaid family workers).
From the survey’s point of view the activities below 
are not considered as work:
– work done without payment for another household 
or institution (voluntary work),
– building or renovating of an own house or flat, intern-
ships tied to education (not even if it is compensated),
– housework, including work in the garden. Work on 
own land is only considered to generate income if 
the results are sold in the market, not produced for 
self-consumption.
Persons on child-care leave are classified – based on 
the 1995 ILO recommendations for transitional coun-
tries determined in Prague – according to their activ-
ity during the survey week. Since the according to the 
system of national accounting, defense activity con-
tributes to the national product, conscripts are gener-
ally considered as economically active persons, any ex-
ceptions are marked in the footnotes of the table. The 
data regarding the number of conscripts comes from 
administrative sources.
Unemployed persons are persons aged 15–74 who:
– were without work, i.e. neither had a job nor were at 
work (for one hour or more) in paid employment or 
self-employment during the reference week,
– had actively looked for work at any time in the four 
weeks up to the end of the reference week,
– were available for work within two weeks following 
the reference week if they found an appropriate job.
Those who do not have a job, but are waiting to start 
a new job within 30 days (since 2003 within 90 days) 
make up a special group of the unemployed. They are 
not subject to all three criteria.
Active job search includes: contacting a public or 
private employment office to find a job, applying to an 
employer directly, inserting, reading, answering adver-
tisements, asking friends, relatives or other methods. 
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The labour force (i.e. economically active population) 
comprises employed and unemployed persons.
Persons are defined economically inactive (i.e. not in 
the labour force) if they were neither employed in regu-
lar, income-earning jobs, nor searching for a job, or, if 
they searched, they could not have started work. Pas-
sive unemployed are included here, who desire a job, but 
have given up any active search for work, because they 
do not believe that they have a chance of finding any.
The Labour Force Survey is based on a multi-stage 
stratified sample design. The stages of sampling are 
defined as follows: primary sampling units (PSUs) are 
enumeration districts (EDs) and secondary sampling 
units (SSUs) are dwellings in settlements with 15,000 
or more inhabitants, while PSUs are settlements, SSUs 
are EDs and ultimate sampling units are dwellings in 
all other cases. In the Labour Force Survey sample de-
sign strata are defined in terms of geographic units, 
size categories of settlements and area types such as 
city centres, outskirts, etc.
The size of the sample means that the main indica-
tors of the labour market are representative in terms of 
regions (NUTS2) as well.
The quarterly Labour Force Survey sample includes 
a sample of three randomly selected dwellings, and la-
bour market information is collected from one house-
hold each month. From 1998, the quarterly sample 
contains about 33,000 households and 66,000 persons. 
The sample has a simple rotation pattern: any house-
hold entering the sample at some time is expected to 
provide labour market information for six consecu-
tive quarters, then leave the sample permanently. The 
intersection of the samples of two consecutive periods 
tend to be less than the 5/6th that would be obtained at 
a 100 per cent response rate.
Since 2003, the weights used to make the sample rep-
resentative are based on the 2001 census population re-
cord base. At the same time, the 2001–2002 data was 
recalculated and replaced as well. The sampling weights 
for 1992–2000 data are based on the 1990 census.
CSO Institution-Based Labour Statistics  
– KSH IMS
The source of the earnings data is the monthly (annual) 
institutional labour statistical survey. The sample frame 
covers enterprises with at least 5 employees, and pub-
lic and social insurance and non-profit institutions ir-
respective of the staff numbers of employees.
The earnings data relate to the full-time employees 
on every occasion. The potential elements of the pre-
vailing monthly average earnings are: base wage, al-
lowances (including the miner’s loyalty bonus, and the 
Széchenyi and Professor’s grants), supplementary pay-
ments, bonuses, premiums, and wages and salaries for 
the 13th and further months.
Net average earnings are calculated by deducting 
from the institution’s gross average earnings the em-
ployer’s contributions, the personal income tax, the em-
ployee’s social security contributions, etc., according to 
the actual rates (i.e. taking into account the threshold 
concerning the social security contributions and em-
ployee deductions). The personal income tax is calcu-
lated based on the actual withholding rate applied by 
the employers when disbursing monthly earnings in 
the given year, the net values are calculated at the in-
stitutional and monthly level.
The size and direction of the difference between the 
gross and the net (after-tax) income indexes depends 
on actual annual changes in the tax table (tax brack-
ets) and in the tax allowances. Thus the actual size of 
the differences are also influenced by the share of indi-
viduals at given firms that fall outside the bracket for 
employee allowances.
The indexes pertain to the comparable sample, tak-
ing changes in the definitions, and of the sample frame 
into account. The CSO traditionally publishes the 
main average index as the earnings growth measure. 
Thus the indicator of change in earnings reflects both 
the changes in the number of observations and the 
actual earnings changes simultaneously. The change 
of net real earnings is calculated from the ratio of net 
income index and the consumer price index in the 
same period.
Non-manual workers are persons with occupa-
tions classified by the standardized occupational code 
(FEOR, version since January 1, 1994) in major groups 
1–4., manual workers are persons with occupations 
classified in major groups 5–9.
CSO Labour Force Accounting Census  
– KSH MEM
Before the publication of the Labour Force Survey, 
the annual Labour Force Account gave account of the 
total labour force in the time period between the two 
censuses.
The Labour Force Account, as its name shows, is a 
balance-like account that compares the labour supply 
(human resources) to the labour demand at an ideal 
moment (1 January). Population is taken into account 
by economic activity, with a differentiation between 
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those of working age, and the population outside of 
the working age.
Source of data: Annual labour survey on employment 
since 1992 of enterprises and of all government institu-
tions, labour force survey, census, national healthcare 
records, social security records, and company registry. 
Data on unemployment comes from the registration 
system of the National Labour Office.
Other data sources
Census data were used for the estimation of the employ-
ment data in 1980 and 1990. The aggregate economic 
data are based on national account statistics, the con-
sumer’s and producer’s price statistics and industrial 
surveys. A detailed description of the data sources are 
to be found in the relevant publications of the Central 
Statistical Office.
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Unemployment (Jobseekers’) Register Database 
– NMH REG
The other main source of unemployment data in Hun-
gary – and in most of the developed countries – is the 
huge database containing so called administrative re-
cords which are collected monthly and include the in-
dividual data of the registered unemployed/jobseekers.
The register actually contains all jobseekers, but out 
of them, at a given point of time, only those are regarded 
as registered unemployed/jobseekers, who:
– had themselves registered with a local office of the 
National Employment Service as unemployed/job-
seekers (i. e. he/she has no job but wishes to work, 
for which they seek assistance from the labour mar-
ket organisation).
– at a point of time (on the final day of any month), the 
person is not a pensioner or a full-time student, and 
is ready to co-operate with the local employment of-
fice in order to become employed (i. e. he/she accepts 
the suitable job or training offered to him/her, and 
keeps the appointments made with the local employ-
ment office’s placement officer/counsellor/benefit 
administrator).
If a person included in the register is working under 
any subsidised employment programme on the clos-
ing day, or is a participant of a labour market training 
programme, or has a short-term, temporary job her/his 
unemployed/jobseeker status is suspended.
If the client is not willing to co-operate with the local 
office he/she is removed from the register of the unem-
ployed/jobseekers.
The data – i. e. the administrative records of the reg-
ister – allow not only for the identification of date re-
lated stock data but also for monitoring flows: inflows 
as well as outflow within a period.
Based on the records of the labour requests needs re-
ported to the National Employment Service, the stock 
and flow data of vacancies are also processed and pub-
lished for each month.
Furthermore, detailed monthly statistics of partici-
pation in the different active programmes, number of 
participants and their inflows and outflows are also 
prepared monthly.
The very detailed monthly statistics – in a breakdown 
of country, region, county, local employment office ser-
vice delivery area and community – build on the sec-
ondary processing of administrative records that are 
generated virtually as the rather important and useful 
“by-products” of the accomplishment of the National 
Employment Service’s main functions (such as place-
ment services, payment of benefits, active programme 
support, etc.).
The National Labour Office (and its predecessors, i. 
e. OMK – National Labour Centre, OMMK and OM-
KMK) has published the key figures of these statistics 
on a monthly basis since 1989. The more detailed re-
ports which also contain data by local office service de-
livery area are published by the County/Metropolitan 
(Budapest) Labour Centres.
The denominators of the unemployment rates cal-
culated for the registered unemployed/jobseekers are 
the economically active population data published by 
the Central Statistical Office’s Labour Market Account 
(KSH MEM).
The figures of the registered unemployed/jobseekers 
and the registered unemployment/jobseekers rate are 
obviously different from the figures based on the Cen-
tral Statistical Office’s labour force survey. It is mainly 
the different conceptual approach, definition and the 
fundamentally different monitoring/measuring meth-
ods that account for this variance.
Short-Term Labour Market Projection Surveys 
– NMH PROG
At the initiative and under the co-ordination of the 
National Labour Office (and its legal predecessors), the 
National Employment Service conducted the so called 
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short term labour market forecast since 1991, twice a 
year, in March and September, by interviewing over 
7500 employers. Since 2004 the survey is conducted 
once a year, in the month of September.
The interviews focus on the companies’ projections 
of their material and financial processes, their devel-
opment and human resource plans, and they are also 
asked about their concrete lay-off or recruitment plans, 
as well as their expected need for any active labour mar-
ket programmes.
The surveys are processed from bottom up, from the 
service delivery areas, through counties and regions to 
the whole country, providing useful information at all 
levels for the planning activities of the National Em-
ployment Service.
The survey provides an opportunity and possibility 
for the regions, the counties and Budapest to analyse 
in greater depth (also using information from other 
sources) the major trends in their respective labour mar-
kets, to make preparations for tackling problems that 
are likely to occur in the short term, and to effectively 
meet the ever-changing needs of their clients.
The forecast is only one of the outputs of the survey. 
Further very important “by-products” include regu-
lar and personal liaison with companies, the upgraded 
skills of the placement officers and other administra-
tive personnel, enhanced awareness of the local circum-
stances, and the adequate orientation of labour market 
training programmes in view of the needs identified 
by the surveys.
The prognosis surveys are occasionally supplemented 
by supplementary surveys to obtain some further use-
ful information that can be used by researchers and 
the decision-makers of employment and education/
training policy.
From 2005 the surveys are conducted in cooperation 
with the Institute for Analyses of the Economy and En-
trepreneurship of the Hungarian Chamber of Indus-
try and Commerce, with one additional benefit being 
that with the help of the surveyors of the Institute, the 
sample size has increased to nearly 8000.
Wage Survey Database – NMH BT
The National Labour Office (and its legal predecessors) 
has conducted since 1992, once a year, a representative 
survey with a huge sample size to investigate individual 
wages and earnings, at the request of the Ministry of 
National Resources (and its legal predecessors).
The reference month of data collection is the month 
of May in each year, but for the calculation of the 
monthly average of irregularly paid benefits (beyond 
the base wage/salary), 1/12th of the total amount of 
such benefits received during the previous year is used.
In the competitive sector, the data collection initially 
only covered companies of over 20 persons; it was in-
cumbent on all companies to provide information, but 
the sample includes only employees born on certain 
dates in any month of any year.
Data collection has also covered companies of 10–19 
since 1995, and companies of 5–9 have been covered 
since 2000, where the companies actually involved in 
data collection are selected at random (ca. 20 per cent), 
and the selected ones have to provide information about 
all of their full-time employees.
Data on basic wages and earnings structure can only 
be retrieved from these surveys in Hungary, thus it is 
practically these huge, annually generated databases 
that can serve as the basis of the wage reconciliation 
negotiations conducted by the social partners.
In the budgetary sector, all budgetary institutions 
provide information, regardless of their size, in such a 
way that the decisive majority of the local budgetary 
institutions – the ones that are included in the TAKEH 
central payroll accounting system – provide fully com-
prehensive information, and the remaining budgetary 
institutions provide information only about their em-
ployees who were born on certain days (regarded as 
the sample).
Data has only been collected on the professional 
members of the armed forces since 1999.
Prior to 1992, such data collection took place in eve-
ry third year, thus we are in possession of an enormous 
data base for the years of 1983, 1986 and 1989 too.
Of the employees included in the sample, the follow-
ing data are available:
– the sector the employer operates in, headcount, em-
ployer’s local unit, type of entity, ownership structure
– employee’s wage category, job occupation, gender, 
age, educational background.
Based on the huge databases which include the data 
by individual, the data is analysed every year in the 
following ways:
– Standard data analysis, as agreed upon by the social 
partners, used for wage reconciliation negotiations 
(which is received by every confederation participat-
ing in the negotiations).
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– Model calculations to determine the expected impact 
of the rise of the minimum wage.
Analyses to meet the needs of the Wage Policy De-
partment, Ministry of National Resources, for the anal-
ysis and presentation of wage ratios
Analyses for the four volume statistical yearbook 
(total national economy, competitive sector, budget-
ary sector, and regional volumes).
The entire database is adopted every year by the Cen-
tral Statistical Office, which enables the Office to also 
provide data for certain international organisations, 
(e. g. ILO and OECD). The National Labour Office 
also regularly provides special analyses for the OECD.
The database containing the data by individual al-
lows for a) the analysis of data for groups of people de-
termined by any combination of pre-set criteria, b) the 
comparison of basic wages and earnings, with special 
regard to the composition of the different groups ana-
lysed, as well as c) the analysis of the dispersion of the 
basic wages and earnings.
Since 2002, the survey of individual wages and earn-
ings was substantially developed to fulfill all require-
ments of the EU. So from this time it serves also for the 
purposes of the Structure of Earnings Survey (SES), 
which is obligatory for each member state in every 
fourth year. One important element of the changes 
was the inclusion of part-time employees in the sam-
ple since 2002. SES 2002 was the first, and recently the 
database of SES 2006 was also sent to the Eurostat in 
anonymized form in accordance with EU regulations.
Unemployment (Jobseekers’) Benefit Register  
– NMH REG
The recipients’ fully comprehensive registry is made up, 
on the one hand, of the financial records containing 
the disbursed jobseekers’ supports (jobseekers’ benefit, 
jobseekers assistance, and entrepreneurial benefit) and, 
on the other hand, of the so-called master records con-
taining the particulars of benefit recipients. This reg-
ister allows for the accurate tracking of the recipients’ 
benefit related events, the exact date of their inclusion 
in, and removal from, the system, as well as why they 
have been removed from it (e. g. got a job, eligibility 
period expired, were excluded, joined an active labour 
market programme, etc.)
This huge database allows for reporting for any point 
of time the detailed data of persons who received ben-
efits on a given day, in a breakdown of country, region, 
county and local office service delivery area. In order 
to align these data with the closing day statistics of 
the registered unemployed, these monthly statistics 
are also completed by the 20th of each month. (Stock 
in the closing day.)
In addition, the monthly statistics also contain in-
formation on the number of those who were affected 
during the month, e.g. the number of those who have 
received benefits on any day of the month between the 
previous month’s and the given month’s closing day. 
Of course, data indicating inflows and outflows are 
also reported here.
It is an important and rather useful aspect from a 
research perspective that, in addition to the standard 
closing day statistics, groups defined by any criteria can 
be tracked in the benefit register, e. g. inflow samples 
can be taken of newly registered persons for different 
periods, and through tracking them in the registry sys-
tem the benefit allocation patterns of different cohorts 
can be compared.
The detailed data of unemployment benefit recipients 
have been available from the benefit register since Janu-
ary 1989. The first two years had a different benefit al-
location system, and the current system, which has been 
modified several times since then, was implemented by 
the Employment Act of 1991 (Act IV).
For the period of between 1991 and 1996, the regis-
ter also contains the stock and flow data of the recipi-
ents of school-leavers’ unemployment benefit. Between 
1997–2005 the system has also contained the recipi-
ents of pre-retirement unemployment benefit. In ad-
dition to headcount data, the benefit register can also 
monitor the average duration of the period of benefit 
allocation and the average monthly amount of the ben-
efits allocated.
The key data regarding benefits were published by 
the National Labour Office in the monthly periodi-
cal Labour Market Situation. In addition, time series 
data and the main results of the wage tariff surveys 
can be reached on the website of the Hungarian Na-
tional Employment Service (http://www.munka.hu/
statisztika).
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